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Abstract 
This thesis contributes to the analysis of the dakwah (Islamic preaching and mission) 
of contemporary Islamist movements with a case study of the Indonesian Tarbiyah 
movement. My analysis borrows from aspects of social movement theory and 
conceptions of lived religion to illuminate both the official discourses and everyday 
experiences of the movement in a novel way. I begin by providing an historical 
framework for understanding dakwah and Islamist movements in modernity 
(Chapter 1) and by locating Islam(ism) and dakwah in terms of the changing social, 
political and religious dynamics of colonial and postcolonial Indonesia (Chapter 2). 
To investigate the Tarbiyah movement, I collected qualitative interviews and 
fieldwork data in Jakarta during 2012–13 (Chapter 3). In the key chapters of this 
thesis, I focus on three main arguments: i) that the gradual transition of the Tarbiyah 
movement from a politically repressed network of religious purists in the 1970-80s 
into a fully-fledged dakwah political party (the Prosperous Justice Party/Partai 
Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS) was the outcome of new ‘political opportunities’ which 
emerged during a period of democratisation 1990-97 (Chapter 4); ii) that the 
movement’s weekly Liqo (circle of religious teaching) illuminates both the synergies 
and tensions between official, top-down framing by increasingly formal, outward-
looking and pragmatic PKS leaders and the more informal and more conservative 
networks, the latter remaining a key resource for mobilisation (Chapter 5); and, 
finally, that the lived experiences of female trainees in the Liqo suggest that this is a 
space where Tarbiyah movement/PKS norms, lifestyles and dispositions are more or 
less successfully taught, learned and reproduced principally through the disciplined 
and repeated performances of embodied piety (Chapter 6).  
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Introduction 
In this thesis I examine the dakwah (Islamic preaching and mission) of an 
Indonesian Islamist group named the Tarbiyah movement. In particular, I study the 
synergies and discrepancies between official discourses and lived experiences in the 
movement and the extent to which this reflects relations and tensions between 
leaders and other members. By way of Introduction here, I firstly establish the 
connections between Islamism, Islamisation, and dakwah strategies in the 
contemporary Muslim world. This section introduces Islamism as a general political 
discourse in a modern global context and highlights the ways in which various 
dakwah strategies are related to Islamisation projects. The second part of this 
Introduction outlines Islamism in the Indonesian context, highlighting in particular 
certain gaps in the existing literature with regard to the Tarbiyah movement. The 
third part of this Introduction explains the theoretical driving force of this thesis, 
while finally I present an overview of the structure of this thesis and underline its 
overall argument. In short, I maintain that although perceptions of the Tarbiyah 
movement are often associated with the increasingly formal and very public dakwah 
managed by the Prosperous and Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), 
members in middle and lower levels of the movement which have their roots in 
informal networks mainly emphasise the personal impact of a more private dakwah 
and embodied religious training in strengthening their individual piety and sense of 
belonging.   
 
Islamism, Islamisation and Dakwah Strategies in the Modern Muslim World 
The processes of globalised modernity that have been taking place in Muslim 
countries since the nineteenth century and earlier have changed the relationship 
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between Islam and the state. The reformulation of laws as a consequence of 
modernisation, and the adoption of a largely Westernised legal system, has had a 
profound impact on Islamic courts and the position of the ulama. Although they 
have not been eliminated from postcolonial nation-states like Egypt and Indonesia, 
the courts are now often restricted to dealing with family law, and have been 
reformed in order to be more accommodating to social change (Asad, 2003). 
Modern, Western-influenced, ‘secular’ law has occupied a more dominant position 
in these states, often replacing the role of Islamic law with respect to matters of 
regulation and punishment. The limiting of the role of such shari’ah related 
institutions in the colonial and now the postcolonial public sphere, and the 
restriction of Islamic authority in modern nation-states that typically followed at 
independence, is perhaps the main way in which so-called ‘Islamists’ – who struggle 
through various political means to re-Islamise the public sphere - have encountered 
‘the downfall of the hegemony of the symbolic Muslim system’ (Burgat, 2003:44). 
While many Islamists accommodated themselves to the idea of the nation-state, at 
least in the sense that it became the focus of their projects of Islamisation, secular 
Western ideologies, from atheism to consumer capitalism, have been seen as the key 
factor in undermining the normative Muslim systems of authority in the modern 
world. As Burgat again points out: 
It was secularism that spawned the idea that the inherited normative capital 
of nearly 14 centuries of civilisation was suddenly no longer the right way to 
run the whole society. It was secularism that strongly believed in regulating 
the sphere of personal status (marriages, inheritances etc) and more than this, 
the relationship of society to its external environment or to its non-Muslim 
components (2003:44). 
 
Despite its potency as a vehicle of political resistance to the colonial powers, it was 
in reaction to ‘the secularism of the postcolonial Muslim state’ that the Islamists 
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formulated a response to the rapid loss of the political authority of Islam and its 
legal institutions (Burgat, 2003:44).  
 
As Roy (2004) and Mandaville (2007; 2014) suggest, Islamism is a modern political 
ideology that emerged as a new phenomenon during the Twentieth century. This 
ideology was in many ways inspired and influenced by pre-modern revivalist figures 
like Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328 CE) and Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-
1787 CE) (Rippin, 2005; Commins 2009). As revivalists, such figures attributed the 
political decline of Muslims to the increasing heterodoxy of the everyday practice of 
Islam. Revivalists believe that if Muslims return to ‘pure’ Islam as found in the 
Qur’an and Sunna, they will be able to restore the ‘glory’ of the past. Hence, the 
ideology of Islamism is related to revivalism and related complex and criss-crossing 
orientations in terms of a basic emphasis on seeking to purify and revitalize Islam 
(cf. Wiktorowicz 2006 and Meijer 2009 on Wahhabi inspired Salafism in the global 
age). However, while inevitably a convenient ‘catch-all’ category encompassing 
diverse orientations, Islamism is also a direct political response to the specific 
context of encounter with Western modernity (Mandaville, 2007; 2014).  
 
Islamists are also to some extent influenced and inspired by the reformist ideas of 
Egyptian scholars such as Jamaluddin al-Afghani (1838-1897 CE), Muhammad 
Abduh (1849-1905 CE), and Rashid Rida (1865-1935 CE) who are considered 
amongst the most influential modernist figures.1 However, Islamism’s reformist 
ideas have a complex relationship to such modernist figures (Rahman 1979). The 
modernists’ reformist ideas generally attempted to reinterpret Islam in such a way so 
                                                 
1 These figures have a key position in between modernism and revivalism/Islamism. Al-Afghani, for 
instance, through his idea of pan-Islamism, attempted to unite Islam politically against the power of 
Europe, while Rida became a key figure in early Salafism (see Rahman 1979; Rippin, 2005). 
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as to support modernity, while the Islamists came to focus more on Islamising 
modernity (Rippin, 2005). Richard Mitchell, writing of the first mass Islamist 
movement, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), which was founded in 1920s Egypt, 
explains: “the Islamist movements aimed at a total reform of the political, economic, 
and social life of the country” (1993: xv). Thus a general characteristic of Islamism 
is the belief that Islamic teachings should encompass all aspects of life, from the 
private to the public domain.  
 
Although its origins can be found in the colonial period, as an ideology and a 
movement, Islamism has consolidated and most strongly marked itself out in the 
post-independence era of Muslim nation-states, as Peter Mandaville (2007) has 
argued. Islamism was a response to the formation of secular nation-states that 
emerged in postcolonial Muslim countries, replacing the Islamic dynasty and 
Islamic imperium (khilafah) in the period after Western colonialism (Mandaville, 
2007). Indeed, movements in the Muslim Middle East such as the MB mentioned 
above, have had a strong global influence on Islamist movements worldwide, 
including in Indonesia. 
 
As noted above, conflict between Islam and the West has been a defining response 
to modernity for many Islamist movements and thinkers. In the Twentieth century, 
Islamist movements came to represent ideological opposition to the influence of 
other Western ‘isms’, such as liberalism, Zionism, and secularism. One concept that 
has been particularly important in articulating this Islamist critique of the impact of 
modernity is Ghazwul Fikri (‘the war of ideas’) (Hirschkind, 2009). While it evokes 
the clash of civilisations thesis (Huntington, 1996), this concept can also be 
understood as closely related to the idea of “cultural imperialism”. For Islamist 
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movements, the increasing global hegemony of Western culture (as well as its 
continuing economic and political power) is said to have undermined Islamic culture 
in Muslims’ everyday lives. Islamists have argued that Western cultural hegemony 
has attacked Islam and Muslim lives through the mass-media, popular culture such 
as films and music, and the secular education system (Hirschkind, 2009). 
  
In response to such a situation, Islamist activists typically presented dakwah (Islamic 
preaching and mission) as a necessity for countering the ‘dangerous’ cultural 
imperialism of the West. They believe that this has caused the spread of distorted 
understandings of Islamic values and a loss of Islamic identity amongst Muslims 
worldwide. The dakwah of the Islamist movements is thus crucial for building up 
consciousness of why Islam and Muslims find themselves in the circumstances they 
do in modernity and how they can hope to overturn this situation through a religio-
political revival. This global Islamist discourse, and in particular its emphasis on the 
war of ideas is evident in Sayyid Qutb’s (1906-1966 CE) work (Kepel, 2003; 
Burgat, 2003; Mandaville, 2007). For the Islamists, dakwah is part of their struggle 
to keep Islamic values alive, and retain Islamic identities. For this purpose, then, the 
MB in Egypt developed an Islamisation strategy which included the following 
stages: (i) the Islamisation of individuals, (ii) the Islamisation of families, (iii) the 
Islamisation of society, and (iv) the Islamisation of the political system or the state 
(Mitchell, 1993: 236-245). 
  
This Islamisation scheme aims to create, in time, both individual piety and public 
piety. The step-by-step approach of such a ‘gradual’ Islamisation strategy is 
considered as starting logically from the pious individual who will then build up 
from a pious family to a pious society that will eventually see the emergence of 
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pious public norms including ultimately the very state itself. For the MB and 
Islamists in general, then, it is not enough simply to be a good Muslim just in the 
personal or private sphere; Muslims also need to actively shape the society or state 
they live in by seeking to make it more Islamic. Thus through this schema, Islamist 
movements not only focus on disciplining the self via dakwah focused on individual 
piety, but also (eventually) on creating and controlling public piety via public 
dakwah.2 The former may be considered private Islamisation and the latter public or 
state Islamisation (cf. Mahmood, 2005; Rinaldo, 2013). By ‘individual piety’ here 
scholars typically mean the commitment to perform obligatory rituals such as the 
five-times-daily-prayers, reciting the Qur’an, fasting in the month of Ramadan, 
giving alms, and dressing and behaving in an ‘Islamic’ way. Strengthening 
individual piety, for the Islamist, is not only an obligation for Muslims, but also 
aims to protect them from being influenced by Western modernity. In the debate 
concerning the private versus the public role of religion (see Casanova, 1994), this 
can be referred to as ‘interiorisation’, which focuses on individualised religion often 
with an emphasis on self-discipline (cf. Mahmood 2005). 
 
When they talk about ‘public piety’, scholars like Benjamin F. Soares (2004) mean 
particular behaviour or practice performed in the public sphere that comes to have 
political significance. The concept of public piety also implies that there may be 
(often highly contested) attempts at the regulation and standardisation of practices 
that are regarded by particular constituencies as appropriately ‘pious’. Islamists, in 
particular, are typically viewed as wanting to control and discipline Muslim societies 
in terms of their behaviours and attitudes through the use of (often authoritarian) 
public norms and state regulations. This discussion on individual piety and public 
                                                 
2 For some revolutionary Islamist movements, dakwah itself is not enough. 
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piety will be taken forward in my thesis, examining when, how and why both sorts 
of piety have been developed through the dakwah of the Tarbiyah movement/PKS in 
Indonesia. It also recognises that official ideologies of and individual appetites for 
different sorts of public/private dakwah are changing e.g. in terms of recent debates 
about ‘post-Islamism’ (Kepel 2003; Bayat 2007; Mandaville 2007/2014). 
 
Islamism in Indonesia and Perspectives on the Tarbiyah Movement 
Islamist movements in Indonesia, like Islamism in other countries, emerged and 
grew mainly in big cities as a response to social change and emerging political 
opportunities (cf. Wiktorowicz 2004; Fox 2012). They were initially focused 
typically on improving the private piety of individuals but then attempted to develop 
more public agendas to Islamise society and the state. Since the pre-independence 
period of Indonesian history, which ran from the beginning until the middle of the 
twentieth century, Islam was used as an ideological means for campaigning against 
colonialism and establishing the ‘Muslim’ character of the nation-state (Latif, 2008; 
Effendy, 2006; Laffan, 2003). However, it was not until the 1980s and 1990s that 
Islamism emerged more visibly in Indonesia, through the Tarbiyah movement and 
other competing Islamist movements. This was also a decade of very public re-
Islamisation of Muslim public spheres worldwide, for example in terms of events 
such as the Iranian revolution (1979) and the Afghan jihad against the Russians, as 
well as the global spread of Wahhabi and Salafi ideology through Saudi-sponsored 
organisations and publications (Commins 2009; Meijer 2009; Mandaville, 
2007/2014; Wiktorowicz 2006; Burgat, 2003).  
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The Tarbiyah movement, in its early phase of development and during a period of 
the state repression of Islamists, focused mainly on strengthening individual or 
private piety and was composed only of small study circles (Halaqah; Liqo) of 
students interested in religious mentoring/training. Most circles were held in 
mosques located in ‘secular’ universities such as the Bandung Institute of 
Technology (ITB) and The Bogor Institute of Agriculture (IPB); these were the 
starting points and epicentres of the emergent Tarbiyah movement. However, the 
movement then developed and consolidated when President Soeharto (who ruled 
from 1966-1998) sought to recognise Islamic organisations in the public sphere in an 
effort to shore up his legitimacy during the final period of his government – from 
1989 to 1998.  
 
The changing political climate and a more democratic state in the post-New Order 
era from the end of 1998 encouraged the emergence in the public sphere of various 
revivalist Islamic groups such as the Islamic Defender Front (FPI), the Hizb ut-
Tahrir of Indonesia (HTI), and the Forum of Communication of Ahl us-Sunnah Wal-
Jama'ah (FKAWJ) (Hilmy, 2010; Hasan, 2006; Jamhari and Jahroni, 2004). In 
addition, new Islamic political parties based on revivalist ideologies (including the 
Crescent Moon Party (PBB) and New Masyumi Party) were founded following the 
liberalisation of the Indonesian political system, which guaranteed people's rights to 
establish parties and social organisations (Platzdasch, 2009; Mietzner, 2009).  
 
In this context, the emergence of a democratic state was also seen by the Tarbiyah 
movement as an opportunity for strengthening and expanding its dakwah movement 
beyond the private to the public sphere and the state domain. Therefore, they 
established a formal political party named the Justice Party/Partai Keadilan (PK) in 
17 
 
Jakarta in 1998.3 The decision to establish the party caused the Tarbiyah 
movement’s orientation to combine a focus on strengthening the individual piety of 
its cadres and more actively attracting wider constituencies. Since the 2004 general 
election, in particular, the party has attempted to attract wider audiences by 
campaigning on ‘secular’ social justice issues (Plazdasch, 2009). It has focused 
more on education for poor people, anti-corruption and clean governance, instead of 
the formalisation of shari’ah and the other Islamic identity issues that were central 
to their campaign in the previous election (1999) (Permata, 2008; Muhtadi, 2012). 
The party even declared itself to be a pluralist party by accommodating non-Muslim 
members and promoting them as candidates for parliament (Plazdasch, 2009).4 This 
‘shifting’ political pragmatism disappointed some of the cadres of the Tarbiyah 
movement. However, this disappointment did not significantly affect the 
organisation as most cadres, tended to obey the party. Although the Tarbiyah 
movement and the party still seem organisationally solid, this does not mean that 
their respective leaders’ perceptions of political issues is always in line with each 
other (Permata, 2008; 2013). According to Permata (2008; 2013) the different 
perceptions and characters of the two organisations – the Tarbiyah movement which 
is more religiously purist and informal, and the party which is more pragmatic and 
formal - has led to internal debates and tensions between key figures.  
 
There are a number of books, doctoral and master’s theses, and academic articles 
published on the Tarbiyah movement and the PKS, which have been written by both 
the Tarbiyah movement/PKS and non-Tarbiyah movement/PKS writers. However, 
                                                 
3 The PK ‘’rebranded’ and changed its name to the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in 2004 because 
as the PK it had failed to meet the electoral threshold requiring all parties to get more than 2% of 
national votes. In the 1999 election, the PK only got 1.7% (see further in section 2.5). 
4 We can also see this attempt in the case of the MB in Egypt who accommodated Christians. The 
MB has also formed electoral alliances with nationalists, secularists and liberals (see Leiken and 
Brooke, 2007). 
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none of these has undertaken a holistic in-depth study of the complex official 
discourse of the elites and its relation to the lived experience of members of 
Tarbiyah movement-PKS. Some ‘insider’ researchers – such as Ali Said Damanik 
(2002) and Yon Machmudi (2006) – have studied the development of the Tarbiyah 
movement-PKS in comparison to other Islamic political parties or Islamic 
movements. They debate whether it is an entirely new group or a new branch of 
older Islamic groups from Indonesia, such as the Masyumi Party (e.1945) and the 
Indonesian Islamic Dakwah Assembly/DDII (e.1967), or from the Middle East, such 
as the MB and HTI (see Taji-Farouki, 1996). 
  
Rahmat (2001) argues that the Tarbiyah movement/PKS is merely the continuation 
of modernist movements like the Masyumi party and the DDII.5 Unlike Rahmat, 
Damanik (2002) rejects the idea that the Tarbiyah movement/PKS evolved from 
previous Islamic groups in Indonesia, arguing that it is a new group inspired by the 
MB in Egypt. Mahmudi criticises both positions and argues that the Tarbiyah 
movement-PKS is a combination of the ‘foreign’ influence of the MB and the 
convergence of earlier Islamic organisations from Indonesia, such as the 
Muhammadiyah and the NU.6 These studies contribute to uncovering the 
                                                 
5 Masyumi or (Majlis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia – the ‘Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims’ 
(Masyumi) was the first Islamic political party in Indonesia, established in 1945. The objective was to 
unite Islamic organisations, including the Muhammadiyah and PERSIS (Persatuan Islam-The Unity 
of Islam) and the NU (Nahdhatul Ulama). These Islamic organizations joined the Masyumi to win 
the election from secular-nationalist parties. They came second in the 1955 election, won 20.9 % of 
the popular vote, and got 57 seats in parliament. DDII or Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia-the 
Indonesian Board on Islamic Dakwah is a non-political organization established by Mohammad 
Natsir (1908-1993) in 1967. It was established in the context where President Soeharto started to 
domesticate/incorporate Islam and Islamic organizations in the public sphere as part of his strategy to 
gain people support for his final period of his leadership. The objective was to develop dakwah in 
Indonesia, that is to call Muslims to be better Muslims and in general to spread Islamic beliefs and 
practices throughout Indonesia.  
6 The Muhammadiyah was founded by KH Ahmad Dahlan in Yogyakarta in 1912. It is widely 
associated with the first ‘modernist’ movement because it chose a modern approach to dakwah 
programmes, mainly through education and social services (see Bruinessen, 2013; Nakamura, 2012). 
Unlike the Muhammadiyah, the NU, has very strong roots in traditional Islam. It was founded by KH. 
Hasyim Asy’ari in 1926 and commonly associated with village dwellers and the Islamic boarding 
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relationship between the Tarbiyah movement/PKS and other Islamic movements in 
Indonesia and abroad. However, they pay more attention to the movement’s elites, 
looking at the ideology of the movement, the official discourse promoted by its 
leaders, and the connections between the leaders of this movement and those from 
other Islamic movements.  
 
Other ‘outsider’ scholars, like Bubalo and Fealy (2005) and Imdadun Rahmat (2005) 
have also explored the official discourse of the Tarbiyah movement and its leaders. 
Bubalo and Fealy (2005) found that books by MB leaders such as Hasan al-Banna, 
Sayyid Qutb, Sa’id Hawwa (1935-1989), and Yusuf al-Qaradawi (b.1926) have been 
the greatest influence on the Tarbiyah movement/PKS. Bubalo and Fealy argue that 
these books “formed the cornerstones of the Tarbiyah movement teachings of the 
PKS” (2005:54). Moreover, Rahmat’s thesis (2005:163) argues that the Tarbiyah 
movement of the PKS simply reproduces the ideology of the MB without any 
modifications or adaptations to make it fit the Indonesian context. Like the previous 
studies mentioned, however, such research has paid little attention to ordinary 
members’ experiences and discourses. Although my work still includes a focus on 
official discourses, which also accounts for the vast majority of work on Islamism 
per se, I pay attention to ordinary members’ lived experiences and discourses too. 
 
Other researchers have investigated whether the PKS attempts to contextualise or 
reconcile its ideology with modern Indonesian values. Masdar Hilmy (2010) who 
studied the PKS in comparison to two other Islamist movements, HTI and Majlis 
Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), for instance, classifies the PKS as those who accept 
modern Indonesian values, but attempt to Islamize them. 
                                                                                                                                         
school (pesantren) community (see Barton, 2002).    
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 The PKS is an example of ‘meliorist’ Islamism namely “those who occupy the in-
between position; on the one hand these Islamists stand firm on their Islamic identity 
but on the other hand they try to accommodate democracy as a means of political 
struggle” (2010:7).7 Platzdasch (2009) argues, however, that their reception of 
modern values is in fact more symbolic in nature than substantive. Platzdasch 
(2009), who compared three Islamist parties in modern Indonesia (PKS, the United 
Development Party/PPP and The Star Crescent Party/PBB), suggests that their 
promotion of ‘secular’ agendas such as political and social reform, economic justice, 
anti-corruption, and human rights are played for external political audiences. This 
‘secular’ agenda contrasts with their internal discourses which were overtly Islamist 
and more focused on shari’ah-based agendas.  
 
Dhume (2005), in contrast to Hilmy (2010), categorises the PKS as a ‘radical’ 
organisation and considers it to be similar to the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)8 in Indonesia 
which used violence in the past.9 He argues that while the PKS wants to take part in 
the democratisation process as a peaceful political organisation, it still wants to 
Islamise Indonesian politics. Dhume therefore concludes that the difference between 
                                                 
7 Masdar Hilmy (2010) in studying the PKS, MMI and HTI, divides Islamism into two categories: 1) 
Utopian Islamism i.e. those who reject existing systems and modern values and obsess about 
establishing an ideal state and community based on Islam e.g. the MMI and the HTI; and 2) Meliorist 
Islamism i.e. those who accept modern systems and values but attempt to control over them through 
Islamizing them, for example, the PKS.  
8Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) is a Salafi jihadist group, inspired by the same ideology as al-Qa’ida (AQ), 
which regards the Indonesian government, along with other nations in the region, to be illegitimate. 
The JI seeks to revive a pure form of Islam and establish a Pan-Islamic state in Southeast Asia, 
governed by the tenets of shari’ah (Islamic law). The JI was founded in Malaysia on 1 January 1993 
by Indonesian Islamic clerics Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. The movement represents 
an evolutionary development of the Indonesian Islamic movement, Darul Islam (DI), which fought a 
violent insurgency to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia in the 1950s and 1960s. However, in the 
last decade their focus on the Islamic state shifted to a concern for the implementation of shari’ah 
from below (Hasan, 2013).   
9 When these researchers say that the PKS is ‘radical’ they mean that the PKS wants to Islamise the 
state. They suggest that it is not satisfied with the secular system implemented by the government in 
political, economic, social, judicial and other terms. However, they have not tried to ‘bring down’ the 
existing government. Rather, through participation in elections they have become involved with the 
process of government, aiming to change society from inside. So, they are radical in terms of their 
opinions and political views, but not radical in terms of their actions.      
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these two groups is only one relating to their methods: Jemaah Islamiyah uses 
revolutionary violent methods to seek their Islamic goals, while the PKS employs 
conventional and non-violent ones.  
 
To a certain extent, Dhume (2005) is correct in claiming that the PKS wants to 
Islamise the Indonesian state and society. Nevertheless, it is a simplification and 
exaggeration to equate the PKS with Jemaah Islamiyah. Furthermore, Dhume 
ignores the complexity of the PKS, which has been influenced by both its leaders 
and its ordinary members, as well as by the social and political changes that have 
occurred in Indonesia. Machmudi’s research (2006) responds to Dhume’s opinion. 
He argues that even though the PKS tries to Islamise Indonesia, it is flexible and 
rational in its Islamic interpretations (Machmudi, 2006). According to Machmudi, 
the Islamist agenda of the PKS is not a cause for concern because the party is 
flexible in implementing its ideas. Syahrul Hidayat strengthens Machmudi’s 
argument. Hidayat categorized the PKS “as a party of moderation” (2012:8).  He 
saw that the party has revised their ‘radical goals along with substantive 
commitment to democratic principles’ (cf. Wickham, 2004:206). Machmudi’s 
responses and argument cannot be separated from his ‘insider’ position as a 
founding member of the PKS and a senior Liqo mentor of the Tarbiyah movement. 
Machmudi’s arguments must be contrasted with William Liddle and Saiful Mujani 
(2004)’s study on the attitudes of Indonesian Islamists (the Tarbiyah 
movement/PKS) in relation to democratic norms. They found that Islamists in 
Indonesia tend to have negative views about democracy and generally disagree with 
notions of popular sovereignty, religious freedom, and the recognition of minority 
rights. Nevertheless, Liddle and Mujani do not investigate the complexity of the 
relationship between its leaders and its ordinary members.   
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Many researchers, including Syahrul Hidayat (2012), Ahmad Norma Permata (2008) 
and Ahmad Ali Nurdin (2009), have found the PKS an interesting party to study due 
to its pragmatic behaviour since the 2004 General Election. In this period, the PKS 
has behaved differently in terms of its political agendas and ideologies. Permata 
(2008) investigated how the elite members of the party maintained the ideology of 
the party within a more established democratic state, arguing that the more stable 
and democratic a political system is, the more the leaders of the PKS are encouraged 
to seek compromises between their Islamist ideology and the democratic system. 
Regarding this change in political behaviour, Nurdin (2009) argues that this shows 
the PKS’ ability to reconcile Islam with democracy. Thus, according to Nurdin, the 
PKS is not a threat to the future of democracy in Indonesia. However, instead of 
arguing that the PKS has been ideologically flexible and accommodating to political 
changes since its inception, as Machmudi (2006) argued, both Permata and Nurdin 
contend that the shift has occurred since the 2004 General Election, and was 
influenced by changing social and political opportunities.10 As the result of this shift, 
Hidayat (2012) points out that the PKS is facing member criticism for their 
pragmatism. He recognises that there are internal tensions caused by pragmatic 
policies taken by the party leaders, but he differs from Permata (2008) in suggesting 
that internal tensions have not led to internal divisions or splits. Permata believes 
that there is real internal division. 
 
This body of literature shows the diversity of the recent research on the Tarbiyah 
movement/PKS which has mainly been inspired by the rising political profile of the 
                                                 
10 There have been discussions in Indonesia that suggest this simply represents a PKS strategy to get 
power at which point they will reveal their true colours (see Rahmat, 2005; Shihab and Nugroho, 
2008). This is a common critique of Islamism worldwide. 
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PK (PKS) in the last fifteen years. These studies have shown that scholars’ interests 
are primarily based on official, formal and party leaders’ discourses. As a result, 
there has been relative neglect of internal variations within the movement, especially 
in terms of ordinary members’ experiences. In particular, no research has as yet been 
conducted specifically on the concept and ideology of the dakwah of the Tarbiyah 
movement and its weekly Liqo sessions as the core dakwah activity of the 
movement.  
 
Official Discourses and Lived Experiences: The Structure and Argument of this 
Thesis 
This thesis addresses the imbalance in the existing studies outlined above. In 
particular, it aims to examine the dakwah of the Tarbiyah movement from the 
perspective of both official discourses and the lived experiences of its leaders and 
members. Every organisation has an official vision of how it will operate and an 
official and often utopian ideology.11 This is conceptualised, voiced, and spread by 
its leaders, who hope and expect that the movement will run more or less effectively 
according to these official designs. Those members that hold leadership positions 
within the wider movement and senior mentors of the Liqo have typically been 
members of the Tarbiyah movement for more than ten years. They have also 
generally been elite members of the formal political party, the PKS, since 1998. 
However, as in any institution, the leaders of the Tarbiyah movement/the PKS must 
also keep developing, re-positioning and transforming their dakwah strategy as a 
result of changing social and political contexts and related opportunities (Fox, 
                                                 
11 By ‘official discourse’ in the context of contemporary Islamic movements I mean in particular the 
movement’s stated conception of its dakwah ideology and vision, its formal membership structure 
and recruitment techniques, its leadership and religious authority, and other official prescriptions, as 
they are formulated, developed and transformed by leaders at the top levels of the movement (see 
Chapters 4 and 5).  
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2012).12 Leaders may or may not seek to take account of the everyday lived 
experiences of ordinary members at the grass roots level, who typically consist of 
members who have been trainees and mentors of the Liqo for between 
approximately five years and ten years and also newer recruits with less than one to 
two years of experience. Through addressing both top-down and bottom-up 
perspectives on the Tarbiyah movement I aim to advance a new account that is more 
holistic and complementary. 
 
Central to my analysis of official discourses and everyday lived experiences here are 
two key conceptual frameworks: i) social movement theory (SMT); and ii) the 
concept of lived religion. Although my research is situated principally in the fields 
of Islamic studies and ethnography, I have borrowed aspects of these theories from 
Political Science and Sociology of Religion/Religious studies respectively. SMT is 
an interdisciplinary approach within the social sciences more generally and seeks to 
explain collective action in general and social movements in particular. It is 
concerned with how social movements identify social problems, formulate their 
response in terms of goals for social change, constructs a common identity amongst 
its members, and mobilizes their support, also taking account of how changing 
political contexts and dynamics influence movements. However, SMT has mostly 
been studied in relation to Western societies (Wiktorowicz, 2004: 4). This has 
encouraged scholars such as David Snow and Susan Marshall (1984), and more 
recently, Quintan Wiktorowicz (2001; 2004), to examine SMT in the context of 
Muslim societies. While in Western contexts social movements are often formal 
                                                 
12 Fox (2012) explores how the resources and opportunities available to key political actors in society 
influence their ability to organize and mobilize. He also explains that religion is used by these leaders 
(e.g. states, religious institutions, movements, and so on) to legitimize their political agendas, 
dependent on different political opportunities and resources available to them. 
25 
 
organizations, based on his study of the Salafi movement in Jordan, Wiktorowicz 
(2001) found that Islamist movements facing state repression are more likely to 
utilize less formal and informal networks or communities for collective action. Thus, 
they may also use less publicly ‘visible’ means to mobilize supporters and build 
movements.13 Examples of other studies that have drawn on SMT to examine 
Islamism in the last decade or so are Carrie Wickham (2002) and Abdullah al-Arian 
(2014) on Egypt and outside Egypt Jenny White (2002) and Jenny Clark (2004). 
However, in Indonesia, while SMT has been used to analyse the PKS it has not been 
used to analyse the Tarbiyah movement/Liqo.14 
 
My research draws upon SMT to better illuminate how the Tarbiyah movement 
maintains different scales of formality and informality. It can still be regarded as a 
less formal movement in some ways because it is constituted by dynamic networks 
that began their existence beyond the parameters of formal political organizations. It 
did not originally have the structure and boards of formal organizations now 
associated with the PKS. The movement consisted mainly, and to some extent still, 
consists of small groups or ‘cells’ called Liqo.15 These each comprise just a small 
number of people not unlike the base structure of the ‘prototypical’ Islamist 
                                                 
13 According to Wictorowicz (2004; 2001), formal SMOs are often utilized in the West because 
formal, centralized and bureaucratic organizations are considered the most effective mechanisms. In 
contrast, decentralized, less formal, and less bureaucratic organizations are likely to succeed in the 
Muslim world where authoritarian secular states have typically sought to repress/co-opt efforts at 
Islamisation ‘from below’ (Mandaville 2014). 
14 An article written by Hamayotsu (2011) used two key strands of SMT (resource mobilization and 
opportunity structure theories) to study the recruitment and mobilization patterns of the PKS. He, 
however, only focuses his study on the recruitment aspect of the PKS and did not relate them to the 
Tarbiyah movement in general or the Liqo in particular. The article “argues that the PKS’s relative 
success in recruiting commited Muslim youth is explained by two interrelated factors: (1) merit-based 
cadre recruitment and promotion which offers young and ambitious Muslim youth fair and 
institutionalized political career opportunities and thus incentives to commit themselves to the party’s 
collective interests; and (2) the timing of organizational expansion that coincided with a rapid 
increase of state office -both executive and legislative- at the sub-national levels as a result of 
localized democratic elections” (Hamayotsu, 2011: 227). 
15 The Liqo is a small unit of religious activity held informally on a weekly basis by the Tarbiyah 
movement. The Liqo is a loose gathering activity held in a trainee’s house. 
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movement, the MB in Egypt (Mandaville 2007; 2014). The political situation during 
the time of the Tarbiyah movement’s emergence in the early 1980s saw state 
repression of Islamic movements and this constraint on political opportunity 
structures (Wiktorowicz 2001; 2004) was one of the main factors causing the Liqo to 
be informally organised (see Damanik, 2002; Machmudi, 2005; Permata, 2008). 
Only in the post-New Order period (begun in 1998) did the movement start to 
generate its formal organizational structure in the shape of a political party named 
the PK(S). At this point the movement had to begin to think about how to maintain 
its formal, less formal and informal aspects (cf. Wiktorowicz 2001; 2004). The 
move towards formality aimed to take advantage of the ‘political opportunity’ 
provided by a more democratic government, while the less formal and the informal 
aspects of their organisation supports the party in recruiting new members and 
mobilizing its sympathisers. However, although SMT can help to explain such 
general processes, it does not really help in an analysis of how particular members 
perceive, experience and engage with the movement’s dakwah ideology and vision. 
This is influenced and shaped by an individual’s social location and subjectivities 
which may or may not vary significantly from what has been formally 
conceptualised and negotiated by leaders. So, SMT has its limits. It is to a 
conceptual framework that will allow me to better discuss members’ perceptions and 
experiences that I now turn. 
     
The everyday aspects of the Liqo of the Tarbiyah movement can be explained with 
reference to the concept of lived religion. This relates especially to the experience of 
lower level cadres and trainees. While the experience of these constituencies is 
framed by the more formal religious and political agendas designed by the leaders of 
the political party, the PKS, a key claim made by this thesis is that the lived 
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experiences of ordinary members is neglected in previous studies of the 
PKS/Tarbiyah movement. Reviewing the literature on contemporary Islamic 
movements, I saw the general importance of providing a more balanced and nuanced 
perspective on official discourses about dakwah by researching the more informal 
lived experiences of members. The intention of my thesis is not to reject the findings 
and conclusions of studies concerned with formal, official, and institutionalised 
forms of dakwah, but to look at them together with a study of informal everyday 
lived dakwah and to describe and analyse some of the inherent tensions and linkages 
therein. The aim is thus to provide a more complete picture of this Islamist dakwah 
movement in Indonesia.  
 
Among the pioneers of the concept of ‘everyday’ and ‘lived religion’ in the 
sociology of religion are Nancy T. Ammerman and Meredith McGuire. Neither has 
been concerned with the study of Muslim societies. Nevertheless, not unlike key 
contributions to the Anthropology of Islam (e.g. Mahmood 2005, see below), 
Ammerman (2014) points out that studying the perceptions of members of 
organisations aims to listen to their daily experiences. For Ammerman, researching 
the everyday means privileging “the experience of non-experts” (2007:5). Thus the 
perspective of lived religion helps researchers to build an understanding of the 
multi-layered nature of religious movements and the everyday realities of its 
members (Ammerman, 2014). In line with Ammerman’s argument, Berglund 
(2014), who has studied Muslims in Europe, also highlights that discussing only 
official discourses presents Islamic movements as stereotypical, monolithic 
institutions, with all who belong to such movements having the same perspectives 
and attitudes. 
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Sociologist of religion, McGuire, invokes the concept of ‘lived religion’ to research 
“religion as expressed and experienced in the lives of individuals” (2008:3). She 
aims to distinguish “the actual experience of religious persons from the prescribed 
religion of institutionally defined beliefs and practices”, focusing on religion “as 
practiced, experienced and expressed by ordinary people” (McGuire, 2008:12).16 
Lived religion as explained by Ammerman and McGuire is, in particular, the 
embodied and enacted forms of religion and spirituality that occur in everyday life. 
Dwelling on women’s experiences, McGuire argues that religiosity and gender self-
identity are expressed and transformed in an ongoing process of mind-body-spirit 
practice. She shows that “concrete body practices are involved in how gendered 
selves are socially developed, maintained, and changed throughout life” (McGuire, 
2008: 182). Thus, gender roles and identities in society are reproduced (and 
contested) in large part through the enactment of norms through bodily practices. 
Modern religious groups often ask their members to commit to developing “new” 
selves in related ways (no matter how this process is understood – for instance as 
‘spirituality’, ‘healing’, ‘conversion’): “all religious groups (at least for some 
members) promote a measure of transformation of self toward a spiritual ideal” 
(2008:172). McGuire gives examples of movements requiring members to wear 
uniform clothing, assume certain gestures and so on to diminish the old or affirm the 
new self. So, for many who join a religious movement and desire or experience such 
personal transformation, new religious and spiritual practices may also be key 
pathways to new gender roles and literally becoming a new kind of person. 
 
                                                 
16 Woodhead (2013) similarly mentions the religious practices of laymen and women. 
29 
 
However, McGuire’s work tends to focus on Western women and more 
individualistic forms of lived religion and spirituality at some distance from official 
religion. Paying more attention to the relationship between the latter and the former 
in the context of Muslim societies, Saba Mahmood (2005) studies the lived religion 
of women in the revivalist mosque movement in modern Egypt, taking inspiration 
from debates about performativity in feminist studies and applying them to the 
Anthropology of Islam (cf. Butler 1997; Asad 1986).17 Going beyond a focus on 
identity politics in the literature on Islamism, the women she studied seek to 
transform themselves by donning more modest dress and more concealing veils, by 
praying frequently, by attending all-female religious sessions in mosques where they 
are exhorted to adhere to Qur’anic teachings and to act in line with the will of Allah. 
According to these women, the performance of ritualized behavior is one among a 
continuum of practices that serve as the necessary means to the realization of a pious 
self. Thus, disciplining and training their bodies through everyday practices is 
considered as the most effective way to transform their identity. Compared to 
McGuire’s study on women in mixed and ‘unofficial’ religious contexts within the 
context of liberal America, Mahmood’s ethnographic account of the lives of pious 
Salafi-oriented women in contemporary Egypt is closer to my study of the Tarbiyah 
women. It also suggests that lived religion can play a key role in reproducing official 
religion.   
 
                                                 
17 Mahmood discusses how Muslim women’s lived experience of dakwah circles evidences their 
agency even while it reproduces the official discourses associated with Islamic tradition. Engaging 
with Judith Butler’s discussion of the way that all social formations are reproduced performatively, 
that is, via a “reiterated enactment of norms” (1997:14), she shows how the “structure of society 
comes to be lived in human experience” (Butler 1990: 73; Mahmood 2005: 138). Seemingly ‘stable’ 
social formations like Islamic traditions are “vulnerable because each re-enactment [or performance] 
can fail” (2005:19). Thus, for the women Mahmood studied in Egypt’s mosques “ritual performances 
are understood to be disciplinary practices through which pious dispositions are formed” (2005:128). 
Their bodies become “the necessary tool through which the embodied subject is formed” (2005:29).   
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Thus, the present study explores and reveals the complexity of dakwah perspectives 
and practices within the Tarbiyah movement, both as they are formally and 
officially framed and organised by its leaders and as they are understood, 
experienced and performed more informally by its members. It examines three 
important research questions which relate directly to the three fieldwork based 
chapters which make up the second half of my thesis: 1) how is dakwah formally 
conceptualised and how has it been developed and transformed by the leaders of the 
Tarbiyah movement within the changing social and political dynamics of Indonesian 
society and how do members respond to this in more and less formal settings?; 2) 
how does the Liqo, as the main vehicle for the dakwah activities in the Tarbiyah 
movement, but as a less formal network and or informal community, fit into the 
more formal overall structure and ideology of the Tarbiyah movement, and how do 
its members at the lower levels of the organisational hierarchy perceive the 
relationship between the Liqo, the Tarbiyah  movement, and the PKS party?; and 3) 
how do female Liqo members experience, and to what extent do they subsequently 
practice, the dakwah and discipline received  through weekly sessions? In this study 
I thus attempt to provide a holistic picture of the Tarbiyah movement’s approach to 
dakwah, not only showing how and for what purpose the movement’s leaders design 
and shape this formal dakwah ideology, but also examining how its ordinary 
members deal with and experience joining this movement. In this thesis, I will 
therefore argue that the cadres of the Tarbiyah movement in the middle and lower 
levels focus mainly on the impact of their dakwah activities in strengthening 
individual piety, even though the perceptions of the movement are often dominated 
by public dakwah agendas managed by the party. 
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Overview of the Thesis: Chapter Summaries 
This thesis is divided into six main chapters. The first chapter explains the 
significance of dakwah (Islamic preaching and mission) within the Islamic world, 
with a particular focus on the modern period. I briefly explain how dakwah was 
performed by the Prophet Muhammad (7th Century) and by his successors in the 
Classical period (7th–13th Century) and the Medieval period (14th–18th Century). The 
periods of the prophet Muhammad and the four Caliphs are especially important 
because they are the reference point for the development and contemporary 
formulation of Islamist dakwah ideology, which sees Islam as having existed in its 
purest and truest form during these eras. This exploration of dakwah will thus enable 
me to explore how its meaning has altered in the modern period, particularly among 
Islamists. Islamist groups are regarded as the most prominent practitioners of 
dakwah, believing it to be necessary to be active (and sometimes aggressive) in 
Islamising both the private and public domains. The explication of the significance 
and meaning of dakwah in the modern period, particularly within contemporary 
Islamist movements, will help to ground my investigation of the dakwah of the 
Tarbiyah movement. In this chapter I argue that although both dakwah Islamising 
the self and dakwah Islamising society were performed in the era of the Prophet as 
well as in the classical and medieval periods, these concepts – and especially public 
dakwah – have acquired different meanings and orientations for contemporary 
Islamist movements.  
 
The second chapter examines how context has influenced the dynamics of Islamism 
in Indonesia, where the Tarbiyah community emerged and developed during the 
1980s. As in other Muslim countries, the emergence of Islamist movements in 
Indonesia was influenced by a response to the forms of modernity established by 
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leaders who envisioned a secular-nationalist state and society. Continuing processes 
begun in the colonial period, their reforms led to the removal of Islam from the state. 
In this chapter I argue that, in Indonesia, Islamism arose among revivalist Muslims 
in the early stages of modern nation-state formation, but then Islamism and 
particularly the public project of Islamisation gained strength given the new political 
opportunities that emerged following democratisation after the fall of the New Order 
regime in 1998. 
 
The third chapter explains the methodologies used to collect qualitative interview 
and fieldwork data for my project between September 2012 and January 2013 in 
Jakarta. It also reflects upon the challenges that I faced and the lessons that I 
learned.  The chapter is organised around five main discussion areas: 1) research 
process and methods, 2) data collection techniques, 3) ethical issues, 4) researcher 
subjectivity and positionality, and 5) data analysis and interpretation. Jakarta is the 
capital city of Indonesia and was chosen as my fieldwork site as the birth-place of 
both the Tarbiyah movement and the PKS. The members of the Tarbiyah 
movement, the majority of whom are neo-urban, well-educated, young 
professionals, can easily be met in Jakarta. I interviewed 45 respondents from the 
top, middle and lower levels of the Tarbiyah movement and conducted observations 
of their dakwah activities through their Liqo (small religious mentoring) sessions 
and dawrah (religious lectures).18   
 
In chapter four I explore the history, ideology and development of the Tarbiyah 
                                                 
18 The explanation of what and who is meant by ‘top, middle and lower’ levels of the movement are 
discussed in Chapter 3 on Research Methodology (see Section 3.3.2.). I categorised them as such to 
help me cluster them easily; ‘top’ refers to the current leaders who hold the highest leadership 
positions, while ‘middle’ refers to the mentors or trainers of the Liqo, and ‘lower’ refers to trainees at 
the grassroots who are engaged with the weekly dakwah sessions (the Liqo).    
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movement, the reasons for its eventual establishment of a political party, and the 
impact of this on their dakwah concept. The chapter investigates the official 
discourse of Tarbiyah elites, given that Indonesia’s shift to a more democratic 
political system encouraged Tarbiyah elites to shift from an informal to a more 
formal movement structure and organisation. These elites expected that the Tarbiyah 
movement could achieve its dakwah more effectively through a party. As a result, its 
dakwah concept expanded to a focus on public piety as well as individual piety. The 
private aspect of dakwah has been important since the movement’s birth in the early 
1980s to the present day. However, during the 1990s, and a post-New Order period 
(1998-now) in particular, they had the opportunity to develop their private dakwah 
in accordance with the social and political aspects of their ideology. Therefore, the 
three stages of the dakwah process articulated by the MB – personal, social and 
political – now co-exist in the work of the Tarbiyah movement/PKS. Nevertheless, I 
argue that the private and public concepts of dakwah are emphasised differently by 
the more and less senior members involved in the movement. I saw that although the 
movement claims that establishing individual piety remains the main concept of 
dakwah for the Liqo-Tarbiyah movement, the coexistence of individual piety, public 
piety, and political interests produced tensions when the movement started to preach 
more overtly. This chapter extends the existing literature reviewed above in regard 
to the internal tensions within the movement. In my research, the tensions are caused 
by the coexistence of different dakwah orientations; private piety and public piety 
along with political interests.19 This chapter seeks to answer research question 1) i.e. 
how is dakwah conceptualised and how has it been developed and transformed by 
the leaders of the Tarbiyah movement within the changing social and political 
                                                 
19 In previous research (Permata, 2008; 2013) it mainly referred to tensions among leaders caused by 
their political attitudes. 
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dynamics of Indonesian society and how do members respond to this? 
 
Chapter five explains and analyses the significance of the Liqo as a weekly religious 
training session attended by all the Tarbiyah cadres, something that has never been 
studied in-depth before. The chapter investigates the structure, position, function, 
and the lessons of the Manhaj Tarbiyah as the official curricula of the weekly Liqo 
for both the Tarbiyah movement and the party (PKS). The Liqo consists of many 
groups – from beginners and intermediate right the way up to the highest levels of 
the movement. I found that the Liqo is used as a means for recruiting new members 
to the Tarbiyah movement, to strengthen its members' ideology, and to connect the 
Tarbiyah movement with the PKS' goals. I argue that the structure, recruitment, 
management, and hierarchy of religious authority in the Liqo became more political 
with the emergence of the PKS. This chapter seeks to answer research question 2) 
i.e. how does the Liqo, as the main vehicle for the dakwah activities in the Tarbiyah 
movement, fit into the overall structure and ideology of the Tarbiyah movement, and 
how do its members at the lower levels of the organisational hierarchy perceive the 
relationship between the Liqo, the Tarbiyah movement, and the PKS party?  
 
Finally, in chapter 6 I examine the extent to which female Liqo members experience, 
receive, and practice the dakwah designed and campaigned for by Tarbiyah leaders. 
I focus on cadres’ stories about their lived religious experiences through joining the 
Liqo, with special reference to the female Liqo group that I observed during my 
fieldwork. My observations focused on these women’s thoughts and experiences, 
particularly on why they joined the Liqo, how they moved from being outside the 
Liqo to being a part of it, how their journey into the Liqo continues, and the ideas 
they receive in the lessons that are developed and designed by their Tarbiyah 
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leaders. I found that although the experiences of these women revealed a 
heterogeneity and complexity in the range of meanings that being a Liqo member 
has for them, lived religion and piety was actually a key means of reproducing the 
official Islam(ism) promoted by the movement and its leaders. This chapter thus 
seeks to answer research question 3) i.e. how do female Liqo members experience, 
and to what extent do they subsequently practice, the dakwah received through 
weekly sessions?   
 
My conclusion summarises the three main arguments of this thesis: i) that the 
gradual transition of the Tarbiyah movement from a politically repressed network of 
religious purists in the 1970-80s into a fully-fledged dakwah political party (the 
Prosperous Justice Party / Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS) was the outcome of new 
‘political opportunities’ which emerged during a period of democratisation 1990-97; 
ii) that the movement’s weekly Liqo (circle of religious teaching) illuminates both 
the synergies and tensions between official, top-down framing by increasingly 
formal, outward-looking and pragmatic PKS leaders and the more informal and 
more conservative networks, the latter remaining a key resource for mobilisation; 
and, finally, that the lived experiences of female trainees in the Liqo suggest that this 
is a space where Islamist norms, lifestyles and dispositions are more or less 
successfully taught, learned and reproduced principally through the disciplined and 
repeated performances of embodied piety. 
 
So, although leaders seek to emphasise the official/formal dakwah ideology of the 
Tarbiyah movement through Liqo structures, it is members’ own subjective and 
informal, repeated and embodied practice of dakwah that creates the dispositions 
that are at the heart of the movement’s reproduction and success (cf. Mahmood 
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2005). While this study therefore highlights the gap between the official/formal 
discourses and lived/informal experiences of leaders and members of the Tarbiyah 
movement regarding dakwah, it also points to their intimate and necessary 
interconnection. In my conclusion I also suggest possibilities for further work in this 
field. Examples might include comparing the lived experiences of female and male 
Liqo trainees or examining the extent to which the gaps and linkages between 
official and lived experiences can also be found in other aspects of the Tarbiyah 
movement.   
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Chapter 1 
Dakwah, Modernity, and Contemporary Islamist Movements 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter explains the significance of dakwah within the Islamic world, with 
particular focus on the modern period. I briefly explain how dakwah was performed 
by the Prophet Muhammad (7th Century) and by his successors in the classical (7th–
13th Century) and medieval periods (14th–18th Century). These periods–as I 
mentioned earlier in Introduction- are especially important because they are 
regarded as the basis for the contemporary formulation of dakwah ideology, 
including for the Islamists. The eras of the Prophet and the Caliphs have provided 
sources of inspiration for Islamists because they see pure and true Islam as having 
existed during these eras. This exploration of the performance of dakwah will thus 
enable me to explore how its meaning has altered in the modern period, particularly 
among Islamists, including the Tarbiyah movement – an Islamist dakwah group that 
emerged at the beginning of the 1980s in Indonesia. 
  
Islamist groups are regarded as the most prominent adherents of dakwah in both 
Muslim-majority and Muslim-minority countries. Modern Islamists, having a 
stronger commitment to dakwah than was the case historically, believe it necessary 
to be especially active (and even sometimes aggressive) in preaching and Islamising 
both the private and public domains. In this chapter I argue that although both 
private dakwah (which concerns the Islamisation of the self to create pious 
individuals) and public dakwah (which concerns the Islamisation of society to create 
a pious society) were performed in the era of the Prophet, as well as in the classical 
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and medieval periods, these concepts, especially public dakwah, have different 
meanings and orientations for contemporary Islamist movements. This focus on 
public dakwah has resulted in large part from the disappointment that Islamists have 
confronted regarding the relative absence of shari’ah (together with the lack of 
religious values) within the public sphere in the modern period.  
 
In this chapter I begin by examining dakwah within Islamic history, before 
exploring the impact that modernity has had on the Muslim world and outlining 
three basic ‘types’ of Muslim response to the impact of globalised modernity. In the 
final two sections I will focus on the contemporary Islamist movement, with special 
reference to the MB in Egypt – a movement that (as we saw in the Introduction) has 
significantly influenced and shaped the Islamist Tarbiyah movement/the PKS in 
Indonesia.  
 
1.2 Dakwah in the history of Islam 
1.2.1 The early period of Islam 
Dakwah is a noun that comes from the Arabic verb da’a, meaning ‘to invite’ or ‘to 
call’. In a religious sense, it is the invitation addressed to humans by God and the 
Prophets to believe in the true religion of Islam: “God summons to the Abode of 
Peace” (Q 10:25).20 This Quranic verse invites humankind to live in accordance with 
the will of God or the sacred law. In Indonesia, a Muslim who conducts dakwah 
(dakwah in the Indonesian language) is commonly called a da’i (plural: du’at) when 
                                                 
20 All the monotheistic prophets’ religions are considered part of Islam and each prophet conducted 
dakwah in various ways. The Prophet Muhammad’s mission was to repeat and act as the final seal of 
the previous dakwah of the prophets that went before him 
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he is a male preacher, or a da’iya (plural: da’iyat) when female. A da’i or da’iya is 
one who calls, who invites, or is a propagandist.  
 
Islam is a faith in the monotheistic (tawhid) tradition, and the messages of Islam are 
‘universalist’ – open to all people, regardless of ethnicity, nationality, and race 
(Mandaville, 2007:277). Islam’s openness to people beyond Western Arabia is 
emphasised in texts such as the Quran (49:13) and the Hadith of the Prophet. 
Dakwah has been conducted under this monotheistic and universalist outlook since 
the beginning of Muhammad’s prophecy (610 CE),21 which he used to invite his 
family and close friends to join Islam soon after receiving a revelation from God 
(Lapidus, 2002:21). However, the way in which the Prophet invited people to join 
Islam shifted during his lifetime. In the first three years following his initial 
revelations, he conducted dakwah covertly, and the scope of his audience was 
limited to his close family and friends (Lapidus, 2002:21). However, he began to 
publicly declare his prophetic message in the fourth year after his revelation (Rippin, 
2005), visiting different tribes to introduce the messages of dakwah and to call on 
the people to join Islam more publicly, as seen in the dakwah he delivered during his 
hajj (pilgrimage) period, and to the people of Ta’if (Janson, 2003). The Prophet thus 
changed his approach to dakwah from its covert beginnings to its overt nature in His 
later prophecy. According to Lapidus (2002:22), this change in the dakwah approach 
arose because God instructed the Prophet to preach overtly and publicly, as revealed 
in the Quran.  
 
                                                 
21 According to Muslim tradition Muhammad was born in Mecca in 571 CE and was appointed as a 
Prophet in 610. For the history and life of the prophet Muhammad, amongst many others, see Haykal 
(1976) for instance. 
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The central focus of the dakwah message of the Prophet was tawhid (monotheism) 
(Lapidus, 2002; Poston, 1992), and social reforms such as the freeing of slaves and 
the protection of orphans. Some scholars see these as two separate aspects: the 
Meccan society's concept of God and the reformation of its society (cf. Hodgson 
1974). However, I prefer to see social reform as the main message and monotheism 
as the theological foundation of its reformation agenda (cf. Reza Aslan 2006). The 
Prophet’s message of social reform attracted the lower-class members of Meccan 
society and, after conducting dakwah for around thirteen years in Mecca, most of his 
followers came from marginal tribes and oppressed social classes, including slaves 
(Aslan, 2006), with the Prophet only gradually calling for Meccan society to join 
this new religious group.  
 
However, the dakwah of the Prophet angered Meccan elites, who felt disturbed by 
his movement. For them, Islam represented a threat to their old religions and beliefs 
and, perhaps most crucially, to their economic and political dominance (see Poston, 
1992). Their pre-Islamic religions had a significant link to both economics and 
politics, and the dakwah of the Prophet was a direct challenge to the social and 
economic order of the society (Janson, 2003). Engineer (1990) has also argued that 
the Prophet’s dakwah changed the economic monopoly and political leadership of 
the elites of the Quraish.22  
 
Even though the Prophet faced resistance from Meccan elites, many of whom came 
from his clan23 – the Banu Hashim – he insisted in continuing to deliver Islamic 
                                                 
22 Mecca, at that time, was a trade and business centre, and the Quraishi economy was dependent on 
‘rites’ which people performed in order to get a blessing, especially Arab traders visiting the ka'ba (a 
holy place where many idols for worship were placed). Disturbing the dominance of these ‘rites’ 
would affect the two other sides (economy and politics) (Haykal, 1976). 
23 A clan is a smaller group of a tribe.  
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messages to the wider society (Janson, 2003). The resistance of those elites 
increased after the death of the Prophet's uncle, Abu Talib, who was the leader of the 
Banu Hashim clan and the key figure protecting the Prophet’s dakwah movement 
from the Quraish elites. Abu Talib’s position in the clan was taken by Abu Lahab 
who, unlike his predecessor, was hostile to the Prophet’s movement, and thus the 
Prophet and his disciples became much more vulnerable after his uncle’s death. 
Facing strong resistance in Mecca led the Prophet and his followers to look for other 
cities that would accept them and tolerate their beliefs. Medina was finally chosen, 
and they moved to the city in the thirteenth year of his prophecy (622 CE). He 
continued his dakwah to Medinan people for ten years (622-632) – the rest of his 
life.24  
 
There was less resistance from non-Muslim groups and individuals to the Prophet’s 
dakwah in Medina than there was in Mecca, and this enabled the Prophet to start to 
institutionalise the dakwah movement publicly through the establishment of 
mosques. Following his emigration (hijrah) from Mecca to Medina in 622, he 
established the first mosque, called the Quba mosque.25 He then built other mosques 
in which Muslims could not only perform their prayers or other acts of worship 
(ibadah), but could also conduct and attend religious meetings. Moreover, as Islam 
had spread to several places outside Mecca and Medina, such as Yemen, the Prophet 
also sent trained teachers to these new Muslim communities. As Rippin (2005:42) 
states, Muhammad emerged as both a forceful religious and political leader in this 
period – Prophet and statesman. For instance, in addition to calling for salvation in 
                                                 
24 Several tribes, such as the Aws and Khazjraj, supported the Prophet’s dakwah, and offered Medina 
as the centre for his dakwah movement (Haykal, 1976). 
25 The Quba mosque is well known among Muslims as the first mosque in Islamic history, whose first 
stone was placed by the Prophet Muhammad soon after his arrival in Medina. The building of the 
mosque was later completed by the Prophet’s companions. The mosque is mentioned in both the 
Quran (At-Tawba: 108) and the Hadith (Sahih Bukhari, 2:21:284 and 2:21:285). 
42 
 
the Friday sermons, the Prophet Muhammad also started to enunciate public policies 
and messages. According to Antoun (1989:186), attendance at his sermons at Friday 
prayer became a political as well as a religious obligation, since it marked the newly 
formed umma (community).  
 
1.2.2 The classical period of Islam 
The dakwah project of Islam continued after the death of Muhammad in 632 CE, 
and came to be led by his four companions, referred to as al-Khulafa’ ar-Rashidun 
(the Rightly Guided Caliphs): Abu Bakr (ruled 632-634), Umar ibn Khattab (ruled 
634-644), Usman ibn Affan (ruled 644-655), and Ali ibn Abi Talib (ruled 655-661) 
(Poston, 1992). Although the leadership of the Muslim community became a 
controversial issue after the death of Muhammad, these companions, in turn, 
replaced the Prophet’s position as leader of the Muslim community.26 This is why 
they were called Caliphs (khalifa), which means successors (though not, according 
to Muslim tradition, ‘successors’ in relation to prophet-hood, but in terms of 
political and religious leadership).  
 
When the Prophet Muhammad died in 632 and Abu Bakr took over as the first 
Caliph of the community, “the Arab[s] controlled no territory outside Arabia” 
(Rippin, 2005:58), but under their leadership, they conquered other places outside 
the Arabic peninsula, including Iraq (in 633), Syria (in 634-638), Damascus, 
Palestine and Persia (in 638) and Egypt (in 639) (Rippin, 2005; Lapidus, 2002). 
However, this territorial expansion did not necessarily mean that non-Muslims were 
forced to convert to Islam. Many wars or military aggressions occurred under these 
                                                 
26 A group later known as Shi’a argued that fourth Caliph ‘Ali was the rightful Caliph and must be 
appointed as the first leader after the death of Muhammad’. However, Abu Bakr was selected by a 
group of elders as the most qualified person to rule at that time (see Rippin 2005:58). 
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Caliphs’ leaderships, and most of them were successful (Poston, 1992) but 
conversion was not always a high priority in early times not least because of the 
taxes paid by non-Muslims and the fact that any emergent Islamic ideology was 
most likely associated with the Arabs (Rippin 2005).  
 
The territorial expansions continued under the first two dynasties of Islam – the 
Umayyad caliphate (661-750) and the Abbasid caliphate (750-1258) – which ruled 
after ‘the Rightly Guided Caliphs’. During both periods, the military expansion 
continued – into North Africa, Eastern Europe, Spain (Western Europe), and central 
Asia (Rippin, 2005). Scholars such as Lapidus (2002), Rippin (2005) and Poston 
(1992) regarded the caliphates after ‘the Rightly Guided Caliphs’ as dynasties 
because the transfer of leadership was primarily based on family ties.27 In the period 
of the Abbasid dynasty especially, the intensity of military aggression decreased 
with the emergence of a cosmopolitan urban peace economy based on Baghdad and 
the spread of Islam mainly through transnational scholarly and Sufi networks (cf. 
Mandaville, 2007), but military expansion increased again under the Ottoman 
caliphate. Unlike the capital cities of the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates, which 
were located in Damascus (Syria) and Baghdad (Iraq) respectively, the Ottoman 
caliphate’s capital was centralised in Constantinople (Istanbul), which was the 
capital city of the Eastern Roman Empire and was near to Europe. The Ottoman 
caliphate conquered many Eastern and Western European states and, as a result, its 
territory extended, stretching from the Middle East, through Africa, Asia, and 
Europe.     
 
                                                 
27 It is worth noting that these two dynasties originated from the Quraish tribe. They were thus from 
the same tribe as the Prophet Muhammad, albeit from a different clan. 
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Dakwah messages in these classical and medieval periods (632–1700) were more 
complex than those in the era of the Prophet. Muslims in this period were no longer 
dominated by members of lower class society, but came from the upper, middle, and 
lower classes and from a much wider range of ethnic groups (Poston, 1992). In these 
periods, although monotheism and social reform were still one of the concerns of 
Muslim dakwah, justifications for power expansion and political contestation also 
marked the dakwah rhetoric. The former motivation (power expansion) could be 
found among Islamic rulers, while the latter (political contestation) could be found 
among both rulers and other Islamic dynasties in Muslim societies such as the 
Abbasids. 
 
The legitimation of power expansion can be seen in Islamic rulers’ ideological 
claims that their aggressions aimed to liberate indigenous (local) people from the 
oppression of the Byzantine and Persian empires (Lapidus, 2002) – a position 
supported by Thomas Walker Arnold (1965).  They stated that non-Muslim rulers 
must be offered a number of options before being attacked: 1) to convert to Islam or 
2) if they rejected conversion, to pay a jizyah or tax to the Islamic authorities. Only 
‘if they refused both these choices would they be attacked by Muslim soldiers’ 
(Janson, 2003:67). Thus dakwah was part of the ideology justifying the political 
expansion of the Caliphate's territory.    
 
Political contestation within Islamic societies, both at the state and the grass roots 
levels, also influenced the development of the dakwah concept during this period. 
The Abbasids, for instance, oversaw a period of increasing equality among Muslims 
of different origins with the faith open to all, and utilised this as part of their dakwah 
message. Appeals to principles of equality were used by the Abbasids ‘to undermine 
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the political authority of the Umayyad dynasty as the latter’s more parochial policies 
privileged Arabs over other ethnicities, thus denying the universalising potential of 
Islam’ (Janson, 2003:70). 28 
 
In this classical period, however, the Caliphs did not dominate the development of 
dakwah. There were also ulama, or religious scholars, who became the agents of 
dakwah. Ulama is an Arabic word (sing. Alim), which refers to “a class of scholars 
with privileged access to texts, methods, and traditions of knowledge that create 
their capacity to speak authoritatively on religious issues” (Mandaville, 2007:307). 
These ulama engaged in preaching Islam to their societies, either as an official part 
of state institutions or outside of them contributing to an emerging Muslim civil 
society. According to Janson (2003), ordinary people preferred to obey ulama or 
religious scholars who were mostly outside the state’s authority. Moreover, the 
Islamic views of the ulama were not monolithic, varying for instance between the 
five main schools of law in Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) – Ja'fari, Hanafi, Maliki, 
Shafi'i, and Hanbali (Hodgson, 1974).  
 
Sufis from a variety of networks or orders (tariqa, pl. turuq) were also concerned 
with the development of dakwah after the era of the Prophet. They were primarily 
(though never exclusively) interested in esoteric issues concerning religion, with a 
focus on purifying the soul away from secular or worldly affairs and building up 
pious individuals. Sufi orders such as the Naqshbandiyya and the Qadiriyya are 
associated with a traditional form of dakwah, and their religious authority is closely 
                                                 
28 Similarly, the Shi’a conceptualised their dakwah in a way that enabled them to fight against both 
Umayyad and Abbasid political authority. The Shi’a developed the notion of ahl al-bayt (the family 
of the Prophet) as the most authoritative for being both a religious and a political leader (see Janson, 
2003). 
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related to the leadership of charismatic Sufi Shaykhs, who dispense spiritual 
blessings and wisdom (baraka) (Mandaville, 2007). Branches of the Sufi orders 
have spread Islam to many countries throughout the centuries (Mandaville, 2007).  
 
In contrast to the early period of Islamic history, during which the main agent of 
dakwah was the prophet Muhammad, these classical and medieval periods had a 
range of dakwah practitioners who offered a variety of dakwah approaches for 
Muslims, including: 1) the caliphs, sultans, or kings, who held political power; 2) 
the travelling traditional ulama or religious experts and their students, who had 
religious training; and 3) the Shaykhs and followers of sufi tariqahs. It can therefore 
be seen that the development of dakwah throughout Islamic history was dominated 
by traditional forms of dakwah.29   
      
1.3 Muslims' responses to modernity and dakwah in the modern 
period 
1.3.1 Modernity and its impact on the Muslim world 
From the Sixteenth century through to the Nineteenth, European society gradually 
acquired and expanded its cultural, economic, and political supremacy (Lapidus, 
2002). This growth was marked by the rise of the natural sciences, new technology 
which enabled industrial capitalism and new forms of communication (such as the 
printing press), as well as a new political stability. The structural transformations 
that Europe witnessed in these areas is often collectively known as ‘modernity’ 
(Lapidus, 2002). 
                                                 
29 In this context, ‘traditional forms of dakwah’ means that practitioners are well-trained as traditional 
religious trainers or scholars. 
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The modern period was also the period during which Muslim supremacy declined as 
European economic and political strength increased (Lapidus, 2002). Thus the 
European conquest of Muslim lands also occurred in this period, with Britain, 
France, and the Netherlands having conquered and colonised numerous Muslim 
countries by the end of eighteenth century (Rippin, 2005). One by one, the Ottoman 
caliphate's territories were occupied, and the caliphate itself – which was the only 
remaining symbol of Muslim political supremacy – started to decline, with its final 
collapse occurring in 1924 (Lapidus, 2002). The collapse of the Ottoman caliphate – 
‘the sick man of Europe’ - was widely taken as the key symbol of Muslim political 
stagnation.  
 
European colonisation pushed Muslims into an intense encounter with modernity. 
Napoleon Bonaparte’s occupation of Egypt in 1799 not only brought French troops 
armed with guns, but also modern science, administration, and technology (Lapidus, 
2002). Later, Egypt was colonised by the British, who built modern hospitals, 
schools, and scientific laboratories (Lapidus, 2002). Egypt’s Muslim leaders and 
religious scholars were amazed by these European modern scientific developments, 
and these encounters made them realise how much Islamic countries had declined 
compared to European (non-Muslim) countries. Within this period, then, Muslims 
came to acknowledge the superiority of European society and the end of their own 
supremacy. They felt that the Europeans had left them too far behind in the fields of 
modern education, economics, politics, and military power, and this loss of power 
produced a deep psychological impact on Muslims.  
 
Realising their ‘backwardness’, many Muslim leaders adopted modernity, 
particularly within the arena of politics. They built freedom movements which 
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aspired to indigenous modern nation-states, often leaving the idea of the caliphate 
and other traditional Islamic political systems behind. Nation-state building began 
after World War I, and during this period, Muslim elites in countries such as Turkey, 
Egypt and Indonesia endeavoured to establish modern political and social systems 
(Lapidus, 2002). These modernisation programmes transformed the structures of 
political systems in Muslim societies, with Turkey, under the leadership of Mustafa 
Kemal Attaturk, becoming the first Muslim country to reject the Islamic caliphate 
and become a modern, secular state (Lapidus, 2002). For Attaturk, to develop the 
state required Turkey to become westernised and Islam largely privatised (Lapidus, 
2002), and such thinking led to similar modifications soon following in other 
Muslim states. 
 
This ‘modernisation’ agenda challenged many Muslims’ convictions, particularly 
those who disagreed with the marginalisation of Islamic systems (Milton-Edwards, 
2005). In the face of such challenges, many Muslims felt it necessary to defend 
Islam and to object to the adoption of secular concepts such as rationalism, 
parliamentary institutions, and the replacement of Islamic law with European law. 
Many regarded this reform as being incompatible with Islamic principles requiring 
Muslims to use shari’ah as the central source of Muslim social life, and saw it as 
removing Islam from Muslims’ public lives. As a result, heated debate emerged 
during the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries among Muslims, concerning how 
best to respond to modernity. 
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1.3.2 Muslims’ responses to modernity 
Many scholars including Wiktorowicz (2006), Rippin (2005), Roy (2004), Kurzman 
(2002; 1998) and Rahman (1982) have come up with different but related typologies 
to classify Muslim responses to modernity. As Rippin (2005) points out, typologies 
are theoretical categories that can help to identify tendencies, but social realities can 
rarely be fitted neatly into one position or another. For the sake of simplicity, I will 
examine three basic types of Muslim response to modernity suggested by these 
scholars – the traditionalist; the modernist (and related secularist position); and the 
Islamist.   
 
The first basic type of response is traditionalism. Traditionalists have historically 
been the main Islamic groups to be concerned with dakwah or preaching. In 
responding to modernity, ‘they refer to the traditionally well-trained ulama, sufis, or 
other religious experts, maintaining a strong commitment to the religious beliefs and 
practices that they have inherited from the past’ (Rippin, 2005:192). They believe in 
‘time-honoured’ ways of gradually dealing with changes (Rippin, 2005), holding 
that the changes brought about by modernity should not ultimately unsettle the 
tradition of the past.  
 
Their dakwah seeks to renew piety and assure the correct devotional practice of 
individual Muslims. Their dakwah encourages Muslims to observe the tenets of 
belief and practice. As with Sufi networks, this dakwah movement is rarely involved 
in overt political activities, but Mandaville (2007) is right to hold that although it 
considers itself to be apolitical, in renewing the religious consciousness of Muslims, 
its dakwah activities can nonetheless encourage the emergence of Islamist-related 
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dakwah movements. An example of a traditionalist dakwah movement in Indonesia 
is the Nahdhatul Ulama (NU), which was established in 1926. 
 
Whilst traditionalism represents maintaining the status quo in Islamic history, other 
ideal types, such as modernism, promote various changes. Modernists hold to the 
idea of going ‘back to the sources’ of Islam, but tend to produce radically modern 
interpretations of them (Rippin, 2005:195). In contrast to traditionalists, modernists 
do not view the authority of the past as being entirely fixed or binding and may 
question key notions such as revelation (Burgat, 2003, Hefner, 2005, Rippin, 2005). 
The modernists perceive the need to reinterpret Islam in light of contemporary needs 
because most parts of Islamic teaching consist of following the interpretations of 
classical and medieval ulama.  
 
Modernist Muslims argue that there is no necessary contradiction between 
modernity and Islam and that the two are thus essentially compatible. They adopt 
modern and ‘Western’ ideas, such as equality, liberty, democracy, tolerance, and 
justice, viewing modern knowledge and the use of reason to be necessary for 
bringing vitality back to Islam. Jamaluddin al-Afghani (1838–1897 CE), 
Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905 CE), and Rashid Rida (1865–1935 CE), Indian 
scholars Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817–1898 CE) and Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938 
CE) are considered amongst the most influential modernist Islamic figures (Rippin, 
2005:195) although interestingly some can be seen as pointing forward to more 
Islamist approaches (Rahman, 1982).30 An example of a modernist dakwah 
movement in Indonesia is the Muhammadiyah, which was established in 1912.31 
                                                 
30 For an account of the work and life of Jamaluddin al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh, see Hourani 
(1983), Keddie (1972), Kedourie (1965, 1966, 1997), Kudsi-Zadeh (1971) and Milson (1968); and 
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The secularist type of Muslim response to modernity adopts a similar approach to 
the modernist one. Given that modernist and secularist Muslims stand together in a 
number of ways regarding modernity, I have not categorised secularism as a 
separate ideal type, but rather as being attached to the modernist one. However, most 
notably, Muslims who seek to privatise Islam are classified as secularists. For them, 
although Islam has a significant role to play in society, it should not be used either 
as a basis for a state or for state law. According to Rippin (2005), Albania 
exemplified this typology in the mid-twentieth as it replaced all Islamic values with 
modern ones. This also happened in Turkey under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal 
Ataturk (1881–1938), who founded the Republic of Turkey in 1924. Turkey 
separated Islam from the state and public life entirely, with modern laws and modern 
education replacing Islamic law and Islamic traditional education. The Turkish 
government abolished shari’ah law, the practice of polygamy and Sufi orders, and 
closed traditional Islamic schools (madrasahs).    
 
Both traditionalist and modernist/secularist points of views on responding to 
modernity are rejected by Islamism, which is characterised by its key ideology that 
‘Islam(ism) is the solution’. In this regard, Islam is not only seen as a religion, but 
also as a political ideology that should reformulate all aspects of society, including 
politics, economics, social life, the law, and so forth (Roy, 2004), with Islamists 
emphasising ‘the absolute character of the source of authority of Islam; Quran and 
Sunna’ (Rippin, 2005:183,192). In contrast with traditionalists, modernists and 
                                                                                                                                         
for an account of the work and life of Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Muhammad Iqbal, see Ashraf (1975), 
Malik (1980), Schimmel (1989), Sheikh (1972) and Troll (1978).  
31 The Muhammadiyah is recognised as a modernist or reformist movement. On the 
Muhammadiyah’s reformism/modernism, see Federspiel 1970, Nakamura 1980, and Peacock 1978; 
on the Muhammadiyah’s attitudes to Javanese culture, see Burhani 2005, Nakamura 1983.  The 
Muhammadiyah is called modernist because it allowed its members to follow ijtihad (independent 
reasoning to interpret the Qur’an and the Sunna) and they were thus not restricted to following a 
certain school of thought. See www.muhammadiyah.or.id (Accessed and up-dated on 5 April 2017). 
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secularists, Islamists tend to accept changes in a ‘controlled’ fashion (Rippin, 
2005:183,192). They accept more restricted changes than modernists, and use the 
two authoritative sources of the Quran and the Sunna to accept or legitimate changes 
in the modern era.  
 
Islamists have often responded to modernisation in a complex fashion by rejecting 
Westernisation but rooting certain aspects of modernity in the ‘pure’ Islam of the 
Quran and Sunna. Thus, Islamists have ‘indigenised and Islamised’ many concepts 
and structures from Western political sciences, including ideology, revolution, 
organisation, democracy, and political parties (Roy, 2004:447). Islamists use 
political actions to attempt to re-create a ‘true’ and ‘pure’ Islamic society utilising 
shari’ah (Islamic law) to govern the state as well as public life (Roy, 2004). The key 
message of their dakwah is that Islam should be strongly present not only in the 
private sphere, but in the public sphere as well. Islamists also believe that the state 
should aim to unite the ummah (global Muslim community), and that the ummah 
should not be restricted to a specific nation (Roy, 2004). Most Islamists have sought 
to establish political parties and have participated in democratic procedures such as 
general elections whilst trying to show that Islam represents the best form of 
‘democracy’ (Nasr, 1996). Islamists have claimed that shura (consultation), as 
mentioned in the Qur’an and practiced by the Prophet Muhammad, is a principle of 
democracy in Islam, but have accepted democracy per se in order to support their 
goal of establishing an Islamic society.  
 
Rippin (2005), Roy (2004) and Nasr (1996) consider Abul A’la Mawdudi (1903–
1979), Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949) and Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966) to be amongst 
the earliest Islamist ideologues. They are founding fathers and intellectuals of 
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Islamist dakwah movements, namely the MB in Egypt (e.1928) and the Jamaat-i 
Islami (JI) in Pakistan (e.1941).32 Through these dakwah organisations, the afore-
mentioned Islamist figures advocated a more ‘authentic’ Islamic framework for 
Muslim society. Also, whilst Mawdudi and al-Banna believed that the use of 
persuasion and gradual changes was best suited for achieving Islamic goals, Qutb 
believed in the need for more radical change.  
 
These three figures had a significant impact on Muslims worldwide, especially 
young educated Muslims in urban areas with secular educational backgrounds (Roy, 
2004, Mandaville, 2007). The MB attracted Muslims in the Middle East especially, 
and some of their branches became prominent parties in the Sudan, Palestine and 
Tunisia. By contrast, the JI became more prevalent among South Asian Muslims, 
and their immigrant and diaspora communities in Pakistan, India, East Africa, the 
UK, and the Caribbean (Mandaville, 2007:283). However, the MB also attracted 
Muslims in Indonesia, and became the inspiration for an Islamist dakwah party, 
whilst the influence of the JI is not prevalent among Indonesian Muslims. 
 
The Islamists’ ideology is inspired by revivalist or ‘fundamentalist’ ideas.33 For the 
revivalist, there is only one ultimate source of Muslim authority – that found in the 
Quran and the Sunna. Revivalists believe that if Muslims return to ‘pure’ Islam, they 
will be able to restore the ‘glory’ of the past, and they thus reject Sufism, 
philosophy, and the use of rationality in interpreting the Quran and Sunna.34  
                                                 
32 For key studies on the Pakistani Jama’at Islami and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and its key 
ideologues see, for instance, Nasr (1996), Zollner (2009), Al-Hudaybi (1969), Mitchell (1993), Lia 
(1998), Kepel (1985) and Gilsenan (2000). 
33 Islamists, as a consequence, are sometimes referred to as ‘revivalists’ or ‘fundamentalists’, with 
many scholars using these terms interchangeably. 
34 This is regarded by Rippin (2005) as one of the key points for distinguishing Islamists from 
modernists. 
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Revivalism has a long history in Islam and emerged before the modern period, for 
instance in the figures of Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328) and Muhammad Ibn Abd al-
Wahhab (1703–1787) – the founder of the Saudi Wahhabi movement (Commins 
2009). Thus, according to Rahman (1982), revivalist or fundamentalist movements 
can be divided into pre-modern and the modern manifestations.35 Nevertheless, both 
pre-modern and modern revivalist ideas focus on purifying Muslims from non-
Islamic faiths and any innovations (bid'a) that have entered their religious practices, 
including local beliefs, customs, and superstitions. The spirit of purification among 
revivalists holds that the essence of ‘true Islam’ will be corrupted by these 
innovations.  
 
Islamists have adopted and developed many ideas from revivalists, such as the 
emphasis on erasing popular or traditional Muslim beliefs and practices, which 
Islamists also consider to be contradictory to ‘pure’ Islam. The difference between 
the two movements is that the revivalists’ focus on Islamising society through 
purifying faith and rites, while Islamists are not only interested in this spirit of 
purification, but also in Islamising the modern nation-state and the public sphere 
through ‘active’ dakwah and politics. Islamists regard politics as the crucial arena to 
occupy in order for Islamist leaders to create a more Islamic society and an Islamic 
public sphere.36 
                                                 
35 Rahman (1982) mentions other characteristics of pre-modernism, namely a deep concern with the 
socio-moral degeneration of Muslim society and a call to carry out revivalist reforms through Jihad. 
Some pre-modern revivalist movements had a Sufi orientation.  
36 There is an important relationship too between Islamists and the politico-Salafists of Wictorowicz’s 
(2006) typology (see also Wahid, 2014; Rasheed, 2007; Hasan, 2005). Wiktotowicz divides Salafists 
into three factions: ‘purists’, ‘politicos’ and ‘jihadis’. All observe strict monotheism, returning to the 
Qur’an and the Sunna, and following the examples of the salafus shalih (the pious ancestors i.e. 
companions (Sahabah), their followers (Tabi’un), and the follower’s followers). The difference 
between these orientations lies in their strategies in promoting their ideas: 1) the purists: through 
peaceful means such as dakwah for purification and education but largely disengaged from politics 
and maintaining unconditional obedience to the ruler; 2) the politicos: who is engaged with politics 
but typically pursues this through peaceful political means (like reformist Islamism); and 3) the 
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The debate concerning Islam and modernity indicates that there is a range of ways in 
which Muslims have dealt with modernity. They differ in approaches regarding the 
extent to which modernity and its transformations should be accommodated. Most 
Muslims realise that Islam has been declining – in politics, economics, the military, 
and sciences – and for revivalists or Islamists, this decline has been caused by 
Muslims breaking with Islamic values and traditions. They view most Muslims as 
failing to practice the ‘true’ Islam revealed to the Prophet Muhammad, and contend 
that the best way to solve this problem is to return to living by the Qur’an and 
Sunna. By contrast, modernists consider conservatism as the key factor that led to 
Islam’s decline and hold that in order to develop Islamic civilisations, Muslims 
should adopt modern culture and the sciences.   
  
1.4 The Islamist notion of ‘active’ dakwah in the modern period 
Modernity’s reshaping of Muslims’ lives (see Section 1.3) led Islamists to worry 
about the decreasing role that Islam was playing in society and in the state. The 
modernisation undertaken by Muslim rulers brought a shift in Islamic worlds in 
terms of culture, social life, economics, and politics, including the marginalisation of 
the shari’ah court, the ulama's role in society, and traditional Islamic schools (see 
Section 1.3).  
 
Their worry about the absence of Islam in the public sphere led Islamists to become 
the front-line dakwah group, intensively countering the impact of modernisation in 
the Islamic world by seeking to speak their truth to power (Hirschkind 2006). 
                                                                                                                                         
jihadists: who engages in physical struggle against the unbeliever (kafir) even if that is a Muslim 
ruler who does not apply Islamic laws (Wiktorowicz, 2006:217).  
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Although, they use modern technologies such as transportation, telecommunications, 
and medical technology, the Islamists’ dakwah is especially active in countering 
Western culture, politics, and economics (Mandaville, 2007). Unlike modern 
technology, which they perceive to be ‘neutral’, Western culture, economics, and 
politics are regarded as reflecting ‘Western’ values, which are characterised as 
‘atheistic’, secular, and anti-religion (Roy, 2004; 1994).  
 
Islamism is the most ‘active’ Islamic dakwah movement in the modern period. 
Activism is the key identity of this globally diverse movement, which routinely calls 
on Muslims to respond to the impact of Western power. The ideas of criticising 
‘Western’ modernity and emphasising Islamic identity are most attractive to urban, 
lower middle-class Muslims (Burgat, 2003; Eickelman and Piscatori, 1996), who 
believe that modernisation programmes in Muslim countries cannot succeed in 
transforming these societies into prosperous ones. For them, religious authenticity is 
the key for this transformation (Rippin, 2005, Mandaville, 2007), and this is one of 
the central factors that generates their interest in the ‘alternative’ to the state system 
offered by Islamists (Hirschkind 2006). Their dakwah, as an activist ideology, 
therefore represents a new or reinvented approach.37 
 
Islamist dakwah movements see Islam as a comprehensive and active ideology 
whose role is not only to transform their selves but also their society. During the 
beginning of twentieth century, these dakwah movements emerged rapidly in 
countries such as Egypt and India where Islamic organisations such as the neo-Salafi 
                                                 
37 I use the term ‘active’ or ‘activist’ dakwah in this thesis to reflect what I heard from daily 
conversations in Indonesia in referring to the Tarbiyah community and also to reflect what I inferred 
from the literature of Islamist movements. From this literature, I understood that Islamist groups are 
regarded as the most prominent practicioners of dakwah, believing it to be necessary to be active (and 
sometimes aggressive) in Islamising both the private and public domains (see Introduction). 
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movement, the mystical orders, and Islamic reformism were established (Meuleman, 
2011). Examples of these groups include the MB, founded in Egypt in 1928 and the 
Jama’ati Islami (JI), founded in India in 1941. Their dakwah emphasises the 
promotion of Islamic teachings and the provision of information on Islam for both 
Muslims and non-Muslims (Mandaville, 2007:285).  
 
These organisations propagate dakwah messages, not only focusing on private 
dakwah or seeking to Islamise individuals, but also focusing on public dakwah with 
the aim of Islamising the society and the state. For them, dakwah not only serves the 
purpose of educating people, but should also be used for correcting their religiosity 
and behaviour (Mahmood 2005). The focus of dakwah, for them, should go beyond 
the level of the individual, and be instrumental in creating an Islamic society, either 
through establishing Islamic political parties or producing impacts on the social and 
spiritual aspects of society through some other media or ‘counter-public’ 
(Hirschkind 2006). Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the core dakwah agenda of 
these organisations is the same – to transform individual Muslims and their society 
based on Islamic teachings.  
 
In transforming their societies, these organisations developed a variety of dakwah 
models, including religious edification, religious education or training, and Islamic 
charity or social activity, building educational centres, religious places, and social 
and public services such as hospitals and clinics to support their agenda. They also 
travelled to many countries around the world to promote their dakwah ideology and, 
as a result, transnational dakwah activities and dakwah organisations have been 
established in many parts of the Muslim world (Mandaville, 2007:283). These 
organisations have adopted various new forms of dakwah, with new aims based on 
58 
 
their religious interpretations, their responses to public issues, and their involvement 
in social and political activities.  
 
Key Islamist figures such as Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, and Abul A'la Mawdudi 
have greatly influenced contemporary Islamist dakwah movements by strengthening 
their focus on locating Islamic identity within the public sphere and critiquing 
modernity. They also exemplify more ‘gradualist’ (al-Banna and Mawdudi) and 
more ‘radical’ / ‘revolutionary’ (Qutb) forms of Islamism. Al-Banna, the founder of 
the MB, was deeply concerned about the impact of Westernisation on the Islamic 
beliefs and practices of Egyptian Muslims, perceiving Western culture and thought 
to have had a significant influence on Muslims in Egypt (Mitchell, 1993). He 
regarded this influence as a cause of the moral and political decline of Muslims, and 
created a new model of dakwah that called on Muslims to perform Islamic teachings 
in their daily life to address this, ranging from issues regarding domestic affairs to 
public matters. For al-Banna, Islam needed to provide the key guidance for Muslim 
societies, and his influence is clear in the MB’s political views that Islam: 1) is a 
comprehensive, self-evolving system providing the ultimate path to life; 2) emanates 
from, and is based on, two fundamental sources – the Qur’an and the Sunna; and 3) 
is applicable at all times and places (Mitchell, 1993). However, although he, like 
other Islamists, promoted the establishment of a better Islamic state, he did not 
propose violence as a means for achieving this goal. The ideas of al-Banna regarding 
‘active’ dakwah will be elaborated further in next section (Section 1.5). 
 
Like al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, who was born in 1906 in Asyut-Egypt and was hanged 
by Gamal Abd al-Nasser in 1966 for his denunciation of the Egyptian regime, also 
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criticised modern cultures and thoughts.38 These criticisms are mostly presented in 
his books, al-Adala al-Ijtima’iyya fi al-Islam (Social Justice in Islam) which was 
written in 1949 and Ma’alim fi al-Tariq (Milestones) which was first published in 
1964.  The first book explains that the separation of religion and politics is a 
characteristic of Western societies and thus would be inappropriate for Islamic 
societies. He argued that ‘there is no hierarchy among believers and the ultimate 
authority lies with God alone and Islam is the basis for social equality and true 
justice’ (Zollner, 2009:51). The second book deals with the key concept of jahiliyya 
(ignorance).39 According to Qutb, although current Muslim societies proclaim 
themselves to be Muslim, they do not practice worship (ibadah), and they 
erroneously believe in sovereignty (hakimiyya) other than God. For Qutb, Muslims 
in these societies are also living in jahiliyya (Kepel, 2005)40 – they are living in the 
same condition as the Arabian people in the pre-Islamic jahiliyya before the Prophet 
Muhammad proselytised Islam.41  
 
According to Qutb, any society that is not Muslim is an instance of jahiliyya (Kepel, 
2005:47), and everything outside Islam must also be included in the category of 
Jahiliyya as it is derived from the spirit of barbarism and is contrary to Islamic 
teachings (Rippin, 2005). For Qutb, although contemporary Muslim governments 
remain, they can be categorised as ‘infidel’ governments when they do not 
                                                 
38 Qutb is well known as one of the leading figures of the MB. He became a member of this MB in 
1951, then head of its department for spreading Islam (Qism nashr al-dakwah) in 1952, and an editor 
of the weekly newspaper al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun in 1954 (Zollner, 2009) 
39 Qutb, divided jahiliyya society, in which people are ignorant of divine guidance, into three types. 
First, there is Communist or Atheist society, which denies God, and in which sovereignty (hakimiyya) 
is exercised in the name of the people or parties; second there is Jewish and Christian society; and 
lastly there is contemporary Muslim society (Kepel, 2005:47). This book is considered to be the key 
text for the dakwah ideology of radical Islamists (Zollner, 2009; Qutb, 1992; Kepel, 2005). 
40 Qutb’s critique of the modern jahilliya “stems from his identification of Islam with the dynamic 
unity of the universe and his assertion of the autonomous character of human actions” (Lee, 
1997:100). 
41 Qutb drew on Mawdudi for the terms and interpretations of hakimiyya and jahiliyya (see Zollner, 
2009) 
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implement shari’ah. Muslim rulers, as they existed in the history of Islam are, 
therefore, not enough for Qutb and his followers: Muslim rulers must have a 
commitment to implementing shari’ah and Islamic values in their countries. A 
Muslim society, according to Qutb, must apply Islam across the board, letting it 
guide their faith, worship, legislation, social organisations and modes of behaviour.  
 
As a result of these views, Qutb, unlike al-Banna, stated that Muslims are allowed to 
fight against such 'infidel' governments (Haddad, 1983). Qutb therefore promoted a 
new model of dakwah that emphasised the need for activism and political jihad in 
order to turn Islam into a global power (Zollner, 2009). This shows Qutb’s goal of 
making Islam the basis of a state – an orientation that demands a total human 
submission to God (Khatab, 2006). Qutb thus rejected democracy, rationalism and 
secularism, and held that Islam needed to be purified from Western influences. For 
instance, he rejected the Western banking system, which he considered to be 
contrary to Islamic law. He also criticised Western behaviour, in particular that 
associated with a concern for material goods (Lee, 1997). Likewise, he rejected 
Western ideas about separating religious from secular matters, and the West’s 
adherence to rationalism. He thus refused to reconcile Islamic teachings with 
European outlooks, viewing Islam as a comprehensive ideology that regulates all 
aspects of human life (see Khatab, 2006; Moussalli, 1992; Shepard, 1992).  
 
Giles Kepel (2005), who studied Islamic radical movements in Egypt, found that 
many contemporary radical Islamist activists are influenced by Qutb’s ideas and, 
like Kepel, Rippin (2005) classified Qutb and other Muslims who oppose their 
governments as ‘radical’ Islamists. Qutb was also considered to be responsible for 
the shift in the outlook of at least some of the MB’s members from holding 
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moderate views under al-Banna’s leadership to becoming a radical splinter 
movement. His concept of Jahiliyya marks an obvious fission in the MB’s ideology, 
as al-Banna never accused the Egyptian regime of his day of being non-Islamic 
(Kepel, 2005).  
 
Mawdudi was another key Islamist figure. He was regarded as an Islamist because 
of his beliefs about God’s unique sovereignty, the universal application and 
implementation of shari’ah, and the need for a democratic caliphate (Nasr, 1996). 
According to Mawdudi, sovereignty over any aspect of life is only for God, since 
God is the creator and the ruler of the universe.42 He criticised the concept of 
democracy because he believed that it misleads people about the true concept of 
sovereignty (Mawdudi, 1960). Furthermore, governments that are elected by people 
should consider their position as being amanah (in trust) from God. Therefore, they 
have to implement God’s commands – shari’ah – in the state and in all Muslim 
society.               
 
Appealing to such an understanding of sovereignty, Mawdudi argued that political 
sovereignty also belongs to God alone. If there are human agents that seek to 
constitute the sovereignty of God through implementing the political system of 
Islam in a state, they will never succeed because of the limitations of their power.43 
A democratic caliphate, for Mawdudi, means that the government is the only 
                                                 
42 Mawdudi elaborated his idea of sovereignty in his book, First Principle of Islamic State, published 
in 1960. Sovereignty is that which de jure belongs to Allah, and de facto is manifested in the working 
of all parts of the universe. Mawdudi refers to some verses of al-Qur’an (7:3, 12:40, 5:44) in which it 
is insisted that the acceptance of the de jure sovereignty of God is the meaning of Islam, while 
denying such sovereignty is kufr (unbelief). In other words, there is no space for any other 
sovereignty in the world, particularly in a state. The sovereignty can be defined as the source of 
power and law and, for Mawdudi, such a source is only found in God. Although people elect 
government representatives, sovereignty does not come from people. 
43 The agents are called ‘caliphates’, which means that they are not sovereigns in-themselves. Such 
agents are the representatives of the real sovereignty. The agents or systems they construct are under 
the sovereignty of God, who is the owner of the sovereignty both de jure and de facto. 
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institution that is responsible for establishing shari’ah. The Islamic caliphate is 
certainly not a ‘theocratic’ system. It is the antithesis of monarchy, and 
fundamentally different from the Western democratic system, which is based on the 
sovereignty of the people, whereas the caliphate system is tied to the sovereignty of 
God.  
 
1.5 The contemporary Islamist dakwah movement: the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt  
To understand how contemporary Islamists apply their dakwah strategy, I will now 
examine the MB movement in Egypt in greater detail. The MB has been chosen 
because it has influenced the establishment and the development of the Tarbiyah 
movement of the PKS in Indonesia, the dakwah movement that I am focusing on in 
this thesis. Here, the MB is explored in terms of its strategy of utilising private 
dakwah to Islamise individuals, and the public and political use of dakwah to 
Islamise the public sphere. Founded in Ismailia in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna, the MB 
endeavoured to establish a greater religiosity among Egyptian Muslims. The MB 
hoped that it would be able make Egyptian society more Islamic through influencing 
individual outlooks, and concentrated its movement first on changing the attitudes of 
individuals, then families, and finally society (Mitchell, 1993, Gilsenan, 1982). This 
indicates that the MB started with individual dakwah, and then extended this to 
public dakwah.44  
 
Given that the aims this movement adopted were to reform individual and social 
morality, Tarbiyah (training, education) became the core ‘indoctrination unit’ that it 
                                                 
44 For further accounts of the dakwah strategy of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Indonesian language, 
see Hasan al-Banna (2001), Risalah Pergerakan 2 and Ali Abdul Halim Mahmud (2004), Perangkat-
Perangkat Tarbiyah Ikhwanul Muslimin. trans. Wahid Ahmadi et al. Both books are published in 
Solo, Intermedia. 
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employed (and continues to use) to achieve this objective (Mitchell, 1993:195). 
These Tarbiyah activities were (and continue to be) supported by the ‘family’ 
system (nizam al-usra), with each family system being composed of no more than 
ten active members, one of whom is chosen to be a leader or mentor representing a 
family (Mitchell, 1993:197). This family system conducts regular lectures and 
classes on Islamic teachings, which focus on building the commitment of each 
‘family’ member. This Tarbiyah instrument is still the main dakwah activity and 
ideological link that MB branches worldwide share.   
 
The MB's character and ideology in its early period was influenced by al-Banna’s 
background as a teacher and follower of a traditionalist Sufi network (Mandaville, 
2007:59). According to Gilsenan (1982), this Sufi background had an influence on 
the way in which al-Banna managed the MB movements in relation to individual 
piety. For al-Banna, education (Tarbiyah) represented the best approach for making 
the views and attitudes of Muslims more pious and disciplined. The movement was 
then called Tarbiyah (education), and its main activities were to educate adults and 
children through increasing their religious consciousness. In addition to the religious 
education that was chosen by al-Banna as a method for achieving the MB’s ideals, 
worship activities (ibadah), such as the practice of dhikr (mentioning God’s names 
and other recitations), were also used to establish religious awareness among 
members. In line with al-Banna's revivalist views, the MB called on Muslims to 
return to the ‘true’ Islam of the Quran and the Prophet’s traditions (Sunnah).  
 
A part of the MB’s focus on public dakwah was concerned with countering secular 
ideas from the West that had started to emerge in Egypt. As Gilsenan (1982) notes, 
external powers in the form of colonialism, Zionism and communism changed Egypt 
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radically, and represented the major impetus that led to the MB’s objective to 
change Egyptian society. The MB believed that a society based on ‘true Islam’ 
provided the best model for a modern Egyptian state, in contrast to the ideas of 
secular nationalism that were widely professed by Egyptian elites at that time. It is 
worth noting that the MB accepted nationalism, conceiving of it as an effective 
medium through which to fight against colonialism and imperialism in Egypt. 
However, the MB endeavoured to establish a form of nationalism based on Islamic 
morality. Moreover, the MB preferred to build Islamic social order within the 
framework of the modern nation state instead of through adopting an Islamic 
caliphate (Mandaville, 2007:60). 
 
Nevertheless, the MB was not only concerned with colonialism, but also with 
cultural imperialism. The MB’s leaders wanted to raise people’s consciousness of 
materialism, individualism, atheism and democracy being the destructive forces that 
these great powers have unleashed on individuals and societies. Cultural 
imperialism, according to Hassan Al-Hudaybi (1891-1973), a key MB figure as 
leadership successor to al-Banna as “General Guide”, “entered the minds of the 
people with its teachings and thoughts and tried to dominate [the] social situation in 
Egypt” (Gilsenan, 2000:229-230; Al-Hudaybi, 1969). For Qutb, this ‘spiritual and 
mental invasion’ presented the true danger to Muslims. As a result, the MB’s active 
dakwah was designed to counter the impact of this cultural imperialism, and to raise 
Muslims’ consciousness – something they thought that traditionalist Muslim leaders 
were failing to do.  
 
The MB’s ideology appeared in a context where the discourse concerning the 
necessity of reviving the caliphate (after its abolition by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in 
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Turkey in 1924) was being pushed by Muslim leaders. Rashid Rida and Ali Abd al-
Raziq (1888–1966) were the most prominent Egyptian Muslim intellectuals 
discussing this issue at the time (see Salvatore, 1997). For Rida, the caliphate is 
authorised by the Qur’an, and plays an important and central role in the history of 
Islamic society. Although Rida realised that it would be unrealistic to rejuvenate the 
caliphate due to the contemporary political conditions at that time, he emphasised 
the importance of ulama in providing guidance for a state, together with the 
establishment of Islamic social order (Mandaville, 2007:51-52). Abd al-Razik 
disagreed with this outlook, arguing that the Quran never takes a stand on the kind 
of state that Muslims should establish, and argued that the existence of the caliphate 
in Islamic society engendered repressive attitudes by the state towards its citizens 
(Mandaville, 2007:52). However, there is a strong case to be made that the MB was 
most concerned with shaping an Islamic social order through Islamising society, and 
that it was largely ambivalent about whether this was done within the structure of an 
Islamic caliphate or a modern secular nation state, so long as this primary goal could 
be achieved.  
 
As Kepel (1985:26) has observed, although the MB in Egypt was “officially a social 
organization and not a political party, it represented the largest organised popular 
force in the country”. Within a short period of time, the MB became a significant 
Islamic movement in the political constellation of Egypt, having 2,000 branches and 
half a million active members by the early 1930s (Mandaville, 2007:69). Perhaps 
most impressive is the fact that its supporters came from a considerable range of 
social milieus and professional sectors. Mitchell describes how “its membership 
became so diversified as to be virtually representative of every group in Egyptian 
society”, from students and civil servants to urban labourers and peasants (1993:12). 
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According to Gilsenan (1982:220), this wide social range of MB members was “an 
organizational and ideological response to, and a proffered resolution of their own 
and the collective crisis”.  
 
In its earlier incarnation, capturing political power at the state level was not one of 
the MB’s goals, with al-Banna even prohibiting Muslims from establishing political 
parties (Mandaville, 2007:60). The MB required the state to play its role in 
Islamising society through such means as increasing the quantity and quality of 
religious education in schools and encouraging religious and spiritual behaviour 
within society (Mandaville, 2007:61). However, the repressive political system of 
the Egyptian government led the MB to shift their approach in Islamising society 
during the next periods of its development. During the middle to the end of the 
1930s, ‘the MB’s political concerns began to increase’ (Mitchell, 1993:9). Given 
that one of its objectives was to drive out colonialism, the MB began to take a more 
direct role in criticising the government and other political authorities in relation to 
British interference with the Egyptian government. As a result, the relation between 
the MB and the government became increasingly strained, and an eventual conflict 
was inevitable.  
 
In the 1940s, the MB experienced suppression from the state, and some of MB’s 
leaders were imprisoned (Mitchell, 1993). Moreover, the government was involved 
in preventing al-Banna from holding public office. He was asked by the government 
to withdraw his parliamentary candidacy, and his followers believed that the 
government had manipulated the polling process to cause al-Banna to lose in the 
election (Mandaville, 2007:72). It was undeniable that this strained relationship with 
the government encouraged the MB to become more critical of them and to lead 
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protests against policies that ignored British intrusions in Egypt. On the other side, 
the government suspected that the MB was involved in several violent local 
attacks.45 This combination of factors led the Egyptian government to finally ban the 
MB in Egypt in 1954 (Gilsenan, 1982:223).  
 
For the MB, public dakwah, public affairs, and politics cannot be separated. Given 
their belief that dakwah permeates all aspects of a Muslim’s life, ‘the MB still 
operated even though the government had repressed the movement, and during the 
1970s it began to transform its political movement’ (El-Ghobashy, 2005:377). From 
this period on, the MB began to gradually exist again in the public life of Egypt 
(Mandaville, 2007:107). El-Ghobashy (2005:376) contends that the details of its 
establishment and its early history indicate that the MB has the capability to adapt to 
changing political situations. She points to evidence such as al-Banna’s participation 
in the general elections of 1942 and 1945, observing that although the government 
had prevented him from being elected, the MB did not undertake any radical 
retaliation in response. It is worth noting that under the rule of Anwar Sadat (ruled 
1970-1981), who succeeded Nasser, the MB had been given a space to re-enter the 
public sphere, but Sadat signalled that he would only welcome the “moderate” MB 
into the public life of Egypt. This led to a conflict within the MB, with the ‘radicals’ 
(a Qutb-influenced splinter group of the MB) accusing the ‘moderate’ figures of 
having been co-opted by the government. The divide between the radical wing and 
the moderate wing of the MB thus became sharper in this period. 
  
                                                 
45 However, the MB countered ‘this regime’s charge of conspiracy by claiming that the attack had 
been a police provocation’ (see Kepel, 1985:27).  
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However, the moderate wing, which was the mainstream of the MB movement, 
came to have an increasingly significant public role during the 1980s and 1990s 
(Kepel 2003; Mandaville 2007). It targeted social and professional organisations, 
such as student unions and councils, as mediums through which to plant its 
influence. It succeeded in taking over the engineering, pharmaceutical, and medical 
professional associations (Mandaville, 2007:110), and its activists undertook public 
welfare activities, such as providing aid to the victims of disasters. This social role, 
which is viewed as part of their dakwah strategy, attracted wider public popularity 
and sympathy from the Egyptian people. 
 
Its increased popularity encouraged the MB to participate in the 1984 election, in 
which it established an alliance with the al-Wafd party (El-Ghobashy, 2005:378). 
This alliance secured approximately 15% of the vote – around 58 seats. However, 
the MB was only given 8 seats, while al-Wafd obtained 48. This allocation was not 
beneficial for the MB since, while it was responsible for the political movement of 
the alliance, it only got few seats in parliament. Thus, in the following election in 
1987, the MB instead built an alliance with the Labour party and the Ahror 
(Liberation) party. This alliance obtained 17% of the national vote, and 56 seats, 
with the MB receiving 36 of these seats (El-Ghobashy, 2005:379). 
 
The MB’s engagement in politics caused a shift in its ideological orientation. An 
indication of this was seen when the MB reinterpreted verses relating to gender 
equality and women’s roles in public spaces (El-Ghobashy, 2005:382). Moreover, 
the MB movement also began to give higher priority to political issues relating to 
freedom, democracy, culture, education, and the economy, and put the application of 
shari’ah to one side.  
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As has been suggested earlier, branches of the MB can be found in Arab and Middle 
Eastern countries, Asia, Africa and Europe (Mandaville, 2007, 2014). Although the 
movements in these various countries have different historical stories and 
experiences, they are, according to Wiktorowicz, “connected through [a] shared 
symbolic and ideological linkage” (2001:4). For instance, one of their key 
similarities is a shared dakwah purpose – a focus on Islamising society – although 
they hold different attitudes regarding certain issues, based on the particular social, 
cultural, moral and political dynamics and norms of each country. Regardless of 
their differences in responding to specific issues, they all share the same basic 
ideologies of the Egyptian MB, including: (1) establishing a unity of religion and 
politics, (2) the need to apply shari’ah in public life, and (3) the need for 
purification. They also share the basic strategy of the Egyptian MB, which starts by 
creating Muslim individuals, then Muslim ‘families’, then finally Muslim societies.  
 
Although most of the MB’s branches have been transformed into Islamic political 
parties, and their broader political significance has grown as a challenge to secular 
leadership (especially in Muslim societies), they have all still implemented its 
private ‘educational’ (Tarbiyah) instrument. Despite the fact that the MB has parties 
that are prominent in several countries, including Indonesia, the Tarbiyah instrument 
is still the main dakwah activity of the movement, and its ideological linkage is 
shared between MB branches throughout the world.   
 
1.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the significance of dakwah among Muslims, particularly 
in contemporary Islamist movements. I have argued that although private and public 
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concepts of dakwah have existed and been practised in the history of Islam, these 
concepts – especially the public concept of dakwah – have different meanings for 
contemporary Islamists. In the past, dakwah was primarily concerned with Islam as 
a monotheistic faith (tawhid), and had a universalist message that could be spread to 
other people, regardless of race, ethnicity, and nationality. In the era of the Prophet, 
Muhammad was an agent of dakwah who received the holy task of spreading the 
message of Islam. In the periods of the Caliphs and the dynasties of Umayyad and 
Abbasid, the dakwah was not conducted by Caliphs and kings alone, but also (and 
mainly) by well trained, traditional ulama, sufis, and other religious experts.  
 
The role that traditional ulama, sufis and religious scholars had in conducting 
dakwah changed in the modern period as a result of the impact of modernisation and 
secularisation brought by colonialism. With the developments of new media, the 
printing press and information technologies, Muslims became exposed to new 
religious discourses from ulama old and new, as well as modernists and Islamists. 
Modernists and Islamists challenged and criticised the traditionalists’ approach to 
dakwah through their dakwah movements. Modern Islamists strongly believe in the 
need for Muslims to be active in Islamising the public sphere and the state, and the 
absence of Islamic states, Muslim rulers, and public Islamic teaching are their main 
concerns.  
 
Islamist dakwah movements have played an important role in responding to the 
absence of Islam from public life that colonialism and secularism led to in Muslim 
countries. These movements have come to have an influence in both Muslim 
countries and non-Muslim countries in Europe and America, as well as in other 
countries that Muslim immigrant and diaspora communities have spread to. The 
71 
 
Islamist dakwah ideology concerning the strengthening of Islamic identity and the 
piety of Muslims, together with the creation of a more Islamic form of society, have 
attracted young people from the urban lower and middle classes. These young urban 
Muslims perceive this ideology as representing a revision of Islam that is more 
responsive to the modern period, and that provides a ‘better modernity’ – one that is 
more Islamic, religious, spiritual, just and humane. As an Islamist movement, the 
MB in Egypt has had an impact on the development of contemporary Islamist 
movements worldwide, attracting large numbers of young Muslims in Egypt and the 
Middle East as well as in Asia, Africa, and Europe. The MB movements in these 
countries have similar concerns and ideologies regarding the Islamisation of society 
and the public sphere.  
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Chapter 2 
Islam, the State, and Dakwah in Indonesia 
2.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I investigated how the concept and practice of dakwah has 
been influenced by modernity, particularly the dakwah of contemporary Islamist 
movements. I showed how Islamist movements throughout the world are very 
concerned with the Islamisation of the public sphere, and gave particular attention to 
the MB in Egypt. I argued that although both individual and public conceptions of 
dakwah informed the practice of Muslims in the era of the Prophet, as well as in the 
classical and medieval periods, Islamists have developed a different concept of 
dakwah in a different age– the Islamisation of the public sphere. The global impact 
of modernisation on the secularised public space, together with the competition 
between Islam and other Western or modern ideologies, are the factors that have led 
to Islamists adopting this agenda regarding the public sphere and the state.    
 
The purpose of this chapter will be to examine the context that influenced the 
dynamics of Islamism in Indonesia, where the Tarbiyah community emerged and 
developed during the 1980s. As in other Muslim countries, the emergence of 
Islamist movements in Indonesia was influenced by a response to the form of 
modernity brought to Indonesia during the colonial and postcolonial periods. 
Numerous Indonesian leaders that graduated from Western educational institutions, 
and holding visions of a modern and secular-nationalist Indonesian state and society, 
were part of the structure of the state established in modernity. Their visions and 
reforms led to the gradual removal of Islam from the state, which led Islamic leaders 
to respond critically to these changes. In this chapter I argue that the original idea of 
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Islamism in Indonesia arose among revivalist Muslims during a period in which 
early Indonesian leaders were competing to form a nation-state, and then gained 
strength in the more democratic political system that came into being after the fall of 
the New Order regime in 1998.  
 
In the first section of the chapter I explore Islamic movements in the pre-colonial 
and colonial periods. Dutch colonialism had contributed to a breakdown of the 
Islamic kingdoms that had been established a hundred years earlier, and I argue that 
the repressive character of the colonial government and the decline in Islam’s 
political role encouraged Islamic leaders to establish Islamic organisations and a 
campaign for nationalism and independence. In this period, Islamic leaders focused 
on uniting Muslims and fighting against the Dutch regime.  
 
The next section explains how Indonesian leaders came to formulate the concept of 
the Indonesian modern state. I argue that the secularist ideology promoted by 
Indonesian leaders graduating from Dutch institutions led to the idea of Islamism 
gaining strength among Islamic leaders, especially those who were part of revivalist 
groups. The state’s marginalisation of shari’ah, as expressed in the idea of the 
nation-state, was the main factor in leading these Islamic leaders to seriously 
campaign for bringing shari’ah into the state constitution. The pivotal point of their 
demand was that the structure of the state should be based on Islamic teachings.   
 
The next part of this chapter investigates the attitudes that the New Order 
government (1966-1998) had towards Islamist groups. I argue that during the first 
period of the New Order, the government preferred to prevent the growth and spread 
of Islamist ideology among Islamic movements through ‘restriction’ policies, while 
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in the second period, the regime tended to ‘domesticate’ Islamists in order to gain 
their support. The dakwah message of Islamism – to position Islam within the state 
and public life – was regarded by the New Order regime as a threat to national 
ideology, and the government thus prevented Islamist movements and their leaders 
from having public roles in order to restrict the spread of their ideology to wider 
audiences. Nevertheless, in the last period of their leadership, the New Order tended 
to adopt an approach of cooperation with Islamist groups, which the regime had 
come to need to support their quest to retain power. 
 
In the last part of this chapter I will elucidate how the Islamist movement developed 
in the post New Order era (1998–present day), at which point the political system 
became more democratic. I argue that new regulations relating to political 
liberalisation were seen by Islamist groups as providing a good opportunity to widen 
their dakwah audiences. They used this chance to establish new Islamic 
organisations and parties to campaign for their dakwah message on implementing 
shari’ah within the state and the public sphere.   
 
2.2 Muslim campaigns for Indonesian state independence  
There is a historical precedent for the contemporary Islamist struggle to implement 
shari’ah and Islamic symbols both through private dakwah in the individual sphere 
and through public dakwah in the public sphere and at the state level. However, 
although it did not suddenly emerge after the social and political reformation of 
1998, these reforms did open the door for Islamic political parties and various 
religious organisations to establish themselves. Indeed, these groups benefited 
enormously from this political change, but the roots of the struggle for shari’ah and 
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Islamic values date back to the colonial period.    
 
Ricklefs (1993) observes that Muslim traders from the Middle East, China and India 
had been present in some Indonesian islands for several centuries before Islam 
became established in the Thirteenth Century. These Muslim traders played an 
important role as a channel for disseminating Islam (‘dakwah’) to the Indonesian 
archipelago through sea routes (Eliraz, 2004).46 Although it is not possible to give a 
precise date for when Muslim traders first entered Indonesia, it is believed that it 
was sometime between the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Century that there was a shift in 
the traders’ role in disseminating Islam or in conducting dakwah. After sultanates 
(Islamic kingdoms)47 were established in this period, sultans (kings) played a 
significant role in the spread of Islam. At the end of Thirteenth Century, travellers 
that passed through Indonesia, including Marco Polo (1254–1324) and Ibn Battuta 
(1304–1377), found that it was not only ordinary Sumatran people that had become 
Muslims, but that the ruler of Sumatra had done so as well. By the Fourteenth 
Century Islam had started to develop in Northern Sumatra, and was gradually 
adopted by other parts of Sumatra and Java. By the end of the Sixteenth Century it 
had become the dominant religion in several Indonesian islands (Demant, 2006).  
 
The development of Islam in Indonesia in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth centuries 
was influenced by the scholarly networks of Indonesian-Malays and the Middle East 
(Azra, 2004). According to Azra (2004), scholars (ulama) who came from different 
                                                 
46 According to Eliraz (2004), the spread of Islam within Indonesia in these periods was dominated 
by traders from the Middle East. These traders introduced the Islamic teachings and knowledge that 
spread in the Middle East countries, and when it first arrived in Indonesia, this teaching and 
knowledge was not only influenced by Indian but also by Middle Eastern traders, especially the 
Hadramis (immigrants from Hadramaut-Yemen).  
47 Some Islamic kingdoms were established between the thirteenth and the fifteenth Century, such as 
Samudera Pasai (13th century), Aceh (15th century), and Demak (15th century).  
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parts of the Muslim world, met and built extensive networks especially through the 
annual pilgrimage (hajj) in Mecca and Medina. They produced a scholarly discourse 
and shared their common spirit to reform and renew their societies. Their ideas of 
reformism and renewal then spread and transmitted to many part of the Muslim 
world including Indonesia.  
 
Indonesia continued to be dominated by Islamic kingdoms until the Netherlands 
colonised the region in the Seventeenth Century, where they remained in charge 
until the middle of the Twentieth Century (Ricklefs, 1993). Islamic kingdoms 
gradually declined and fell under the control of the Dutch colonial government. This 
colonialism was the main factor that led Indonesian leaders – especially Islamic 
leaders – to unite in the pursuit of Indonesian independence (Latif, 2008). These 
leaders utilised religious doctrines or messages to campaign for Muslim 
independence from ‘infidel’ rulers. The Islamic leaders said that it was the 
obligation of all Muslims to resist the Dutch because they were infidels (Laffan, 
2003), and that Muslims should be led and controlled by a Muslim government.  
 
In the next section, I will show, in greater detail, the important role that Islamic 
leaders played in campaigning for nationalism and for Indonesia’s independence 
from the Western colonial state during this period through establishing Islamic 
organisations and publishing newspapers and periodicals. Islamic leaders utilised 
these organisations and newspapers or periodicals as a vehicle for supporting their 
goal of ‘Muslim nationalism’, which involved calling Muslims to unite in order to 
free themselves from colonialism (Laffan, 2003).  
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2.2.1 Muslims’ nationalist campaigns 
It is not an exaggeration to say that Muslims played an integral role in the 
development of the nationalist movement in Indonesia around the end of Nineteenth 
and the beginning of Twentieth Century (Laffan, 2003:4). Nationalism was 
propagated, and new Islamic ideas spread with the help of journalists and the 
technological innovation of the printing press. Newspapers such as Wazir Indie and 
Al-Imam spread Islamic ideas. Wazir Indie, first published in 1878, claims to be the 
first Muslim newspaper (Laffan, 2003:146), and built a printing press and 
publication houses in Indonesia to disseminate Islamic issues to engage with readers.  
 
Likewise, Al-Imam, which was published in 1906–1908, played important roles in 
disseminating ideas to the Malay-Indonesian community. Al-Imam’s idea of a Malay 
nation (umat Melayu) invokes what Benedict Anderson (2006) has referred to as an 
‘imagined community’, and the newspaper promoted this as the ideal homeland 
from its very first publication. The development of the printing press and the spread 
of national consciousness allowed the emergence of this ‘imagined community’ 
among Indonesian Muslims (Anderson, 2006), and Al Imam was regarded as one of 
the most important vehicles for the dakwah of revivalism, pan-Islamism and, to a 
lesser extent, modernism. Although this newspaper was based in Singapore, the 
highest proportion of its correspondence came from Indonesia.  
 
A few years after al-Imam was published, the use of its printing press was expanded 
to not only produce newspapers, but also periodicals, and by the 1920s new 
newspapers such as al-Munir, Seruan Azhar and Pilehan Timur were also being 
published (Laffan, 2003; Eliraz, 2004). The development of these periodicals was 
78 
 
significantly influenced by Rashid Rida’s al-Manar. It is worth mentioning here 
given Rida’s shift towards revivalism and turning al-Manar into a major vehicle for 
transnational dakwah. All of these periodicals contributed to the transmission of 
Islamic teaching within Indonesia, especially in the form of Islamic revivalist 
voices, and can be seen as part of dakwah agenda of revivalists. This is not 
surprising, given that Muslim revivalists have been the quickest in using almost all 
forms of modern technology, including the printing press, social media, and the 
internet (see Mandaville, 2007; Eickelman and Anderson, 2003).  
 
Moreover, these newspapers also improved the literacy rates in Indonesia, aided in 
the growth of a new vision of education and teaching, and contributed to the 
increasing interest of Muslims in learning about events and situations in other parts 
of the Islamic world. Thus, the idea of pan-Islamism – an issue close to the 
revivalist’s heart – spread among literate Indonesian Muslims in this period. The 
pan-Islamist ideas of al-Afghani discussed in the journal of Al-Manar were 
disseminated through a variety of the publications listed above, including Al Munir 
and Seruan Azhar (Laffan, 2003).   
    
Furthermore, the two earliest Muslim newspapers – Wazier Indie and al-Imam – 
promoted nationalism through Islamic ‘phrases’ such as “love of the homeland is a 
part of faith”48 (and other relevant Quranic verses) in order to raise the national 
consciousness of Muslims. According to Laffan (2003), these newspapers were not 
only concerned with community-building and religious reform, but also with the 
                                                 
48  This phrase – “love of the homeland is a part of faith” (Hubb al-wathan min al-iman) – is very 
popular phrase among Indonesian Muslims. Muslims in the pre-colonial and colonial periods tended 
to assume this phrase to be a Hadith (a collected saying or anecdote reporting the Prophet’s words or 
deeds), and used it in the hope that early modern Indonesian people would struggle to defend their 
country against colonialism. In fact, this phrase is not a Hadith from the Prophet Muhammad, as it 
was generally assumed. This phrase as declared by al-Saghany and al-Albany is fabricated (mawdu).         
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independence of their homeland. They promoted a shared feeling of suffering and 
struggle against the colonisers, and became a unifying source for nationalism 
through Islam.  
 
2.2.2 The establishment of Islamic organisations    
During the beginning of the Twentieth Century Islamic leaders established several 
organisations that aimed to empower and enlighten Muslims in terms of their 
political rights, economic opportunities and education. These included the ‘proto-
Islamist’ Sarekat Islam (SI) in 1911,49 the modernist Muhammadiyah in 1912, the 
modernist Persatuan Islam (PERSIS) in 1923,50 and the traditionalist NU in 1926.51 
These organisations also implicitly demanded and mobilised support for Indonesian 
independence from colonial rule (Latif, 2008). Muslims played an important role in 
the social movements of these organisations and, in this period, Islam was important 
for establishing national unity. Effendy argues that “Islam served as a link which 
tied together the sentiment of national unity against Dutch colonialism” (2003:15).      
 
A political agenda demanding the independence of the Indonesian state was most 
strongly expressed by the Sarekat Islam (SI) movement (Latif, 2008; Saleh, 2004), 
with the main objective of SI during 1912-1929 being to spread an Islamic form of 
nationalism (Saleh, 2004; Laffan, 2003). This organisation developed from Sarekat 
Dagang Islam (the Islamic Trading Association), which was established in Solo-
                                                 
49 Sarekat Islam (SI) was co-founded by Tjokroaminoto (1882-1934) and Agus Salim (1884-1954) 
(see Saleh, 2001). 
50 There is a very comprehensive and detailed study on PERSIS written by Federspiel (2001). 
51 The NU was established to protect Islamic boarding schools and Islamic traditionalism from 
modernism. It is categorised as traditionalist because it refers only to standards set by the Syafi’i 
school of thought for all of its decision-making (www.nu.or.id, accessed on 5 November 2014). The 
NU was established by traditionalist ulama K H Hasyim Asy’ari (1875-1947), and focused on Islamic 
traditional learning and countering revivalist ideas It was a response to Muhammadiyah’s attempts to 
develop modern educational systems (see Barton, 2002; Bruinessen, 1994). 
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Central Java in 1911. The SI was able to attract mass attention from religious leaders 
to Muslim traders, and from both urban and rural areas in Indonesia, and ‘succeeded 
in uniting almost all levels of Indonesian society against Dutch colonialism’ 
(Effendy, 2003:16).  
 
The success of this organisation was, however, short-lived. Sarekat Islam failed to 
continue their efforts towards establishing independence because the leaders of the 
organisation could not maintain solidarity in the face of internal differences 
regarding political idealism (Latif, 2008). The internal conflicts between the leaders 
emerged in the mid-1920s, and ‘increased after Marxism was introduced to the 
organisation’ (Noer, 1978:119-126). After its sixth congress in 1921, the SI 
experienced further internal conflict and fragmentation between its leaders and its 
activists (Saleh, 2001; Noer, 1978).52  
 
In contrast to the SI, the modernist Muhammadiyah and the traditionalist NU were 
more concerned with purification and Islamic education than with politics (See 
Saleh, 2001; Barton and Fealy, 1996). Their concentration on the fields of 
purification and education is relevant to this thesis’s interest in private dakwah 
although as noted in the Introduction and elsewhere the overwhelming focus of the 
literature is on public dakwah The Muhammadiyah was established by Ahmad 
Dahlan (1868–1923) in Yogyakarta, and its objectives were to bring modern 
education to Indonesian (Javanese) Muslims and to purify their Islamic rituals from 
                                                 
52 The conflict in Sarekat Islam emerged as a result of the different orientations of the leaders and 
activists. Some were influenced by Marxism, and wanted to develop the organisation into a socialist-
oriented movement, whilst others were influenced by Pan-Islamism and wanted to develop the 
organisation as a political Islam movement. During this period, Marxism was not only opposed by the 
supporters of Pan-Islamism in Sarekat Islam, but also resisted by many other Islamic organisations, 
such as the NU and the Muhammadiyah. They considered Marxism as communism, and part of the 
Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) (see Noer, 1978).          
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syncretism (Nakamura, 2012; Saleh, 2001). This meant that its organisation’s 
messages placed an emphasis on both the modernisation of education and the 
purification of rituals. Thus the puritanical influences in the Muhammadiyah have 
also led it to being seen as a form of revivalism. The organisation has focused on 
building modern educational systems, and combining them with Western modern 
subjects and Islamic themes in order to allow its students to take advantage of both 
colonial and traditional educational systems (Alfian, 1989). It should be noted that 
the establishment of the Muhammadiyah was inspired by Egyptian modernist 
thinkers Muhammad Abduh (1845-1905) and Rashid Rida (1865-1935) (see Chapter 
1; (Shihab, 1995; Alfian, 1989).  
 
Since their inception, the leaders of the NU and Muhammadiyah – the two largest 
Islamic organisations in Indonesia – were covertly involved in campaigning for 
nationalism, either within their respective organisations or through the SI. Many of 
the Muhammadiyah’s leaders, including Ahmad Dahlan (the founder and first 
chairman of Muhammadiyah) participated in the SI (Alfian, 1989). Through their 
educational institutions, which spread throughout the country, the leaders of both 
organisations emphasised Islamic teachings which informed Muslims that ‘love 
[for] the country is part of the faith’ (Laffan, 2003). The Muhammadiyah and the 
NU were therefore part of the Muslim struggle in pre-independence Indonesia, and 
both organisations are widely known for their roles in social and religious arenas 
(Barton, 2006).53  
                                                 
53 The Muhammadiyah, with its modernist vision of combining spiritual and intellectual reform, is 
actively involved in work on education and social welfare in Indonesian society. This organisation 
has hundreds of modern educational institutions, from kindergartens to universities, which are spread 
throughout Indonesia. It embraces a modern secular curriculum in schools and avoids traditional 
approaches to education, including the rejection of Sufism as a subject (see Nakamura, 2012). 
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2.3 The consolidation of Islamism during Indonesian independence  
In this section I argue that the secularist ideology promoted by post-colonial 
Indonesian leaders with Dutch education, and expressed in the ideas of the nation-
state and nationalism, led to the consolidation of Islamism among Islamic leaders, in 
particular among the revivalists. The idea of the nation-state insisted on the 
separation of Islam from the state (e.g. the rejection of making Islam the foundation 
of the state, Islam as the state law, and the requirement for a state leader/President to 
be a Muslim) and Indonesian leaders thus refused the formalisation of shari’ah as 
state law. Soekarno (1901–1970)54 and Mohammad Hatta (1902–1980)55 were the 
most prominent secularist leaders of this time, becoming the first President and Vice 
President of Indonesia respectively in 1945. They asserted that the nation-state 
should be based on a national identity that accommodates all ethnic and religious 
values. 
 
Soekarno and Hatta were the leaders of the nationalist-secular party – the Indonesian 
National Party (PNI) – which was established in 1927. The main visions of this 
party were the establishment of a nation-state and nationalism. Soekarno had 
modern political ideas, believing that the ‘backwardness’ of Indonesia was the result 
of Dutch colonialism, which had led to poverty and a low-level of education 
amongst the Indonesian people. Soekarno emphasised that his party’s objective was 
to secure complete independence for Indonesian people, including for non-Muslims. 
According to Soekarno, it was not necessary for the party to have an Islamic basis 
                                                 
54 After graduating from the Europeesche Lagere School (the Dutch-Medium Junior Secondary 
School), Soekarno studied in the Hogere Burger School (the Dutch-Medium Secondary School) and 
the Technische Hoge School (the Technical Institute Bandung). During 1916–1926, he was actively 
involved in student organisations (Latif, 2008; Ismail, 1995).  
55 Hatta studied administrative laws in Rotterdam University in the Netherlands (Latif, 2008; Ismail, 
1995). 
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(Ismail, 1995), as its two main aims were to oppose imperialism and capitalism and 
to create an independent nation-state with unity among Indonesian people per se. 
Soekarno, with other Western-educated intellectuals such as Mohammad Hatta and 
Sjahrir (1909–1966),56 formed a circle of secularist-nationalist intellectuals.57 From 
the 1930s onwards, Soekarno, Hatta, and Sjahrir promoted nationalism as a key tool 
for establishing independence (Mrazek, 1994).  
 
Ideological debates between nationalist and Islamic revivalist leaders were thus 
unavoidable. The debates initially focused on the nature of nationalism, with the 
Islamic revivalists believing that it should be based on Islamic teachings, while the 
nationalist group thought that the diversity and heterogeneity of national values 
should be accommodated. Nationalism, for Soekarno, involved the people’s 
consciousness of being united in one group and one nation, while leaders of Islamic 
organizations such as the leader of the more pan-Islamic oriented Sarekat Islam or 
“Islamic Union” Agus Salim (1884–1954) and the founder of the Persatuan Islam 
(PERSIS) or “Islamic Association” Ahmad Hasan (1883–1956) believed that 
nationalism should be placed in the framework of Muslims’ service to Allah. 
Mohamad Natsir (1908–1993), the leader of the largest Islamic political party in the 
1940s and 1950s called the Masyumi stressed Salim and Hasan’s opinion that 
nationalism should be perceived as a medium for gaining the transcendental consent 
(ridha) of Allah (Noer, 1978:276). Effendy (2003:20) points out that these two 
different groups emerged within a certain political context in which Islamic leaders 
                                                 
56 Sjahrir studied law in the University of Amsterdam in the Netherlands (see Mrazek, 1994; Sjahrir, 
1990; Latif, 2008; Ismail, 1995). 
57 By ‘these secularist-nationalists’ I mean intellectuals who frequently published their opinions on 
social, political and economic issues. They were also concerned with long-term strategies for 
educating the Indonesian people using modern educational systems. Mrazek (1994)’s lengthy and 
detailed study of Sjahrir, however, offers a more subtle insight than the simple conclusion that he was 
a secularist. The same can be learned from his memoir “Renungan dan Perjuangan” (1990). 
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were not only united to fight against colonial rule and engaged in a struggle for 
nationalism and independence, but were also struggling in a debate with nationalist 
figures about what the constitution and foundation of the country should be.  
 
In the early 1940s, the debate between these two groups shifted to the nature of the 
relationship between Islam and the state – a debate that represented the key 
disagreement and tension between Islamic and nationalist groups. In an article 
published in 1940, Soekarno argued for the separation of Islam from the state 
(1964:369–500), on the basis that the formal-legal relationship between Islam and 
the state (Effendy, 2003:23) is a likely factor in increasing discrimination, given 
Indonesia’s composition of many different religious groups. In contrast to Soekarno, 
Natsir – a founder and leader of the Masyumi – promoted the idea of unity between 
religion and the state (Kahin, 2012; Effendy, 2003). Since the beginning of the 
1930s, Natsir had been very active in propagating the idea that the state and religion 
were indivisible (Effendy, 2003) – an idea that is typical of the general ideology of 
Islamists in other Islamic countries, such as the MB in Egypt, and Jama'ati Islami 
(JI) in India and Pakistan (See Chapter 1).  Natsir’s Islamist ideas on the state and 
religion cannot be separated from his international network both in Pakistan through 
the Muslim World Congress (Mutamar al-‘Alam al Islami) and Saudi Arabia 
through the Muslim World League (Rabitah al-‘Alam al-Islam) (Kahin, 2012).  
 
The momentum in the debate between these two groups increased in the run-up to 
Indonesian independence in 1945, as well as in the post-colonial period during 
1956–1959. The first gain in momentum came at a time when Indonesians were 
formulating the state constitution in preparation for independence in 1945, while the 
second came in the formative years of the Republic of Indonesia, when they were 
85 
 
completing and revising the constitution after the first general election in 1955.  
 
The first meeting of the Investigating Body for the Preparation for Indonesian 
Independence (Badan Penyelidik Usaha-usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia, 
BPUPKI) was held on 29 May 1945, and at it Islamic and nationalist groups 
discussed the philosophical basis and ideology of the state (Ismail, 1995). During the 
meeting, the Islamic faction argued for the importance of inserting the clause ‘with 
the obligation for the adherents of Islam to practice shari’ah (Islamic law)’ into the 
constitution, while the secularist group rejected this (Effendy, 2003, Latif, 2008). 
This Islamic clause became referred to as ‘the seven words’ in the so called Piagam 
Jakarta or “Jakarta Charter”, referring to the original Indonesian translation: ‘dengan 
kewajiban menjalankan Syari’at Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya’.58  
 
At this meeting, the Islamic representatives argued that Islam should be mentioned 
clearly in the constitution because Muslims contributed to the independence of 
Indonesia. Moreover, Natsir contended that the Muslim majority had taken the 
greatest role in the struggle for Indonesia’s independence, and that an integral part of 
this struggle involved the objective of implementing Islamic teachings and shari’ah 
in the country (Kahin, 2012; Mahendra, 1995). Moreover, the Islamic groups 
appealed to the fact that Muslims made up the majority of the Indonesian 
population, constituting 90% of it in 1945 (Ismail, 1995:51). In this period, the spirit 
to strengthen Islamic identity among Muslims was very high, and the Islamic leaders 
insisted that the constitution of the state should clearly mention the application of 
shari’ah to Muslims, believing that this would guarantee that the state would 
                                                 
58 This clause was a key part of the content of the Piagam Jakarta or the ‘Jakarta Charter’ (see Latif, 
2008; Effendy, 2003; Ismail, 1995). 
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formalise it as official state law. This idea coloured the political thinking of the 
Islamic figures in both the Investigating Body’s (1945)59 and the Constitutional 
Assembly’s (1956)60 meetings (Ismail, 1995:42).   
 
The nationalists, on the contrary, proposed that Indonesia should be a modern 
nation-state, “neutral” with respect to religious identity, but accommodating various 
religions, ethnicities and traditions. They argued that the constitution should not 
prioritise a particular religion, ethnicity or tradition and dropped the ‘seven words’ 
of the Islamic clause from the constitution’s preamble, arguing that Indonesia was 
different from Saudi Arabia and Egypt because it was unique in terms of its 
population, culture and traditions, as well as in historical and geographical aspects 
(Ismail, 1995). In addition, Soepomo – the leading representative of the secularist-
nationalists – doubted whether shari’ah could meet the demands of a modern nation-
state (Ismail, 1995). Instead, the secular-nationalists, led by Soekarno, promoted the 
idea of the Pancasila or ‘Five Principle Doctrines’, whose first doctrine referred to 
‘the belief in one God’ (Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa) (Ismail, 1995, Effendy, 2003). 
Even though the Islamic faction was unable to achieve its goal of having the 
‘shari’ah clause’ in the constitution, this polemic had strengthened the idea of 
‘Islamism’ (the use of Islam as a political ideology to Islamise the state) among 
Muslim leaders – the unity between Islam, politics, and law – and the urgency for all 
Muslim factions, including traditionalism and the NU, to unite (Platzdasch, 2009).  
                                                 
59 This investigating body was established on 29 April 1945 for the preparation of Indonesian 
independence with the agenda of formulating the philosophy of the state. The outcome of the meeting 
was the Jakarta Charter, which includes an obligation for the state to implement shari’ah as state law 
for Muslims. However, in another meeting, the chapter was changed by removing the Islamic clause. 
The committee then agreed to use this amendment of the chapter (see Nasution, 2001). 
60 The Constitutional Assembly was a body elected in 1955 to make decisions regarding a permanent 
constitution for the republic of Indonesia. They held meetings on 10 November 1956 and 2 July 
1959. After these, they decided on the constitution. Soekarno ended their duty on 5 July 1959 (see 
Herbert, 2007; Ricklefs, 1991).         
87 
 
The Islamic organisations such as the Muhammadiyah, Persatuan Islam or PERSIS 
and the NU, established an oppositional Islamic political party in 1945 named the 
Majlis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia – the ‘Consultative Council of Indonesian 
Muslims’ (Masyumi) – whose objective was to unite as many Islamic organisations 
as possible and to aid the mobilization of Muslims against Western allies 
(Platzdasch, 2009; Saleh, 2001; Noer, 1987). These Islamic organisations joined the 
Masyumi to win the election from secular-nationalist parties in 1955 election 
(Effendy, 2003), and their struggle in this period thus shifted its focus from a fight 
against colonialism and a struggle for independence to the fight to become the 
strongest Islamic political party. Despite the strong legitimacy of its initial 
emergence and becoming a crucial participant in Indonesian politics during 1940s-
1950s, Masyumi only survived until 1960 (Platzdasch, 2009; Saleh, 2001; Noer 
1987). Masyumi was a breeding ground for the key Islamic politician, Mohammad 
Natsir, who later continued as a founding leader of DDII (Kahin, 2012).  
 
Most Islamic organisations in Indonesia at this time were reformist Islamist, 
including the Muhammadiyah, which was powerful during this period.61 Therefore, 
the participation of the traditionalist NU in Islamism was odd. I argue that the NU’s 
identity as an ‘Islamist’ group only represented a kind of expression of its solidarity 
as an Islamic organisation. As seen by its development, the NU later separated itself 
from the ‘Islamists’ and established its own political party, called the NU party in 
1952. Moreover, after 1959, the NU preferred to ally with the government's 
secularist party, the PNI, and left the ‘Islamist’ group. The traditionalists believed 
                                                 
61 I categorized Muhammadiyah as reformist Islamist because of the Muhammadiyah’s stance on the 
relationship between religion and politics and in particular on the role of Islam in the Indonesian state 
on one hand, and on the other hand, the Muhammadiyah’s focus on education, social work, and 
management of organisations (see Burhani, 2000; Mulkhan, 2000; Noer, 1978). 
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that the government had to be supported so long as Muslims were free to perform 
their worship. This view contradicted the more clearly ‘Islamist’ (Masyumi) position 
that insisted on the implementation of shari’ah within the arenas of politics, law, 
and the economy. As a result, the NU became closely allied with the government, 
entering into a coalition with them, and its leader occupied the position of Minister 
of Religious Affairs during the Old Order Soekarno regime (Kahin, 2012; Barton, 
2002).  
 
For Islamic leaders, winning in a general election and dominating the parliament and 
government represented another way to pursue a shari’ah-based state. Although the 
NU resigned from the Masyumi and created a new political party as noted above, 
Islamic leaders were united on a common issue: to introduce shari’ah into the 
constitution. In total, these Islamic parties gained 230 seats in parliament, while the 
secularists gained 280 seats (Effendy, 2003:33-34). From 1956 until 1959, the 
polemic on the relation between Islam and the state rose again, and the parliament 
was deadlocked. The polemic ended after the President disbanded parliament in 
1959, arguing that the state had become endangered by the conflict of ideology 
within parliament (Latif, 2008).  
 
2.4 The Islamists in the New Order period (1966-1997) 
During the New Order period (1966-1997), the Indonesian government 
demonstrated two different approaches towards Islamic political parties and 
organisations. Based on these different attitudes towards Islam, the New Order 
government under Soeharto was divided into two periods: the early and the late 
period. In this section I show that, in the earlier period, the New Order government 
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sought to prevent the growth and spread of Islamist ideology among religious 
movements through various restrictions and regulations, while in the later period, 
the regime sought to domesticate Islamist groups in order to gain their support and 
sustain the New Order government. Recalling my comments about SMT in the 
Introduction (Wiktorowicz 2004; Fox 2012), I argue that these different political 
opportunity structures in the early and late periods of Soeharto’s presidency 
impacted on the dakwah activities and strategies chosen by both Muslim leaders and 
Islamic organisations.     
 
In the early period of the New Order (1966-1985), Islamic movements and political 
parties were considered to be a potential threat to national ideology, unity, and the 
survival of the New Order regime. In this period, the government ideology of 
Pancasila was reaffirmed, with Soeharto using it as a vehicle for uniting Indonesian 
people regardless of their religious affiliations or ethnic backgrounds (Jahar, 
2006:360). During this period, Soeharto also ‘refused to incorporate the Jakarta 
Charter’ (Kersten, 2011:53), which led to it being commonly referred to as the 
‘authoritarian period’ of Soeharto’s rule.  
 
The regime attempted to restrict Islamic groups from having public (political) roles, 
with Soeharto creating limitations for and depoliticising the roles of Islamic 
movements and political parties. Moreover, Soeharto sustained the ban on Masyumi, 
considering it to be in the pursuit of a propagandist agenda for formalising shari’ah 
that challenged the modern nation-state, and also considered what so-called later 
‘Islamism’ as a threat (Effendy, 2003). Although, he allowed old Islamic 
organisations such as the Muhammadiyah and the NU to remain active, their 
religious and social programmes were closely monitored, and had to be kept in line 
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with government ideology. As a result of such government policy, the dakwah 
activities of both Islamic leaders and organisations went ‘underground’, ceasing to 
hold any overt political agendas. 
 
Soeharto prevented Islamic movements from engaging in political matters through a 
number of regulations. In 1970, the constituents of the Islamic party were 
disempowered through a government regulation (PP No.6/1970) requiring all civil 
servants to be loyal to the government. The regulation was issued by the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and required civil servants to swear allegiance to the government 
(Porter, 2006:26), which included an obligation to vote for Golkar62 as the official 
government party. During this period, many Muslims coming from Masyumi’s 
families worked as civil servants, and thus the regulation had a significant impact on 
the vote that the Islamic party received in the general elections at that time. In 1973 
a regulation was made to consolidate Islamic political parties into one single party – 
the United Development Party (PPP) (Kingsbury, 2002). It was thought that this 
merger would support the government in controlling and preventing ‘Islamism’ from 
growing within the Islamic party. For Muslim activists, of course, this government 
regulation created very limited opportunities to organise overt political movements.  
The government also passed Law No. 3 as late as 1985 which forced Islamic 
organisations and political parties to adopt Pancasila as their sole ideology and 
ideological basis, which meant that they had to reject Islam as their philosophical 
foundation (Abbas, 2005:56). Failure to comply with this law resulted in the 
dissolution of the organisation or party by the government (Ismail, 1996:17). The 
                                                 
62 The GOLKAR (Golongan Karya, the Functional party) was formed in 1964 to counteract the 
growing influence of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). It was the ruling party during the 
Soeharto (1966-1998) and the Habibie period (1998-1999). In the latest period – the Yudhoyono 
period – this party has been part of the ruling coalition (2004-2014).  
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regime also punished those who criticised or reacted against this rule. For instance, 
in Tanjung Priok-Jakarta in 1984, the regime ordered the military to shoot hundreds 
of Muslim demonstrators who were protesting against the regulation to adopt 
Pancasila as the ideology for their Islamic organisations and parties (Porter, 2006:2).  
 
The government tightly controlled Islamic political organisations and ideologies, 
repressing any signs of Islamism. In 1968, it changed the leaders of the Partai 
Muslim Indonesia or the ‘Indonesian Muslim Party’ (Parmusi) – a new Islamic party 
endorsed by the government and run by former leaders of the Masyumi. Moreover, 
the involvement of Islamists (such as former leaders of Masyumi) in political arenas 
was strongly restricted by the President. The Soeharto regime removed ‘Islamist’ 
figures from leadership positions in Islamic parties, as Soeharto had experience of 
instances in the early history of Indonesia – in 1945 and 1959 – in which Islamists 
had tried to replace Pancasila (Saleh, 2001; Hefner, 2000).  
 
Through these regulations and other authoritarian de-politicisation strategies, the 
government prevented the growth of Islamist ideology spread by either Islamic 
dakwah movements or Islamic political parties. The government believed that 
Islamism would lead to disharmony and instability in the secular nation-state and 
disunity among the people. In these first two decades of the Soeharto leadership, 
Islamist groups were thus seen as a threat to the state (Latif, 2008), and Islamism 
was regarded as being opposed to state ideology (Effendy, 2003:194). Within such a 
climate, many Muslim activists withdrew from party politics entirely (Latif, 2008), 
choosing instead to disseminate their political views through educational, social, and 
religious activities. For instance, Natsir shifted his political activities towards 
dakwah activities (Kahin, 2012; Mahendra, 1995). Islamist dakwah can be 
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conducted either through cultural or political approaches, so the restrictions in the 
political domain led Islamist figures to transform their dakwah movement through 
cultural aspects such as education and training. Because of the suspicious attitude 
adopted by the government, the Islamist leaders also tried to deflect attention away 
from these practices by putting a greater emphasis on dakwah messages relating to 
individual piety.    
 
Several Islamist organisations also emerged within this political context, including 
the Indonesian Islamic Dakwah Assembly (DDII/Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah 
Indonesia),63 the Institution of Islamic Dakwah of Indonesia (LDII/Lembaga 
Dakwah Islam Indonesia),64 Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), and the Tarbiyah 
movement (Hilmy, 2010; Platzdasch, 2009). They emerged during the 1960s, 1970s, 
and 1980s when there was no context for doing political activity. Their emergence 
marked the moment of new Islamist discourse of dakwah which I am focusing on in 
this thesis.  
 
The emergence of these Islamic social movements, however, cannot be separated 
from the development of dakwah in international Muslim society. For instance, the 
establishment of the DDII in 1967 and the LDII in 1972 in Indonesia related to the 
momentum of the oil boom in Saudi Arabia (Kahin, 2012; Hasan, 2008).65 
Outcomes of the wealth generated by this oil boom included the diffusion of Islamic 
                                                 
63 The DDII was founded on 9 May 1967 to continue the mission of the Masyumi party, which had 
been banned by the Soekarno government. The key individual behind the establishment of DDII was 
Natsir, the former leader of Masyumi (Kahin, 2012; Platzdasch, 2009). The official website of the 
DDII is http://www.dewandakwah.com/ (Accessed on 4 November 2014). 
64 LDII was founded by H. Nurhasan Ubaidillah Lubis (d.1982) after his return from Mecca (living 
there for ten years). As its name implies, it is a dakwah organization. It has revivalist character 
(Ricklefs, 2012). I found two official websites of the LDII: http://www.ldii.or.id/ and http://ldii-
online.com/(Accessed on 4 November 2014). 
65 They established close contacts and often received financial support from Saudi authorities (Hasan, 
2008). 
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(and more particularly Wahhabi and Salafi) beliefs and practices through the export 
of religious literature, the sponsorship of international conferences or seminars and 
the establishment of Islamic organisations in many parts of the world.66 In 
Indonesia, Saudi Arabian authorities give grants for various dakwah activities such 
as building mosques and the training of preachers (da’i) (Kahin, 2012). Thus, the 
‘trans-national’ movements travelled easily to Indonesia in this period with various 
degrees of negotiation with local political, economic, social and cultural 
circumstances.  
 
Social and political stabilisation became the main concern of the government at this 
time (Eliraz, 2004), and this resulted in the dakwah activities of Islamic 
organisations being excluded from the public sphere. Dakwah and other religious 
activities were held for limited audiences and held in private places such as 
members’ own houses. According to the leaders of the HTI and the Tarbiyah 
movement, this ‘underground’ phenomenon of dakwah was experienced by both 
these groups though there is limited documentation of this period in the literature 
(see Section 2.5; Chapter 4).  
 
The late period of the New-Order government (1986-1997) showed a more 
accommodating policy towards Islamic activists than the early period, not only 
towards those who had Islamic modernist and traditionalist orientations, but also 
towards those who expressed an ‘Islamist’ character. Islamic movements had, to 
some extent, found ways to integrate themselves into the New Order’s policy 
                                                 
66 See, for instance Mandaville, 2007. McLoughlin (2005:527) points out that the circulation of 
money, people, goods, and ideas have facilitated ‘trans-national’ movements across the borders of 
nation states. Kersten (2011) adds that, in this circulation of ideas or money, there was an ongoing 
creative process or negotiation between foreign ideas and local political, cultural, and religious ones. 
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(Effendy, 2003:195). The fact that the Muslim population comprised more than 85% 
of the overall population of Indonesia was seen as having a new significance for the 
state. In this phase, the government thus tried to ‘accommodate’ Islamists. The 
policy was regarded as representing a ‘turn to Islam’, a process started by mobilising 
Islamists at the end of the 1980s (Hefner, 2000:167), and was indeed very different 
from the approach of the regime in its early period. 
 
In this late period of the Soeharto government, a gerakan pembaharuan or ‘renewal 
movement’ emerged led by Nurcholish Madjid, known as Cak Nur. Cak Nur’s 
movement took inspiration from early-twentieth century modernism, but was critical 
of both reformists and traditionalists-conservatives in Indonesia. They instead 
appreciated the intellectual dimensions of the Islamic tradition that had been rejected 
by earlier modernist figures or movements (Bruinessen, 2013). Cak Nur also 
rejected primordial Muslim politics with his famous slogan “Islam yes, Partai Islam, 
no!” (Kersten, 2011). This movement emphasized understanding the essence of God 
and the Prophet’s message while also paying attention to context. In the 1980s, this 
movement received positive coverage from the media because they gave an Islamic 
legitimization to the New Order. The toleration of ‘accommodationists’ applied not 
only to Cak Nur, but also to his mentors Mukti Ali and Harun Nasution (see 
Munhanif, 1996; Muzani, 1994; Hassan, 1980). This renewal movement led to an 
emerging, more modernist or progressive influence among middle-class Muslims. 
 
There were also other key figures that spread similar ideas to Cak Nur. Gusdur, with 
his traditionalist background, was one of them. He did not join the renewal’s 
Nurcholish, but he actively spread ‘liberal’ Islam and influenced many young 
generations of NU (Barton, 2000). Another key figure is Munawir Syadzali (the 
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former Minister of Religious Affairs 1983-1993) with his ‘re-actualisation’ agenda; 
he emphasized the need of contextual interpretation of Quranic verses. One of the 
issues that attracted a public response was women’s share in inheritance i.e. 
According to Syadzali, women should receive an equal share with men. He argues 
that the stipulation of the Qur’an that a son should inherit twice that of a daughter is 
contradictory to the notion of justice (Hefner, 2000; Effendy, 1995).  
 
These ‘liberal’ ideas, especially those promoted by Cak Nur, were rejected by those 
in former Masyumi circles who later became key leaders of DDII. The main ideas 
rejected by Masyumi and DDII circles were: a defense of secularization, a 
legitimation of the New Order, openness toward other religions, respect for ‘local 
Islam’ (Saleh, 2001; Platzsdach, 2009). These ideas were also unacceptable to the 
Tarbiyah movement and they kept up the struggle against such ideas as we shall see 
in Chapters 4 and 6.  
 
The ‘accommodative’ attitude toward Islamists was shown by the government’s 
approval of the foundation of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals 
(Ikatan Cendikiawan Muslim Indonesia / ICMI) in December 1990 in Jakarta (Latif, 
2008; Hefner, 2000). The establishment of the ICMI showed that the government 
had neutralised their previous attitudes towards Islamism or at least viewed support 
for the ICMI as a means of balancing other Islamic forces. In this regard, the ICMI 
gained advantage from this regime’s shift (Platzdasch, 2009). The ICMI members 
were composed of new middle-class modernist and Islamist figures from the 
Masyumi family, who still favoured the idea of a shari’ah-based state and voiced 
this discourse of the Islamisation of the public sphere. Platzdasch (2009:34) points 
out that the ICMI is ‘one of organizations that have continued the Masyumi 
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tradition’. The ICMI was intended to improve the contributions that Muslim 
intellectuals could make to the government's development programmes.  
 
Another sign that the government was accommodating Islamists was the close 
relations that they built with conservative Islamist dakwah organisations such as the 
DDII and the Indonesian Committee for Islamic World Solidarity (Komite Indonesia 
untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam/KISDI)67 during 1995–1996. Soeharto’s regime 
sought support from these two dakwah organisations and, according to Hefner 
(2000), both groups happily responded to the invitation and supported the regime. 
These movements engaged so readily because it was necessary for their own 
survival and they believed that the regime would not support their dakwah activities 
(Effendy, 2003). 
 
This change in the political context and opportunities also led to the emergence of 
new Islamic social and dakwah movements and the diversification of dakwah 
approaches. Instead of focusing on formal political activities, many Muslim activists 
began to engage in socially and culturally-oriented Islam not unlike the MB in 1980s 
and 1990s Egypt. According to Feener (2007), various discourses on the 
actualisation or implementation of Islam in daily lives started to gain popularity in 
this period, and thus dakwah at the individual or private level started to grow again 
and diversify in this period. These social and dakwah movements were primarily 
initiated by educated, middle-class Muslims from secular universities and, by the 
1990s, they were actively promoting the idea of Islamisation and calling for the 
return to pristine Islam (Hilmy, 2010). Their dakwah and other social and religious 
                                                 
67 KISDI was formed by Muslim activists who were also involved in The Indonesian Council for 
Islamic preaching (DDII), and who had mostly graduated from Middle Eastern Universities. This 
organization called for militant action in the defense of Islam (Jamhari and Jahroni, 2004; Fox, 2004). 
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activities – which focused on the dissemination of Islamic principles and practices 
within the wider society – could now be performed in this political context.  
 
However, although Islamists had come to be viewed as a source of potential support 
for the Soeharto regime rather than as a threat during this later period, the policies 
that Soeharto’s regime created to accommodate them were based in his belief that 
they would support him in the 1997 election. Effendy (2003) referred to this policy 
as a ‘partial’ effort to accommodate Islam, in which Islamic legitimacy was being 
experimented with by the regime in order for it to retain control. The Soeharto 
regime used more Islamic symbols itself and issued more ‘Islamic’ policies. This 
strategy was also used in many other Muslim-majority countries in which the 
governments were happy to play with both Islamist and nationalist-secular 
movements as sources of legitimation.68 
 
In this second period of its rule, the Soeharto government strategy was thus to 
domesticate Islamists rather than to restrict their practices as they had during the 
first period, and the 1990s were considered as a crucial phase for Soeharto’s regime 
to secure its political power. Islamic organisations and leaders, including Islamists, 
were expected to be new allies to support and sustain the government. However, 
many experts, such as Robert W. Hefner (2000) and William Liddle (1992), contend 
that the military, which had been the New Order's partner for two decades, had come 
                                                 
68 Studies have found that Muslims’ governments in numerous countries have turned to Islam to 
enhance their political legitimacy and authority, as well as to mobilize popular support for their 
programmes (Esposito, 1998). Rulers such as Qaddafy (1969) in Lybia, Sadat (1970-81) in Egypt, 
Khomeini (1979-89) in Iran, al-Numayri (1968-85) in Sudan, and Zia ul-Haq (1977-88) in Pakistan 
are among those have used Islam in a variety of forms (through monarchs, military and the clergy) to 
strengthen their policies (see also, for instance, Esposito, 1998). 
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into conflict with the President.69 The President regarded this source of conflict as a 
threat that endangered his position. In addition to this threat, many people began to 
criticise the practices of Soeharto and his family for their corruption, collusion, and 
nepotism (KKN) (Effendy, 1995). The government’s decision to behave more 
accommodatingly towards the Islamists was thus driven by the weakness of 
Soeharto’s regime, and the regime’s need to curtail the growing criticism of its 
corrupt, collusive, and nepotistic practices (see Hilmy, 2010; Platzdasch, 2009).  
       
2.5 New opportunities for Islamist movements 
President Habibie, who was appointed after Soeharto’s fall in 1998, announced the 
liberalisation of Indonesia’s political system (Mietzner, 2009:252).70 This 
represented a new change in direction from the New Order government that had run 
a very tightly controlled and centralised political system. This new political 
liberalisation partially resulted from the fact that Habibie was a civilian president 
who lacked strong support from the military, and thus needed support from the 
Muslim population and its various interest groups to retain his power (Mietzner, 
2009). His policy created a political atmosphere conducive towards a free and 
democratic political system. The Habibie regime allowed all political and 
ideological groups to participate and compete in open political processes. As a 
result, numerous political parties with varying ideologies and objectives sprang up 
between June and August in 1998, only a month after the fall of the Soeharto regime 
in May (Hilmy, 2010).  
 
                                                 
69 The relation between Soeharto, the military and Islamists can also be found in Mietzner (2009) and 
Sidel (2006). 
70 Habibie was the Vice President of the New Order government in 1997-1998. He replaced Soeharto 
as President when the latter resigned from his position in 1998 due to the severe economic and 
political crisis that had gripped Indonesia.   
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Islamist groups saw this new political system as a great opportunity to establish a 
variety of dakwah organisations and political parties with Islamism as their main 
ideology. These social organisations and political parties played a role in 
implementing their religious and political programmes and thus, in this era, the 
Islamist presence within the public sphere was much more obvious than it had been 
in the final period of the New Order. Their emergence indicated that they already 
had the agenda to be involved in public affairs and politics in either direct or indirect 
ways (Meitzner, 2009). Some of these Islamists engaged in political struggles 
through Islamic political parties such as the Star Crescent Party (PBB) and the 
Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), while others did so through Islamic organisations 
such as FPI, HTI, MMI, the Communication Forum of Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jama’ah 
(FKAWJ), and the Indonesian Committee for Solidarity of the Islamic World 
(KISDI) (see Hilmy, 2010; Platzdasch, 2009; Latif, 2008). 
 
The afore-mentioned Islamic non-government organisations were very active in 
developing their dakwah programmes, primarily in campaigning for the 
formalisation of shari’ah in the state. For instance, the main aim of the 
establishment of the FPI soon after the collapse of the regime in 1998 was to 
conduct dakwah. They claim to seek ‘to command the truth and prevent sin or al-
amr bi al-ma’ruf wa an-nahy ‘an al-munkar’ (Bamualim, 2011:272). The founder of 
the FPI–Habib Rizieq Syihab – stated that ‘it was primarily founded for the purpose 
of supporting the implementation of shari’ah’ (Bamualim, 2011:273). The FPI 
approached members of parliament and Islamic political parties to implement 
shari’ah and other Islamic teachings in public life, and their dakwah movements 
within Indonesia’s public sphere became highly visible, being frequently covered by 
the national media. They attracted the media and people’s attention because public 
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places that were considered as being against shari’ah (such as cafes and night clubs) 
were attacked and destroyed by the violent and puritanical FPI (Bamualim, 2011). In 
addition, other Islamic groups – such as the Ahmadiyah, Syi’ah, and the Islam 
Liberal Network71 – also became the targets of their public, disciplinary form of 
dakwah, as these groups were regarded as being ‘deviants’ and ‘non-Islamic’. The 
FPI believe that all Muslims are obliged to implement shari’ah in every aspect of 
their lives.  
 
Like the FPI, the Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) was re-launched publicly in this 
transitional era.72 The spokesperson of HTI – Ismail Yusanto – reported that the HTI 
has conducted dakwah activities and programmes since the 1980s, but because of 
the limitations and regulations that the New Order regime imposed during the 1980s, 
this revolutionary but non-violent organisation arranged their programmes secretly 
for their loyal members during this period (see Section 2.4), only beginning public 
activities after the fall of the authoritarian regime (Jamhari and Jahroni, 2004). The 
core idea behind the establishment of the Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia was the same as 
that behind Hizb ut-Tahrir per se – to re-build the Islamic caliphate (khilafah 
Islamiyah) (see Taji-Farouki, 1996). Masdar Hilmy --who focuses his study on three 
Islamic organizations in Indonesia, namely (1) MMI; (2) HTI; and (3) PKS --, 
categorises the HTI as utopian Islamism because “they are obsessed with 
establishing an ideal state of being and an ideal community based on religion. Yet 
utopia is more than mere imagination”. (2010:7-8). The HTI believes that Islam, as 
practiced by the Prophet and his companions (sahabat), is the system that should be 
                                                 
71The Islam Liberal Network (JIL) represents the most outspoken critical opposition to a literalist 
interpretation of Islam. Research on this organization has been conducted by Ali Nurdin (2005).   
72 HTI is a political movement founded in 1982. It connected to the international Hizbut Tahrir 
founded by Taqiuddin al-Nabhani (1909-1977) (see Hilmy, 2010). 
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implemented by all Muslims in the world, including in Indonesia (Hilmy, 2010). 
 
Another Islamic organisation that was founded after Soeharto’s fall was the 
Communication Forum of Ahl Sunnah wa Al Jama’ah (FKAWJ). FKAWJ was 
founded by Ja’far Umar Talib in February 1999, and its creation was motivated by 
the political and economic crisis in 1998. The forum promoted Islamic doctrines, in 
particular shari’ah, as the solution for this multi-layered crisis. FKAWJ was also 
concerned with supporting Muslims who were engaged in conflict with Christians in 
areas like Ambon (Hilmy, 2010; Jamhari and Jahroni, 2004).   
 
In August 1999 Abu Bakar Ba’asyir (b. 1938) launched MMI, which was based on 
his ideology. He was widely known in Indonesia for actively opposing the 
government for being secular and anti-Islam, and he was banned from forming any 
political organisations by the Soeharto government because of his criticisms of them 
(Hilmy, 2010). After this, he left for Malaysia, claiming that Indonesia was no 
longer conducive to his dakwah movement. Soon after the fall of the Soeharto 
regime, Ba’asyir returned to Indonesia and established a new organisation for 
continuing his dakwah movement, and he criticises the government for its ‘secular’ 
status to this day (Hilmy, 2010). The previous government, led by President Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2014), considered Ba’asyir to be involved in many 
radical Islam movements,73 and maintained that they had enough evidence to prove 
his involvement in terrorist actions. 
 
Although these organisations have different characters, they share the dakwah 
                                                 
73  On 6 June 2011, Ba’asyir was re-sentenced to 15 years in prison, being convicted of supporting a 
Jihadi training camp was actively involved in al-Qaeda activities in Southeast Asia, especially in 
Indonesia. (www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/08/09, accessed on 5 January 2013). 
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tendency to Islamise the state, from promoting the formalisation of shari’ah to 
adopting a literal understanding of Islam. They believe that Muslims should practise 
only the pure and pristine form of Islam implemented by the Prophet Muhammad 
and his Companions (Salaf), and thus use Islam in the Indonesian public sphere to 
promote this end.  
 
As Meuleman (2011) has pointed out, a variety of dakwah movements and dakwah 
activities performed by Islamic organisations address different groups of Muslims.74 
Nevertheless, according to Azyumardi Azra (2010), these organisations exert only a 
limited influence among Indonesian Muslims. The new type of dakwah movement 
which is more active and aggressive has attracted only small numbers of Muslims, 
who are generally young and from urban and secular educational backgrounds. 
Older organisations, such as the Muhammadiyah, PERSIS (Persatuan Islam) and the 
NU, have very strong ties with their large numbers of followers.  
 
The new Islamic organisations above are only some examples of institutions, 
organisations and political parties that were established in Indonesia after the fall of 
the Soeharto regime. These groups have sought to create a better climate for their 
political, social and religious expressions based on their religious interpretations. 
They thus came to regard the Habibie period as the time for them to speak up for 
their rights and freedoms, and did so through their organisations and political 
parties. These organisations competed, not only with each other in spreading their 
dakwah messages and influence in the public sphere, but also with old dakwah 
organisations such as the Muhammadiyah, PERSIS, and the NU. Moreover, they not 
                                                 
74 See Johan Meuleman’s article “Dakwah, Competition for Authority and Development” (2011). 
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only competed in seeking sympathetic ears from Indonesian Muslims in general, but 
also from the international Muslim community (Meuleman, 2011).  
 
The Tarbiyah movement, to which we turn our attention in Chapter 4, was one of 
the organisations that took advantage of the 1998 change of power as a political 
opportunity to build an Islamist party, which it named the Prosperous Party (PK). (It 
then changed its name to the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in 2004.) This more 
democratic political setting provided the movement and many others with an 
enlarged public space in which to advance its religious and political views and 
communicate its dakwah messages to Indonesian audiences. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
The idea of Islamism arose among revivalist Muslims in a period in which 
Indonesian leaders were competing to establish a nation-state. The rising voices of 
those campaigning for ‘secular’ nation-states in the pre-independence period caused 
the crystallisation of Islamist ideas. Islamic leaders were concerned with the place of 
shari’ah and Islamic identity in the state, and inevitably there were contests between 
secularist and Islamic groups over the appropriate form that the state should take.  
 
The emergence of Islamism in Indonesia had a similar pattern to that which it 
showed within other parts of the Islamic world. In Turkey and Egypt, for instance, 
Islamism appeared as a response that revivalist groups took to the modernisation 
programmes of the government, which they perceived to be replacing shari’ah with 
Western political, legal and economic systems.  
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The relationship between Islam and the state has continued to be the most important 
of issues contested by Islamists, from the Old Order through to the New Order 
government. The Islamists remain committed to the necessity of applying shari’ah 
as state law and this, indeed, has become their main dakwah message. For Islamists, 
the formalisation of shari’ah is regarded as a Muslim political right in Indonesia. 
According to Islamists, this is because Muslims represent the majority of the 
Indonesian population and, as such, have made the most significant contributions to 
the development of the country since its early history. Islamists believe that in the 
colonial period, Islam became the main symbol of resistance to the oppressors. 
Many experts, such as Noer (1978), have asserted that the pivotal dakwah message 
of the Islamic movement in the colonial period was the call for Indonesian Muslims 
to be united under the concept of Islamic nationhood and to fight against the colonial 
state.  
 
Islamist figures preferred to use a cultural approach to deliver their dakwah 
messages under the repressive New Order government as they were forbidden to 
conduct their dakwah in the political domain. The government was suspicious of 
them, regarding Islamism in any form as a threat to the Indonesian modern nation-
state. For this reason, many Islamist figures not only changed their political 
approaches, but also transformed the dakwah message to individual piety in place of 
the formalisation of shari’ah. However, the Islamic social organisations established 
by these Islamic figures received more space within the public sphere when the New 
Order government needed their political support to counter the threats from military 
figures that they faced at the end of the 1980s.    
 
Islamist ideologies were developed and implemented more thoroughly within the 
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more democratic political system that emerged after the downfall of the New Order 
in Indonesia in 1998, with the ‘reform era’75 marking the beginning of the 
democratisation process in Indonesia. In this period, many significant changes in 
Indonesia’s social and political systems were brought about through the introduction 
of political policies that supported the emergence of new organisations and political 
parties.  
 
Democracy provided people with freedom of expression, and Islamists saw it as an 
opportunity to play a more significant role in public life. As a result, many Islamic 
organisations and parties emerged in this period, including the Prosperous Justice 
Party (PKS). The PKS was established by the Tarbiyah community, which had 
existed since the beginning of the 1980s, and believed that Islam should govern both 
individuals’ ways of lives and behaviours and the running of the state. The PKS 
wanted to implement shari’ah, not only in relation to the social and cultural aspects 
of lives, but also within the political arena of Indonesia. They thus decided to pursue 
the Islamisation of Indonesia from the individual, family, and societal level through 
to the state level.  
                                                 
75 In the history of Indonesia, ‘the reform era’ (Indonesian: reformasi) is the term widely used for the 
post 1998 era. It was called the ‘reform’ era due to the more liberal social and political conditions that 
it introduced into Indonesia.  
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Chapter 3  
Research Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters developed a conceptual and historical contextual framework 
for exploring Islamism and dakwah in Indonesia. This chapter describes the 
methodological approaches used and issues arising from this project. The main 
research questions this project asks are: 1) how is dakwah conceptualised and how 
has it been developed and transformed by the leaders of the Tarbiyah movement 
within the changing social and political dynamics of Indonesian society and how do 
members respond to this?; 2) how does the Liqo, as the main vehicle for the dakwah 
activities in the Tarbiyah movement, fit into the overall structure and ideology of the 
Tarbiyah movement, and how do its members at the lower levels of the 
organisational hierarchy perceive the relationship between the Liqo, the Tarbiyah  
movement, and the PKS party?; and 3) how do female Liqo members experience, 
and to what extent do they subsequently practice, the dakwah received through 
weekly sessions? This chapter explains the choice of the research methods selected 
to collect the data to answer these questions, as well as the processes used to analyse 
that data. It also engages with other relevant issues thrown up by this study in 
relation to questions of researcher reflexivity and research ethics.  
 
The Introduction provided a general outline of the methodology used in this thesis, 
and this chapter elaborates on that discussion whilst showing that appropriate 
procedures and processes were followed. I provide my reflections not only on the 
methods that I used, but also on the challenges that I faced and the lessons that I 
learned in my five months of ethnographic fieldwork, conducted between September 
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2012 and January 2013 in Jakarta. To elucidate on this fieldwork experience, the 
chapter has been organised around four main discussion areas: 1) research processes 
and methods, 2) data collection techniques, 3) ethical issues and subjectivity, and 4) 
data analysis and interpretation.  
 
I will begin by discussing the methodology in relation to my research questions. An 
account detailing which research methods were selected for data collection and why 
will then be provided. This will be followed by a discussion of how my own 
perspective may have influenced my investigations and interpretations of the data, 
and an examination of the ethical issues that arose in conducting the study. Finally, a 
discussion of the use of reflexivity in analysing and interpreting the data during the 
conducting and writing up of the research will be provided.  
 
3.2 Research processes and methods 
I decided that this research would be best undertaken using both inductive and 
deductive methods. Its inductive component involved leaving the research open-
ended in order to capture any new concepts and understandings that emerged during 
the data analysis, which can help to bring new insights to studies (Merriam, 1998). It 
is deductive in the sense that it started with a theoretical framework on Islamism and 
dakwah and a list of research questions to keep the research focused on the case 
study and the research topic, as well as to capture any contrasting views between the 
existing literature and the perspectives provided by the participants (Yin, 2009).  
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An ethnographic approach was chosen in order to capture the social meanings and 
activities of people involved in the dakwah movement under study.76 This 
ethnographic approach also allowed me to observe people in their dakwah settings 
and to participate in their dakwah activities. As I planned to study the dakwah of the 
Liqo-Tarbiyah movement and, as McGuire (2008), Mahmood (2005) or Blaxter et 
al. (2001) might put it, the ‘lived or felt’ religious experiences of its members, a 
qualitative methodology seemed the most appropriate one to adopt. Qualitative 
methods are useful for exploring areas “where previous understanding appears 
inadequate or insufficient to make sense of complex situations and shifting 
phenomena” (Richards and Morse, 2007:29), or where people’s constructions of 
meanings have not previously been explored (Hassard, 1990). This research method 
is also appropriate for generating in-depth data (Bryman, 2008). Thus, this method 
was adopted because it was deemed to be suitable for uncovering the values, 
opinions, attitudes and beliefs of the dakwah community of the Liqo-Tarbiyah 
movement.  
 
Ethnographic research uses case studies to produce focused and natural research,77 
and the current research involves a case study of female Liqo activists, using both 
the more informally-organised Liqo group that I studied and other Liqo groups that I 
interviewed, together with a study of more formal and official perspectives (cf. 
Wiktorowicz 2001; 2004). The Liqo group that I studied was one for new recruits, 
and it was important to observe such a group as I wanted to examine the lived 
experiences of members in terms of how they became interested in joining the Liqo, 
                                                 
76 According to Brewer, “Ethnography is the study of people in naturally occurring settings or ‘fields’ 
by methods of data collection which capture their social meanings and ordinary activities, involving 
the researcher participating directly in the setting, if not also the activities, in order to collect data in a 
systematic manner but without meaning being imposed on them externally” (2000:6). 
77 The case study approach is one of the five basic research approaches outlined by Bryman 
(2008:33–55). 
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how they moved from being outside the Liqo to its core, and how their ‘dakwah 
journey’ continued within the movement.  
 
The appropriateness of my choice of the case study approach is further supported by 
Yin (2009), who argues that such approaches are very useful for describing, 
understanding, and explaining contemporary phenomena within their real-life 
contexts. Moreover, Gerring (2007) claims that it is generally more suitable for a 
piece of qualitative research to employ a single case study than multiple ones. While 
I still needed to put the PKS dakwah in its wider religious and political context in 
Indonesia, a single case study allowed me to examine also one element of the PKS 
dakwah – the weekly Liqo sessions. Furthermore, this was an exploratory study to 
answer questions of the form ‘what is going on’ and ‘is there any relationship 
between one variable and another’ (Bouma and Atkinson, 1995).78    
 
Case studies are frequently criticised on the grounds of “the credibility of 
generalizations made from their findings” (Denscombe, 2003:39). However, my 
research does not claim to represent all the Liqo programmes of the PKS in 
Indonesia. Gerring (2007) has criticised the case study method for not perfectly 
representing the population but, nevertheless, a case study can be seen as a single 
representation of a wider group (Denscombe, 2003). In my opinion, it is important to 
see the case study as an approach that is concerned with in-depth research into a 
particular event or organisation. The approach that I have adopted does not aim to 
generalise findings, but rather focuses on the way a specific group of people see 
particular issues. By engaging with the general discourse of the dakwah movement 
                                                 
78 According to Merriam (1998), a case study should be understood as an analysis of defined single 
units or systems. Gerring (2007) says that studying a single case in a research project is more 
intensive than studying multiple cases.      
110 
 
and using publicly available literature, my research adopts an approach that has been 
referred to by Stake (1995:8) as ‘particularisation’. Thus, in terms of the debate on 
methodological divides in the social-scientific study of religion, I adopt a 
‘particulariser’ rather than a ‘generaliser’ position (Spickard and Landres, 2002).  
 
My research explores the meaning of dakwah, both conceptually and practically, “to 
the particular individuals I interview, [in terms of] how they make sense of it, and 
how they use it to make sense of their world” (Spickard and Landres, 2002:2). I seek 
to understand the Liqo community of the Tarbiyah movement/PKS concerning 
particular issues that they teach in their weekly Liqo sessions and encounter during 
their interactions with other Liqo cadres. Using this framework, I did not attempt to 
understand their whole society, but instead “listened, watched, questioned, thought 
and listened again to make sense of my informants’ lives” (Spickard and Landres, 
2002:3). As McGuire (2008) observes individuals’ lived religious experiences, 
expressions and practices are complex and dynamic. I concur with her claim that, “at 
the level of individual, religion is not fixed, unitary, or even coherent” (McGuire, 
2008: 210). Thus, part of this research involves examining how the dakwah 
ideologies of the Tarbiyah movement are understood, practised, experienced, and 
expressed by the female cadres in the context of their everyday lives in the wider 
context of Indonesia. The case study is expected to provide an analytical point of 
view for comparing empirical findings in which propositions and theories are 
revised and/or rejected (Yin, 2009), and thus aims to contribute to the accumulation 
of knowledge within a given field (Collins, 2003).  
 
The ‘weaknesses’ of the case study approach outlined above can be mitigated 
through well-planned research and sampling. For example, I chose purposive 
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sampling to produce the primary data for my case study. According to Rubin and 
Rubin (2005), it is necessary for the researcher to select a good sampling strategy in 
order for the chosen sample to accurately reflect the lived reality of those she is 
studying, and to ensure that the full range of relevant views and experiences are 
accounted for. Qualitative researchers frequently choose purposive sampling 
because they can select their respondents based on their research needs. Bouma and 
Atkinson (2005) stress that purposive sampling allows the researcher to select 
‘typical’ samples for his or her research project, and it was employed here to 
identify respondents who could provide multiple perspectives on the research topics 
under study. Thus, the interviewees and participants selected for this study were 
chosen on the basis of their ability to give relevant and valuable information on the 
concept and practice of the dakwah adopted by the Liqo-Tarbiyah movement of the 
PKS in Jakarta.  
 
The sampling targeted mentors and students from the weekly Liqo sessions to give 
information on lived experiences, as well as high-ranking members of the PKS, 
including the Head of the shari’ah council (DSP), the Head of the Advisory Council 
(MPP), other influential figures from the Liqo-PKS and first generation Liqo 
activists (as-Saabiquun al-Awwaluun), to provide me with first-hand information on 
official aspects of the movement’s dakwah. However, because accessing and making 
appointments with these high-ranking officials involved a long and difficult process, 
requiring recommendations from third parties, I decided to use snowball sampling as 
well. This was employed to identify potential interviewees who were unknown to 
me through recommendations.79 However, I did not identify participants merely on 
                                                 
79 According to Patton (1990), snowball sampling is one of the various types of purposive sampling, 
along with convenience sampling and critical case sampling. 
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the basis of recommendations, but after consideration of the criteria of my research 
(see Section 3.3.2).  
 
3.3 The application of research methods  
Having outlined the design of the research process and the methods adopted to carry 
the research out, this section will now explain how each method was applied within 
my research. As interview and observation are the most effective and well-
established techniques for generating qualitative data, these were the main tools used 
for data collection in this research. Using these techniques, I aimed to understand the 
official perspectives and lived experiential aspects of those involved in the research 
– the leaders, mentors, and trainees of the weekly Liqo sessions – and to construct 
explanations and understandings of the weekly Liqo sessions and other dakwah 
events, such as dawrah (lectures) (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). To investigate the 
discrepancies between official and lived experience of dakwah discourse and 
practice, I also reviewed official texts associated with the Liqo-Tarbiyah movement 
and conducted focus group discussions (FGDs; see section 3.3.4 below). The 
triangulation of methods, namely interviews, observation, reviewing texts, and focus 
group discussions, was used to corroborate my findings across different sorts of data 
and also to spot gaps in the evidence base. As Bryman (2008:379) maintains: 
“ethnographers often check out their observations with interview questions”. As we 
shall see in 3.3.4 below triangulation made my research more robust, validating the 
data gathered from a variety of sources in response to the possible limitations that 
could emerge from using only one approach. 
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3.3.1 Review of written sources  
As my project aimed to locate any differences between the official discourse of the 
Liqo-Tarbiyah movement of the PKS and the lived religious experiences of its 
members, the official documents and publications of the movement were used as a 
source of data. These official discourses can be found in books that collect leaders’ 
speeches from a variety of dakwah events. Examples of such books that I accessed 
are: Dari Qiyadah untuk Para Kader; KH Hilmy Aminuddin (DPP PKS, 2007a), Seri 
Pemikiran Anis Matta; Integrasi Politik dan Dakwah (DPP PKS, 2007b); Dakwah 
adalah Perubahan ke arah yang Lebih Baik; and Bunga Rampai Pemikiran Tiffatul 
Sembiring (DPP PKS, 2007c). Official discourse can also be found in other official 
records, publications, and public forms of discourse that include the vision, 
ideologies, structure, and objectives of Tarbiyah/PKS dakwah. Moreover, the 
discourse and conceptual foundations of this dakwah movement is contained in a 
variety of archives, such as dakwah syllabi (Manhaj Tarbiyah, 2005), the official 
religious guidance and decisions of the movement (fatawa); and in party guideline 
books, brochures, posters, and pamphlets. However, not all archives were open to 
me, especially those relating to the early periods of Tarbiyah movement in the 1980s 
and 1990s. My thesis is limited in this way because the Tarbiyah movement has not 
yet produced or published any official texts about their movement in that early 
period. The archives that can be accessed relate only to the period of the PK(S), i.e. 
after 1998. This includes the version of the Manhaj Tarbiyah (2005) manual that I 
have used as the main reference for explaining the weekly Liqo ideology and its 
Liqo lessons in Section 5.3. These contemporary publications are produced by the 
PKS to (retrospectively) narrate and position the history of their dakwah movement 
in relation to its current development. Various academic research projects, such as 
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journal articles and theses or dissertations written by ‘insiders’ of the movement 
have also helped to build my understanding of the movement but based on a limited 
archive this remains a partial account.  
 
Given the importance that these official written resources have for my research, I 
started analysing them from the beginning of my study. My review of this written 
literature provided me with relevant information and the ‘clues’ that I needed to 
explore and examine the movement further during my fieldwork (Stake, 1995). 
Together with a background knowledge on the topic, this helped in understanding 
the development of dakwah in the Liqo-Tarbiyah movement of the PKS, including 
its private and public dimensions. This background knowledge on the subject area 
helped my fieldwork to become more productive, providing many opportunities to 
actively respond to the participants’ answers during interviews, observation and 
focus group discussions. During the review of these written sources, I took every 
opportunity to check the information on dakwah events organised by the PKS 
through their website and through newspaper coverage.80 This media coverage 
provided a useful and relevant resource to use for engaging its members during 
interviews. For example, in several interviews, I opened the conversation by asking 
the participants about the latest newspaper coverage of the PKS’s dakwah 
movement. This helped me, as a researcher, to overcome the formal structure of the 
‘questions and answers’ session.  I used these written data sources for researching 
the official aspects of the movement’s dakwah. The purpose of analysing these 
written texts was also to expand my personal horizons on the research topic 
(Bryman, 2008). This was necessary for enabling me to develop a wide knowledge 
                                                 
80 The official website of the PKS is www.pk-sejahtera.com. An example of newspaper coverage is 
www.thejakartapost.com/channel/national, accessed in 20 September 2012.   
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and a good understanding of the topic and the local setting of the research (Holstein 
and Gubrium 1995).   
 
It is worth mentioning finally, here, that all these primary texts were written in the 
Indonesian language. Quotations from these texts were all my own translations and 
not those of the authors. This raises a methodological question about the extent to 
which my translations provide a full and accurate sense of the intended meaning of 
their original statements, a point on which there is some relevant literature in other 
fields of qualitative research (see, for example, Temple and Young 2004; van Nes et 
al 2010).81 In general, my approach was to rigorously double-check words and their 
meanings with other publications and going back to the original fieldwork record 
and sometimes back to my respondents as necessary. Overall, I feel confident that I 
have accurately reflected the meaning of the original statements. 
 
3.3.2 Semi-structured interviews 
My research aims to discover how the Liqo of the Tarbiyah movement of the PKS 
was conceptualised, and how the movement practises and organises its dakwah 
ideology and strategy. As the interview is the most popular and effective technique 
used for qualitative research, I adopted it to examine the worldviews of the PKS 
members (Bouma and Atkinson, 1995). I chose to conduct semi-structured 
                                                 
81 According to this literature, the key problem of translating non-English data into English is the loss 
of the meaning of the original statements (van Nes et al, 2010). To try to avoid this and keep the 
research valid, some procedures are suggested: (1)To keep the record of all fieldwork data in the 
source language. Thus, in the situation where the choice of words is not fully suitable to express the 
intended meaning, this retained record of the original words would be useful, especially when in later 
phases the translation need to be adapted. So, in my case of analysing the data, I kept going back to 
the original words in Indonesian so I can get the meaning and the feeling of the word. (2)To be 
supported by a professional translator or proofreader. In my case, I did use a professional proofreader 
to cover myself for two situations: firstly, to discuss some points in the text when I was not really 
sure about whether an English word was suitable or not and secondly, to check the validity of my 
own interpretation. 
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interviews as they facilitated a fully open discussion with the interviewees, whilst 
allowing me to focus on the main research themes (Bryman, 2008). This technique 
enabled me to gather official statements from the leaders of the Liqo-Tarbiyah 
movement as well as to develop the perspectives of members of the movement 
based on their particular lived experiences. Both the official and lived experiences’ 
aspects of the data gathered from the interviews are important for my research.  
 
In order to elicit diverse responses and perspectives from both the official and lived 
experiential discourses, I interviewed people from a range of different positions in 
the Liqo-Tarbiyah movement’s hierarchy, comprising the top rank (ten past and 
present leaders of PKS/the Liqo), the middle rank (twelve mentors or murabbi of the 
Liqo that trained the students in the weekly dakwah sessions) and the lower rank 
(twelve trainees or mutarabbi who regularly joined the Liqo sessions), together with 
nine PKS and non-PKS ‘public’ scholars/activists and two ex-Liqo/PKS trainees. 
These different ranks and positions marked one of the criteria for selecting the 
participants, apart from gender and locality. My reviews of the written resources on 
the movement and the broader literature on global Islamism informed me that the 
activists of almost all the Islamist dakwah movements are typically young graduates 
from non-religious educational backgrounds (non-shar’i) (see Chapter 5). However, 
because I knew from my reading that gender segregation is practised within their 
dakwah activity, I tried to strike a balance between male (19 respondents) and 
female respondents (26 respondents), as their experiences in attending the Liqo-
Tarbiyah sessions were likely to raise different issues.  
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Table 1: Different positions/ranks of respondents 
No Roles Number 
1. Leaders 10 
2. Mentors 12 
3. Trainees 12 
4. Ex-trainees 2 
5. Public scholars/activists 9 
 TOTAL 45 Respondents (Female: 26; Male:19) 
Source, Author, 2015. 
 
Out of the forty-five interviewees, most of the leaders and scholars were ones that I 
had identified at the beginning of my study, while half of the mentors and 
participants of the Liqo were suggested by the Liqo-PKS leaders or mentors as being 
appropriate for my research, and the other half were identified and recruited by me, 
mainly on the basis of their involvement in the Liqo programmes. Although the 
majority of the Tarbiyah community are typically from secular educational 
backgrounds, I managed to interview leaders and mentors with both secular 
educational backgrounds (16 with non-shar’i educational backgrounds) and Islamic 
educational backgrounds (6 with shar’i educational backgrounds).82  
 
The trainees of the Liqo programmes (Mutarabbi) were identified on the basis of 
two main criteria – amount of experience working in the Liqo programmes and 
holding a college or university level education. For the female trainees of the Liqo 
group that I observed, the first criterion could not be applied because they had only 
                                                 
82 The shar’i education mentors had mainly graduated from Islamic institutions in Saudi Arabia, 
Egypt and Indonesia. The non-shar’i education mentors had graduated from ‘secular’ campuses in 
the West and Indonesia (see Chapter 5).  
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just joined the Liqo. Most of the trainees I interviewed, however, were very active in 
the Liqo, with at least ten years’ experience. I also met two trainees with only two 
years’ experience in the Liqo programmes, and three female trainees who had quit 
Liqo programmes as a result of dissatisfaction (see Chapters 5 and 6). The majority 
of Liqo trainees had completed undergraduate degrees at universities, and only one 
of them had not gone beyond senior high school. They mostly came from ‘secular’ 
universities, with only five having religious school backgrounds from Islamic state 
schools or universities or Islamic traditional boarding schools (Pesantren).  
 
During the interviews, I was also concerned with the economic and social status of 
the trainees. This factor was taken into consideration in examining whether they had 
social or economic motivations apart from their religious interests (see Chapters 5 
and 6). During my fieldwork planning I attempted to balance the number of women 
and men I would interview so that I could explore whether women had the same 
level of access to religious education as men, in particular to the weekly Liqo 
religious programmes run by the PKS (see Chapter 6). During the actual fieldwork, 
however, women were more accessible to me than men because of my own gender. I 
successfully interviewed nine women (Murabbiyah) but only three men (Murabbi) 
from the mentor level, and eleven women (Mutarabbiyah) and one man (Mutarabbi) 
from the trainee level. Nevertheless, these figures were useful, as I was mainly 
interested in exploring the women’s experiences and feelings regarding the Liqo.  
 
Scholars were identified and recruited as participants because of their knowledge of 
the Tarbiyah movement’s dakwah or the dakwah ideology of the PKS. Their 
expertise was assessed from their academic achievements and publications, such as 
books, journal articles and PhD dissertations. These contributors gave me useful 
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insights not only into my research themes but also into practical issues based on 
their research experience. It was easier to make appointments with scholars and ex-
Liqo trainees as they responded positively after initial contact was made via email or 
Short Messages Services (SMS).  
 
Figure 1 The dakwah centre or Markaz Dakwah (MD) of DPP-PKS, Jakarta   
 
Source: A female respondent, used with her permission, October 2014.  
 
The interviews with the leaders and senior mentors of the Liqo took place mainly in 
the PKS central office (DPP-PKS)83 and the PKS Fraction Office at Parliament 
House.84 The interviews with the PKS Liqo trainees were mostly held either in their 
                                                 
83 The DPP-PKS is often referred to as the Markaz ad-Dakwah (MD), or the Dakwah Centre. It is the 
national head quarters of the PKS, and is located on the main road of Simatupang in South-Jakarta. 
During my fieldwork, I visited this office once or twice a week to meet PKS/Tarbiyah activists and 
leaders.   
84 The PKS Fraction Office is located on the 3rd and 4th floor of the Indonesian Parliament House in 
Jakarta. The PKS has participated in four general elections – in 1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014. In the 
most recent election in 2014, they received 6.92 % of the popular vote. This represented a decline in 
votes from the 2009 general election, which saw them receive 7.88% of the popular vote. In 2014, 
they came fourth out of all the parties (nationalist-secular and Islamist parties) that participated in the 
election, and first among Islamist parties. There are 59 PKS parliament members working in this 
Fraction Office, and a large number of staff assists each member. In the 2004 general election, the 
party tripled its votes from the previous election to 7.34%, receiving almost seven times as many 
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local dakwah offices or their houses, while the interviews with scholars were mostly 
held at their campuses in Jakarta. However, I also visited smaller cities near Jakarta 
– such as Bekasi, Tangerang, and Depok (‘dormitory towns’) – to interview scholars 
and trainees.85  
 
Jakarta was chosen as the main field site because it is distinctive in terms of its Liqo-
Tarbiyah populations and PKS cadre configurations in general. Jakarta is well 
known for Tarbiyah population growth compared to other cities in Indonesia. Rural 
migrants move from their hometown to Jakarta for studying or work. As a result, it 
provided me with a good resource for securing accounts of lived experiences of 
religion from female members of the Liqo-Tarbiyah movement of the PKS, 
particularly in terms of respondents who were able to comment on modern and 
secular issues, and on how to combine such outlooks with their Islamic identities 
(see Chapter 6). Because the National Headquarters (DPP) of the PKS is located in 
Jakarta, this also gave me the opportunity to attempt to elicit an official perspective 
about dakwah from high-ranking members of the movement. Jakarta’s status as a 
multicultural, heterogenous, and complex city impacted on my research. Given its 
status as the centre for public discourses on religion, politics, and dakwah in 
Indonesia, this enabled me to relatively easily up-date my information regarding 
such issues. From a practical point of view, Jakarta also represented a good choice, 
because it is where I live and work, which made my fieldwork easier and more 
manageable.  
 
                                                                                                                                         
seats in parliament as they won in 1999, with three ministry positions. In 1999, the PK (the previous 
name of PKS) only received 1.36 % of the vote and failed to achieve the parliamentary electoral 
threshold. (The results of the general election are provided by the General Election Committee at 
www.kpu.go.id, accessed in December 2014; Platzdasch, 2009). 
85 A dormitory town is a place from which many people travel in order to work in a bigger town or 
city. 
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Although the fieldwork was concentrated in Jakarta, ‘neighbouring’ cities such as 
Depok, Tangerang and Bekasi were also visited when required.86 For example, I 
visited these cities to interview five senior activists and leaders of the Tarbiyah 
movement, either at their houses or at public dakwah events that they were holding 
in these cities. Although these three cities are smaller than Jakarta, they are very 
popular for religious activities, showing an increasing use of symbols representing 
Islamic identity within the public sphere, such as the application of the regulation 
called the formalisation of shari’ah, which requires women to wear a headscarf. 
These cities were thus helpful in terms of providing an understanding of the main 
field site, and the wider context of dakwah in the Tarbiyah movement.  
 
All forty-five interviews were conducted face-to-face. I had initially planned to 
conduct all the interviews on a one-to-one basis, but six of the interviewees with 
senior leaders were accompanied by an additional person, usually the interviewee’s 
secretary or staff. In each case this was to satisfy Islamic/ist norms of gender adab 
(manners/propriety/ethics) (see also section 3.5 below). As the interviewee’s junior 
the secretary or staff were not involved in the exchange apart from one instance of 
an unrelated and non-confidential conversation between an interviewee and a 
member of his staff. I did not record or transcribe this and have made no use of it in 
my thesis. The duration of each interview varied depending on interviewees’ 
responses and availability, ranging from 45 minutes to 2 hours. Approximately half 
of the interviewees were very open and happy to carry on talking,87 while the other 
half were more restricted in the answers they gave. The latter sometimes claimed to 
                                                 
86 These three cities contain a variety of religions and ethnicities. However, Muslims are still the most 
dominant religious group in each. The PKS has significant influence in these cities, as shown by the 
fact that its local leaders came from the PKS dakwah party background.  
87 The interviews that contained the best responses were mostly followed up by an informal 
discussion about my research topic and a conversation about family or academic life. 
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be ‘very busy’ but were also slow or unwilling to answer my questions the 
particulars of dakwah approaches and the relatively ‘closed’ and ‘committed’ culture 
of the Liqo. 
 
The interview questions covered three broad areas: the dakwah history and ideology 
of the Tarbiyah movement and its transition into a political party (PKS); the role of 
the Liqo in the structure and dakwah ideology of the Tarbiyah movement; and the 
lived experiences of female Liqo members, including their reception of the themes 
taught in the weekly Liqo sessions with reference to the discussion of private 
religiosity and how it links to public or political issues. These three areas were 
drawn from the main research questions on the private and public dimensions of the 
dakwah adopted by the Tarbiyah movement/PKS, together with the discussion on 
official and lived religion. Before the interviews, I rehearsed the main research 
question and the three broad areas of questions numerous times, and developed them 
into detailed questions both prior to and during the interviews.88  
 
There were different emphases in the questions that were directed at those who held 
leadership positions as compared to mentors or trainees. For example, I posed 
detailed questions concerning policy, ideology, history, organisational structure, 
religious decisions (fatawa), and other issues relating to official discourses to the 
leaders of the movement. With Liqo activists (mentors and trainees), I focused on 
their religious experiences of joining the Liqo, and their understanding and reception 
of dakwah ideology and Liqo lessons.  
                                                 
88 For each group of interviewees, I prepared ten questions using the main research questions and the 
three broad areas of questions. However, there were about five questions in common for all 
interviewee groups, such as those concerning their personal experiences and opinions about dakwah. 
I assumed that every interviewee had a particular opinion of dakwah based on her own experiences 
that differed from the official conceptualisation of dakwah provided in the dakwah manuals (Manhaj 
Tarbiyah, 2005).  
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Several relevant themes emerged through the broad range of questions utilised for 
the semi-structured interviews. This allowed other issues to come to the fore, such as 
questions about the political strategies the PKS adopted as a response to the election 
of Jakarta’s governor and the Presidential election.89 Questions on this topic were 
relevant to my research because many ideological issues arose during the 2012 
election period in Jakarta regarding how their dakwah appeared to the public (see 
Chapter 6).  
 
I started each interview session by trying to put the participants at ease through 
discussing their current jobs and responsibilities, their educational and family 
backgrounds, their stories of how they became involved with the Liqo-Tarbiyah 
movement, and their opinions on certain public issues related to both their dakwah 
and political movements. This strategy was useful for helping the respondents to feel 
relaxed and to feel that they could express their opinions in a natural way. However, 
for the leaders, who were familiar with public discourses, I decided to go straight 
into my questions out of consideration for their time limitations. During the 
interviews, I was aware of being sensitive about the sentiments of the interviewees. I 
carefully chose suitable phrases for the questions for different interviewees in 
different situations, being aware of the need to be very humble, polite, formal and 
wise on some occasions, but more relaxed and flexible on others.90  
                                                 
89 The latest ‘hot’ issue was about an allegation of corruption that had been made about the President 
of the PKS. LHI, the president of PKS, was arrested by the Corruption Eradication Commissions 
(KPK) for using his position and influence to secure a lucrative government contract for the import of 
Australian beef for a private company (see the article written by Endy Bayuni: “Can Indonesia’s main 
Islamist Party Recover from Scandal?”). Many debates and discussions emerged in response to the 
case that was reported in January 2013. As the well-known PKS slogan ‘clean, caring and 
professional’ suggests, the PKS is very active in campaigning against corruption in Indonesia. 
Moreover, they have a very strong agenda on Islamising the society and the state. This corruption 
case shocked the PKS party as well as the wider Indonesian people.      
90 The phrases used in the interviews with older interviewees were different to those used with 
younger ones. I used different phrases because this is part of the ethics (adab) of how to show respect 
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I recorded all except two of the interviews digitally, with the exceptions being the 
result of a noisy background, and for these I took notes manually. These interviews 
were all conducted in the Indonesian language (bahasa) of which I am a native 
speaker. I also took notes when appropriate during the other interviews. I found 
note-taking was very convenient, time-saving and straightforward for me and, of 
course, it was seen as respectful by some interviewees (Blaxter et al., 2001). The 
notes were not only used to write up my research question-related themes, but also 
to record my personal reflexive feelings about the events, circumstances and people 
that I interviewed, for example, when I was upset about the attitude of particular 
leaders to the fact I had studied at a Western university (see section 3.5 below). Not 
all notes, however, were taken in full during interviews as it would have distracted 
the flow of the interview. Rather, some additional and more expansive notes were 
also written up afterwards. Notes were also helpful to me in preparing ideas and 
questions to follow up in the next interviews. I also conducted two follow-up email 
interviews after returning to Leeds in order to seek clarification on particular issues 
and to ask emerging questions that I had not begun to formulate during the 
fieldwork. In order to secure my fieldwork data, in accordance with the University 
of Leeds’ data protection procedure, I saved all the digital recordings of interviews 
to my password-protected University folder and the interview notes were re-written 
and stored on my own password-protected laptop and external hard drive. 
 
3.3.3 Participant observation 
Participant observation is a qualitative research technique for documenting and 
analysing what is happening in a particular setting. Observation is also the key to 
                                                                                                                                         
to older people. However, for both formal and relaxed occasions, I maintained my key position as a 
researcher. 
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ethnographic research, as the ethnographic researcher is the main instrument for 
watching, listening, talking and thinking. Bryman (2008:369) notes that during 
participant observation, “the researcher is immersed for some time in order to 
observe and listen with a view to gaining an appreciation of the culture of a social 
group”. In order to understand and appreciate the culture of the Liqo community of 
the PKS, I established a good relationship with them and observed their ‘everyday 
practice of Islam’. I used this technique for my research as it provided flexibility for 
my investigations in terms of the research design and the details of the approach 
(Bouma and Atkinson, 1995). However, I also needed to prepare for my 
investigations, and spent a considerable amount of time reading through resources to 
develop ideas for responding to any events that may occur during my observation.  
 
Most of the observations took place in Jakarta between October 2012 and January 
2013, and during this period I successfully attended about 15 Liqo meetings. Each 
meeting ran for a length of two to four hours in the trainees’ (Mutarabbi) homes (see 
Chapter 6). The observations were more difficult than the interviews in terms of 
approaching people and gaining their trust through attending their weekly Liqo.  
 
Apart from the weekly Liqo sessions, I attended a range of PKS dakwah training 
events (daurah), which included: a) daurah (training) on ‘the evaluation of the 
Jakartan governor election’, b) daurah on Islamic entrepreneurship and Islamic 
economy, and 3) daurah on leadership.91 I also attended a number of dakwah events 
                                                 
91 The daurah is one of the religious programmes run by the PKS under the umbrella of the Tarbiyah 
movement (see also Chapter 5). The daurah programme also relates to the Liqo, as both are used for 
spreading the Tarbiyah messages of dakwah. This is shown by the lessons in the daurah and Liqo, 
which are mixed together in one manual book, called Manhaj Tarbiyah (2006, 2008). During my 
observation, however, I discovered that these two programmes have differences, especially in terms 
of their audiences and lessons. The audiences taught through the daurah are larger than those of the 
Liqo. The audience of the daurah can also be of mixed gender, including both male and female 
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held by other dakwah institutions (such as the Muhammadiyah and the NU) to help 
me to understand the distinctive role that the Tarbiyah movement/PKS plays in the 
wider context of dakwah in Indonesia. Observations were also made during my visit 
to the headquarters of PKS (DPP-PKS) and at the PKS fraction office at Parliament 
House, for instance, checking their posters and flyers on upcoming events and the 
newspaper coverage of their previous dakwah activities.92 
 
Figure 2 Posters at the PKS office in Parliament House (DPR), Jakarta 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: A female respondent used by permission, November 2012. 
Upcoming events were notified on the display walls of the ground floor in the DPP-
PKS building, and also on the 3rd and 4th floors where I conducted the interviews. 
During my interview schedule I read a banner advertising Haditsul Khamis 
(Thursday talk) on Thursday afternoons – an activity that includes learning the 
exegesis of certain verses of the Qur’an (Tafsir). Eleven observations of Liqos were 
                                                                                                                                         
Tarbiyah activists, and there are no limitations about which members can attend. The daurah lessons 
also cover larger and more up-to-date materials and agendas, including issues arising in the elections, 
other political discourses, and developing peoples’ skills. Thus, daurah can be seen as being more 
concerned with issues relating to public life than the Liqo is.  
92 Within this PKS office, at the time where I conducted my interviews/observations, there are 59 
PKS legislators in the People’s Representative Council (DPR) for the period (2009-2015), 
http://www.pk-sejahtera.org, accessed on 15 November 2014.  
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recorded manually through note taking and four were recorded electronically. The 
note taking was mostly conducted during the events to avoid misunderstandings and 
to prevent information from being forgotten, with some notes being made after 
dakwah events so that the natural flow of the events was not interrupted. My 
decisions on whether to take notes during or after the dakwah events were made 
after I had learned the whole circumstances of the dakwah events. Before the events, 
I attempted to engage in informal conversations with Liqo mentors and trainees on 
my research topic, while gave them and explained to them of participant Information 
sheets. 
 
I also made informal observations about the daily religious and social lives of the 
Liqo community in my neighbourhood, in the shopping centre, and in other public 
places. It was thus my habit to write down the ‘research’ information I acquired 
during these informal observations, and to undertake some basic analysis of it by 
comparing and contrasting it with what I learned from formal dakwah events and 
interviews, from asking questions about the participants’ daily experiences and 
through my observations of their daily experiences.  
 
3.3.4 Focus group discussions (FGDs) 
In addition to reviewing written sources, conducting interviews and participant 
observation, I also held two FGDs. Focus groups are “a form of group interview 
which consists of several participants and a moderator” (Bryman, 2008:474). FGDs 
are also considered as being complementary to semi-structured interviews and other 
qualitative methods (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011; Mason, 2002). Therefore this 
method was chosen to provide more evidence to support the data gathered from 
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other methods, particularly the interviews. One of the strengths of FGDs is that, 
whilst researchers may be reluctant to point out contradictions in a conventional 
interview, participants will argue and challenge each other’s opinions in a group 
discussion, as they provide “the opportunity of allowing people to probe each 
other’s reasons for holding a certain view” (Bryman, 2008:348). As I found 
discrepancies in the information given by interviewees on the private and public 
dimensions of dakwah among different levels of the Tarbiyah movement/PKS 
dakwah community, this research method helped me to ‘fill in the gaps’. Therefore 
data gathered from the FGDs were useful to triangulate (clarify, strengthen, 
compare, and contrast) the data collected from other methods (see also section 3.3 
above). For example, the FGDs helped me clarify the culture of polygamy and the 
ideology of ‘enemies of Islam’/ghazwul fikri among the Tarbiyah activists. These 
issues were not often mentioned during the interviews and observations. Using 
FGDs to triangulate my research enabled me “to see the same thing from different 
perspectives and thus be able to confirm or challenge the findings of one method 
with those of another” (Bell, 2005:116).   
 
I identified and recruited participants purposively for the group sessions based on 
either their level of experience in Liqo sessions or their familiarity with my research 
topic. The participants had come from a variety of different Islamic organisations 
(The Muhammadiyah, the NU, and the Tarbiyah movement) and covered an age 
range of 30-45 years of age. Using this research method, I allowed each participant 
in a group session to discuss their own views and their reasons for holding them. I 
provided some direction to the discussion as the researcher, and the participants’ 
emphasised issues that they felt were significant to my main research topic. This 
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method thus helped me to gather more realistic and accurate views of what the 
participants thought about the Liqo’s understanding and practice of dakwah.  
 
I arranged two FGDs in different locations, with participants from different 
backgrounds. The first was at my home university – the University of 
Muhammadiyah of Prof. Dr. HAMKA (UHAMKA) – in Jakarta with the main aim 
being to generate outsider perspectives on the dakwah of the Tarbiyah movement. I 
invited a mixture of scholars, University lecturers, NGO activists and one senior 
Tarbiyah activist. I decided to invite this senior Liqo activist as he was also a 
researcher on Islam and Middle Eastern issues and had a doctoral study background. 
In addition, I thought that it would be useful to invite participants that were senior 
lecturers, and thus had well established interactions with the dakwah community of 
the PKS that had been formed over a period of time. Fifteen participants attended, 
most of who were lecturers at UHAMKA, and the majority were Muhammadiyah 
activists, while the rest of the group came from different backgrounds of Islamic 
activism, comprising the NU (1 participant), PERSIS (2 participants), and PKS (1 
participant).  
 
The discussion was moderated by a young lecturer who was a Muhammadiyah 
activist, and he was involved in a number of the discussions on Islamism. He started 
the discussion with a short introduction about the dakwah of the PKS in Indonesia, 
and then gave the first speaker time to talk about his opinions on the Liqo-dakwah of 
the PKS. The first speaker was a senior dakwah activist of the PKS, but he preferred 
to see himself as an academic. During the discussion, all the participants projected a 
spirit of knowledge and enthusiasm, sharing their knowledge about the Liqo of the 
PKS dakwah and their experiences of interactions with Liqo-PKS activists. They 
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also raised questions and comments on their dakwah concepts and practices, and I 
was very aware of the sensitivity of some of the issues raised, such as the 
widespread practice of polygamy among the dakwah community of the PKS and 
their rigid social interactions with the wider society (see Chapter 6).   
 
The second FGD was conducted in Tangerang – the closest neighbouring city to 
Jakarta. In order to fill in the gaps that existed in the previous discussion, whose 
audience was dominated by male contributors, I invited six female activists only to 
this focus group, all from the lower Liqo level. The core aim of this second FGD 
was to generate insider perspectives/perceptions and their lived experiences of 
joining the Liqo. I expected that they would be able to share their opinions and 
feelings on their lived religion before and after joining the weekly Liqo sessions. I 
thus decided to use this group session to focus more on a particular issue. As 
Bryman (2008) explains, there are two types of focus group discussion – the group 
interview, which often spans a number of topics; and the focus group, which 
generally emphasises single themes. Unlike the first FGD, which spanned a number 
of research themes concerning the Liqo’s conception and practice of dakwah, this 
FGD focused solely on how joining the weekly Liqo sessions affected the 
participants’ lived religious experiences, opinions and feelings.   
 
Although I had only had three months of interaction with the participants, they 
agreed to take part in the discussion after I explained my research project in detail 
verbally and via the Participant Information Sheet (see Appendix B). The discussion 
was arranged in a more relaxed and informal way than for the first focus group, with 
the participants being asked from the beginning to talk about their personal, 
religious and social life before and after joining the Liqo of the PKS. As they started 
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to express their feelings and views, I then made sure to let the discussion flow as 
much as possible without making any unnecessary interruptions.  
 
I asked the participants at the beginning to try to talk straightforwardly on the topic, 
and reminded them of this during the discussion were possible. A small number of 
the participants expressed their opinions on the media coverage of the PKS or on 
certain election issues relating to the PKS, before sharing their experiences and 
perceptions of their weekly Liqo. They highlighted that the Liqo of the PKS had 
transformed their perspectives on Islam and its practice within their society and, 
accordingly, had transformed the way that they behave (see Chapters 4, 5 and 6). 
The maturity of participants, both in terms of their involvement in the Liqo and their 
academic experience came through in their discussion of the dakwah practice of the 
PKS through their subjective opinions and experiences. I made an audio recording 
of the whole discussion, including the presentation and question-and-answer 
sessions.93  
 
Methodological and practical issues both emerged during the data collection using 
the methods above, and I learnt two key lessons. Firstly, it is difficult to control the 
data given by respondents during fieldwork, particularly data collected through 
observation and discussion. However, I could not judge whether some data was 
insignificant or irrelevant to my research during the data collection, as relevant data 
was sometimes only revealed during the analysis stage. Thus, what I classified as 
significant during the analysis was sometimes different from my assumptions about 
what would be significant. Secondly, I learnt that it is hard to stick to schedules in 
                                                 
93 Like the recordings of the interviews, this recording was transcribed and later coded and analysed 
based mainly upon my key research themes (see Section 3.5).   
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this type of research, as the influence that the participants and the field site have on 
undertaking the research cannot be accurately predicted. Nevertheless, the schedule 
was still manageable when I restricted the interviews to a maximum of two per day, 
leaving it more flexible by having a good interval between the two interviews, which 
also allowed for the fact that working in the very busy and hot climate of Jakarta 
was very tiring.  
 
3.4 Ethical issues  
As Bryman (2008:113) notes, researchers have ethical responsibilities in conducting 
their research that relate directly to its integrity. Ethical issues might arise at a 
variety of research phases, with many emerging during the data collection phase. 
The topic of concern is the ethical issues that are generated from the relationship 
between the researcher and research participants. For example, two ethical questions 
that it was pertinent to answer prior to conducting my fieldwork were “how should I 
treat my participants? and “how do I anticipate the impact of my research on my 
participants in terms of the possible harms or stresses their participation could 
produce?” 
  
In this section, I will discuss the ethical procedures and issues that are outlined in the 
research ethics forms used by the University of Leeds. The key ethical standards that 
I needed to ensure were adhered to during my fieldwork were: 1) that interviewees’ 
participation in this project was voluntary, and that they provided informed consent 
to take part; 2) that all interviewees were offered anonymity to ensure their privacy 
was protected; 3) that no participants came to any harm as a result of this project; 
and 4) that all the interviewees and participants of the FGDs were appropriately 
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informed about the nature and purpose of my research through clear, simple and 
transparent explanation of it (see Appendix B and Appendix C). 
 
In terms of seeking informed consent, I tried to anticipate obstacles or barriers that 
may exist for my participants’ understanding, such as language barriers. I was aware 
that the participants needed to understand their rights from the outset. Because I was 
aware about this issue, and I knew that the majority of my participants use the 
Indonesian language in their daily reading and conversation, I translated the 
Information Sheet and the Consent Form into Indonesian. The advantage of 
translating these forms is that it maximised the participants’ capabilities to 
understand the topic of my research and the implications of their participation in my 
research as much as possible.  
 
Regarding the privacy of participants and the confidentiality of the information that 
they would provide, the Information Sheet that I gave them provided details about 
the whole process that I would use to maintain their confidentiality and keep their 
identities anonymous. I gave them a guarantee of anonymity and confidentiality by 
hiding their true names and hiding the most significant identifying data such as their 
main work (e.g. nurse, engineer) in writing up my research (see Appendix C for a 
list of anonymised signifiers used, however I exluded two public intellectuals from 
this list because they are well-known public writers on the PKS). There is also the 
question of whether this research may cause harm to any participants. I made every 
effort to make sure the participants enjoyed their contributions to and participation 
in my research, and to reduce possible stresses. However, it was not always possible 
to prevent participants feeling uncomfortable when questioned on sensitive issues, 
such as certain beliefs and daily norms. 
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The last issue was to avoid any possible deception or misinformation being 
propagated by this research. I believe that the Information Sheet and Consent Forms 
that I gave to my participants were made as transparent as possible. In observing the 
weekly Liqo sessions and dawrah activities, I explained my role to the Liqo mentor 
and trainees and to key individuals of the dawrah (lecturer and some participants), 
but not to all dawrah participants as this was not practical given that dawrah was 
attended by large number of participants, and would have disrupted the activities. 
Thus, the informed consent was negotiated in dawrah sessions. However, this did 
not involve misinforming them or deceiving them about my role, and my permission 
to participate in the activities had already been granted by leaders of the PKS.  
 
3.5 Subjectivity and positionality 
As “both researchers and respondents ‘speak’ from a variety of subject positions all 
of which are context bound” (McLoughlin, 1998:5), I also needed to consider what 
impact my subject positions had upon this research. This section, therefore, provides 
my reflections on the extent to which my own identities impacted upon the research 
that I undertook among the dakwah community of the Liqo-Tarbiyah movement 
within the PKS in Indonesia. Given that social scientists accept that no knowledge is 
‘value-free’, researchers need to be aware of their subjective biases and outlooks 
during their research, and also of how their respondents view their positions and 
outlooks. This section discusses how my positionality in this research was 
constructed through my identities as a young female Indonesian Muslim, a lecturer 
at the Muhammadiyah University, and a student at a Western University. 
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Respondents ascribed these different identities to me during my research in relation 
to different situations. 
 
Prior to my fieldwork, I considered whether my identity as a young female 
researcher would be an obstacle to conducting the fieldwork, especially during 
interviews with male leaders and male Liqo mentors and trainees. I knew that a few 
other female researchers were studying aspects of the Tarbiyah movement or the 
PKS.94 However, given the religio-cultural expectation of having a companion 
present during meetings with men,95 I provided male interviewees with a choice of 
the most appropriate interview situation for them – accompanied or unaccompanied. 
It was their free choice. In fact only three male leaders chose to be accompanied by 
another male activist (see discussion in section 3.3.2 above).  
 
There was also the question of my organisational affiliation with the 
Muhammadiyah. I had been associated with the Muhammadiyah organisation since 
my employment as a lecturer at the Muhammadiyah University of Prof. Dr. 
HAMKA in Jakarta in 2004, and was a member of the women’s wing of 
Muhammadiyah (Nasyiatul Aisyiah) two years before.96 At some points, I felt that 
                                                 
94 See, for instance, the work of Rachel Rinaldo (2008a, 2008b, 2013) from the National University 
of Singapore. 
95 The Liqo-PKS activists believe in the concept of ghadd al-bashr which requires both male and 
female Muslims to “lower their gaze” in each others’ presence. The idea of ikhtilath forbids Muslims 
of different genders from meeting or gathering in one place (see Section 5.3). These beliefs are based 
on the Prophetic tradition (Hadith), which suggests that it is forbidden for a man and a woman to be 
alone together because ‘Satan would be their companion’. We can easily find the Liqo-PKS activists 
practicing this teaching in their daily life. This teaching led the PKS leaders to separate their 
programmes for women and men. For instance, the Liqo programmes never mix two genders in one 
Liqo group (see Chapter 6). Unlike the PKS activists, most Indonesian Muslims, including activists of 
Islamic organisations such as the NU and Muhammadiyah, are very flexible regarding this issue, and 
conduct religious programmes (Pengajian) and meetings which gather men and women in one place 
where they can talk to members of different genders as well as look at them. In my opinion, this is the 
wider norm that is practiced by Muslims in Indonesia. 
96 Along with other young activists, I was also involved in a series of workshops, discussions and 
seminars on Islam and the new social movements of the ‘Maarif Institute for Culture and Humanity’ 
during 2003–2006. Muhammadiyah has many organisational wings and educational institutions, 
136 
 
my affiliation with the University of Muhammadiyah would help me to approach 
respondents, especially PKS leaders and senior activists from Liqo, as I assumed in 
Indonesia academics (even those at universities affiliated to Islamic movements) are 
still regarded as having neutral and independent opinions concerning their research. 
At other points, however, I worried that this position would lead to some questions 
about the neutrality of my work. 
 
Being a female Muhammadiyah activist, I am aware that I have my own opinions 
about the dakwah of the Tarbiyah movement, such as that their dakwah is too strict 
and that they too often adopt a polarised ‘black and white’ or ‘enemies and friends’ 
position. However, I attempted to put these views to one side and focus on the 
evidence that I collected in my fieldwork. A few years ago, there was some 
discussion about the ‘soft conflict’ between Muhammadiyah and the PKS. Several 
assets of the Muhammadiyah, including mosques and schools, were used, taken 
over, and finally dominated by Liqo-PKS activists (see Chapter 6). I thought that 
this ‘conflict’ would have some influence on the respondents’ willingness to give 
their opinions on my research topic, as it related closely to their commitment and 
obedience to dakwah. However, I found that none of the interviewees raised this 
issue, instead simply responding to my questions and sharing their opinions and 
experiences about their dakwah movement.  
 
The last identity that respondents frequently ascribed to me was that of a student at a 
Western University. The majority of respondents asked me about my reasons for 
choosing to study Islam in the West, and nine respondents even reminded me to be 
                                                                                                                                         
reaching from the lowest to the highest levels of education, and is the second largest Islamic mass 
organisation in Indonesia, with branches concerned with educational, social and religious aspects of 
Indonesian Muslim life (Alfian, 1989).  
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cautious of studying religions in the West. They argued that it would influence my 
perspective on my own beliefs or the practice of my faith, something which has 
never happened to me. They also asked me about my reasons for undertaking 
research on their dakwah movement. They related this query to the issue of “selling 
data on Islam or Islamic movements to the West so that the West [is] able to 
understand the weakness of Muslims”.97 This query was an example of an old and 
ingrained stigma that I often heard. They related this query closely to the concept of 
ghazwul fikri (war of ideas) or the idea of a Western conspiracy against Islam. As 
McLoughlin (1998:5) has pointed out, there is often a need to re-negotiate our role 
in the research process by talking about our own experiences, and this query drove 
me to make clarifications based on my own experiences and knowledge. However, it 
was not appropriate to reply to such opinions in all interview situations. While some 
discussions and interactions facilitated further dialogue, others just required my 
willingness to listen to participants before asking them my interview questions.  
 
Although my respondents ascribed these identities to me, I did not “choose to 
represent myself in any one way consistently throughout my research” (1998:6), as 
McLoughlin reflects about his research experience with Bradford-UK Muslims. 
Rather, I tried to build a point of connection with my respondents by talking about 
the broad topics of dakwah and Islam in Indonesia, which had become the major 
concern of their movement. However, I concur with McLoughlin (1998:6) that such 
connections are only partial, because “the relationship between the researchers and 
                                                 
97 The issue of ‘selling research data to the West’ was raised by respondents from all levels, including 
one leader, three Liqo mentors and two Liqo students. These issues were indeed closely related to the 
idea of ghazwul fikri (war of ideas) that is spread among the Tarbiyah movement/PKS community 
(see Chapters 4 and 6). 
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their respondents is always cross-cut by social divisions, of gender, ‘race’, and 
class”.   
 
Indeed, the multiple identities I discussed above generated outsider images of me, 
producing limitations to the research that I could conduct. For example, restricted 
access to high-ranking members of the PKS and to official dakwah documents 
impacted on the data I could acquire about the dakwah movement before 1998. 
However, I made regular contact with Liqo activists by telephone or email to 
identify the correct official documents to analyse, the right persons to interview, and 
the right dakwah events to observe. I also tried to establish a friendly relationship 
with respondents by discussing dakwah, as this not only represented a topic that we 
had a mutual interest in, but was a practice that we shared as well. I talked to them 
about my long involvement in dakwah practice in my institution and my 
neighbourhood, as well as my motivation to contribute to the development of 
dakwah in Indonesia. In my opinion, this introduction gave the respondents a more 
balanced idea of my status as an outsider, my reflexive understandings as a scholar 
in the Study of Religion, and my identity as a mosque activist (ustadzah/da’iya, 
teacher/preacher). In response to my introduction, many Tarbiyah activists became 
willing to talk to me and to provide me with the relevant documents, while few of 
them rejected my requests.  
 
Although my outsider status vis-à-vis the Tarbiyah movement produced limitations 
to my research, my critical distance also generated benefits for it. Knott (2010) 
claims that the aim of a religious studies scholar should be to build upon the benefits 
of critical distance to explain a religious phenomenon from the outside. Having all 
the different identities listed above for researching the dakwah of the Tarbiyah 
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movement of the PKS enabled me to adopt a critical distance within this research 
process.    
 
3.6 Analysing and interpreting data 
After returning to Leeds from my fieldwork at the end of January 2013, I started to 
focus on the process of analysing and interpreting the data. In order to analyse the 
data gathered from interviews, observations and FGDs, it was first necessary to 
separate the data gathered using each method. As discussed in relation to the 
analysis of textual sources (see section 3.3.1), the data recorded through interviews, 
observations and discussions in Bahasa Indonesia (the Indonesian language) were 
all transcribed and analysed (in Indonesian).98 Only later when I selected the most 
relevant examples of data to illustrate a particular point or topic did I translate from 
Indonesian into English. Therefore, to be clear, I did not translate all data gathered 
from my fieldwork into English but left some parts in Bahasa Indonesia without 
translation.  Although this transcribing and translating was a very time-consuming 
process, it enabled me to become more familiar with the data, and to gradually start 
identifying key themes. As noted above (section 3.3.1) relevant literature on the 
question of translating data (for example, Temple and Young 2004; van Nes et al 
2010) suggests that ‘qualitative research is considered valid when the distance 
between the meaning as expressed by the participants and the meaning as interpreted 
in the findings is as close as possible’ (van Nes et al 2010:314).99  
                                                 
98 The reflective notes that were written manually in my fieldwork diary (written sometimes in 
English and sometimes in Indonesian) were also organised and typed out in a document on my laptop 
to secure against the possibility of my diary being misplaced or lost. 
99 Translating the ‘Indonesian’ data into English, the key challenge for me was to find the most 
suitable word to describe the participants’ comments or statements. The translation process involved 
interpretation as well. The better I was at interpreting the participants’ comments or participants, the 
better the English translation can be understood by readers. My approach was check this ‘feeling’ or 
meaning with my proofreader until I felt confident with the chosen meaning in my analysis and 
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As May (2008:138) notes, understanding data gathered from interviews involves 
“the coding of open-ended replies in order to permit comparison” and, with this in 
mind, I started the systematic coding by re-reading through these transcripts and my 
own reflexive notes. After this I coded the data into categories and themes based on 
the main research questions (and semi-structured interview questions), which 
together provided the main tools for guiding the extraction (‘cutting and pasting’) of 
these themes. As I wanted to locate the distinctions between the official discourses 
and the lived experiences of dakwah, as well as between the private and public 
aspects of the dakwah of the Liqo-Tarbiyah movement, it was key to capture the 
responses of the different levels of respondents – the elites, the activists (the mentors 
and trainees of the Liqo), and the scholars – during this process. In the next step of 
the analysis, these themes were simultaneously organised, compared and contrasted 
to interpret the information. Then key parts of the data were highlighted, and this 
determined the focus of the chapters as well as the sections of each fieldwork-based 
chapter.  
 
The process of analysis used the whole set of data produced through my 
ethnographic fieldwork. The semi-structured interviews, however, generated the 
most detailed data, allowing me to critique the official discourses of the elites 
through the first-hand information about the Liqo-Tarbiyah sessions from the early 
generation of mentors and their trainees. Preparing the interview guide before 
entering the field proved to be very useful, both for conducting the interviews and 
for analysing the data they produced. It ensured that the key interview questions 
                                                                                                                                         
interpretation of the data. I also checked my work against that of other researchers on the same 
subject, so that I could further clarify the ‘feeling’ and meaning of a certain word or term. 
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were always asked, allowed other themes to also be addressed during each 
interview, and helped me to categorise or cluster the themes during the analysis. The 
reflexive notes from participant observation and two group discussions were also 
very useful, although the data these produced lacked the depth of that generated by 
the interviews. The data from observations mainly exposed me to the living dakwah 
practices of the Liqo-Tarbiyah community, while that gathered from discussion 
sessions primarily exposed me to public opinion on the Liqo-Tarbiyah movement. 
 
The data gathered from this case study helped me to contextualise my research 
themes. As Blaxter et al. (2001:72) stress, “the detailed study of one or a small 
number of cases does not mean that the context of those cases can be ignored”. 
Despite the earlier discussion of the fact that the findings of a single case study 
cannot be generalised (see Section 3.2), the findings of single case studies do have 
significant value in producing evidence in a research context. Given that the process 
of contextualising and interpreting data should be reflexive, I located my research 
project in the wider context of my field of study. I reflected upon the key themes in 
my research, such as: private dakwah; public dakwah; lived experience and lived 
religion; official discourses; Islamism; politics; identity and modernity with 
reference to the wider discourses of dakwah; and Islam and politics in the sociology 
and anthropology of Islam.   
 
To address the concern that case studies can be structured by the interests and 
perspectives of their researchers, thus producing findings that lack validity (Hakim, 
2000), I paid attention to the role of the qualitative researcher as an interpreter. As 
Geertz (2000) emphasises, an interpretative researcher should give their own version 
of how they understand the subject they are studying. As an ‘interpreter’ of this 
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project, I was constantly reminding myself that my interpretations should be based 
on strong evidence drawn from the opinions and events that I observed during my 
fieldwork. This evidence should be seen as being based on a continuous process of 
clarification and validation. For instance, the process of writing-up the research 
exposed me to ‘gaps’ in information, which led me to carefully revisit the fieldwork 
materials and to clarify issues with respondents through emails.  
 
The final step of the writing-up process involved re-assessing the themes and 
presenting them within a rounded explanation. Continuous brainstorming was used 
to generate the main analytical ideas, to connect the chapters together and to line 
them up with the research questions. Finally, the overall work of transcription, 
translation, analysis, interpretation and writing-up was carried out at the Leeds 
Humanity Research Institute (LHRI) office (or the Cavendish Road office) using the 
University’s M drive, and a daily backup of the research was made on my external 
hard disk.  
 
3.7 Conclusion  
The main purpose of this chapter has been to present and justify, as well as reflect 
upon, the research methods used for this project. This ethnographic research utilises 
a single case study of weekly Liqo sessions in Jakarta, and analyses the history, 
ideology and structure of the Tarbiyah movement in relation to the discussion of 
private and public dimensions of dakwah and the official discourses and lived 
experiences of the Tarbiyah community. The study integrates both primary and 
secondary data to investigate the key research question that has been asked about the 
conception of dakwah adopted by the Liqo-Tarbiyah movement and the lived 
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religious experiences of its members. This chapter has explained the rationale for 
using both deductive and inductive methods in carrying out this case study, as well 
as the reasons for selecting the case study, and the three main data collection 
techniques – the literature review, the semi-structured interview and participant 
observation – together with one complementary method – the focus group 
discussion. The ethical procedures for data collection that are outlined by the 
University of Leeds Ethics Committee were discussed, and the impact of my 
multiple identities on the research were explained in regard to my position as an 
outsider researcher vis-à-vis my respondents. The limitations that I encountered as 
an outsider were also identified, together with the strategies that I adopted to address 
them. Conducting ethnographic fieldwork amongst the Liqo-Tarbiyah community in 
Jakarta was a hugely rewarding experience for me. It was enjoyable to meet new 
people who were willing to talk and share information about their ideologies and 
religious experiences, and to build new friendships ‘between the researcher and the 
researched’ afterwards.  
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Chapter 4  
The Dakwah of the Tarbiyah Movement: Official Discourses, 
Leaders, and Transformation 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I am going to explore the historical development of the dakwah of the 
Tarbiyah movement that emerged in Indonesia in 1983, the reasons for its 
establishment of a political party in 1998, and how this has impacted on its dakwah 
concept and strategies. The official discourses among the Tarbiyah movement elites 
will be examined through the interviews that I conducted with them, and through 
reviews of the texts published by the movement and its cadres. This chapter 
therefore focuses on my first research questions: 1) how has dakwah been 
developed, transformed, and conceptualised by the Tarbiyah movement leaders 
during the changing religious and political climate in Indonesia? Recalling aspects 
of SMT discussed in the Introduction (Wiktorowicz 2004; Fox 2012), my argument 
is that the gradual transition of the Tarbiyah movement from a politically repressed 
network of religious purists in the 1970-80s into a fully-fledged dakwah political 
party by the late 1990s was the outcome of new ‘political opportunity’ structures 
which emerged during a period of democratisation. 
 
A review of the existing literature in Chapter 2 has already revealed that the more 
democratic climate that has recently emerged in Indonesian politics was crucial in 
this regard. Indeed, my research shows that the elites thought that the Tarbiyah 
movement could be extended and developed through this party and its dakwah 
movement. As a result, its dakwah focus has expanded to be concerned with not 
only building individual piety through individual religious training, but also building 
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public piety within civil society. The private aspect of dakwah has also continued to 
be important, from the movement’s establishment to the present day.  Therefore, the 
personal, social and political stages of dakwah now co-exist. Nevertheless, I 
maintain that private and public concepts of dakwah are emphasised differently by 
members that are positioned at different points in the movement’s hierarchy. I argue 
that although establishing individual piety remains the main commitment of the 
dakwah of the Tarbiyah movement it now coexists with public piety and political 
interests, particularly since the movement began performing more overt preaching, 
and after it established its political party in 1998.  
 
This chapter starts by profiling the Tarbiyah movement in Indonesia, its emergence 
in 1983, and its dakwah ideology. This is followed by a section that describes the 
dakwah movement in this formative period. Although their dakwah during this 
period focused on reforming individual religiosity to create a better Islamic lifestyle, 
the idea to reform society was also part of their long-term dakwah agenda from the 
start. The focus on this private aspect of dakwah was based on the movement’s 
belief that reforming individual piety is the foundation from which to establish a 
better Islamic society. However, as noted above, I argue that the political conditions 
and constraints that repressed Islamist movements in Indonesia during the 1970s and 
early 1980s also led the Tarbiyah movement to spread their dakwah messages 
covertly, preventing them from having the opportunity to spread their dakwah more 
publicly.  
 
In the section that follows, I then explain the development of the movement’s 
dakwah with reference to the changing political climate in Indonesia, in which the 
government began to become more accommodating of Islamist groups at the end of 
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the 1980s. I argue that the shift in the government’s attitude led Tarbiyah activists to 
perform their dakwah more overtly, although their dakwah orientation still focused 
on the reformation of individual piety. I also show why the Tarbiyah movement 
decided to establish an Islamic political party in 1998, and what the implications of 
this were for their dakwah movement.  
 
My research revealed that the main reason for establishing this party was the belief 
in the integration of Islam and politics combined with the expectation that the party 
could significantly support their dakwah.  In the next section, I discuss the more 
complex elements of the Tarbiyah movement’s concept of dakwah. I argue that the 
movement not only focuses on strengthening the individual piety of its members, but 
also urges them (through the party) to be involved in public matters and state 
institutions in order to control public morality. In the final section, I explore the 
challenges for, and debates on, the Liqo in the different periods of the evolution of 
the Tarbiyah movement and the PKS. In particular, I investigate leadership and 
authority issues relating to the Liqo-Tarbiyah movement after the establishment of 
the PKS. I argue that although its leadership and authority exist on multiple levels, 
in which the Consultative Assembly (Dewan Shura) of the PKS is the highest 
authority, the mentors (murabbi) are regarded as the main reference point for the 
Liqo trainees (mutarabbi), especially at the Liqo’s lower levels. 
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4.2 Dakwah and the Islamist ideology of the Tarbiyah movement: the 
concept of Ghazwul Fikri (ideological conquest)  
Gerakan Tarbiyah (the Tarbiyah movement) or Jamaah Tarbiyah (the Society of 
Tarbiyah) is an Islamist movement in modern Indonesia.100 It was officially founded 
by Hilmy Aminuddin,101 Salim Segaf al-Jufri,102 Abdullah Baharmus, and Encep 
Abdusyukur (a.k.a Acep Abdussyukur) in 1983, and is dedicated to dakwah 
(Permata, 2013). Although 1983 is cited as the official date of its establishment in 
my interviews with its leaders, its history can actually be traced back to 1968, when 
the Indonesian Islamic Dakwah Council (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, 
DDII), which was led by Natsir, focused their efforts on dakwah programs in 
university campuses through a program called Bina Masjid Kampus (Campus-
Mosque Building) and organised the dakwah training called Latihan Mujahid 
Dakwah (Training for Dakwah Fighters, LMD). Two key figures and founders of 
the Tarbiyah movement – Abu Ridho and Mashadi – were among the participants in 
this ‘LMD’ training (Luthfi, 2002). During my observation and interviews I often 
heard the names of two influential figures mentioned, who the members always 
referred to as the ‘founding fathers’ of the Tarbiyah movement – Abdi Sumaiti 
(a.k.a Abu Ridho) and Hilmy Aminuddin. 
 
The LMD programme focused on training new cadres among university students 
throughout Indonesia to undertake dakwah activities (Platzdasch, 2009). The most 
                                                 
100 Some scholars of the PKS/the Tarbiyah movement use Jemaah Tarbiyah or Jamaah Tarbiyah to 
refer to it – see Machmudi (2006) and Permata (2008; 2013) – whilst others refer to it as the Tarbiyah 
movement. I will refer to it as the Tarbiyah movement or the Jamaah Tarbiyah throughout the thesis.  
101 Hilmy Aminuddin is the current Head of the Majlis Shura of the PKS, and is a graduate from the 
University of Islam, Medina (source: Bayan DSP-PKS, 21 Syawwal 1429/21 October 2008, accessed 
from official website www.pk-sejahtera.org in 10 August 2012).  
102 Salim Segaf Al-Jufri is a grandson of the founder of a well-known educational institution – “al-
Khairat” – in Makassar, Sulawesi (source: Bayan DSP-PKS, 21 Syawwal 1429/21 October 2008, 
accessed from official website www.pk-sejahtera.org in 10 August 2012) 
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influential figure in the LMD program was a senior leader of DDII, Imaduddin 
Abdurrachim.103 Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Imaduddin Abdurrachim -better 
known as Bang Imad- was a key figure who first introduced the concept of an 
Islamic religious gathering or pengajian among Muslim student activists and this 
pengajian became a model for similar gatherings at other campus mosques in 
Indonesia (Damanik, 2002). One of the foremost universities that successfully 
attracted many students to join this programme was the Bandung Institute of 
Technology (ITB) where Bang Imad became a leading figure at the ITB’s Salman 
Mosque. The Tarbiyah movement started their pengajian, usrah, or halaqah in this 
campus mosque (Hilmy, 2010).  
 
The relationship between the DDII and the rise of the Tarbiyah movement can be 
measured not only through the training of the LMD but also through various other 
means such as sending students to study in Saudi Arabian and Egyptian universities, 
facilitating its graduates to be the mentors or teachers involved in teaching Islam and 
spreading Islamist ideas in university mosques or boarding schools, and translating, 
publishing and circulating books written by Islamist ideologues such as Qutb, al-
Banna and Mawdudi (See Kahin, 2012). These programmes were funded by the 
Saudi Arabia government as part of its project of exporting Wahhabi/Salafi ideas, 
the two conservative creeds having been “cross bred” when MB activists from Egypt 
were exiled in the kingdom (see Chapter 2 and also Hasan, 2005). As the result of 
those programmes, the DDII has a great impact on changing Islamic discourse in 
Indonesia (Bruinessen, 2013).  
                                                 
103 In establishing and running this LMD, Bang Imad, together with Endang Saefuddin Anshari 
(1938-1996), was personally supported by DDII’s figurehead, Natsir. He also had been appointed 
general secretary of the Kuwait-based International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations 
(IIFSO) and later become a founder of ICMI (Latif, 2008; Hefner, 2000).  
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The four key Tarbiyah movement founders listed at the beginning of this section 
were worried about Indonesian Muslims living outside Islamic values, and created a 
dakwah movement to invite Muslims to return to living in accordance with Islam. In 
creating and developing their dakwah movement, they were inspired and influenced 
by the dakwah of the Egyptian MB. Scholars such as Permata (2013:241) have 
called the movement ‘the Indonesian branch of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers’.104  
 
Concrete evidence that the Tarbiyah movement was influenced by the MB is the 
popular usage of the terms ikhwan (sing. akhi, brothers) and akhawat (sing. ukhti, 
sisters) to refer to fellow cadres; the former for male cadres and the latter for female 
cadres. The term ‘cadre’ refers to disciplined and committed members of an 
organisation. As much of the literature on Islamic activism by scholars such as 
Wiktorowicz (2001) notes, the ‘cadre’ is one of the most powerful aspects of 
Islamist dakwah movements. It is used in the MB tradition and other Islamist 
movements. The terms mutarabbi and murabbi are also roots of the term Tarbiyah 
(education). The use of the terms mutarabbi and murabbi among the Liqo 
community are the result of the influence of the MB in Egypt too. The founder of 
the MB, Hasan al-Banna, and the MB’s community, use these terms as they come 
from the Sufi shaykh-murid tradition (Lia, 1998). Mutarabbi is the Arabic term for a 
male trainee, and mutarabbiyah the term for a female trainee of the Liqo, whilst a 
murabbi is a male mentor and a murabbiyah is a female mentor.105 
                                                 
104 However, my interviews with both leaders and members suggested that they never clearly 
declared the Tarbiyah movement to be a branch of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. 
105 This relational model of the Liqo community was confirmed by a senior Liqo activist, who notes 
that (ideally) the relationship between trainees and their mentors in the Liqo goes beyond the formal 
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The founders of the Tarbiyah movement successfully attracted a certain 
demographic of people to join their movement – neo-urbanites, students and 
professional, well-educated individuals. They are mostly migrants who come to the 
city to study at higher educational institutions or to work as professionals. Because 
they generally live far from their families, joining the Tarbiyah movement gives 
them the benefits of a type of family support, as well as new friendships and 
networks. Although these new recruits come from a variety of backgrounds in terms 
of their religious and social affiliations – such as the Salafi group, NU, 
Muhammadiyah, DDII, and HMI – they are bound by the same benefits mentioned 
above (See Machmudi, 2006). During the Tarbiyah movement’s early stages, its 
leaders created small groups for regular religious training sessions, called Liqo or 
Halaqah. These cell-like groupings consist of one mentor or trainer who recruits, 
trains and supervises 6-10 trainees (Permata, 2013). Although a Liqo group is small, 
its members meet ‘socially’ every week. The movement gradually expanded the 
Liqo numbers through inviting members of the wider society to join the Liqo of the 
Tarbiyah movement. As a result, by the 1990s the Tarbiyah movement “had stable 
networks in many universities in major cities across the country, and it started taking 
over intra-curricular and extra-curricular student organizations” (Permata, 
2013:252). 
 
In 1998 the Tarbiyah movement established a political party called the Justice Party 
(Partai Keadilan, PK), which was then renamed the Prosperous and Justice Party 
(Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS) in 2003. The emergence of the Tarbiyah 
                                                                                                                                         
relation between teachers and students in other classes, as they are (ideally) very close both inside 
and outside the Liqo sessions (see section 5.4). 
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movement and their ‘active’ dakwah cannot be separated from their critiques of the 
modern phenomena that have influenced Muslim’s lives. They believe in the need to 
be active in conducting dakwah so that Muslims can avoid being influenced by non-
Islamic (Western) ideologies and cultures. 
 
A concept that has been particularly important in articulating the critical stance 
toward modern social phenomena put forward by the Tarbiyah movement in 
Indonesia is that of ghazwul fikri.106 The importance of this concept can be seen 
through the way it has shaped their dakwah and its criticisms of modern social 
changes in both the Indonesian context and the global Muslim world. This concept, 
which literally means “ideological conquest” (Hirschkind, 2009), is used by the 
Tarbiyah movement to refer to the conquest of Muslim countries by the West, and 
indeed to any social, cultural, economic or political changes that are believed to 
have been intentionally designed by the West to influence people in Muslim 
countries to adopt Western cultural values (Manhaj Tarbiyah, 2005:174). This 
concept can therefore be translated as “cultural imperialism” (Al-Hudaybi, 1969; 
Gilsenan, 2000; Hirschkind, 2009).  
 
The clear explanation about their perception of ghazwul fikri is described in their 
manual of dakwah: 
 
Physical wars that have been carried out by the enemies of Islam are always 
failure[s]. They change their strategy by using a very soft attack through 
economics, politics, and culture. They expect[ed] that Muslims would follow 
them. This threat was conducted professionally until Muslims did not notice 
about them (Manhaj Tarbiyah, 2005:173). 
                                                 
106 The concept of ghazwul fikri was already used by the Muhammadiyah scholar Haji Abdul Malik 
Karim Amrullah (HAMKA) in 1969 in his article “Beberapa tantangan terhadap Islam di masa kini”, 
Pandji Masyarakat 4:50 (1970). Unfortunately, due to lack of access to the Tarbiyah movements’ 
literature of the 1980s and 1990s, I cannot trace its initial use by the Tarbiyah leaders. 
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Even though this book is a contemporary document written after they established a 
party, the idea of ghazwul fikri has been taught since the beginning of the movement 
in the early 1980s (Noura, 50s, leader, female, Jakarta). There was a perception 
among the Tarbiyah movement that although the occupation and colonisation of 
Muslim countries by the West ended in the middle of the Twentieth Century, the 
domination of the West in the post-colonial world has continued through the 
invasion of their ideas and cultures in the globalised Muslim world. The issue of 
Western cultural domination, therefore, has influenced the dakwah concerns of the 
Tarbiyah movement in Indonesia since its inception. Thus, avoiding dressing in 
Western styles was considered by them to be one way of fighting against the 
domination of Western culture. The idea of ghazwul fikri also shaped the movement 
in strengthening other Islamic ‘communal’ identities among its members.    
 
For the Tarbiyah movement, the increasing hegemony of Western cultures has led to 
the loss of Islamic culture from Muslims’ everyday lives. They argue that Western 
cultural hegemony has attacked both Islam and Muslim lives through the mass 
media, films, and secular education systems. Both the leaders of the Tarbiyah 
movement and the mentors of the Liqo (murabbi) often ground dakwah in the need 
to counter the ‘dangers’ that have emerged for Muslims as a result of ghazwul fikri. 
They believe that this Western project has caused the spread of distorted or false 
understandings of Islamic values among Indonesian Muslims in particular, and 
among Muslims in other parts of the world also. Their dakwah, then, is central to 
their struggle ‘to save Islam and Muslims’. 
 
This concept grounds the criticism of modern society and is spread widely among 
the Tarbiyah community, from the top to the lower levels of its hierarchy. A variety 
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of lessons delivered in the weekly Liqo (religious circle) sessions are often linked to 
this concept (see Section 5.3 and Chapter 6). For example, the lessons of Akhlaq 
(morality) or Adab (etiquette) are linked to the increasing moral degradation of 
young Muslims. The movement sees their moral degradation in the clothes worn by 
Muslim youth to the behaviours shown in their everyday lives. They believe that this 
represents the impact of globalised Western cultures among Muslim youth. A senior 
Liqo mentor put it thus: 
 
Let’s see the reality. There is much evidence supporting this suspicion. As an 
example, let us take a look at teenagers’ phenomena here [in Jakarta and 
Bekasi]. Most of them no longer have a respect for the Prophet Muhammad. 
They also do not know their life’s aim [based on Islamic teachings] (Ridho, 
40s, senior mentor, male, Bekasi, Staff to a PKS legislator).107 
 
Another example is the lesson of akidah (faith), which is linked to political issues. 
For the Tarbiyah movement choosing a pious Muslim leader is one important step 
for directing the government towards applying shari’ah to the public sphere, whilst 
choosing non-Muslims as political leaders will lead to the government failing to 
apply shari’ah. They also believe that government policies will be easily dictated 
and influenced by Western governments if non-Muslim leaders are selected. The 
official leaders of the Liqo and the PKS consider the true akidah to be the most 
important aspect in choosing local and national leaders. A leader of the PKS who 
was a senior murabbi explained to me how the community considered akidah to be 
very important for making political decisions related to the election of Jakarta’s 
governor, which was conducted during my fieldwork in 2012: 
 
The process of selecting a candidate [as Jakarta’s governor] supported by the 
PKS was very long. Why do we reject Jokowi for the governor and support 
                                                 
107 Interviewed on 17/10/2012. 
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[the] other candidate named Foke?108 We are very concerned about the 
aspect of akidah, because the success or failure of leadership in a democratic 
system is very biased. For instance, when Jokowi is considered as one among 
the best city mayors [in a survey], it is a biased assessment. There is also an 
indication that he is involved in corruption, and the evidence was hidden by 
the Committee for Corruption Eradication (KPK). In addition to that, from 
the study of a statistics body, it is mentioned that the percentage of poverty 
increased about 11% in the city that he governed before. We, then, 
concluded that the standard of his achievement is biased. There is always a 
position who agree and disagree with this achievement’s standard. This also 
happens to other candidates for governor. We, therefore, made an objective 
and valid standard, which is the aspect of akidah (Muhammad, 30s, young 
leader, male, Bekasi, local preacher and school teacher).109 
 
This explanation indicates that leaders of the Liqo-Tarbiyah movement attempt to 
connect religious piety with political affairs. Whether a candidate for the role of the 
governor has a good track record in leadership is not considered as being relevant by 
the Liqo-Tarbiyah movement. As long as his akidah is in line with the 'true' akidah, 
they will vote for the candidate. In my opinion, this suggests that the dakwah 
ideology of the Tarbiyah movement requires all its cadres to link akidah (belief) to 
politics, and this is in line with their general aim to expand their focus from 
individual religiosity to public morality in general. Choosing a leader with a strong 
background in akidah will, in turn, facilitate public morality because the leader will 
represent a key symbol and model for the people. This shows that the typical 
dakwah of the Tarbiyah movement seeks to discipline other people, and requires 
them to follow their set of beliefs. My informal conversations with the majority of 
the Liqo trainees and mentors revealed that those who cannot be elected as leaders 
                                                 
108 Jokowi (original name; Joko Widodo) and Ahok (original name; Basuki Cahaya Purnama) were 
supported by two secular-nationalist parties – The Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI-P) and 
Gerindra, while the incumbent governor, Foke (original name: Fauzi Bowo), and his vice candidate, 
Nachrowi, were supported by the rest of the big parties, including nationalist and Islamist parties such 
as GOLKAR, The Democrat party, The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), The National Awakening 
Party (PKB) and The United Development Party (PPP), amongst others. From my observations 
during their campaign period, the incumbent candidate was convinced that he would win the election 
due to the massive political support he had from these parties. However, Jokowi and Ahok ultimately 
received a very significant majority of votes to become Jakarta’s governor and vice governor for the 
period 2012–2017 (www.thejakartapost.com/channel/national, accessed in 20 September 2012). 
109 Interviewed on 08/09/2012. 
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due to their ‘distorted’ akidah include non-Muslims, Muslim secularists/liberalists, 
and Muslim syncretises (abangan).110   
 
However, the attitude that the PKS has to this issue seems to have changed prior to 
the 2004 election. They have tried to be ‘open’ to non-Muslims joining the party and 
being party candidates for certain political positions. Scholars including Shihab and 
Nugroho (2008) and Permata (2008; 2013) see this as a political strategy to gain 
more votes. I think this suddenly more ‘open’ attitude can not only be seen as a 
political strategy, but also as part of their dakwah strategy to gain wider popularity 
among Indonesian Muslims.  
 
The lesson of akidah is also strongly linked to the concept of ghazwul fikri in terms 
of ‘unjust’ Western dealings with Muslims beyond Indonesia, in Syria, Egypt and, 
primarily, Palestine. The term tends to be connected with Zionism instead of 
referring to the West per se. For the Liqo-Jamaah Tarbiyah, Zionism refers to the 
movement that aims to return Jews to their homeland in Palestine (Manhaj 
Tarbiyah, 2005:175). This definition can be found in their book, Manhaj Tarbiyah 
(2005):  
 
One of the groups that keep fighting against Islam is Zionism which spread 
its organizational branches throughout the world. The main project of 
Zionism is to establish the Israel state in the land of Palestine. Moreover, 
there are still many crimes planned by Zionism to harm Islam and Muslims 
(Manhaj Tarbiyah, 2005:175-176). 
 
                                                 
110 In the election for Jakarta’s governor, Jokowi was perceived as not being a pious Muslim since he 
came from an abangan background (syncretic), while Ahok was a Chinese Christian. Jokowi was 
also a member of the PDI-P (The Indonesian Democratic Party), which declared a secularist-
nationalist ideology, and was supported mostly by those from abangan backgrounds. 
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Here, it is implicitly suggested that Zionism infiltrates many countries. Under the 
concept of ghazwul fikri, the Tarbiyah movement widely believes that the unjust 
attitudes taken towards Muslims in Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan, amongst other 
countries, represent the core of a Jewish and Christian conspiracy against Muslim 
power (see Chapter 6). That is why the Tarbiyah community is the most active 
movement in Indonesia in terms of its protests against American support for Israel, 
and in its campaign to promote and encourage the distrust of Western countries 
(Bubalo and Fealy, 2005). The Palestine-Israel conflict is indeed one of the core 
issues among Islamist movements throughout the Middle East and the wider Muslim 
world, as it is considered to be the manifestation of Muslims’ experiences of the 
injustice experienced by the global ummah (Mandaville, 2007). 
 
The movement’s claims implicitly suggest that Christians as well as Jews are 
proponents of Zionism. In Islamist discourse, both Christians and Jews are 
connected with Western colonialism and Zionism (Esposito, 2010), being regarded 
as ‘unbelievers’, and seen as partners in a conspiracy against Islam. Van 
Bruinessen's (2003) research on the PKS supports this position. He argues that the 
PKS strongly believes in anti-Islamic conspiracies, and that they are comprised of 
anti-Zionist, anti-Western, anti-liberal and anti-secularist Muslims (Bruinessen, 
2003). This characterisation is supported by quotes in the Liqo's dakwah manual 
from the al-Baqarah (the Cow) – a chapter of the Qur’an – which are used to justify 
the PKS’s belief on Jews and Christians:   
 
The battle between the right (Haq) and wrong (bathil) is continuous all the 
time as the Qur’an mentioned in Al-Baqarah: 120 ‘Neither the Jews, nor the 
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Christians, will accept you unless you follow their religion’ (Manhaj 
Tarbiyah, 2005:175).111 
 
The dakwah manual explains that the lesson of ghazwul fikri in the weekly Liqo 
sessions aims to make members aware that there are numerous movements seeking 
to defeat and harm Muslims:  
 
To be aware of very soft … anti-Islam movements, especially international 
Zionism, to know various projects of these anti-Islam groups in defeating 
Muslims, to avoid … being trapped in a heated debate carried out by these 
groups, and to know that Israel is a Zionist state (Manhaj Tarbiyah, 2005: 
175).112 
 
The leaders of the movement, therefore, aim to teach and spread this concept to their 
members in as close a way to that which is written in this dakwah manual book as 
possible. As a result, this concept has spread widely among the Tarbiyah community 
in Indonesia. 
 
This idea of ghazwul fikri evokes the classic Islamist rhetoric about the battle or 
clash between Islam and the West, which is a defining theme of modernity for many 
Islamist movements and thinkers. In the Twentieth Century, Islamism represented 
the response or opposition to the influence of other ‘isms’ from the West, such as 
colonialism and secularism (see Chapter 1). The dakwah ideology of the Tarbiyah 
movement and the strategies it adopts in its Islamisation project are borrowed from 
the ideology of MB in Egypt and include: (i) the Islamisation of individuals, (ii) the 
Islamisation of families, (iii) the Islamisation of society, and (iv) the Islamisation of 
the political system or state (Mitchell, 1993). These strategies are thus shaped by the 
                                                 
111 The translation of this verse of the Qur’an is also referenced in their manual: ‘Neither the Jews, 
nor the Christians, will accept you unless you follow their religion’. This verse was originally written 
in Indonesian, but I use one of the English translations provided by Yusuf Ali (2006). 
112 I summarised and translated this statement into English from the Manhaj Tarbiyah (2005:175). 
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founder and leaders of the movement to respond to other ideologies, such as 
secularism, liberalism and Zionism. My research and observations revealed that their 
dakwah ideology emerged and was shaped by the concept of ghazwul fikri in order 
to prevent Western influences on Muslims, being developed in different dakwah 
phases of the Tarbiyah movement, as the next sections show. 
   
4.3 The dakwah of the Tarbiyah movement in the repressive political 
period (1970s-1980s) 
The 1970s–1980s was an era in which the Indonesian government issued strict 
policies for controlling political Islam (see Chapter 2). It was a difficult and 
challenging era for the Islamists in Indonesia to conduct overt dakwah activities. 
The government prohibited Muslim leaders from being involved in political affairs, 
such as forming Islamic parties or discussing political issues in the public sphere 
(Effendy, 2003). Prominent leaders of the Masyumi – the biggest Islamic political 
party in the period of the Old Order (1945–1965) – were one well-known example 
of those forbidden to engage in politics during this period. Similarly, the Masyumi 
party was not permitted to be active (Effendy, 2003). This had not been expected by 
the Masyumi’s leaders who, at the beginning of the New Order (the end of the 1960s 
to the beginning of the 1970s) had hoped that the party would be able to participate 
in political contests again after being disbanded by the Old Order government in the 
previous period of leadership. In addition, other Muslim leaders who spoke about 
political issues in public spaces, such as in mosques, schools, and campuses, were 
also strictly monitored by the government (see Chapter 2). According to Yudi Latif 
(2008:369), Muslim leaders in this era, especially Islamists, experienced ‘acute 
socio-political dislocation’ driven by state repression. 
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In such a socio-political context, many Islamist leaders, and particularly those who 
were involved in Masyumi, attempted to establish new religious movements that did 
not have political orientations (Latif, 2008). DDII was a new vehicle for their 
religious movement (See Chapter 2). They used campus mosques as places for 
training and educating young people, constructing and strengthening their Islamic 
identity and collective solidarity (see Section 4.2). Thus the programs of Bina 
Masjid Kampus and Latihan Mujahid Dakwah (LMD) provided an alternative for 
the would-be Muslim campus activists (Hilmy, 2010; Platzdasch, 2009). The 
selection of these mosques indicates that the movement was targeting well-educated 
middle-class society. The Islamist leaders gradually played a significant role in 
establishing the new phenomenon of dakwah-oriented students at secular 
universities. This phenomenon spread from one major city to another, and created 
the so-called ‘Islamic turn’ (Latif, 2008).  
 
The early Tarbiyah movement emerged from this broader range of Islamic 
movement activity. In the early dakwah movement, this community was unnamed, 
as a young leader of the Tarbiyah movement explained during an interview 
(Darmanto, 30s, senior mentor, male, Jakarta, staff to at PKS legislator).113 Later, 
the movement gradually came to be known among the internal members as the 
community of usrah (family) which invokes a MB inspiration.114 The term usrah 
was not familiar yet to the wider society and Noura, an early female Tarbiyah 
                                                 
113 Interviewed on 04/09/2012. 
114 The concept of usrah was taken from the term used by the MB in Egypt. The MB officially uses 
this term to refer to its system for recruiting and developing its trainees (Mitchell, 1993). They use 
the family system (nizam al-usrah) in their Tarbiyah activities, which were composed of groups with 
6-10 members each, in which one person is chosen to be the leader of the group, representing a 
‘family’. This system gathers many people bound by the same religious interests in order to educate 
(Tarbiyah) them and prepare their dakwah to Islamise society and the state.   
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activist that I interviewed at headquarters of the PKS (the Markaz ad-Dakwah) 
emphasised that:  
 
The wider society still did not have any idea what to call this Jamaah 
Tarbiyah in the early 1980s. At that time, it was widely regarded as an 
underground organisation called OTB (Organisasi Tanpa Bentuk/Organisation 
without Form) or OBT (Organisasi Bawah Tanah/ Underground Organisation) 
(Noura, 50s, leader, female, Jakarta).115 
 
 
Through my interviews with the leaders, I saw that, as an impact of the repressive 
attitude of the government, Tarbiyah activists in the early 1980s limited the scope of 
their dakwah activities to a narrow audience. A key female leader of the Tarbiyah 
who introduced herself as a member of the first generation of the Tarbiyah 
community, explained when I interviewed her in the Markaz Dakwah (centre of 
dakwah) of the PKS: 
During the mihwar tanzimi (the formation period), the programmes of the 
Liqo were conducted in very ‘narrow’ [or marginal] places, such as kitchens, 
corners of mushalla [small mosques], and other places that enabled them to 
sit or melingkar [to sit within a circle].116 (Noura, 50s, leader, female, 
Jakarta).117  
 
 
Likewise, they hid the structure of the organisation and the trainers, mentors and 
coordinators of the Tarbiyah movement and its weekly training programme. During 
this repressive regime, they held that ‘the structural organisation [of dakwah] is 
secret and the dakwah is open’ (Sirriyah al-Tanzim wa ‘Alamiyah al-Dakwah, DPP-
PKS, 2003:27). The impact of this idea is still seen in the attitudes of some current 
Tarbiyah activists, especially those at the grassroots level. In my fieldwork diary, I 
                                                 
115 Interviewed on 18/10/2012. 
116 Melingkar (making a circle) is one of the characteristics of their religious meetings or study 
circles. Sitting in a circle formation made it easier for the teacher to deliver and discuss the religious 
materials, and to deepen and intensify the interactions among members of the Halaqah group. 
117 Interviewed on 18/10/2012. 
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wrote about how my interview and observation requests were rejected by six 
dakwah activists on the basis that they were unable to share their opinions (mainly 
about the hierarchy or the contents of the Liqo) with outsiders. They said that they 
were worried about making statements that were factually mistaken or that 
misrepresented the movement, and suggested that I meet their Liqo seniors instead. 
Nevertheless, Siddik – a key figure of the Tarbiyah movement – once said that this 
secrecy only applied at the beginning of the Tarbiyah movement, under the Soeharto 
regime. According to one of my respondents, the secret nature of their dakwah 
hierarchy was no longer applied by the current Tarbiyah activists, because today’s 
situation is different to that in the past, and there is no longer any need to hide their 
dakwah structure (Machmudi, 40s, founding members of the PKS/senior mentor of 
the Tarbiyah movement, Depok, University lecturer).118 
 
When I interviewed him, Machmudi explained that this secret nature of the 
organisation led to a secret process for recruiting new Tarbiyah cadres in the past. 
He said that the recruitment of new members for the weekly training sessions was at 
the time only undertaken among people close to existing members, and not openly 
among the wider society. Later, the weekly training session was gradually known as 
the Liqo (small religious circle).119 According to the majority of my respondents, this 
Liqo programme had a very limited number of trainees (mutarabbi) and mentors 
(murabbi) at the very beginning of the 1980s, but by the middle of the 1980s, they 
had been successful in recruiting a large number of students from the young 
                                                 
118 Interviewed on 03/08/2012. 
119 This weekly training was also called Halaqah (Arabic for religious circle). The term Liqo 
(meeting) and Halaqah (religious circle) refer to the same weekly religious mentoring developed for 
the purpose of teaching the religious doctrine and ideology of the Tarbiyah movement. Although the 
term Halaqah is mainly used in the Tarbiyah movement’s official books, I prefer to use the term Liqo 
because my observations and interviews revealed that it is more widely used by the Liqo community 
than the term Halaqah. 
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generations, including many educated people who were attracted towards studying 
Islam (Machmudi, 2006; Damanik, 2002; Rahmat, 2005; 2008). 
 
According to leaders of the Tarbiyah movement, including Noura, Machmudi, and 
Abdullah, there were no well-structured or well-organised materials and methods 
used in the Liqo or dakwah training during this early phase, or in the Tarbiyah 
movement as a whole. This is understandable given the fact that it was then an 
informally structured movement. The unstructured beginnings of the Liqo of 
Tarbiyah movement mean that the teaching materials at this point were taken from 
various sources that accommodated many different strands of Islamic thought. 
Neither were there any standard or enforced methods for delivering their religious 
messages, which were largely left to the expertise of each individual mentor. These 
initial cadres obtained their dakwah skills from their interactions with people and 
books that have links with the dakwah ideologies of the Egyptian MB. The Liqo 
training and the dakwah activities as a whole were later gradually developed by key 
leaders of the Tarbiyah movement by developing both the knowledge and skills of 
the mentors, considering the interests of the members, and providing religious 
materials (the Tarbiyah manual 2005) for the mentors. 
 
The early 1980s was the period in which the reforming of individual religiosity was 
emphasised as the Tarbiyah movement's dakwah message. This era was known 
among the activists as ‘the period of Tarbiyah training’ (Abdurrahim, 2005:140). As 
written in one of the official books I reviewed, the development of individual 
religiosity was the main goal of the Tarbiyah movement in this period.  
After joining the Liqo or other dakwah activities, trainees are expected [by 
the Tarbiyah movement] able to develop their individual religiosity, which 
includes: 1) having understanding of the basics of Islam; 2) having good 
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akhlaq/moral; 3) having no influence from any idolatry or polytheism 
(kemusyrikan); and 4) having no relationships with enemies of Islam 
[individuals or institutions] (DPP-PKS, 2003:5). 
  
Moreover, the leaders and senior activists of the Tarbiyah that I interviewed 
emphasised that their goal was to create individuals with certain Tarbiyah-designed 
‘characteristics’ known as al-Muwashafat al-Tarbawiyah (PKS, 2003:5-9). 
 
Tarbiyah-based individual religiosity is created and developed through weekly Liqo 
training (see Chapter 5). The training is intentionally directed by the Tarbiyah 
activists in a way that aims to develop Syakhsiyah Islamiyah (Islamic personality), 
which covers beliefs (akidah), rituals (ibadah), and the behavioural ethics and 
lifestyles (akhlaq) of Muslims (see Chapter 6). In order to strengthen the formation 
of individual religiosity, the weekly training during the early phases of the Liqo 
primarily discussed the issue of Islamic personality. Subjects of Tafsir, Hadith, Fiqh 
and Sirah were taught to Tarbiyah activists with the aim of making them better 
Muslims in their daily lives. 
 
The Tarbiyah movement’s emphasis on individual religiosity in their dakwah 
movement was driven by their strong belief that to turn inwards towards the self is 
the best solution for Muslims’ problems. This idea of individual religiosity 
endeavoured to establish a better religious understanding within Muslim individuals 
and the skills to apply this understanding to their daily lives (PKS, 2003: 1-3). The 
idea of Islamising the self was the concern of young students not only in Indonesia, 
but globally in the 1970s and 80s. In this period, Muslims around the world were 
also concerned with the idea of an Islamic state, which was a global trend that 
travelled to many Muslim countries (Mandaville, 2007). 
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One of the important lessons of individual piety preached by the Tarbiyah 
movement leaders is to encourage all of their members, particularly the male ones, 
to be individuals who are closely ‘connected with mosques’ in their daily lives. 
Ahmad, one of the top leaders of the Tarbiyah movement, and head of the Shari’ah 
Council (Dewan Syariah Pusat/DSP) of the PKS, who is responsible for giving 
guidance on religious matters, explained that Tarbiyah activists’ regular attendance 
of public mosques for prayer, reciting the Qur’an, and other religious activities is 
part of the requirement relating to personal character building that must be fulfilled 
by all Tarbiyah cadres. Ahmad believed that this represents the basis for building 
many other aspects of a pious Muslims’ character and activism:  
 
[If they follow this guidance to come to the mosques frequently], they should 
be ready and active to offer any help in mosques, for instance for becoming a 
leader of prayer (Imam); delivering religious sermons (khutbah or dakwah); 
or assisting other religious and social services at the mosques, such as giving 
alms (sadaqah). The Tarbiyah movement’s doctrine that we really 
emphasised to the activists is that they work – just work with feelings of 
ikhlas (sincerity) and itqan (being well-structured and professional), as has 
been taught by Islam (Ahmad, 60s, leader, male, Jakarta).120  
 
Another means of building individual piety that is widely known, and has been 
practised by Tarbiyah activists, is related to dress code. In an interview with a young 
leader, he informed me that during its early phase, it was easy to recognise Tarbiyah 
activists simply by looking at their dress (see Chapter 6). He emphasised that the 
Islamic identity of the Tarbiyah community at that time was very strong, explaining 
that:  
 
                                                 
120 Interviewed twice on 27/08/2012 and 17/10/2012. He also said that because of the ‘moderate’ 
nature of the Islamic messages delivered by the Tarbiyah movement’s preachers and leaders of 
prayer, many audiences listen to them. This, in some cases, has led to the emergence of jealousy 
among people from different mass organisations. A study conducted by Zuhrie (2013) reveals that 
this very strong connection and commitment to the mosque led the Tarbiyah activists in Klaten 
(Central Java) to occupy a Muhammadiyah mosque, Al-Muttaqun, which then led to conflict between 
Tarbiyah movement and Muhammadiyah activists (see Chapter 5).  
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They have specific dress for both men and women [that are] considered to be 
more representative of Islam. For instance, the koko [a Tarbiyah style of 
religious clothes] for men and the baju terusan panjang, jubah or abaya [a 
long dress] and long headscarf for women were mostly practiced in their 
daily life. Apart from that, both men and women were also forbidden to wear 
jeans (Salim, 50s, leader, male, Jakarta).121  
 
Wearing jeans was forbidden for both men and women because it was perceived to 
be a form of Western clothing style. This provides further evidence that the 
Tarbiyah movement has an anti-Western ideology (see Section 4.2). Moreover, for 
women, wearing jeans was regarded as being un-Islamic because it is a common 
form of male clothing (see Chapter 6).  
 
The dakwah orientation of the Tarbiyah movement was influenced by the ideology 
of ghazwul fikri. The community perceived the West as being the enemy of 
Muslims, who could not defeat Muslims through a physical war, and so changed 
their strategy to a 'soft war' using cultural imperialism (see Section 4.2). The overall 
dakwah ideology of the Tarbiyah movement attracted more students to enter the 
weekly religious Liqo. Machmudi, a leader of the Tarbiyah, explained this further in 
an interview:  
 
The Tarbiyah’s focus on improving individual religiosity attracted university 
students to join the Liqo. They found the Tarbiyah offered them a more 
individual approach that is concerned with their personal development of 
religiosity. This approach cannot be found in other Islamic organisations 
such as HMI [Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam/Islamic Student Association], PII 
[Pelajar Islam Indonesia/Indonesian Islamic Student], and PMII 
[Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia/Indonesian Islamic Student 
Union], which are regarded as too focused on [the] political or economic 
issues of the country (Machmudi, founding members of PKS/senior mentor 
of the Tarbiyah, 40s, Depok, University lecturer).122 
 
                                                 
121 Interviewed on 09/10/2012. For a description of the typical dress of the women’s Liqo community, 
see Chapter 6. 
122 Interviewed on 03/08/2012. 
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Machmudi (2006) argued in his PhD thesis that the process of Islamisation at secular 
campuses was successful in this period and continued to grow during the 1990s:  
 
The prestigious state universities in Java, such as the Bandung Institute of 
Technology (ITB), [the] University of Indonesia (UI), Gadjah Mada    
University (UGM), [the] Bogor Institute of Agriculture (IPB), Airlangga 
University (Unair) and the Sepuluh November Institute of Technology (ITS) 
have become strongholds of [the] Tarbiyah movement (Machmudi, 
2006:112). 
 
The students’ interest in attending the Liqo and learning the dakwah ideologies of 
the Tarbiyah was driven by the same motives as the movement itself. They worried 
about the attitudes of the Indonesian government towards political Islam and the 
global political tendency that has led to the absence of Islam from the public sphere 
(see Chapter 1). They feel the need to pay attention to this phenomenon and to 
Islamise the self and then society through their involvement in the Liqo (see 
Chapters 5 and 6).  
 
4.4 The dakwah of the Tarbiyah movement in the ‘more 
accommodative’ political period (1990-1997) 
Unlike in the previous decade, from the end of the 1980s, the New Order 
government (1986-1997) started to accommodate Islamic movements (see Chapter 
2). In this period, the government supported Islamic organisations in establishing 
mosques (Effendy, 2003). Around one hundred new mosques were established by 
the government, which also allowed civil servants to express their religious (Islamic) 
identity in state offices through conducting Friday prayers, giving lectures on 
Islamic subjects, and wearing Islamic dress – a factor that was important for Muslim 
women in particular (Latif, 2008). Such religious allowances were not made during 
the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s. Furthermore, in 1992, the government 
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supported and even subsidised Islamist leaders and neo-revivalist figures in 
establishing an Islamic organisation named ICMI (the Association of Indonesian 
Muslim Scholars) (Hefner, 2000).123 Regardless, the shift of the government’s 
attitude was also a political strategy for domesticating and gaining political support 
and legitimacy from Muslims through providing more freedom and privilege for 
Islamic organisations.          
 
I argue that the shift in the government's political attitude, which was welcomed by 
Islamic movements, encouraged the Tarbiyah movement to take advantage of 
opportunities to expand the scope of their dakwah and its audience. Whilst the 
Tarbiyah movement had previously focused on campuses and disseminated its ideas 
covertly, the movement now began to target wider social groups from various 
backgrounds, as well as institutions, and spread its ideas overtly. Noura gave me a 
brief account of the Tarbiyah’s shift from an ‘underground’ movement conducting 
its dakwah activities in small and marginal places to a more open movement 
promoting its ideas in public areas. She said: “then, after [the] political conditions 
[became] more conducive, the scope of our dakwah broadened into wider society”. 
Noura thus states that the shift in political opportunities (Wiktorowicz 2004; Fox 
2012) was the factor that led the movement to preach their messages overtly, and to 
target wider society. 
                                                 
123 There was a debate among Muslim leaders about whether this organisation (ICMI) was initiated to 
give Muslim leaders a 'space' for aggregating and articulating Muslim political interests due to their 
position as a majority of the population, or whether it was only used by the government to 
domesticate Islamic organisations and gain more legitimacy from them (Latif, 2008). For me, 
however, both purposes could have been pursued at the same time. The shift in the Government’s 
attitude to Islamic movements might have been based on taking and giving or on mutual benefit. The 
organisation itself was chaired by Habibie, one of the influential ministers in the cabinet, and well 
known for having close relationships with Islamic figures.  
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 The dakwah activities were performed by senior Tarbiyah activists.124 As Noura 
explained further: 
 
The Tarbiyah activists entered the mosques and religious institutions, and 
most of the activists were known as ustadz [religious teacher] or muballigh 
[preachers]. Ustadz or muballigh, trained not only the younger activists in 
[the] groups, but also gave lectures at various public places overtly, such as 
campuses, offices, and mosques (Noura, 50s, leader, female, Jakarta).125  
 
From interviews I held with the early activists of the Tarbiyah movement, I 
concluded that the senior cadres of the Tarbiyah movement played a significant role 
in spreading their dakwah ideologies from private to public places, such as offices, 
large mosques, schools or other educational institutions, and other public places. 
These senior cadres also established social and educational services, such as Islamic 
schools and religious institutions. These educational and social activities supported 
the Tarbiyah movement in enlarging their dakwah audiences beyond university 
mosques. 
 
The senior members of the Tarbiyah movement referred to this period as mihwar 
sha’bi (the popular phase). From the interviews I held with the leaders of Tarbiyah 
movement and by examining their official texts, I found that this term meant that the 
Tarbiyah members who were trained in the previous period were now required to 
interact with the wider society and to take part in educating it (al-irsyad al-
mujtama’) (MPP PKS, 2008a: 57). A statement from a key leader of the Tarbiyah 
movement, for instance, makes it clear that:  
                                                 
124 During the early development of the Liqo in the 1980s and the early and middle part of the 1990s, 
this movement had numerous Liqo figures, with different sorts of expertise in Islamic studies. They 
were well known among the Liqo community, and widely referred to using the title ‘ustadz’, which 
means teachers of religious or Islamic subjects. The title ‘ustadz’ was not a formal or official 
appointment, but established through an informal process of recognition. This recognition developed 
over years of interactions between the Liqo and the Tarbiyah community through various 
opportunities provided by both formal and informal activities.  
125 Interviewed on 08/10/2012. 
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After having a mihwar tanzimi, we then have a mihwar sha’bi. Sha’bi means 
society. We have indeed many instruments and activities in reaching our 
society [in this phase] (Fatih, 50s, leader, male, Jakarta).126  
 
In this period, Tarbiyah members who already had distinctive Tarbiyah 
characteristics (tamayuz) were expected by the leaders to spread and conduct non-
verbal dakwah among Indonesian society. Verbal dakwah here involves a call to 
religious piety which, according to the movement, is achieved by members 
providing themselves as role models for society, as indicated by a statement from a 
leader of the Tarbiyah movement:  
 
There is guidance (kaidah) that [members] should always be reminded [of]: 
all of us [Tarbiyah members] must interact with anybody with our Islamic 
‘uniqueness’ (fa-l yakhtalithuun wa-laakin yatamayyazuun). This guidance 
does not require the members to be exclusive, but [to be] blended within the 
society without losing their ‘uniqueness’. However, we are aware that, as a 
consequence of our social interaction (mu’amalah), people might say that we 
are very exclusive, strange or something else (Ahmad, 60s, leader, male, 
Jakarta).127  
 
In my observations of their behaviour and attitudes, however, this guidance not only 
created the ‘uniqueness’ of its members, but also their distinctive characters – in the 
sense of their ideologies and practices. Three interviewees from non-Tarbiyah/PKS 
backgrounds, for instance, strongly opined that “the Liqo members’ ways of 
thinking and behaviours are ‘strange’ or ‘odd’ as compared to the wider Indonesian 
Muslims” (Fachruddin, Muiz and Masdar, age group 40s-50s, Jakarta, university 
lecturers).128 Fachruddin, for instance, gives an example:   
My neighbour who is a cadre of the Tarbiyah movement –whenever he has a 
chance to talk with me-- is continuously condemning the activists of 
democracy and human rights (Hak Azasi Manusia, HAM) as having no 
contribution at all to Muslims both in Indonesia and Palestine [overseas]. 
                                                 
126 Interviewed on 21/11/2012. 
127 Interviewed on 27/08/2012 and 17/10/2012. 
128 Interviewed on 08/11/2012, 12/11/2012 and 12/11/2012. 
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Rather, they are bad influences in terms of the adoption of Western ideas or 
cultures among Muslim youth (40s, male, Jakarta, university lecturer).129 
  
 
The Liqo members were required by the leaders of the Tarbiyah movement to 
participate in a variety of public outreach events, such as community events. The 
public events aimed to disseminate the movement's ideology and also to draw in 
new members. Like other Islamist movements, any social interaction is seen by the 
Liqo-Tarbiyah movement as an opportunity for dakwah (see Chapter 5.3).130 
 
In addition, Tarbiyah activists started to mobilise their public dakwah activities 
through training and education centres, charity centres, cultural activities, free 
medical services, and so on. Fatih, a key leader of the Tarbiyah movement, 
explained various activities in this period (1990-1998) as follows: 
 
We started to develop publishing institutions such as Rabbani Press, asy-
Shamil, Intermedia, and many more. We have many social, educational, and 
cultural institutions, such as the council for giving alms [zakat], the 
Integrated Islamic Primary School [Sekolah Dasar Islam Terpadu/SDIT], the 
School Dakwah Union [Lembaga Dakwah Sekolah/LDS], the Campus 
Dakwah Union [Lembaga Dakwah Kampus/LDK], and other smaller dakwah 
movements, as managed by Tarbiyah female activists for women in the 
society (Fatih, 50s, leader, male, Jakarta).131 
 
These institutions were established by the Tarbiyah cadres to promote their dakwah 
messages to wider audiences and to help people understand these messages. These 
centres are the main medium of interaction between the Tarbiyah community and 
wider communities. Through my observations and interviews with the majority of 
the Tarbiyah movement leaders, I found that through these centres, the Tarbiyah 
                                                 
129 Interviewed on 08/11/2012. 
130 This can be seen in other studies of Islamist movements, such as Salafis and the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Jordan (Wiktorowicz, 2001), the Muslim Brotherhood and the female mosque 
movement in Egypt (Gilsenan, 1973; Mahmood, 2005), and Al-Muhajirun in the UK (Wiktorowicz, 
2005). 
131 Interviewed on 21/11/2012. 
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movement not only provides basic goods and free services to the wider community, 
but also promotes their ideological values. In many cases, through providing 
services and programmes, the Tarbiyah movement aimed to spread their public 
dakwah messages and foster a more religious Indonesian society.132 This range of 
centres, from charities to educational institutions, is part of the Tarbiyah 
movement’s main dakwah ideology and strategy (see Chapter 5.3.2).  
 
4.5 The Tarbiyah movement as a political party during the 
democratic period (1998-present day) 
Although the Indonesian political system had been more ‘accommodating’ of 
Islamic groups at the end of the New Order government (from the end of 1980s until 
1998), the rise of the new regime in 1998 evoked new and greater expectations 
amongst the Tarbiyah movement’s senior members, and enabled them to further 
strengthen involvement in the public arena. From 1998, it was open for any group, 
whether Islamic or secularist, to participate in the general elections that are 
conducted every five years.  
 
1998 was thus considered by the Tarbiyah movement as marking the beginning of 
the new dakwah phase – which is often called mihwar mu’assasi (the political 
penetration phase) or al-‘am al-intikhabi (the election period).133 A leader of the 
Tarbiyah movement and the head of cadre development’s division of the PKS, for 
instance, explained in one of the official documents that this period refers to:  
 
                                                 
132 This is similar to the MB in Egypt, which built various centres to support their dakwah movement 
(Mitchell, 1993; Mandaville 2007/2014). 
133 For further discussion of this phase, see MPP-PKS (2008a; 2008b); Abdurrahim (2005).  
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These years are years for struggle to strengthen the existence of our political 
movement for the sake of dakwah, al wujud al-siyasi li al-dakwah (translate) 
In this era, all cadres should become voters and constituents in the wider 
society. The cadres should perform their dakwah and politics in order to gain 
love and sympathy [of the society] so that they are able join the Tarbiyah 
movement [and support the party] (Abdurrahim, 2005: 56).  
 
Although a female leader highlighted that the Tarbiyah community had not initially 
planned to transform their dakwah activities into a political movement – “[from the 
beginning] there was no planning to establish a political party” (Noura, 50s, female, 
Jakarta, the Tarbiyah movement leader) – the gradualist Islamisation ideology of the 
movement strongly suggested that their dakwah would enter the political sphere at 
some point. 
  
By the end of 1998, a discourse among the leaders and members of the Tarbiyah 
movement had emerged about the need for a political party. Noura shared her 
experience of these events as follows:  
 
In 1998, Anis Matta, a key leader of the Tarbiyah movement [and the current 
President of the PKS], asked me and other Tarbiyah activists whether or not 
they wanted to enter the political arena. There was a voting process to see the 
interests of activists in politics. The vote showed that about 76% wanted to 
struggle through politics, while the rest wanted to remain with their dakwah 
movement. The majority agreed to enter politics because they wanted to 
contribute [to developing] a better society – ishlah al-ummah. We held an 
internal meeting among the Tarbiyah cadres in order to review this result and 
to decide the next plan. Alhamdulillah (praise to Allah) through takbirullah 
(Allah’s guidance) and takdirullah (Allah’s predestination), we entered the 
political arena. This moment, for us, was a stage of our maturity to 
understand the manhaj (the overall ideology) of our dakwah (Noura, 50s, 
leader, female, Jakarta).134  
 
Noura’s explanation shows that there was internal debate between senior Tarbiyah 
members about the decision to establish the party. Whilst some wanted to keep the 
                                                 
134 However, some of the literature notes that the voting process was carried out via questionnaires 
that were distributed to approximately 6,000 Tarbiyah activists, and that 68% of those who returned 
the questionnaires agreed to create a political party (Hilmy, 2010; Collins, 2003).  
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Tarbiyah movement away from the political domain, after the party was established 
all of them accepted the decision that had been made. Nevertheless, these 
differences of opinions and further dynamics and developments in the party caused 
internal conflicts and tensions to emerge among the senior members of the Tarbiyah 
movement (Permata, 2013).   
 
The unification of religion and politics was one of the goals that drove the Tarbiyah 
movement to establish the political party. The majority of the leaders that I 
interviewed held strongly to the view that there is no separation between dakwah 
and politics. This idea involves the implementation of the concept of ‘total Islam’ 
(Islam kaafah) that was talked about widely among this community, and stated in 
their official documents, and involves applying Islam to both the secular and 
religious aspects of life (see Chapter 1).135 The establishment of the dakwah party by 
the Tarbiyah activists was, therefore, regarded as a continuation of their dakwah 
activities more broadly. Based on my reading of it, their official book, called ‘The 
Platform of PKS Development’s Policy’ (Platform Kebijakan Pembangunan PKS) 
holds that the purpose of their dakwah in this phase should be understood as follows:  
 
Islam cannot be separated from politics as the manifestation of Islamic 
consultation (shura), ‘commanding right and forbidding wrong’ (amar 
ma’ruf nahi munkar) and struggling for justice. The PKS, therefore, has 
chosen politics to implement Islamic values, not only at individual and 
family levels, but also at society and state level (MPP-PKS, 2008a:52).  
 
The founders, key leaders and senior activists of the party thus sought to show that 
their political movement cannot be separated from dakwah. My interview with 
Noura, who is responsible for the official archives and history of the DPP-PKS, 
                                                 
135 The PKS’s engagement with wider society through political means was part of the idea of ‘total 
Islam’, which was inspired by the founders and ideologues of the MB in Egypt – Hasan al-Banna and 
Sayyid Qutb.  
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shows that “the PKS leaders and founders of the Tarbiyah movement frequently 
used the term dakwah, and that they refer to it numerous times in their speeches” 
(Noura, 50s, female, leader, Jakarta). This suggests that the leaders want to 
emphasise that dakwah is still their main concern, and that they are strongly attached 
to it, even though they have established the political party. Noura explained that, “in 
order to transfer and spread the ideas of the leaders on their dakwah ideologies to the 
wider society, their speech collections were published officially by the PKS under 
my division [of archives]”. Furthermore, she argued that these publications are 
significant for disseminating the idea of the integration of dakwah and politics to all 
dakwah activists, from senior members to those at the grass roots level. Backing this 
up, another leader said during an interview:  
 
The dakwah that is held by PKS is a comprehensive dakwah that covers all 
aspects of life, including the private and public. Basically, one aspect of life 
cannot be left alone by dakwah. What we [the PKS] do right now is not a 
moving process [from dakwah to politics], because politics is only one aspect 
of this comprehensive dakwah. Therefore, we did not leave anything by 
establishing a political party, but we did all things together under the idea of 
comprehensive dakwah (Fatih, 50s, leader and a founding member of the 
PK/PKS, male, Jakarta).    
 
The PKS, therefore, can be seen as an outcome of the Tarbiyah’s dakwah 
movement, which, in widening its dakwah into this political movement, appointed 
Tarbiyah activists to run the party.  
 
In order to strengthen the argument for integrating dakwah and politics, the founders 
of the movement placed dakwah as the party’s central identity and purpose in the 
articles of the party. No. 2, Article 5 – on ‘the objective of the party’ - asserts: “the 
PKS is a dakwah party which aims to establish a just and prosperous society blessed 
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by Allah within the Republic of Indonesia based on the principles of Pancasila” 
(MPP-PKS 2008).  
 
During this phase, the image of the PKS as a dakwah party was also strengthened 
through growing publications of books concerning the PKS and dakwah written by 
both leaders and cadres. They used the term dakwah as the title of the books, and as 
the keyword for its contents.136 ‘Dakwah’, therefore, became closely associated with 
the party’s image, both by the community of the party itself (the party’s leaders and 
cadres), and also by those external to it, such as the media and wider society. The 
PKS’s use of the term ‘dakwah’ is understandable as it distinguishes it from other 
Islamic parties and organisations. Five PKS leaders that I interviewed emphasised 
the idea that attaching and associating the term ‘dakwah’ with the party was not only 
done for the purpose of reassuring Tarbiyah activists of the continuity of the party 
and their dakwah movement, but also for differentiating the party from other Islamic 
parties (Abdullah, Noura, Rahman, Fatih and Mona).  
 
The PKS is a dakwah party (partai dakwah) which means that for the PKS victory in 
elections (politics) is a victory for dakwah. However, there is a different perception 
of how to win elections and how to ‘win’ dakwah projects among its leaders and 
members (Hidayat, 2012). Party leaders such as former PKS president Anis Matta 
(2011), as quoted by Hidayat (2012:234), says that “the project of the PKS is to grab 
a chance to lead the country with capability and quality to the benefit of all society, 
and politics is part of the implementation of that. Offering the best cadres for the 
                                                 
136 The word ‘dakwah’ has been used as the keyword of the majority of books written by both 
dakwah activists and leaders of the PKS, both those published institutionally by the PKS and by 
publishers affiliated to it. There are more than thirty books using the keyword ‘dakwah’, and this 
keyword is also frequently used in the party’s pamphlets, bulletins, articles and banners. 
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country to give their best is the way to lead the path to this vision”. This official 
vision is rejected by some members who argue that political projects would have a 
negative impact on both the party and the cadres because of its pragmatic political 
attitude. 
 
Nevertheless, there is a strong perception among the community – as revealed by the 
interviews with grass-roots activists and party leaders – that the Tarbiyah movement 
and the party (PKS) are sharing a common ideology. They are perceived as having a 
close relationship because they have the same ideological and organisational roots. 
In addition, the same activists manage these two institutions, as the Tarbiyah 
movement and the PKS are composed of the same people (Permata, 2013), with 
most of the party's leaders being senior members and leaders of the Tarbiyah 
movement (see Chapter 5).137  
 
There has been much discussion of whether these political and dakwah institutions 
should work together as equals in different arenas, or whether one of them should be 
subordinate to the other, and different perceptions about the hierarchical relationship 
between these two institutions can be found in the opinions of different Tarbiyah 
leaders. One of the key figures of the Tarbiyah movement emphasised that “the 
Tarbiyah movement and the party are complementary [to] each other” (Salim, 50s, 
leader, male, Jakarta). This means that these two institutions were ‘ranked’ equally, 
with the hope that they would support each other. However, Ahmad (60s, leader, 
male, Jakarta) thought otherwise, emphasising that “the party was founded as a 
means of [supporting] our dakwah movements”. The other two senior figures of the 
                                                 
137 Permata explains that ‘basically members of the Tarbiyah movement are PKS members’ 
(2013:249). However, the increasingly pragmatic behavior of the PKS separates PKS members from 
the Tarbiyah members who do not get involved in party activities.  
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Tarbiyah movement articulated the idea that “politics, for us, is only one of the ways 
of widening the dakwah territory (mihwar dakwah)” (Noura and Fatih, 50s, leaders, 
Jakarta). This indicates that the party is supposed to be part of the Tarbiyah 
movement, and support the Tarbiyah movement’s goals, and hence that it should be 
subordinate to it in the big picture.  
 
Given that the party was established by the Tarbiyah community, it is logical to 
assume that the Tarbiyah movement should control the party and have executive 
authority. Furthermore, the Tarbiyah movement is much older, and thus seeing the 
party as the means for supporting the dakwah of the movement should be the logical 
understanding of their relationship. This was the expectation held by senior 
Tarbiyah activists. The leaders of the party tried to convey a clear message to all 
cadres about the unity of religion and politics, and the necessity of using politics for 
upholding religion. The majority of cadres, therefore, believed that the 
transformation to a political movement was a great idea for promoting their 
Tarbiyah ideologies through a legal and formal political approach. Machmudi, a 
lecturer at the state University in Jakarta emphasised:  
 
Through the integration of politics and [the] dakwah movement, we expected 
to be able to change the conditions of Muslims from all aspects of life, and of 
course to be able to return to the victory of Islam in the past. This point was 
the key spirit that has been transferred by the early leaders of the Tarbiyah 
movement to the next generation of the Tarbiyah activists since the early 
1980s (Machmudi, 40s, founding members of PKS/senior mentor of the 
Tarbiyah movement, Depok). 
 
 
However, my findings suggest that this is not how the relationship has developed in 
reality. Although the party was established by the Tarbiyah movement, there are two 
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examples that demonstrate how the party in fact attempts to control or to subordinate 
the Tarbiyah movement.  
 
First, the weekly Liqo sessions, which have been the main activity of Tarbiyah since 
the movement’s inception, are conceptualised and managed by the Cadre Division of 
the party (see Chapter 5). This means that the Liqo is no longer independent of the 
influence of other institutions within the movement as it was in the past. Likewise, 
the Liqo programmes are the party’s central way of recruiting, mobilising, and 
shaping the ideology of cadres (see Chapter 5). Apart from the Liqo, the party also 
controls other Tarbiyah programmes, such as Dawrah (religious lectures), Rihlah 
(tours to any tourism centres),138 Mabit (staying overnight for ritual activities such 
as reciting the Qur’an, praying and thinking of Allah/dhikr), and Mukhayyam 
(religious camps). Even though all these activities are conducted by the Tarbiyah 
community, the content and design of the programmes are determined and managed 
by the party’s division (MPP-PKS, 2008b).  
 
Second, the topics or lessons (mawad) that they have to deliver in the weekly Liqo 
sessions should refer to the Manhaj Tarbiyah book, which was prepared and written 
by the party (see Chapter 5). The murabbi (mentors) of the Liqo are mainly managed 
by the party. It is possible that the murabbi of the Liqo at the beginner level are not 
formally members of the party, but at the higher levels, most of them are members 
of the party. Given that the murabbi at the lower levels are mutarabbi (trainees) of 
the Liqo at higher levels as well, all murabbi are cadres of the party (see Chapter 5).  
 
                                                 
138 Tours are designed for spiritual purposes, through which individuals can reflect on their 
spirituality outside of the dakwah classes. 
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My research, however, revealed that the Tarbiyah movement has been utilised as a 
'medium' for enlarging and strengthening support for the party. By declaring it to be 
a dakwah party, the leaders of the party – who are also senior members and leaders 
of the Tarbiyah movement - intended to construct an emotional connection between 
the party and all the Tarbiyah’s cadres. The founders expected that all the 
Tarbiyah’s cadres would have the same sense of belonging and views about their 
responsibilities to the party, and to encourage this the PKS promoted a tenet among 
the Tarbiyah community that runs: “the (Tarbiyah) community is the party and the 
party itself is the (Tarbiyah) community” (al-jama’ah hiya al-hizb, wa al-hizb huwa 
al-jama’ah) (DPP-PKS, 2003: 33). This principle was used to encourage the 
Tarbiyah cadres to see themselves as having obligations to become involved in 
politics and to support the party in addition to their involvement in Tarbiyah 
activities.  
 
4.6 The dakwah of the Tarbiyah movement and the domination of 
the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) (2004–present day) 
Even though the Tarbiyah movement still placed the focus of dakwah on improving 
individual piety, it attempted to synchronise this objective with the PKS party's goal 
to place their cadres within state institutions. There have been many cases in which 
the Tarbiyah community has been intensively involved in supporting candidates of 
the party for positions as parliamentarians, governors, and as President, in both local 
and national elections. Leaders of the Tarbiyah movement and murabbi of the Liqo 
mobilised their cadres to participate in influencing public opinion in order to aid 
their candidates in winning elections.  
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The party has participated in the Indonesian general elections since 1999, and its 
popularity has increased significantly, from receiving 1.36% of the vote in the 1999 
general election to 7.88% in 2009, although this decreased by about 1% in the last 
election in 2014. The party has been successful in convincing Indonesian people to 
not only commit to private dakwah, hence reforming individual and social religiosity 
(Damanik, 2002; Rahmat, 2008), but also to accept public dakwah, leading to a 
focus on eradicating poverty and corruption, providing better education and helping 
victims of disasters (Shihab and Nugroho, 2008; Muhtadi, 2012). In the 1999 
election, the PKS were very strict in focusing their campaign on Islamic shari’ah. It 
seems that they became aware of the fact that establishing shari’ah was not 
‘enough’ of an agenda for Indonesian Muslims to back, and transformed the issues 
that they addressed from Islamic shari’ah oriented issues to issues oriented towards 
humanity and national concerns in order to attract public attention. Many observers 
have suggested that this transformation was at the root of its significant 
achievements in the 2004, 2009 and 2014 elections.  
 
During my fieldwork in Jakarta at the end of 2012, I observed how the Tarbiyah 
community was involved in campaigning for a PKS candidate for governor in the 
Pilkada (the local election). The most recent political events that I observed (from 
Leeds) were the parliamentary and Presidential elections conducted in April and 
July 2014. The leaders of the community frequently reminded members of the Liqo 
to choose candidates based on their ‘true’ akidah, and those who will support Islam 
(see also Section 6.5). This rhetoric elegantly prevented them from directly 
mentioning the PKS candidates, whilst the implication of their encouragement was 
clear. Religious arguments were consistently invoked to ‘remind’ the members who 
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the appropriate candidates were. This promotion of candidates and encouragement 
for voting has been practised since the establishment of the PKS.     
 
The Tarbiyah movement leaders who are also PKS leaders regard this dakwah phase 
as being al-mihwar al-dauli (a state institutional phase). This phase involves 
‘vertical mobility’, aiming to gradually penetrate state institutions and other public 
organisations (DPP-PKS, 2003:47). The idea behind this phase is to spread their best 
cadres into state institutions, so that they can ‘reform’ or Islamise them from within. 
A key leader of the Tarbiyah movement and the party explained this dakwah phase 
as follows: 
   
This stage is the continuation of the previous stages. Nothing is stopped in 
this stage because the development of individual religiosity remains the 
focus. The thing that differs from other stages is the spread of these 
individuals to influence their work places through their dakwah values, such 
as in government offices, the parliament, private offices, and companies 
(Abdullah, 40s, leader, male, Jakarta).  
 
 
According to Abdullah, the distribution of cadres to offices within state 
organisations as well as within other public institutions was regarded as a vital step 
in creating a more Islamic society and state. Those cadres are expected to play a 
significant role in influencing institutions to become more in line with Islamic 
teachings and to spread Islamic values to society at large. Islamising the public 
sphere through spreading their dakwah ideologies is, therefore, the most significant 
goal of the dakwah movement in this phase.  
 
One of the roles that the Tarbiyah’s cadres have in 'reforming' (Islamising) the state 
can be seen through the position that the PKS’s parliamentary members adopted in a 
debate of the parliament (MPR) during 2000–2002. It concerned the amendment of 
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Article 29 of the Constitution of Indonesia (UUD 1945), which contains clauses 
about the relationship between religions and the state. The PKS proposed the 
Madinah Charter (piagam Madinah), instead of the Jakarta Charter, as the main 
inspiration for the amendment to the state constitution (Hilmy, 2010).139 The 
Tarbiyah–PKS cadres demanded that Article 29 be amended, stating that it was 
“obligatory [for the state] to implement religious teachings for its respective 
followers”.140 They attempted to convince parliament that the state should be 
involved in maintaining the religiosity of its believers. In the final debates on this 
clause the PKS was one of the two Islamic political parties that insisted that article 
29 be amended, while most parties revoked their objections (Hilmy, 2010). Most 
Islamist parties favour the insertion of the “seven words” of the Jakarta Charter (see 
Chapter 2; Hilmy, 2010). The reasons behind the PKS’s choice are: ‘first, to uphold 
the religious values espoused by the preamble of the UUD 1945, and second, ‘to 
emphasize the equal position of religions in Indonesia’ (Hilmy, 2010: 202-203).   
 
Although the PKS’ subscription to the Madinah Charter was criticized by many 
Islamists groups and they were accused of having betrayed its commitment to 
implement shari’ah (Hilmy, 2010), in my opinion, however, this still indicates that a 
central aim of the Tarbiyah movement’s dakwah is to strengthen the Islamic 
character of the state through its cadres in the parliament.141 As mentioned in a book 
                                                 
139 The Madinah charter (Piagam Madinah) ‘is a constitution that essentially established the Madinah 
city-state under the leadership of the Prophet Muhammad. The charter was the first written 
constitution in Islam and arguably the first constitutional law in society’ (See Hasan, 2012:24-25; a 
further account of the Madinah charter can be found in Watt, 1956)  
140 Islamic parties such as the PKS, the United Development Party (PPP), and the Star and Crescent 
Party (PBB), as well as Muslim supporter-based parties like the PAN (supported by members of the 
Muhammadiyah) and the PKB (supported by the NU) held that this article should be revised through 
adding a sentence stating that it is “obligatory to implement shari’ah for Muslims” (offered by PPP 
and PBB) or that it is “obligatory to implement religious teachings for its respective followers” 
(offered by PAN, PKB, and PKS). 
141 I argue that their rejection of the Jakarta Charter cannot be separated from its context as the ‘new 
face’ of the political party in 2002 when they were facing new challenges and battling to influence 
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written by three Tarbiyah leaders, who are also foremost leaders of the PKS – Balda, 
Rida, and Wahono (2000) – the key task of Tarbiyah activists in parliament is to 
control, monitor and issue legislation that is in line with the central Islamic teachings 
of the Qur’an and the Sunna. In an official statement (Bayanat) of the party, it was 
also mentioned that:  
 
Through the parliament, the PK [PKS] struggles to implement Islamic 
teachings and Islamic laws. This struggle focused to insert Islamic elements 
on the legislation products at the parliament, such as the law of giving alms 
(Zakat), the law of banking, the law of marriage, and so on (DPP-PK, 1999).   
 
Given that the Tarbiyah movement and the party are intertwined in their visions, this 
suggests that the dakwah movement is, at this stage, more challenging for members 
of the Tarbiyah movement than it has been at previous stages. The Tarbiyah 
movement needs to tolerate as well as to justify the pragmatic attitudes of the party. 
However, it is worth noting that, as a political party in a democratic state, the PKS 
has to attract as many voters from different social groups as possible,142 and the 
1999 General Election proved that their stance on the shari’ah issue did not create a 
good impression on the wider society, with the party receiving less than 2% of the 
national vote.  
 
                                                                                                                                         
constituencies with nationalist parties. I agree also with Hasan’s (2012) opinion that this strategy was 
‘an elegant manoeuvre’ by the PKS because they were aware of the previous failure of the first 
generation of Islamists who attempted to give shari’ah a constitutional status in the seven words of 
the Jakarta charter.   
142 Shihab and Nugroho (2008) said that these changes in the political and dakwah strategy were 
intentionally designed to gain more national voters. Studies by Muhtadi (2012) and Permata (2008) 
stated that this changing strategy showed the dilemmas they were facing and the pragmatic 
compromise they had ultimately chosen to make between retaining their dakwah ideology and 
responding to political realities.   
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Thus, in the 2004 General Election,143 the party moved away from campaigning for 
shari’ah, preferring to fight for more 'secular' issues, such as education for poor 
people and an anti-corruption agenda (Muhtadi, 2012; Permata, 2008; Shihab and 
Nugroho, 2008). In 2007, the party even publicly declared its support for a policy of 
religious pluralism, selecting some non-Muslims for its parliamentary candidates in 
the 2009 election (Permata, 2008). Furthermore, my interview with a founding 
member of the PKS (Hafidz, 60s, male, Jakarta) revealed that the party built a close 
relationship with a liberal Muslim scholar, Nurcholish Madjid, who had previously 
been condemned as a figure who was corroding Islam from within.144 According to 
Hilmy, it is not surprising that the PKS eclectically adopt many intellectual 
viewpoints from different sources including ‘liberal’ ones if ‘they help enhance the 
soft power of the party’ (2010:204). Even though the issue of religious pluralism 
was very controversial for the Tarbiyah community, most of them complied with 
and supported the pragmatic political choices that the party made.  
 
However, there were also significant criticisms of the party's pragmatic choices from 
key leaders within the Tarbiyah community and a founding member of the PKS, 
such as Daud Rasyid, a lecturer in an Islamic State University, and Yusuf Supendi, a 
well-known preacher (da’i) within the Tarbiyah community. The party’s openness 
to religious pluralism and liberal Muslim figures disappointed these leaders and 
other activists of the Tarbiyah movement, who supported the establishment of the 
PKS, but were keen to maintain the original dakwah ideology of the Tarbiyah 
movement. These figures were, however, marginalised by the party as a result of 
                                                 
143 In the 2004 General Election, the party tripled its votes to 7.34% and received almost seven-fold 
the number of seats in the parliament, as well as three ministerial positions (www.kpu.go.id accessed 
8 September 2012). 
144 Interviewed on 15/08/2012. 
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their criticisms (Permata, 2013). Other members preferred to be ‘loyal’ to the 
Tarbiyah movement and obey the party, even though they disagreed with its 
pragmatic approach.145 
 
4.7 The Liqo in the periods of the Tarbiyah movement and the PKS: 
leadership and authority  
Liqo-Tarbiyah activists and PKS cadres are bound by the same authority, as they are 
part of the same dakwah community and ideology. In practice, there are differences 
in the leadership structure, as the Liqo-Tarbiyah movement uses an ‘informal 
structure of leadership inspired by the MB in Egypt, whilst the PKS follows the 
formal structure of the political party system in Indonesia’ (Permata, 2013:271; see 
also my discussion in Chapter 5). In the literature on the MB, however, the MB 
reflects the Western political party system too (Mitchell, 1993). From the Tarbiyah 
movement’s emergence in 1983 until the late 1990s, both Liqo sessions and other 
Tarbiyah activities were organised by a supreme leader (muraqib ‘am), holding both 
religious and organisational authority, and assisted by deputies responsible for 
different tasks and duties.146 This leadership, however, changed after the 
establishment of the PKS political party in 1998.147 As a political party, the PKS 
follows the party’s president under the guidance of the Shura Council (Majlis 
                                                 
145 In my interviews with three ex-activists of the Tarbiyah movement – two from Jakarta and one 
from Tangerang – they expressed their disagreement with the pragmatic approach adopted by the 
party. However, a leader of the Tarbiyah movement opined that it is better for them to stay inside the 
Tarbiyah community and the party and critique it. He said that their critiques will be better listened to 
by the PKS elites if they are delivered from within (Abdullah, 40s, leader, male, Jakarta). 
146 It is adopted from the MB structure too (Mitchell, 1993). 
147 From 1998 onwards, there was a shift in leadership. In their early political period, the highest 
authority of the PKS was the National Assembly, which was responsible for many tasks, including 
the selection of the Party’s central leadership. But later on, the leadership of The National Assembly 
was moved to the Shura Council (Majlis Shura) (Permata, 2013). 
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Shura).148 This shift in leadership, as Permata (2013:244) notes, has led to changing 
internal dynamics and tensions between the Tarbiyah movement and the PKS.  
 
From 1998 onwards, the Liqo has become more centralised under the structure of the 
PKS. This centralisation reflects the fact that the Liqo sessions and other religious 
activities of the Tarbiyah movement are managed by the Cadre Division of the PKS 
(see Table 2: Diagram of the Liqo within wider structure of the PKS). Thus, the 
Cadre Division of the Party Central Office determines the direction of the Liqo 
movement, including preparing, monitoring, and reviewing the manual of the Liqo, 
together with Tarbiyah activities in general (Manhaj Tarbiyah, 2005). This division 
is responsible for the overall concepts, practices, and strategies of the Liqo’s dakwah 
and the Tarbiyah movement.149 The Cadre Division exists at every level of the 
structure of the PKS – from the highest to the lowest levels – and plays a significant 
role within the Liqo community.150 Although the strategic role that the Cadre 
Division plays is plain to see, especially in the Party Central Office (DPP), they are 
still required to follow the general directions and organisational decisions of the 
higher level leadership of the PKS, namely the Advisory Council (Majlis 
Pertimbangan Partai/MPP), the Party Central Office (Dewan Pengurus Pusat/DPP), 
and the Shari’ah Council (Dewan Syariah Pusat/DSP), which is second only to the 
Shura Assembly (Majlis Shura) as the highest structure within the PKS (MPP PKS, 
2008a; Permata, 2013). 
 
 
                                                 
148Majlis Shura has 99 members, 65 of whom are elected from 33 provinces, based on the 
approximate numbers of the Tarbiyah members in each province; 2 special members (the current and 
former chairmen of this council); and 32 additional members selected by the council based on their 
professional expertise (Permata, 2013:266). This is similar to the MB structure. 
149 Based on Interview with Fatih, 50s, leader, male, Jakarta on 21/11/2012.  
150 Based on Interview with Ahmad, 60s, leader, male, Jakarta on 17/1/2012. 
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Table 2 The Liqo-Tarbiyah movement within the wider structure of the PKS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from the official website of the PKS, www.pk-sejahtera.org. 
Accessed in August 2014, used with permission. 
 
Advisory council 
(MPP) 
Shura 
Assembly 
Party Central 
office (DPP) 
Shari’ah council 
(DSP) 
Party President 
General Secretary (GS) 
GS deputies: 
Div. Coordination 
Div.Organization (Cadre Division/ Liqo) 
Div. Administration 
Div. Data & Info 
Div. Archive & History 
Div.Political Communication 
General Treasury (GT) 
Sectorial Dept.: 
Trainees Affairs 
Islamic Affairs 
Women’s Affairs 
Public Policy 
Youth and Professions 
Economic 
Development 
Scouts and Sports 
Social Affairs 
Public Relations 
Territorial Dept: 
Sumatera 
Banten and West 
Java 
Bali, NTT, and NTB 
Kalimantan 
Sulawesi 
East Indonesia 
 
 
Special Bodies 
Discipline 
Leadership 
Planning 
Elections 
Foreign 
relations 
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Abdullah, one of the PKS leaders, refers to this structure as a ‘mechanism system’, 
formulated to manage both the religious and political activities of the PKS. 
Abdullah, who is also a former head of the Cadre Division, explained that this 
division, or the ‘Council of cadre training programmes’, is not only concerned with 
internal cadre development in the Liqo, but also in the wider society.151Abdullah’s 
explanation above was strengthened by claims made by a leader of the PKS 
structure, who says that the Liqo has been better organised and developed since 
being under the party’s control:  
 
There is a regular monitoring process of the Liqo conducted by the PKS 
structure. The weekly training sessions of the Liqo, from its top to its lowest 
levels, are managed to conduct [them on] different days for each Liqo level. 
Such monitoring is designed for the effectiveness of evaluation and 
dissemination of information (Ahmad, 60s, leader, male, Jakarta).152  
 
However, the cadres that I interviewed from the Liqo – Thifa, Fadila, Nabil, and 
Nuriah – held that in terms of direction the Liqo was better before the PKS was 
established. They saw the PKS’s control of the Liqo as negatively impacting upon 
their dakwah and the Tarbiyah movement. There is now a greater focus on the 
political aspect of the party than on the religious aspect of the Tarbiyah movement, 
and these cadres were generally unhappy about the fact that the political activities of 
the PKS have moved them further away from their original dakwah activities. Thifa, 
Fadila, Nabil, and Nuriah all expressed the same sentiment that “the Liqo has been 
used to support the party’s activities, especially in the elections period”.  
 
                                                 
151 According to Abdullah, this structure of the party is responsible for both the internal development 
of cadres through education and training and for attracting external sympathisers or members of the 
wider society. For discharging its internal responsibilities, the PKS has the Council of Cadres 
Training (Badan Pembinaan Kader-BPK), while to carry out its external remit, it has a structure 
called the Council of Umat Training (Badan Pembinaan Umat-BPU). Each council has its own leader 
or head of council. 
152 Interviewed on 27/08/2012. 
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In his Doctoral dissertation, Permata (2008) also points to the changing attitudes of 
the party’s leaders. In the 1999 legislative election, its leaders asked Liqo activists to 
focus more on their dakwah activities while, in the 2004 elections, the leaders issued 
a fatwa calling on activists to mobilise the people around them to vote for the PKS. 
In my opinion, criticism of the PKS in this regard comes only from those who are 
dissatisfied with the shift of the movement’s dakwah focus from aiming to improve 
individual cadres’ religiosities to a more political concern with Islamising the public 
sphere. However, the majority of trainees and members accepted this shift and 
regarded it as part of the leaders’ policy and as part of the evolving dakwah stages. 
They also emphasized that the Liqo is still largely focused on reproducing purist 
religiosity, the same aim as at the beginning of the movement. 
 
Given that there are multiple levels within the Liqo’s hierarchy, there are also 
multiple levels of religious authority within the Liqo community, and a chain of 
ideological authority for Liqo trainees. Apart from the cadre’s division of the DPP, 
the Shari’ah Council (DSP) plays a significant role in giving religious advice to both 
Liqo and PKS cadres. The DSP provides useful considerations for the political 
policies of the party through interpreting how to apply Islam to various issues. The 
DSP’s role is not just to provide a religious reference point for the Liqo community 
and the wider society, however, but also to maintain the religiosity of all Liqo and 
PKS cadres, from the elite to the grassroots members. One of the PKS leaders 
emphasised this point as follows:   
 
The major role of DSP-PKS is to put shari’ah as the foundation of the party. 
The DSP has a responsibility to control and to maintain the obedience and 
compliance to shari’ah for both the party and its individuals. The individuals 
include elites and cadres from the highest to the lowest level of the party’s 
membership. All leaders and activists [of the Liqo] are required to have 
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commitment to use shari’ah as the way of guiding their lives. For the party, 
the DSP needs to give guidance so that all policies or strategies do not 
deviate from the principles of shari’ah (Ahmad, 60s, leader, male, 
Jakarta).153 
 
The fact that the DSP requires the full obedience of all the different structures of the 
party, including the Liqo cadres, suggests that the PKS/Tarbiyah movement is an 
authoritarian religious movement. The DSP is the central body of the dakwah party 
that is responsible for its shari’ah compliance and, as explained by Ahmad (60s) it 
frequently gives shari’ah rulings under various names, such as fatwa (legal opinion), 
bayanat (explanation), tadzkirah (reminder), qadla (decision), taushiyah (religious 
advice) and ittijah fiqh (fiqh guidance). These shari’ah / religious recommendations 
or rulings are issued to respond to the discourses or phenomena that occur within the 
movement/party. Through my observations, I found that this ‘advice’ is issued in 
letters about decisions, and is disseminated through the PKS official website.  
 
In order to make appropriate legal opinions and decisions, “the key figures of DSP 
should be experts on shari’ah who [have] graduated from a faculty of Shari’ah of 
any Islamic institution following postgraduate studies” (Noura, 50s, leader, female, 
Jakarta). For example, Ahmad (60s, leader, male, Jakarta), studied Shari’ah during 
his undergraduate and postgraduate degrees. His masters and doctoral degrees were 
obtained from the faculty of Islamic law (shari’ah) of the University of Al-Azhar in 
Cairo, Egypt. Other members of the DSP are also experts on Shari’ah, with the 
majority of them having graduated from Middle Eastern universities (Noura, 50s, 
leader, female, Jakarta). However, as a female national leader admitted, the PKS has 
                                                 
153 Interviewed on 27/08/2012. According to Barbara Metcalf, controlling the cadres’ religiosity and 
public behaviour is one of the characteristics of Islamic activism (see Metcalf, 2001). 
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a very limited number of members with a background in shari’ah (shar’i activists). 
This is in line with the typical background of the Liqo community, who are mostly 
‘lay’ people rather than Islamically educated members or leaders. A senior shar’i 
activist of the PKS who graduated from Al-Azhar University confirmed this:  
The most dominant activists of the Liqo are non-shar’i background. There 
are of course some [members with a] shar’i background from Medina, 
LIPIA-Jakarta, and Al-Azhar University. However, it is very rare to find 
activists from the universities in Medina or Egypt. The most dominant and 
very active in mentoring new trainees are those who graduated from LIPIA. 
When Medina or Egypt graduates return to Indonesia, it is very difficult for 
them to be ‘re-educated’ through [the] Halaqah system and to join this 
dakwah community, as they may feel their superiority over others in terms of 
religious knowledge (Arif, 40s, leader, male, Jakarta).154  
 
The shari’ah rulings issued by the DSP thus provide guidance on how to live for all 
the Liqo and PKS cadres. The DSP also fully supports and strengthens the Majlis 
shura (the Consultative Assembly) – the highest organisational structure in the PKS 
hierarchy. Although the Majlis Shura is above the DSP in the chain of command, 
and has the responsibility of reporting their religious activities and decisions to the 
Majlis Shura, the DSP is regarded as the key ‘think tank’ of the Majlis Shura (see 
Figure of the structure of the PKS).155 The purpose of the DSP’s involvement in the 
Majlis Shura is to maintain and fit together all the political and dakwah policies and 
ideologies with the shari’ah system (Ahmad, 60s, leader, male, Jakarta).  
 
The Majlis Shura is the highest religious authority within the Liqo community as it 
is the highest religious and political entity in the PKS hierarchy. It has the power to 
control both the leadership and the ideology of the PKS, and is responsible for 
constructing ideological (theological) views. The Majlis Shura frequently issues 
                                                 
154 Interviewed on 18/10/2012. 
155 Statute of the PKS (Anggaran Dasar/ Anggaran Rumah Tangga -AD/ART), MPP- PKS, 2008b. 
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rulings or advice related to the position of the party on the national stage, in terms of 
the party’s theological and political views.  
 
The religious authority that is most frequently referred to by Liqo trainees is that of 
their Liqo mentor. These murabbi also have their religious references in their Liqo 
groups (the mentors of these mentors), and the same pattern of authority works its 
way up to the highest level of authority in the hierarchy. One of the national leaders 
of the PKS that I interviewed informed me that “all top leaders of PKS also have 
Liqo groups, and they still manage to conduct or to attend their own Liqo meetings 
during their busy time as public political leaders” (Abdullah, leader, Jakarta). This 
shows the importance of both cadre discipline within the Liqo-Tarbiyah movement 
and maintaining regular contact with members at the grassroots level, as well as in 
the Liqo-Tarbiyah network in general.  
 
Given that a mentor (murabbi) at one level is subordinate to mentors at the next 
level up, they should ask their murabbi if they do not understand issues concerning 
ritual or Islamic jurisprudence. Thus, each murabbi’s interpretation of Islam is 
expected to have an ideological coherence with higher-level murabbi. In order to 
make higher level murabbi’s interpretations of Islam available, and thus enable this 
ideological coherence, the ideas of senior murabbi or key figures in the Liqo-
Tarbiyah are disseminated and published on their official website, and in their books 
and pamphlets.156 The overall leadership of the Liqo movement is, therefore, 
centralised by ‘unity’ on religious doctrines and practices. However, disagreements 
                                                 
156 Books on the ideas of the top figures of the Liqo/PKS community were published in 2007 by the 
DPP PKS. The top figures include Anis Matta, Hilmy Aminuddin, and Tiffatul Sembiring (see 
Bibliography).  
 
193 
 
on particular issues regarding doctrines, practices, or the tactics to be used to 
achieve Liqo goals can also be identified within the Liqo community at any level of 
the hierarchy.  
 
4.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has explained the dakwah of the Tarbiyah movement, its ideology and 
how it has developed its dakwah messages and strategies in relation to different 
political opportunities (Wiktorowicz 2004; Fox 2012). I argue that although the 
official discourse of the movement’s leaders suggests that their main dakwah 
message initially emphasised individual piety, they also had a public Islamisation 
project, and were simply awaiting the right political climate to implement it. They 
have thus used different dakwah strategies to deliver their messages in different 
political climates in Indonesia. The change in their dakwah strategies can be seen in 
the case of the Liqo, as the focus of their main dakwah activity. They first developed 
the Liqo based on the situation and challenges faced in the early period of the 
Tarbiyah movement and then subsequently developed it again as opportunities 
changed during the period of the PKS. The overall dakwah message attempts to 
reform individual religiosity and to produce better Islamic lifestyles, with the aim of 
gradually producing reform and leading to the creation of an Islamic society. 
 
In the repressive conditions of the authoritarian regime of the early 1980s, the 
Tarbiyah community used covert dakwah approaches to prevent the movement 
being shut down by the regime, which was hostile to political Islam. Given such a 
difficult climate, their weekly training programme, called the Liqo or Halaqah, was 
conducted informally and indeed secretly in the corners of mosques on campuses 
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located in urban areas. A more overt dakwah approach started to be practised from 
the end of the 1980s, when the regime began to become more accommodating of 
political Islam in order to gain support from Muslims. The Tarbiyah movement 
started to reach wider audiences and to convey its dakwah messages through 
conducting a variety of more formal activities in bigger public spaces, for example, 
through giving lectures, sermons, running a variety of religious classes, and building 
publishing companies, educational and social centres. Through these programmes, 
they attempted to attract new potential audiences in order to improve their religious 
knowledge and develop their religiosity.  
 
With the fall of the authoritarian government in 1998 and the subsequent rise of the 
post-New Order government, the Tarbiyah community took its opportunity to 
establish an Islamic political party named the Justice Party (PK). The party was re-
named the Prosperous and Justice Party (PKS) in 2003. The Tarbiyah leaders argued 
that the party would be utilised as their means for spreading their dakwah messages. 
The purpose of dakwah, in this period, was to push out their ideologies via greater 
access to political power and influence and to build up a strong foundation for 
spreading their Islamic messages within various state related institutions.  
 
Due to the overlapping roles and leadership of the two organisations that emerged 
(the Tarbiyah movement and the PKS) (Permata, 2008; 2013), tensions increased 
among the leaders regarding dakwah and politics, and a greater complexity in the set 
of structures, goals and issues that the movement had to deal with. The informal 
dakwah of the Tarbiyah movement was increasingly subordinated to the more 
formal party, which was itself rapidly growing and pragmatic in pursuing its goals. 
This is not how the Tarbiyah movement leaders originally envisaged the Tarbiyah 
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movement being managed and directed. Before the establishment of the party, the 
leaders were only really concerned with dakwah, but now dakwah is used as the 
‘medium’ for the political purposes of the party.   
 
I argue that the interests and goals of the Tarbiyah movement and the party (PKS) 
are, to some degree, intertwined. The Tarbiyah movement is still focused on 
strengthening the individual piety of its members, but it has started to become 
involved in mobilising the members of the movement to support the party's goal. 
Therefore, the dakwah of the Tarbiyah movement in this period (including the Liqo), 
has a mixed focus on both developing individual piety and mobilising the cadres for 
more formal political purposes, such as gaining political positions in the parliament 
and government.  
 
Due to its present position as a political party within a democratic state, the PKS has 
publicly adopted pragmatic policies on religious pluralism, human rights and so on. 
These commitments have displaced the party’s commitment to establishing shari’ah 
governance – something that the Tarbiyah community has sought since its outset. 
The Tarbiyah community has been impacted by the changing structure of the Liqo, 
changing strategies and its orientation of dakwah in each period of the Tarbiyah 
Movement and the PKS. As a result, the Tarbiyah community members actively 
involved in the weekly Liqo sessions have found themselves in a dilemma. On the 
one hand, they have to be committed to being assertive on the importance of 
Islamising individuals, whilst on the other they have become subordinate to the 
political interests of the party.  
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Chapter 5 
Locating the Liqo within the Tarbiyah Movement’s Approach to 
Dakwah  
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter looked at the historical development of the Tarbiyah 
movement and the emergence of the PKS. It showed that different stages or 
dimensions of dakwah typical of Islamist movements such as the MB were 
developed in relation to the changing social and political opportunities that have 
existed for Islamist movements in Indonesia (see Chapter 4). The role of the first 
stage or dimension (private dakwah) is to build the self-awareness of individuals in 
order to reform their religiosity and Islamic piety. This was developed within the 
context of repressive and restricted political opportunities (cf. Wiktorowicz 2004; 
Mandaville 2007/2014; Fox 2012). The latter stages or dimensions (public dakwah) 
broadened the focus of dakwah to include public awareness (which is built gradually 
from self-awareness), its role being to Islamise the wider society and eventually the 
state. These latter stages or dimensions of dakwah were developed in a more open 
and accommodating climate of political opportunity.  
 
Chapter 4 concluded that although the dakwah of the Tarbiyah movement initially 
focused on the private dimension of dakwah, the idea of public dakwah was 
certainly in their minds from the start, and represented the dakwah agenda of its 
founders and leaders. They developed private dakwah because they saw it as the 
appropriate way to begin building social change but also because there was no 
opportunity to pursue public dakwah. However, when the political climate in 
Indonesia changed at the end of 1980s, and the Tarbiyah movement saw the 
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opportunity, they started to push their dakwah messages out to wider public 
audiences (see Chapters 2 and 4). This also meant that that purist ideology and 
political pragmatism had to be negotiated.  
  
This chapter explicates the official Tarbiyah movement discourse surrounding the 
Liqo – a weekly religious form of training for members. I examine the second of my 
three key research questions: 2) how has the Liqo – the main dakwah activity of the 
Tarbiyah movement – been designed by the movement’s leaders to fit with the 
structure and ideology of the movement? Again, with reference to aspects of SMT 
discussed in the Introduction, I will argue that the Liqo illuminates both the 
synergies and tensions between official, top-down framing by increasingly formal, 
outward-looking and pragmatic PKS leaders and the more informal and more 
conservative networks of the Tarbiyah movement, the latter remaining a key 
resource for mobilisation.  
 
In seeking to answer my research question I investigate the importance of the Liqo 
in terms of its position and function within the Tarbiyah movement and the party 
(PKS), as well as its key role in the movement’s recruitment and ‘indoctrination’ 
strategies.157 As we shall see the small, informal networks of young, committed, 
                                                 
157 The term ‘indoctrination’ is used in my thesis to refer to ideological indoctrination that occurs 
mainly in the weekly Liqo sessions of the Tarbiyah movement. I use this term because during the 
Liqo, Islamic subjects such as Akidah, Ibadah, Dakwah, and other subjects are taught from the 
exclusive point of view of the. The ideas and values of the Tarbiyah Movement are disseminated and 
taught by the Liqo mentors to their trainees, who are expected to understand and to practice these 
ideas during their Liqo sessions and to implement them in their daily lives. The Liqo mentors are 
instructed to use the official teaching modules and syllabus provided by the leaders of the Tarbiyah 
Movement/PKS. This module and syllabus are influenced by the ideology of the MB as can be seen 
from the literature on each subject. It is mostly written by ideologues such as Hasan al-Banna, Said 
Hawwa, Fathi Yakan, etc. There is very little exposure to other scholars or ideologues of non-MB 
background. The other reason that I used the term indoctrination is because the Liqo I observed 
focuses extensively on the enforcement of discipline, loyalty and commitment of each trainee to their 
group/movement. This term was also used in his classic study by Richard Mitchell (1993) to describe 
the MB’s religious training. 
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well-educated cadres it builds and seeks to extend as part of increasingly formal 
PKS structures is a key resource to be mobilised by this dakwah movement (cf. 
Wiktorowicz 2001; Mandaville 2007/2014; Fox 2012). However, there are also 
tensions between these two quite different organisational structures. 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, each Liqo group is attended by a limited 
number of permanent trainees, comprising 6-10 people (see Chapter 4.2). There are 
many Liqo groups, and three levels of groups – Pemula and Muda (‘beginner’), 
Madya (‘intermediate’), and Dewasa (‘advanced’). The levels relate to the progress 
of trainees after joining the Liqo. The Liqo is used by the Tarbiyah movement/the 
PKS as a means for recruiting new members, to strengthen its current members’ 
dakwah ideologies, and to connect the private dakwah of the Tarbiyah movement 
with the public goals of the PKS. The Liqo is carried out within a network of groups 
inside the Tarbiyah movement, which are led and connected to one another by 
mentors and supervised by the highest institution of the PKS.  
 
This chapter begins by outlining the official structure of the Liqo, as framed and 
organised as a weekly religious lecture by the Tarbiyah movement. The second 
section focuses on the presentation of the Liqo lessons in the Manhaj Tarbiyah 
manual and why and how these lessons are designed as they are by the Tarbiyah 
movement. In the next section, I examine how the movement recruits people into the 
Liqo, arguing that personal and social networks are a key resource for movement 
mobilisation, and so play an important role in growing the Liqo’s membership. In 
the next part of the chapter, I explain the mutarabbi-murabbi (trainee-mentor) 
relationship, and how it has become the most important tie for the Liqo-Tarbiyah 
community. I argue that mentors who are also trainees in lower levels of the Liqo are 
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the ‘cogs’ in the machinery of the movement, connecting one group to another and 
to the party. 
 
5.2 The Liqo (Islamic circle) of the Tarbiyah movement  
The Liqo is an intensive religious lesson conducted by the Tarbiyah movement of 
the PKS. Interviews with twenty-five leaders and senior mentors from within the 
Tarbiyah movement and observations of the Liqo sessions revealed that the Liqo is 
the Tarbiyah movement’s most powerful religious activity for disseminating and 
strengthening the dakwah ideology of its community. The Head of the Shura 
Council (majlis shura), Hilmy Aminuddin, in one of the official texts published by 
the PKS, writes that ‘the Liqo’s status as a tandzim nukhbawi (cadre organisation) is 
the key feature of the Tarbiyah movement’ (DPP PKS, 2007a:7). He argues that this 
‘cadre’ aspect clearly distinguishes the Tarbiyah movement from other mass 
organisations.158  
 
Each Liqo is a small training cluster consisting of 6 to 10 trainees held under the 
supervision of a mentor or trainer. As the Liqo lessons (mawad [pl.], madah [sing.]) 
revolve around Tarbiyah ideology, the trainee of the Liqo is called a mutarabbi (a 
male trainee) or mutarabbiyah (a female trainee), while the mentor or trainer is 
called a murabbi (a male mentor) or murabbiyah (a female mentor). The Liqo is 
designed for single gender classes, with male and female Liqo groups being 
                                                 
158 This term is adopted from Western political ideologies and parties by Islamist movements. This is 
ironic in light of their concept of ghazwul fikri (ideological conquest) (see Chapters 4). 
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segregated. Gender segregation is typical of almost all dakwah movements among 
modern Islamists.159 
 
An interview with a senior mentor in Pondok Aren-Tangerang revealed that Liqo 
mentors are advised to recruit trainees from their neighbourhood areas (Arifin, 40s, 
trainees, male, Jakarta).160 Arifin who is a state employee in the Ministry of Finance 
added that all trainees in his Liqo group live in Pondok Aren or Ciputat – two 
districts that are very close to each other.161 This guideline aims to make it easier for 
both trainers and trainees to attend their routine meetings.  
 
The Liqo sessions are conducted every week, with the day and time of the sessions 
being discussed and chosen by the trainees (mutarabbi) in conjunction with the 
mentor (murabbi) of each Liqo group based on their availability. However, sessions 
are commonly arranged for weekends, as the majority of both trainees and trainers 
are young working men and women. The Liqo is scheduled to last two hours, and 
can be run in the morning, afternoon, or evening, again depending on each group’s 
preferences. 
 
Although the official texts stipulate that the Liqo sessions must remain small to 
allow intensive learning and indoctrination, together with routine individual 
assessment of the trainees by their mentors (Manhaj Tarbiyah, 2005), in reality this 
                                                 
159These include Al-Muhajirun in the UK (Wictorowicz, 2005), Salafis and the M B in Jordan 
(Wictorowicz, 2001), the mosque or piety movement in Egypt (Mahmood, 2005), and the Hizb al-
Tahrir (Taji-Farouki, 1996). 
160 Interviewed on 14/10/2012. 
161 Pondok Aren and Ciputat are two districts in the city of South Tangerang in Indonesia. Both 
districts are located very close to (‘inside’) the greater Jakarta metropolitan area, on the border area 
between Jakarta and Tangerang. 
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depends on each situation and each mentor. The official Manhaj Tarbiyah book says 
that each Liqo group should hold six-ten trainees, but the trainees and mentors that I 
interviewed told me that the number of trainees in a group is not always in this 
range. For instance, four Liqo mentors said that the number of trainees in their 
groups varies between eight-twelve. According to one male mentor, who leads a 
Liqo group in the district of Bekasi:  
 
In regard to the restriction issue, I think it is hard to restrict the number of 
Liqo trainees when there are many requests to join. As they want to learn 
about Islam from us, it is difficult for us [mentors] to reject them (Ridho, 
40s, senior mentor, male, Bekasi).162  
 
 
Another female mentor (Ranti: 40s, mentor, female, Tangerang) said that she is 
flexible about the number of trainees that she accepts in a Liqo group when it is 
formed because three to five trainees usually drop out after the Liqo meetings have 
run for a few weeks as their commitment is not strong enough.163 My interviews 
suggested that this often happens, as individuals do not know exactly what the 
lessons given in the Liqo involve until they experience them.  
 
Nevertheless, the small number of trainees per group produced by the restrictions on 
Liqo group size are broadly adhered to, and enable mentors and trainees to pass on 
and receive Liqo messages effectively.164 A young female mentor who is a member 
of staff to a PKS legislator, argues that:  
 
The Liqo is different [from] other pengajian (religious learning or lecturing 
groups) such as Majelis Taklim, particularly in terms of [its] audience and its 
                                                 
162 Interviewed on 17/10/2012.  
163 Interviewed on 14/10/2012. 
164Restrictions on the number of trainees (mutarabbi) in religious circles are also used in the Egyptian 
MB (Mitchell, 1993).  
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effectiveness.165 The Majelis Taklim is attended by more than 20 [people], so 
… it tends to be one-way speaking. Unlike the Majelis Taklim, the audience 
of the Liqo is very limited, to an audience of about 6 to 10 persons. [This] 
causes the learning conditions [to be] more effective and interactive. It 
means that the study is not a one-way process in which the audience are 
discouraged to ask and express their ideas. In a small group, the audience are 
more comfortable in asking questions. The mentors are also encouraged to 
stimulate the audience to raise questions and to be involved in … discussion 
(Rahima, 30s, mentor, female, Jakarta).166 
 
5.3 Manhaj Tarbiyah: The official curricula of the Liqo  
During the weekly Liqo sessions, the mentors (murabbi/murabbiyah) are required to 
follow the guidance from the Manhaj Tarbiyah. This book, first published in 2005, 
contains 566 pages, and is one of the PKS’s key texts on movement ideology. 
Produced by Media Insani Press, it is managed by the PKS’ Division of Cadres. The 
PKS leadership expects that it will be the key volume used for the instruction and 
guidance of members in all lessons taught among the Tarbiyah cadres. The back 
cover of the book confirms that the Manhaj Tarbiyah is ‘developed to be a dakwah 
curricula for cadres’ training’ (Manhaj Tarbiyah, 2005: back cover). One of the 
Tarbiyah mentors told me: 
I am very happy to have this book because [it] contains very detailed 
curricula, and has learning steps for every stage of the Liqo (Muhammad, 
30s, young leader, male, Bekasi).167 
 
The Manhaj Tarbiyah explains the madah (subject or lesson), sarana (methods of 
teaching) and maraji’ (literature or texts used as key sources for each subject). This 
curriculum is the main reference point, particularly for the Liqo/Halaqah, and also 
other dakwah and religious training (tarbiyah) related activities such as Dawrah or 
Taujih (religious lectures), Mabit (reciting the Qur’an overnight), praying and 
                                                 
165Pengajian (Indonesian) is a religious learning group whose members specifically learn about the 
Qur’an, Sunna and other key Islamic subjects. Pengajian is usually attended by more than twenty 
people. It currently has several names, including Majlis Taklim (learning session). 
166 Interviewed on 04/09/2012. 
167 Interviewed on 08/09/2012. The translation of this interview is my own. 
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thinking of Allah (dhikr) and Mukhayam (religious camps). The book is designed for 
training and teaching all different levels of trainees within the Liqo of the Tarbiyah 
movement; the beginner level (Kader Pemula), youth level (Kader Muda), 
intermediate level (Kader Madya), mature level (Kader Dewasa).168 Although the 
main topics/lessons of each level are the same, the detail in terms of sub-topics does 
vary. Even so, in the general style of ‘pamphlet Islamism’, the Manhaj Tarbiyah 
does not provide very detailed elaboration on the subjects at any point. The book is 
not for experts. Two other dakwah manuals published by the DPP-PKS (2003 and 
2008)169 are used as more detailed reference works by Tarbiyah movement mentors. 
 
Subjects such as Aqidah (faith), Fiqh (Islamic Jurisprudence) and Akhlak (moral) in 
the Manhaj Tarbiyah are similar to those in the curricula of most Islamic 
educational organisations such as NU and Muhammadiyah.170 However, the aims 
and references given for the subjects frame the text differently. Under the subject of 
Akidah, for instance, the trainees are expected:  
 1) to understand the comprehensiveness of Islam compared to other religions; 
2) to believe that Islam is a perfect way of life; and 3) to fully accept and obey 
Islam so as not to practice any other way of life except Islam (Manhaj 
Tarbiyah, 2005: 46).171  
 
This emphasizes that Islam is a complete doctrine and way of life including social, 
economic, and political as well as religious dimensions in the style of classic 
statements of Islamist ideology. Again in a style typical of classic Islamism, it also 
draws sharp boundaries between Muslims and others, warning Tarbiyah members 
                                                 
168 Thus the contents of the book contain 4 Parts (Seri I-IV) and each part contains its own chapters; 
Kader Pemula includes 4 chapters, Kader Muda includes 3 Chapters, Kader Madya includes 4 
chapters, and Kader Dewasa includes 4 chapters.    
169 Both editions are published by the same publisher (DPP-PKS) and have the same author (Cadres 
Division of the PKS).  
170 These key subjects are taught to the Liqo trainees from the lowest level (Kader Pemula) to the 
highest level (Kader Dewasa). 
171 The translation of this text is my own. 
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not to adopt other ways of life. Such emphases are more marked as compared to 
traditionalist or modernist educational and religious sessions organised by the 
Muhammadiyah and the NU.  
 
This is also the case in the subject of Fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence). Firstly, it focuses 
on purification issues typical of Salafists (cf. Meijer 2009); this is mentioned in its 
purpose “to avoid any bid’ah (innovation) in each Ibadah that is not taught by the 
Prophet” (Manhaj Tarbiyah, 2005: 82-83),172 Topics in this subject area also discuss 
how to dress and behave in an Islamic fashion, aiming to reject the Western dress 
and Western lifestyle that hugely influences Indonesian Muslims, especially the 
urban youth. For women, wearing a headscarf and avoiding mixing with males in a 
class or a common room (ikhtilath) are some of the issues taught.  
 
In the subject of Akhlak (morality) is also found a similar tone. In general, this 
subject covers various topics such as attitudes to fellow Muslims, fulfilling 
promises, and other related topics (see Chapter 6). For instance, there is a topic 
emphasizing that Tarbiyah members should not make friends with those who have a 
‘bad personality’. This means ‘those whose way of life is not in accordance with 
Islam, enemies of Islam, and kafir (an infidel)’ (Manhaj Tarbiyah, 2005:111). Based 
on my own observations, this topic is also often referred to in supporting the 
movement’s harsh attitudes to those who hold liberal interpretations of Islam.  
 
Furthermore, the texts (maraji’) used for teaching these subjects are mainly the 
works of ulama and ideologues whose backgrounds and orientations link closely to 
the Islamist ideas of the MB in Egypt and related movements. Some of those cited 
                                                 
172 The translation of this text is my own.  
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most routinely are: Sa’id Hawa (1935-1989) (Al-Islam), Abdul Karim Zaidan (1917-
2014) (Ushul ad-Dakwah translate), Mawdudi (1903-1979) (Islamic Principles), 
Yusuf Al-Qaradawi (b.1926) (Characteristics of Islam), Abdullah Muslih and 
Shalah al-Ashmawi (Islamic Principles for Life), and Abu Bakar al-Jazairi, (The 
Guidance of Muslims’ Lives). Thus, repeated reference to the works of these Islamist 
ideologues in the Liqo constructs an ideological framing that connects the 
leadership, mentors and members of the Tarbiyah movement to the global Islamist 
movement in general and the MB in particular. 
 
The most distinctive subject in the Manhaj Tarbiyah compared to curriculum 
developed by the NU and the Muhammadiyah is the subject of Dakwah.173 This 
subject covers Fiqh ad-Dakwah, Sirah and Islamic history, the contemporary 
Islamic world, Islamic reform movements, as well as Comparative Religions and 
Sects. Through this lesson, the trainees are expected:  
 (1) to understand factors that led to the weakness of Muslims and make 
every effort to solve the problem; 2) to understand the role of Tarbiyah 
(education) and harakah (movement) in solving this problem; and 3) to 
believe that the only way to solve this problem is through joining the 
Hizbullah (warrior of Allah), that is through joining the Tarbiyah movement 
(Manhaj Tarbiyah, 2005: 161-173).174  
 
The key content of this subject area is the concept of Ghazwul fikri (ideological 
conquest). It is the core ideology of the Tarbiyah movement and frequently 
expressed in the text of the Manhaj Tarbiyah. One of the issues explained in terms 
of ghazwul fikri is the issue of ‘the Enemies of Islam’. The purposes of this subject 
as written in the text are that the trainees are able:  
                                                 
173 Dakwah is part of a traditional education in Indonesia taught in both traditional and modern 
schools. Dakwah in these schools is taught in a general sense for nurturing Islamic virtue among its 
students. However, in the hands of modern Islamist dakwah activists such as the Tarbiyah movement, 
this subject has a new significance and a more powerful meaning as an active dakwah particularly 
focused on rejecting Western culture and strengthening weakened Islamic identities.  
174 This is the core revivalist discourse that is frequently related to the concept of ideological conquest 
or so called Ghazwul fikri (see Chapters 4 and 6). The translation of this text is my own. 
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         1) to recognize various groups or organizations that aim to destroy Islam from    
both inside or outside Islam, 2) to understand the purposes, strategies and 
activities of these organizations, and 3) to explain the danger of these 
organizations to Muslim fellows and to respond to these organizations 
effectively. (Manhaj Tarbiyah, 2005:545-546)  
 
Key literature (maraji’) used for this subject are Ghazwul fikri (Hasan al-Banna), 
Ghazwul fikri (Mawdudi), 70 years of Ikhwanul Muslimin (Yusuf al-Qaradawi), 
Invasi Pemikiran or the Invasion of Thought (Abdus Sattar), Du’at la 
Qudhat/Preachers not Judges (Hasan al-Hudaibi), and Manhaj Haraky (Mustafa 
Munir Ghadban). Although most of these references in the Manhaj Tarbiyah are 
mentioned by name in Arabic, the movement typically uses translations of the 
originals in Indonesian for teaching and learning. This indicates that only a small 
number of the Liqo community knows Arabic. Moreover, Arabic is not taught much 
and even mentors do not necessarily know Arabic. 
 
The Manhaj Tarbiyah mentions that ‘a cadre, whether he/she is a mentor or a 
trainee, must own a copy of it’ (Manhaj Tarbiyah, 2005: back cover). However, I 
discovered during my fieldwork that only those in higher leadership positions 
typically have their own copies of the manual. Mentors and trainees that I 
interviewed did not generally have access to it, and most had not even read it. 
I got this [Manhaj Tarbiyah] book from a top leader of the PKS 
[Tarbiyah]. He gave it to me in a very special moment. I know that not 
everyone actively involved [in] and [a member of] the PKS [Tarbiyah] has 
this book (Muhammad, 30s, young leader, male, Bekasi).175 
 
This lack of circulation of the book is one indication that the Tarbiyah 
movement/the PKS may not be well linked up from the top to the bottom of the 
movement/the party. There is a gap between the formal instructions and expectations 
of the party leaders and everyday circulation of the book among Tarbiyah cadres. 
                                                 
175 Interviewed on 08/09/2012. The translation of this interview is my own. 
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Furthermore, although the community of the Tarbiyah movement (like other 
activists in Islamist movements) are very active in spreading their dakwah 
ideologies online, this book cannot be accessed on their public website or from 
cadres’ more private access.176 This manual is, therefore, not widely available and 
cannot be purchased in any public or Islamic bookshops. The lessons received by the 
trainees of the Liqo are thus largely dependent on what is delivered by the mentors 
in each Liqo group. 
 
Figure 3 The book cover of the training manual Manhaj Tarbiyah (2005)  
 
Source: Author, April 2013. 
 
                                                 
176  www.pks.or.id and www.pkspiyungan.org. 
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5.4 The role of social networks in recruitment and 'conversion' to 
Liqo membership 
As Wiktorowicz (2001:133) argues, “social networks play a critical role in social 
movement recruitment”, and this is also true for the Liqo movement. Their social 
networks are mainly built through kinship and personal relationships. Although Liqo 
activists target all Muslims, regardless of their backgrounds or organisational 
affiliations, they see that a prior personal relationship makes it easier to invite 
individuals to join the movement. Family members, friends, and people living in the 
same location, like neighbours, are those that are considered as personal 
relationships.  
 
The Liqo trainees that I interviewed typically cited the ‘intervention’ of family 
members or friends who had already joined the Liqo as the reason for their 
conversion. Tania (32), from Depok, initially joined the weekly Liqo sessions 
through being encouraged to attend by her classmate in the Nurul Fikri education 
centre.177 She shared her story during an interview:  
 
In the last stage of my SMA (Sekolah Menengah Atas/Senior high School), I 
joined the Nurul Fikri training centre to prepare in pursuing higher education 
at the University of Indonesia (UI). In this centre I found new close friends 
as we met every day for about three hours at a minimum to learn various 
school subjects. I made even closer relationships with my classmate, who 
invited me to join her ‘religious’ learning group that later on I knew as Liqo 
                                                 
177The Nurul Fikri learning centre is widely associated with the Tarbiyah movement, and was 
founded by Tarbiyah activists in 1985. Although officially still in the private dakwah period, this 
centre was starting to reach public audiences. The literature and the official website of the centre 
mentions that their motivation and purpose is to help students to develop their skills in order to enter 
top state universities after graduating from senior high school (see Damanik, 2002). However, I 
observed that this institution as part of the dakwah strategy of the Tarbiyah movement. Evidence for 
this can be seen in the topics discussed among students of Nurul Fikri, the ‘typical’ books on Islam 
used by the Tarbiyah movement that are widely circulated among them (such as books written by the 
key figures of the M B) and, of course, in the rules for behaviour and their physical performances of 
them, which all strongly relate to the Tarbiyah movement. This learning centre has grown, and now 
has more than eighty-seven branches spread across Jakarta and other cities in Indonesia 
(http://www.bimbelnurulfikri.com/, accessed on 10 December 2013).  
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or Halaqah group. She said that it is important not to forget religious 
subjects as well as school subjects, such as Maths, Physics etc. (Tania, 30s, 
trainees, female, Depok).178 
 
Rina from Lombok (West Sumatra) – who moved to Jakarta to pursue her Master’s 
Degree at the University of Indonesia (UI), and then worked to earn money to 
support herself – reported that her older brother was involved in her decision to join 
the Liqo:  
 
I was initially asked by my brother to attend one of the religious programmes 
in Bogor, managed by the Tarbiyah community in my new campus. It was a 
very intensive religious training for one full week. I [had to] attend the 
overall programme over the week, and was not allowed to go outside the 
training venue during the whole week. During the training, I was told that 
this one-week training was an introductory programme for the potential 
trainees before they officially join the weekly Liqo sessions. In my opinion, 
this training was significant in building my understanding on Islamic 
teaching, as taught by the Tarbiyah, [and] it attracted me to attend the regular 
Liqo sessions afterwards (Rina, 40s, trainees, female, Jakarta).179  
 
In my opinion, this training represented an important ‘indoctrination’ phase for 
Rina, as well as aiming to test her interest and engagement. Although Rina's 
explanation shows that her decision to join the Liqo came gradually, it was clearly 
influenced by the one-week ‘indoctrination’ training that she attended. This training 
and experience made her aware of the importance of participating in such an Islamic 
group, and the advantages she would accrue from doing so. As Snow, Zurcher, and 
Ekland-Olson contend, “people seldom initially join movements per se; rather, they 
typically participate in movement activities and only gradually became members” 
(1980:795).180 
 
                                                 
178 Interviewed on 05/09/2012. 
179 Interviewed on 28/10/2012. 
180 See also Clark’s discussion in Wiktorowicz (2004:171). 
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Moreover, Rina's brother played a very important role, not only in introducing her to 
the movement, but also in persuading her to participate and to join a group. In this 
regard, the role of families and friends, or so-called social networks, is to introduce, 
promote, and persuade potential members to join the movement. Therefore, 
candidates’ decisions about whether they should join or decline are not only 
influenced by their own considerations, but also by the support, encouragement and 
‘pressure’ of their relatives or friends. This trend will be discussed in further detail 
later, based on my observations of the women’s Liqo group in which I participated 
in Jakarta (see Section 6.3).    
 
Based on official documents published by the PKS and my interviews with leaders, I 
found that the ‘approaching familiars’ strategy, or recruitment through personal 
relationships, was most used by the Liqo-Tarbiyah movement during its emergence 
in the 1980s and through until the 1990s. However, this approach has recently been 
used in tandem with other ‘public’ approaches that will be explored below. The 
leaders of the movement, however, still consider the ‘private’ recruitment pattern as 
being more successful than ‘public’ recruitment in pulling individuals to the Liqo.  
 
5.5 Expanding the social networks 
The use of social networks for recruitment both increased and came to coexist 
alongside other approaches when the Indonesian political climate became more 
accommodating towards the Islamist movement during the 1990s, and after the 
emergence of the more democratic state in the post New Order (1998 – present day) 
in particular (see Sections 4.3 and 4.4). The movement started to approach strangers, 
which comprises a more public form of recruitment, and began to actively build up 
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new social ties. A statement by a national female leader, Noura, who is also a Liqo 
mentor (mutarabbiyah), describes the expansion in the approaches for recruiting 
new members: 
The recruitment process [has] become much easier and bigger now because 
we are recruiting through [a] range of institutions and activities. In the past, 
we recruited members only through personal relationships (Noura, 50s, 
leader, female, Jakarta).181 
 
The success of recruitment through social networks is driven mainly by the belief 
among members of the Liqo that recruiting new members into their community is 
part of their dakwah. For them, dakwah is seen as obligatory for every Muslim. 
Through my interviews and observations, I saw that the Tarbiyah community invite 
new members more actively in the periods of public dakwah through a variety of 
educational and social centres. They believe that their work places are part of their 
dakwah for promoting Islamic values. This belief is very widespread amongst loyal 
activists (ikhwan and akhawat). Through their belief in uniting the religious and 
secular aspects of their lives, they combine serving God, religion, and society. 
During conversations with two Tarbiyah activists during my fieldwork in Jakarta, I 
asked them how providing social services or teaching children secular subjects, such 
as sports or maths, could be considered as a religious activity. They responded that 
the factor that determines whether a particular activity should be classified as 
religious or non-religious is the intention of each individual in teaching these 
subjects. Nabil (40s) and Rahima (30s) declared: “we all did these teaching activities 
with the intention of serving God and Islam, thus everything we did is religious or 
part of dakwah activity”.182  
                                                 
181 Interviewed on 18/10/2012. 
182 Interviewed Nabil on 23/09/2012 and Rahima on 04/09/2012.  
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Observations and interviews revealed that the community is always encouraged to 
present themselves as good examples of Muslims and to behave in ways that 
exemplify the ideals of their community (Tarbiyah movement). They invite 
relatives, friends and ‘strangers’ to join their community and break with their un-
Islamic (or less Islamic) practices and communities.    
 
5.5.1 Controlling campuses, student organisations, and mosques 
When the Tarbiyah movement started to realise that they could begin promoting 
‘public dakwah’ at the beginning of the 1990s, they started to see the importance of 
capturing and controlling student organisations in big universities, as well as 
mosques in campuses and big cities. As previous scholars have shown, they began to 
take over student organisations in campuses across Indonesia, including at the 
University of Indonesia (UI) in Depok (near to Jakarta), the University of Gajah 
Mada (UGM) in Yogyakarta, and the Institute of Technology of Bandung (ITB) in 
Bandung (Permata, 2008; Machmudi, 2006; Rahmat, 2005; Damanik, 2002). This 
suggests that the Liqo-Tarbiyah movement tried to build new social networks by 
dominating institutions in which young Muslim students could be persuaded to join 
the movement.   
 
This ‘recruitment’ through student organisations, in which many potential members 
are located, is still conducted by the Tarbiyah movement. As a result, the Liqo-
Tarbiyah network tends to grow in these places. A young male leader voiced his 
opinion regarding this issue as follows: 
 
My dakwah struggle at that time [of being appointed as a mentor] was very 
hard because there was no cadre in this small town [in Bekasi]. It was very 
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difficult and challenging for me to find new cadres. [The] first step I took 
was to recruit them through the University students’ network, especially the 
students who are living in Bekasi, but studying at the Universities in Jakarta. 
Alhamdulillah (praise to Allah), I got two cadres from the Jakarta State 
University (Ridho, 40s, senior mentor, male, Bekasi).183 
 
 
The mosques on the big campuses mentioned above are also dominated by Liqo 
activists, who actively participate in them more than members from other religious 
movements, such as Muhammadiyah and the NU. An activist of a university mosque 
in Jakarta told me that he has seen how Liqo activists have become increasingly 
involved in mosque activities, covertly recruiting new Liqo trainees, and then 
gradually coming to dominate the board of the mosque (Masdar, 40s, non-
Tarbiyah/PKS activists, Jakarta).184  
 
Moreover, the domination of mosques by Liqo activists is not limited to campus 
mosques, but is also seen in some city mosques. Two respondents (non-Tarbiyah 
scholars/activists) from different mosques in Jakarta (Fachruddin, 40s and Muiz, 
50s) explained that they had experienced being marginalised from mosques 
activities by Liqo activists (ikhwan). Research conducted by Syaifudin Zuhri (2013) 
also revealed that the Muhammadiyah mosque (Al-Muttaqun mosque) in Klaten- 
Central Java was taken over by PKS/Tarbiyah activists in 2006. Such experiences 
underline the active dakwah of the Tarbiyah movement and its aggressive 
penetration into the assets of established Muslim organizations such as the 
Muhammadiyah and NU. The attitudes and actions of Tarbiyah activists in this 
regard have provoked resistance from both Muhammadiyah and NU.185  
                                                 
183 Interviewed on 17/10/2012. 
184 Interviewed on 12/11/2012. 
185 Muhammadiyah former chairman, Din Syamsuddin, issued a letter circulated among its members 
about the necessity to control and monitor their organizations’ assets and to close the Tarbiyah 
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The expansion of the numbers of Liqo activists in mosques, and their subsequent 
domination of some of them has enabled them to approach more strangers, as Ridho 
explains: 
 
In recruiting new trainees, I mainly tried to be active in a mosque. And then I 
become a [member of the] board of the mosque. Through my activities in the 
mosque [especially] with the position as the board of the mosque, I can 
identify who are potential individuals who can be recruited into the Liqo 
through mosque activities (40s, senior mentor, male, Bekasi).  
 
Liqo activists typically develop new personal relationships with strangers by 
building new friendships and trust through various methods, including inviting them 
to their social events, helping them, or listening to their concerns. This approach of 
being nice, friendly, and helpful, but covering up their primary intentions in doing 
so, is sometimes known in the New Religious Movements literature as ‘love 
bombing’ (see Clarke, 2006; Barker, 1984). ‘Love bombing’ appears to be a part of 
the Liqo community’s dakwah strategy for attracting wider public attention. As 
Wiktorowicz notes, “the formation of new social ties is common for Islamist 
movements” (2005:23).  
 
Through my observation and participation in the dawrah sessions, I witnessed new 
social ties being established and growing through institutional networks that offered 
a range of activities, including study circles; charities and cultural activities; and 
professional training for improving a range of skills. These activities, in turn, 
facilitated points of interaction between the targeted audiences and the Liqo-
                                                                                                                                         
Movement/PKS’s access to mosques and schools (The letter is titled: Surat Keputusan PP 
Muhammadiyah No 149 Kep/1.0/b/2006 tentang Kebijakan PP Muhammadiyah tentang Konsolidasi 
Organisasi dan Amal Usaha). According to Hasan (2012) the NU leaders also warned his members 
to protect their educational institutions and mosques from being infiltrated by the Tarbiyah 
Movement/PKS and warned them of the Tarbiyah Movement/PKS’s ideological influence and threat 
against NU’s Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama’ah. The Tarbiyah Movement/PKS has been criticized for 
introducing neo-Wahhabism among NU people.  
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Tarbiyah movement. The leaders and senior mentors such as Ahmad 60s), Fatih 
(50s), Abdullah (40s), Salim (50s), Rania (30s) told me in interviews that this 
formation process is referred to within the Liqo community as establishing ‘robthul 
‘am’ (public ties).  
 
My observations revealed that Liqo activists usually avoid talking on religious issues 
during this initial stage, including about their interpretations of Islam. This seems to 
represent a kind of dakwah strategy, which I will refer to as ‘dakwah by deception’, 
as the activists try to influence the people they are approaching but hide their real 
intentions and beliefs.186 They do not reveal their religious views or their dakwah 
until they feel confident that the individuals they are approaching are interested in 
learning about Islam through the Liqo sessions. 
 
5.5.2 ‘Lay’ people as potential targets 
Although the Tarbiyah movement/PKS leaders stated through the interviews with 
me that the Liqo does not prioritise any particular group of strangers to approach, I 
observed that Liqo activists tend to target young Muslims who study in secular 
universities and that have a ‘religious’ and ‘pious’ tendency (see Chapter 4).187 
According to them, people from this group are easier to attract and to persuade to 
join the Liqo. Like other activists who are drawn into Islamist movements, these 
                                                 
186 ‘Dakwah by deception’ occurs when cadres of the Tarbiyah Movement do not provide new 
recruits/targets with a complete account of what their dakwah is about. They want to limit the 
recruits/targets’ understanding of their dakwah so that they respond more naturally to their ‘invitation 
to join’ to their dakwah movement. It is a strategy of gradual dakwah that is chosen by the 
cadres/movement/party. They do not want to reveal to recruits/targets the key ideology of their 
dakwah at the outset, but only later, after they join their weekly Liqo and get sufficient understanding 
about their dakwah movement. 
187 As has been observed and noted by Hasan (2012), targeting young people for the Tarbiyah 
Movement /PKS is like planting seeds. 
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young students are in the process of searching for ‘Islamic authenticity’ or the ‘roots 
of Islam’, as they feel that Muslims are living far away from an ‘authentic’ form of 
it (see Chapter 1).188 Targeting this demographic is in line with the approaches seen 
in other Islamic activist and revivalist groups studied by researchers including 
Esposito (2010) and Wiktorowicz (2001; 2005). These young Muslims typically 
socialise in friendship circles in which Islam plays a central role, and the groups of 
individuals that are formed thus have a predisposition to search for a particular, 
‘non-mainstream’ form of Islam, but are still in the process of ‘searching for 
meaning’ (see Wiktorowicz, 2001; Mandaville, 2007). This is in line with a 
statement from a female mentor (murabbiyah) in Tangerang, who asserted that: 
 
In recruiting new Liqo trainees (mutarabbiyah), we look at those who have 
tendency to be pious or having ‘benih-benih kehanifan’ (the seeds of the 
straight path to Islam) (Athya, 40s, mentor, female, Jakarta).189  
 
 
Although these ‘pious’ individuals might come from different professions, social 
levels, and family backgrounds, and include professionals, students, workers, and 
traders, the most predominant groups are those of young students and professionals.  
 
My observations and interviews show that these targeted groups can be identified 
through information shared among senior and ordinary Liqo members. The initial 
ways used for identifying potential Liqo trainees was explained by a senior mentor 
of the Liqo, Ridho, who described the process during an interview in his office in 
Jakarta:  
                                                 
188 Mitchell (1993) also explained that young activists from the MB in Egypt had been searching for 
‘meaning’ and ‘authenticity’. Similar accounts can also be found in Wiktorowicz (2004; 2005) and 
other scholars who study New Religious Movements and trends in the ‘conversion’ of young people 
to these movements. (See, for instance, The Encyclopaedia of New Religious Movements, edited by 
Peter Clarke, 2006.) 
189 Interviewed on 22/10/2012. 
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Initially, I asked my friends who live in Jakarta, including my friends in the 
same Liqo group with me. From them, I got information about potential 
cadres that I could recruit to be trainees [of the Liqo] (Ridho, 40s, senior 
mentor, male, Bekasi).190 
 
As part of their dakwah obligations, the Liqo cadres will invite these individuals to 
attend the weekly Liqo sessions. The acceptance of these invitations is not always 
straightforward and unconditional, however. In some cases, it takes a longer period 
of time than in others, and requires multiple interactions. Such individuals are 
usually involved in debate and discussion with Liqo members before they become 
convinced that the Liqo-PKS perspective of Islam is 'the straight path' and join the 
weekly sessions as a result (see Chapter 6). 
 
Almost all the participants in the Liqo group and dawrah programmes in which I 
participated as an observer came from non-Islamic educational backgrounds. The 
widespread nature of this phenomenon was confirmed by one of the mentors:  
 
Those who are interested to join the Liqo are mostly from ‘lay people’. Their 
enthusiasm to study Islam is indicated by their eagerness in asking many 
questions to the Murabbi (Muhammad, 30s, young leader, male, Bekasi).191 
 
Based on the information I received from activists and leaders of the Liqo, most 
trainees lack a knowledge of Islamic subjects, particularly those in Jakarta and 
nearby cities such as Bekasi and Tangerang. There are several reasons why these 
‘lay people’ are so keen to join the Liqo. First, they want to improve their 
knowledge of Islam; second, they want to ‘refresh their faith’; and third they want to 
share and learn from each other about how to live their lives in an Islamic way. 
                                                 
190 Interviewed on 17/10/2012. 
191 Interviewed on 08/09/2012. 
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These three reasons can be seen in the explanation that a female Liqo participant 
(mutarabbiyah) who lives in Tangerang and works in Jakarta gave for joining:  
 
Sometimes, when I did not attend the Liqo meeting, I felt that I missed 
‘something’ valuable. Therefore, the most important reason to join the Liqo 
[was] to refresh my soul. Through the Liqo I can study Islamic principles. 
We also can learn [from] other trainees in the same Liqo group. For example, 
I can learn from my Liqo friends, who are better in terms of self-discipline. I 
am really aware about this. Through joining the Liqo, we can improve our 
loyalty and commitment to our religion. How to dress properly, as taught by 
Islam, is the best example to mention [as part of our loyalty and commitment 
to the religion] (Tika, 40s, trainees, female, Jakarta).192    
 
Thus, ‘refreshing the soul’ is a key motivation of trainees for improving their private 
piety through the Liqo. Furthermore, trainees also need a good environment to 
support them in becoming better Muslims. Another female Liqo participant voiced 
her point of view as follows: 
 
It is necessary to have a [learning] group. We need to have a conducive 
environment [for] supporting us in implementing Islamic teachings, on how 
we should behave … in line with Islamic teachings, and how we should keep 
maintaining the spirit of Islam in our everyday life. These are the reasons 
why I decided to join the weekly Liqo mentoring. The influence of the Liqo 
is really significant to me. It changes my mind extensively (Miya, 30s, 
trainees, female, Tangerang).193                   
 
 
5.5.3 Liqo members with Islamic educational backgrounds 
The fact that most Liqo trainees do not have a background in Islamic education does 
not mean that urban, Islamically educated graduates are not interested in joining the 
Tarbiyah movement. Liqo activists do also come from Islamic educational 
backgrounds, including graduates from Middle Eastern institutions. The founders 
and current leaders of the movement are also graduates from prominent Middle 
Eastern universities, such as Al-Azhar in Egypt and Medina University in Saudi 
                                                 
192 Interviewed on 07/10/2012. 
193 Interviewed on 15/10/2012. 
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Arabia. However, they experience a different kind of engagement with the Liqo than 
those who do not have Islamic backgrounds. Their learning experiences, together 
with their developed knowledge on Islamic subjects, mean that they are less keen 
than ‘lay people’ to receive Liqo messages. This was clearly articulated by a 
member of the Liqo who graduated from an Islamic institution: 
 
In the beginning, when the mentor taught me about Tawhid in the early 
meetings of the Liqo, I think there was nothing new. It [was] just like what I 
had studied in pesantren (Islamic boarding school in junior and senior high 
school levels). How female Muslims should dress in Islamic ways is the part 
that I think the mentor gave different knowledge to me. It was mentioned 
that we have to wear a long jilbab (headscarf) and socks anywhere outside 
[the] home. Initially, it was not too hard for me to perform what the mentors 
said. However, it is often boring to listen to mentors' presentations, because I 
need new information [about Islam]. I am sure that you [referring to 
interviewer] knew … our feeling. [It] is [as] if we are taught basic lessons of 
Islam [after learning for years in Pesantren]. We have already studied these 
subjects intensively during our junior or senior high schools and university. 
These subjects are the most often delivered in the Liqo meetings. Probably 
for those who do not have Islamic educational backgrounds, these subjects 
are interesting, but it is not for us (Nabila, 30s, female, trainee, mother, 
Tangerang).194 
 
Those with a knowledge of Islamic subjects generally have privileged positions in 
the movement, as revealed by one of the murabbi: “While the lay people become 
students, those who [have] graduated from Islamic universities like Al-Azhar can be 
appointed as the mentors (murabbi)” (Muhammad, 30s, male, Bekasi). Although 
they are ordinary trainees as well, as indicated by their membership in Liqo groups, 
they are grouped with counterparts who also have previous experience of studying 
Islam. As revealed by Arif – a Liqo mentor and a young leader of the PKS – those 
who have advanced knowledge in Islamic subjects tend to be grouped with those at a 
similar level: 
 
                                                 
194 Interviewed on 11/09/2012. 
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When I finished my study from Al-Azhar University, I joined the Liqo [in 
Jakarta]. I was grouped with other trainees (mutarabbi) who had the same 
background [as] me in terms of their Islamic educations. I can say that those 
who have deep knowledge in Islam – called ustadz – prefer to be grouped 
with [those at] the same level (Arif, 40s, male, Jakarta).195        
This ‘streaming’ of people in the Liqo represents a natural division as they have 
different levels of knowledge on Islamic subjects. Therefore, although there are 
fewer people with Islamic educational backgrounds than those without, they are 
usually appointed mentors or as elites of the movement or party soon after they join. 
As a result, some leadership positions in the Tarbiyah movement (and also within 
the PKS party) are held by individuals that have graduated from Islamic educational 
institutions, both abroad and in Indonesia, and these appointments are based on their 
expertise in Islam. This can be seen from the current structure of the PKS, with the 
Head of the Syuro Council, the Head of the Shari’ah Council, the President of the 
PKS, and the Head of the Archive Division all having Islamic backgrounds. Within 
the Tarbiyah movement/the PKS, there are two kinds of cadres or activists: those 
with an education background in shari’ah or Islamic law, who are called shar’i 
cadres or activists, and those who have a secular education background, who are 
called non-shar’i cadres or activists. 
 
5.6 The Mutarabbi-Murabbi (trainee-mentor) relationship 
The mutarabbi-murabbi (trainee-mentor) relationship is the most important tie in the 
Liqo community since it connects Liqo groups to one another and perpetuates not 
only the Tarbiyah movement, but also the PKS. Based on my interviews and 
observations, I found that the restrictions in the number of members of Liqo groups 
is not only to make study more effective (see Chapter 5.3), but also for establishing 
                                                 
195 Interviewed on 18/10/2012. 
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a close connection between members of the Liqo community – a ‘familial 
relationship’ that crosses beyond the kinship boundary. A female mentor explained: 
“this condition creates a very close relationship between the mentors and their 
trainees, and among the trainees” (Rahima, 30s, mentor, female, Jakarta). This is 
why, in the past, the Liqo was called usrah (an Arabic term meaning family) (see 
Section 4.3). Machmudi (2006) is thus right to claim that a small family is 
established through the Liqo groups, within which a sense of belonging, solidarity, 
and togetherness is built. My interviews with trainees revealed that the weekly 
mentoring group is regarded by them as their ‘second family’. This is one of the 
reasons why trainees stay in one Liqo group for many years, and are often not keen 
to move to the next Liqo group level, which provides more advanced Islamic 
subjects. As one mentor put it: 
 
I have been mentoring one group of the Liqo. Most of them [the Liqo 
trainees] do not want to move to other groups, although I asked them to do 
so. They already feel comfortable with this group, so … they rejected … 
[being] joined to other groups. I advised them to move to other Liqo levels, 
considering that different murabbi will have different expertise, so that 
moving into other groups will be good for enriching their insight on Islam 
(Athya, 40s, mentor, female, Tangerang).   
 
 
The mentors play the role of ‘heads of families’, being perceived as the teachers, 
educators, parents and role models for the trainees of each group. As Machmudi 
(2006) argues in his thesis, and my female interviewees attested to, when Liqo 
members get married, their mentors even play a significant role in the marriage 
process (Rania, Rifa, Rahima, and Tania). During an interview, a young female 
mentor told me about her murabbi when she was an ordinary trainee:  
Personally, I felt respect to my murabbi, due to her position as my teacher. 
Of course, I felt that the figure of murabbi is different [to that of] ordinary 
trainees. She is a role model for me. I preferred to consult and ask advice 
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from my murabbi rather than from other Liqo trainees or my family (Rifa, 
30s, mentor, female, Jakarta).196 
 
Her statement also supports the idea that religious authority is mainly invested at the 
local level amongst the trainees – that is, with the mentor rather than the 
organisation per se (see Chapter 6.3).   
 
The Liqo group I participated in clearly acted as one ‘family’, sharing their own life 
experiences and problems. Furthermore, they also asked and told each other about 
difficulties and problems concerning their families and daily activities. During my 
participation in the Liqo, one of the trainees (Mona, 30s, mother, female, Tangerang) 
told the group about her child’s sicknesses and overactive behaviour, and the other 
trainees then shared their personal experiences of dealing with such problems. In 
another case, one of the Liqo trainees (Saida, 30s, female, Jakarta) became severely 
ill and required hospitalisation. In the following Liqo meeting, the trainees and the 
mentor all discussed how to help her. We then agreed to visit her in her house after 
she was back from the hospital and to give her a small donation that we gathered 
between us. Such relationships facilitate the development of close and firm bonds 
among trainees, between the trainees and the mentor, and also between the trainees, 
the mentor and the movement. For these trainees, who are mostly migrants and live 
away from their close families, the Liqo provides many benefits, especially in terms 
of therapy, support, and local community.  
 
Through their roles as teachers, parents, and role models, every mentor (Murabbi) 
attempts to encourage their Liqo trainees to be more committed to Islamic teachings, 
                                                 
196 Interviewed on 05/09/2012. 
223 
 
both during and outside the Liqo sessions. They motivate the trainees to conduct 
prayers – not only the obligatory salat (five daily prayers: Fajr, Duhr, Asr, Maghrib, 
and Isha), but also the recommended optional prayers (Salat Nawafil). The mentors 
also give the trainees tasks, such as reciting more than ten verses of the Qur’an 
(‘Ashru ayah) every day (see Section 6.4). Moreover, as heads of the ‘families’, the 
murabbi arrange other activities outside of Liqo time. One murabbiyah commented: 
 
We (murabbi) have to think how to make the trainees of our group not to feel 
bored. We offer to arrange activities [for them] that can make them fresh. 
Therefore, the programme of gathering, eating together, and travelling were 
sometimes conducted. These are some of the cultural as well as personal 
approaches that are important to be done (Athya, 40s, mentor, female, 
Tangerang).197      
 
Given that the majority of the Liqo trainees belong to two Liqo groups at the same 
time – as a mentor of one group and a trainee in another – the Liqo network will 
continuously grow, because Liqo trainees become mentors who share the same 
belief systems as new recruits.  
 
The Liqo is thus a ‘multilevel organism’, connecting, growing, and constantly 
building a network from its highest levels to its lowest. The highest levels are 
composed of those who have the longest experience in attending the Liqo, and the 
lowest ones consist of those who have just joined. The murabbi play an important 
role in connecting one level to another through their double position as both mentors 
of a lower Liqo group and trainees in a higher group. In turn, the lowest level 
produces more Liqo groups, because each trainee is encouraged to invite new 
trainees as part of their dakwah responsibility.  
                                                 
197 Interviewed on 22/10/2012. 
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Table 3: ‘Multilevel organism’ of the Liqo 
 
Source, Author, 2014. 
 
When selecting a trainee to become a mentor (murabbi), the mentor of a group will 
consider the capacity of the trainees in his or her group, and their familiarity with the 
Liqo belief system. The murabbi thus emerge from the bottom of the Liqo group – 
they are ordinary but experienced trainees, appointed by their own mentors. A 
commitment to behaving in an Islamic way and significant experience in the Liqo 
are two of the main requirements to be selected as a murabbi. These requirements 
were explicitly mentioned by a few respondents, and most murabbi have been 
involved in the Liqo longer than regular trainees (mutarabbi). There is an 
assumption among the Liqo community that the longer they participate in the Liqo, 
the more they will come to know about Islam. Consequently, those who have been 
in the Liqo for a long period will be likely to be appointed as new murabbi. Ten of 
the murabbi that I met for interviews told me that they have been involved in the 
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Liqo for more than five years, including the female mentor (murabbiyah) in the Liqo 
group that I joined.  
 
The Liqo population is mainly comprised of well-educated neo-urban members of 
Indonesian society (see Chapter 5.3), and thus most mentors are university 
graduates. However, only a few of these mentors have been educated in Islamic 
studies. Based on my reflections on what I saw during my fieldwork, a formal 
educational background in Islamic studies is not regarded as a key requirement for 
being appointed as a mentor. Nevertheless, those who have more Islamic knowledge 
and have a strong sense of and connection to the ideology of the movement will be 
more likely to be seen as potential mentors. This indicates that knowing the 
principles of Islam is one of the important requirements for becoming a murabbi, as 
one of the female mentors explained: 
 
I believe that when someone is selected to be a murabbi, he must be 
competent and capable in that position. It is not possible that he will be 
selected as a murabbi if he does not know much about Islamic subjects. As 
far as I am aware, there are certain criteria required, such as those who are 
competent and capable in terms of their knowledge in Islamic subjects. [It] is 
possible [for anyone] to be a murabbi, regardless of their educational 
background. A murabbi is part of a role in a group of Liqo. I mean that 
everyone has the same chance to be a murabbi. However, they are required 
to [meet] certain criteria (Rahima, 30s, female, Jakarta).198          
 
Because the Liqo is multi-layered, when members are appointed as mentors this 
does not mean that they cannot continue their learning within the Liqo. Rather, they 
move to a Liqo group with other mentors who are at the same level in terms of their 
participation and experience within the Liqo, and are then taught by a more senior 
mentor. The same pattern also runs among senior mentors at the next level, and this 
                                                 
198 Interviewed on 04/09/2012. 
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pattern continues until the highest Liqo level is reached. Each Liqo member learns 
about the Liqo belief system through a more informed and experienced mentor, and 
the Tarbiyah network continues to grow.  
 
For these mentors, to be a murabi gives them the opportunity to deepen and 
strengthen their knowledge of Islam. The higher the level in the Liqo, the more 
advanced the subjects will be, and every time a topic is delivered in the weekly 
activity, the mentor has to prepare it. As a result, they might learn additional 
information that was not imparted to them previously by their own mentors. 
Furthermore, by delivering the topic, they strengthen their understanding of the 
subject: 
 
When my position was [as] a participant or a student, I enjoyed receiving as 
many lessons as possible. It is not the case when my role is a mentor like 
now. I have to obtain the [Islamic] subjects by reading as much as I can from 
many sources. This role supports me to get a deeper and wider understanding 
on Islam (Aliyah, 40s, mentor, female, Jakarta).199  
 
This ‘cell’ model, and the mutarabbi-murabbi relationship it involves are effective 
in spreading the dakwah ideology among the Liqo community because it connects 
the groups to each other. A common ideological orientation and its practice thus 
connect all Liqo individuals, and has led to a high level of unity in the Liqo 
community. 
 
However, it has also produced segmentation among the internal community. The 
differences in personal views and religious interpretations, together with the Liqo’s 
                                                 
199 Interviewed on 23/09/2012. 
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development strategies sometimes cause divisions within the movement. Research 
conducted by Permata (2013) explains the internal dynamics of the Tarbiyah 
community and the PKS, which are caused by the different nature of the two 
institutions. Recalling the contrast I identified in the Introduction with respect to 
SMT (cf. Wiktorowicz 2004), he contends that the Tarbiyah movement is a secretive 
religious movement, managed informally under a supreme leader. The PKS, 
however, is a political party, managed under a party president who follows the 
formal political regulations and dynamics of the Indonesian system. 
 
Indeed, I found that mentors and trainees preferred to talk about their feelings and 
lived experiences during the Liqo rather than share their knowledge on the concepts 
or ideologies of their dakwah. The majority had very little abstract knowledge of the 
concept or ideology of their dakwah. Instead I saw that practising dakwah values 
such as daily rituals, wearing particular clothing styles, and inviting others to join 
the weekly Liqo sessions was more significant embodied ‘knowledge’. This, of 
course, was different for the elites, who are the individuals most responsible for the 
ideology and official discourse and concepts within and behind the movement. As 
we shall see in more detail in the next chapter my fieldwork revealed that the Liqo 
sessions impart only a small amount of knowledge on the ideology or concept of 
dakwah. Rather building the discipline and commitment necessary for implementing 
the religious knowledge delivered in the Liqo within their daily lives is key.  
 
5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter discusses the development of the Liqo during periods of the Tarbiyah 
movement and then the PKS, in particular its related debates and challenges. The 
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weekly Liqo sessions have been designed and developed by the Tarbiyah movement 
of the PKS. From the early 1980s, the Liqo focused on improving private piety 
informally through dakwah, but was transformed in 1998 to focus on creating public 
piety via the more formal framework of a political party (cf. Wiktorowicz 2004; 
Mandaville 2007/2014; Fox 2012). This new formality in the context of changing 
political opportunities led to the reformulation of the Tarbiyah movement’s official 
structure, official curricula (Manhaj Tarbiyah) and recruitment system. Membership 
associated with the Liqo of the Tarbiyah movement thus became more political with 
the emergence of the PKS.   
 
The drive to promote their dakwah messages to the Indonesian society as a whole 
from the end of 1990s built ‘a mutual relationship’ between the Liqo-Tarbiyah 
community and the PKS, but also moved the Liqo away somewhat from its original 
dakwah activities and orientations. From the point of view of the leaders of the party 
(or the movement), the informal structures associated with the Liqo significantly 
contributes to the growth and mobilisation of the PKS’s cadres and develops the 
quality of the dakwah party, as the PKS has appointed senior Liqo activists as the 
party elites. They also consider it to be the case that the PKS enables the Liqo to 
expand and mobilise its dakwah network through its various activities. For the 
cadres at the middle and lower levels of the movement, however, especially at the 
grassroots level, the formalisation and pragmatism of the party has mixed and thus 
diluted their ‘pure’ dakwah ideologies and orientations through its focus on political 
interests and strategies.   
 
The Liqo community’s growth occurs via personal networks, social networks and 
institutional networks. However, networks created through informal personal 
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relationships still represent the strongest and most common way of attracting people 
to join the Liqo community. Liqo groups grow over time as every mentor and 
trainee, as part of their dakwah, tries to ‘convert’ friends, family and neighbours to 
the Liqo community. This doubling-up of friendships and religious sessions 
establishes a high degree of group solidarity and loyalty within the Liqo-Tarbiyah 
community. Thus, informal social networks remain an absolutely key resource for 
the movement.  
 
The Liqo community mainly spreads and grows on secular campuses, in mosques 
and at other educational institutions in big cities, and has created a Liqo population 
that is largely composed of neo-urban individuals who are students or professionals, 
and are thus well-educated individuals. They are mostly migrants to the city, who 
have come to study at higher education institutions or to work as professionals. They 
thus generally live far away from their families and, as a result, although each Liqo 
is composed of a very small group of people, the trainees treat each other like family 
members, providing informal support, friendship and new networks that can be 
mobilised both for each other and for the general purposes of the movement (cf. 
Wiktorowicz 2004; Fox 2012). The Liqo thus proves to be an invaluable resource for 
many of its members, and strong bonds develop between trainees and the Liqo, as 
well as between trainees and their mentors.  
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Chapter 6  
The Lived Experience of Female Liqo Members 
6.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter I showed how the Liqo – the main vehicle for dakwah in the 
Tarbiyah movement – is designed by Tarbiyah movement leaders to fit into the 
structure and ideology of the movement. Although each Liqo is attended by six to 
ten permanent trainees, I found that it seeks to use Tarbiyah movement leaders in a 
number of ways: as a means for recruiting new members to the Tarbiyah movement 
and to the party; for seeking to strengthen its current members’ dakwah ideologies; 
and for seeking to connect the Tarbiyah movement with the political goals of the 
PKS. In this chapter I seek to answer my third and final research question: 3) how 
do female Liqo members experience, and to what extent do they subsequently 
practice, the dakwah and discipline received through weekly sessions? My argument 
will be that the Liqo is a space where Tarbiyah movement / PKS norms, lifestyles 
and dispositions are more or less successfully taught, learned and reproduced 
principally through the disciplined and repeated performances of embodied piety.  
 
I examine the extent to which women Liqo members experience, receive, and 
practice the dakwah designed and campaigned for by Tarbiyah movement leaders. I 
focus on trainees and cadres’ stories about the lived religious experiences they have 
had through joining the Liqo, with special reference to the female Liqo group that I 
observed in Jakarta during my fieldwork. My observation focused on these women’s 
experiences, particularly concerning why they joined the Liqo, how they moved 
from being outside the Liqo to being a part of it, how their journey into the Liqo 
continues, and how they receive and enact ideas and lessons developed and designed 
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by Tarbiyah movement leaders. I found that although the experiences and practices 
of these women revealed a heterogeneity of meanings, it is through the everyday 
lived, practiced and embodied cultivation of pious norms in this informal 
institutional setting that the official religion promoted by the movement and its 
leaders (see Chapter 5), is most successfully reproduced (cf. Mahmood 2005) 
 
McGuire (2008) argues that individuals’ religious experiences, expressions, and 
practices are complex and dynamic.200 I agree with McGuire that “at the level of the 
individual, religion is not fixed, unitary, or even coherent” (2008:12), and this means 
that it is impossible to understand individuals’ religiosity and identity based only 
upon the official viewpoint of the organisations of which they are members even 
when those organisations put an emphasis on party/movement discipline. Thus, this 
chapter examines how Liqo lessons and ideologies are understood, practiced, 
experienced, and expressed by middle and low-level trainees and cadres in the 
context of their everyday lives, rather than simply through the official ideology of 
the Tarbiyah movement. However, as Mahmood’s (2005) study of the women’s 
mosque movement in Egypt also underlines, becoming pious means learning 
adherence to norms of religiosity especially through the performance of acts of 
worship (ibadah), attention to Islamic dress and other ways of practicing Muslim 
self-identity. Thus, official and lived religion are intimately interconnected. 
 
In this chapter, I will explore how these ‘norms of proper religiosity’ and Islamic 
piety are practised and experienced by the Liqo cadres, examining how this personal 
                                                 
200 McGuire uses the term ‘lived religion’ for “distinguishing the actual experiences of religious 
persons from [the] prescribed religion of institutionally defined beliefs and practices” (2008:12). She 
highlights the idea that an “individual’s lived religion is experienced and expressed in everyday 
practices – concrete ways of engaging their bodies and emotions in being religious” (2008:208). 
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religiosity is framed both by the movements and actively created by individuals in 
their everyday lives. Firstly, I will describe the workings of the women’s Liqo group 
that I joined for observation, including who the mentor and the trainees are, and why 
they were drawn to the Liqo circle in the first place. This is followed by an 
exposition and discussion of the teaching/reception of the four main lessons of the 
Liqo: ghazwul fikri, akidah (beliefs), ibadah (worship), adab (Islamic ethics) and 
aspects of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) which are related to women’s dress codes and 
their public roles. During my attendance at the Liqo group, I observed how the 
lessons were delivered by the mentor, and how they were received and the extent to 
which they were put into practice by the trainees. In order to discover how the 
trainees combined the learning from these lessons with their previous knowledge 
and experience, as well as with existing practices in the wider society, I spent time 
interacting with the trainees outside the Liqo sessions as well.  
 
The first section provides details about the profile of the members of the Liqo group 
that I participated in as a trainee. The next section then goes on to investigate the 
motivations of the trainees – mostly those from the group I participated in – for 
joining the Liqo. I found that the trainees had a range of reasons and motives for 
joining the Liqo, including obeying their husbands who are movement/party 
members but also expanding their own social networks and finding new friends. I 
then go on to discuss mentors’ and trainees' perceptions about the concept of 
ghazwul fikri (ideological conquest). Ghazwul fikri is perceived by the mentors and 
trainees as a ‘soft’ cultural war that is carried out by Western countries (European 
and American) with the purpose of defeating Muslims. The Liqo community 
opposes Western culture due to its potential imperialistic threat to the Muslim faith.  
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In the next part of the chapter, I explore mentor and trainee reception of the topic of 
akidah. The trainees were genuinely shocked to discover that many of the customs 
practised by their families and members of their village communities are apparently 
‘un-Islamic’. However, the reasons that they accept this critique are not always in 
accordance with those provided in the official discourse. The chapter then goes on to 
investigate the understanding of the trainees and the mentor regarding the issue of 
ibadah (worship). The female trainees felt that the Liqo’s attempts to improve their 
commitment to performing both obligatory and recommended daily worship are 
very strictly pursued, but while this caused some to drop out the majority accepted 
that this was an important part of the self-disciplining programme.  
 
The last section of this chapter explores the female Liqo members’ reception of 
women’s dress codes and their public roles. The mentor and trainees believe that 
wearing a long headscarf, modest clothes, and socks is required by God. In addition, 
although women are allowed to be active in the public domain, they again accept 
that their main role is a domestic one, and that they need to get permission from 
their husbands if they want to be active in public. 
 
6.2 A women’s Liqo group in Jakarta 
My observations of the women’s Liqo group that I joined supported and 
strengthened Arifin’s statement in Chapter 5 that Liqo groups typically consist of 
trainees and a mentor from a local neighbourhood area. During my observations, I 
was allocated by my respondent (a female senior mentor) to a Liqo cluster whose 
members were comprised of people from a neighbourhood in the district of Pondok 
Aren, near Jakarta. In its first session, my Liqo group was composed of nine women 
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within an age range of approximately 30–40 years.201 However, two of the group left 
after the first two Liqo sessions.202 The initial group was made up of seven married 
women, who all had children, and two unmarried women. Five of the trainees were 
working women, three were housewives, and one was a college student. All of us 
met at the Liqo meeting place which was a trainee’s house. The majority of the 
trainees travelled to the weekly Liqo session on their own motorcycles, whilst some 
travelled by car and were either dropped off by their husbands or drove themselves. 
Two trainees travelled to the Liqo sessions on public transportation. Our mentor 
sometimes drove to the Liqo venue in her private car, and sometimes came on her 
motorcycle.  
 
All the trainees came dressed in soft-coloured long dresses, with thick kerudung or 
jilbab (both types of headscarves) covering their neck and extending over their 
chest. This is the most commonly adhered to Islamic dress code among the Liqo 
women’s community. My close observations revealed that it is almost impossible to 
find Liqo trainees dressing in jeans or cotton trousers and tops, with face make-up or 
with up-to-date styles of kerudung (headscarves).203 Such clothes are regarded as 
‘non-Islamic’ and as an influence of Westernisation. The absence of Liqo women 
activists wearing such clothes or make-up is one of the characteristics of those that 
the Liqo lessons attract.204 
                                                 
201 A similar number of Liqo members were also found in other Liqo groups that my interviewees 
(who are Liqo trainees (mutarabbi) in Jakarta and other cities such as Tangerang and Bekasi) were 
members of. 
202 I explain in the next section why these two women left the Liqo, and only seven trainees thus 
remained in the group. 
203 My reflection is that this dress code and its performance represent a ‘marker of difference’ that 
makes it easy to identify Liqo women in Jakarta public areas, such as malls or shopping centres, 
hospitals, street and offices, where their style of dress does not represent the mainstream clothing 
style for Muslim women. A similar type of women’s dress code is seen in the offices of Islamic 
organisations, such as those of the NU and Muhammadiyah. 
204 See Chapter 6.5 on the Liqo community’s perspective on women’s dress codes, including the veil 
and headscarves, and the doctrinal reasoning that lies behind their choices and commitments. 
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Although the Liqo sessions are scheduled to last for two hours, my observations and 
interviews with my trainees revealed that they usually last much longer than this. 
The Liqo that I joined during my fieldwork was conducted every Saturday morning 
for about three hours, from 09.00 am until 12.00 pm. The Liqo was held in the living 
room of a different trainee’s house each week so that the trainees got to know each 
other and became closer. All of us were relatively new members, and before joining 
this group none of us had any experiences related to Liqo lessons or Jamaah 
Tarbiyah. We met each other at the first Liqo mentoring session, and each of us 
joined this group through recommendations from senior mentors that lived in the 
same district. New mentors (murabbiyah) are chosen to establish new Liqo groups 
by their former mentors, who also manage these new mentors (see section 5.4).205 
 
Given that all trainees are new recruits to the Liqo network, we were advised to learn 
basic Islamic topics, such as Shahadat and other Akidah or Tawhid-related topics. 
We were given basic topics on Islam because we were classified as beginners in this 
community, with none of the learning experiences that we had outside the Liqo 
being taken into account, and the lessons were delivered in Bahasa (the Indonesian 
language). Both my experience of attending ‘my own’ Liqo and my conversations 
with members of other Liqos revealed that it is common to commence the Liqo 
sessions with one of the trainees reading two or more selected Qur’anic verses out 
while the mentor and the other trainees listen. After this, the trainees remain seated 
on the thinly carpeted floor and listen attentively in silence as the mentor explains 
the topic for the day. The mentor then relates the topic to everyday life with practical 
                                                 
205 This system of shifting in role from a trainee (mutarabbi) to a mentor (Murabbi) is employed 
whenever a new small Liqo group is established, with trainees always chosen to be new mentors by 
their Liqo mentors (see section 5.4). 
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examples, and invites questions from the trainees. A serious atmosphere was 
maintained throughout the session, with very little joking or chatting.   
 
However, in the Liqo group that I joined, this silent and serious atmosphere only 
occurred when none of the trainees brought their children. Most of the Liqo 
meetings that I attended were noisy, with children crying and screaming. 
Consequently, the lessons were often stopped for a number of short periods whilst 
the mothers calmed their children down and got them back playing with their toys or 
else took them away from the circle. The Liqo allows mothers to bring their children 
as it aims to accommodate mothers’ responsibilities. The movement believes that 
women members, just like men, are obliged to attend the weekly Liqo, and because 
caring for children is perceived to be the woman’s responsibility (see also chapter 
6.7.2), it is thus accepted that women must be allowed to bring their children when 
they attend the Liqo. My interviews with male Liqo members and mentors indicated 
that it is less common for men to bring their children to Liqo sessions, which 
indicates that women get little help from their family in looking after their children. 
 
It is common for new recruits to leave their groups when they cannot find what they 
are looking for. My observations during the four months that I attended the Liqo 
group confirmed this phenomenon. Two of the nine Liqo trainees did not come again 
after the first two sessions, but the majority (seven trainees) continued with the 
weekly meetings. I could see that those who came were very enthusiastic and 
committed to improving their skill in reciting the Qur’an and to learning other basic 
Islamic knowledge.  
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Such small ‘family’ groups are expected to make it easier for mentors to build the 
ethos of the groups and to discipline each Liqo trainee (see section 5.2). During my 
observations, however, I rarely found a situation in which the mentor built a good 
learning environment that encouraged the trainees to raise questions. In many cases, 
the trainees were passive, and tended to be afraid to express their opinions. Such 
experiences were supported by the women’s statements during the interviews that I 
conducted with them. Thus, the way the mentors delivered the lessons did not 
constitute an exploratory approach in which trainees had the opportunity to reflect 
on their lessons, but was mostly instructive, consisting of guidance to create an ethos 
of discipline.  
 
6.3 Social networks among female Liqo activists 
As I argue in section 5.3, my observation of the women’s Liqo group that I joined 
during my fieldwork also supported the hypothesis that social networks play a 
significant role in women’s decisions to join the Liqo. The female Liqo trainees from 
my group described the influence exerted by Liqo members who were husbands, 
other family members (sisters or brothers), or friends and neighbours on their 
decision-making. Within my Liqo group, three female trainees (mutarabbiyah) were 
sisters from the same family, and during an informal conversation with one of the 
female trainees who had graduated from the school of design at a state university in 
Solo-Central Java, she explained:  
 
I come from Central Java for working in Jakarta. My two older sisters have 
been working here [a] few years before me. Following my arrival in Jakarta, 
I saw them every week [and] came to a religious meeting [the Liqo]. I think 
that it would be good for me if I joined them as well. Besides learning 
religious subjects, I can also find new friends from this meeting. So, three of 
us gathered in one Liqo group. However, not too long after I joined this Liqo, 
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one of my sisters moved to another Liqo group in [a] different part of Jakarta 
following her husband (Mona, 30s, trainees, female, Tangerang).206    
 
 
A female trainee named Fathya said that she attended a Liqo group in the Pondok 
Aren-Tangerang district through an invitation from her friend and neighbour. Such 
experiences were not unique to Rina (40s), Tania (30s), and Fathya (40s), but were 
shared by my other interviewees, who were friends or neighbours with one another, 
or who had Liqo members in their families before they joined their groups. The 
interventions of family members, friends, or neighbours that are more senior 
members in the Liqo encourages others not only to join, but to ‘convert’ to the Liqo 
perspective or ideology.207 They ‘convert’ in the sense that they change their 
perspective on particular issues in Islam, and shift their daily attitudes or practices to 
ones that they consider to be superior to those that they held before becoming 
involved in the Liqo.  
 
My interviews also revealed that marriages to Liqo activists have supported the 
process of conversion to the Liqo ideology and perspective. For instance, Retno 
(30s), a Liqo trainee, told me that she was encouraged to attend the Liqo by her 
                                                 
206 Interviewed on 16/12/2012. 
207 The discourse of ‘conversion’ is common in Western sociology of religion. It does not always 
involve literal conversion to a different religion, but can often be about changes of ideology, mind, 
and practice. In Britain, people become ‘born again Christians’, which refers to a change in their 
religious beliefs and attitudes and/or practices. In the United States in the 1970s, a growing number 
of young well-educated people began converting to the ‘New Religious Movements (NRMs)’ and 
they were very visible in public places – on the streets – where they sold flowers and candles and 
invited young people to their centres. The growing trends of conversion amongst young people led to 
the idea that the trainees of various NRMs were being ‘brainwashed’ through various techniques. For 
further discussion of ‘conversion’ in the Western context see, for instance, Barker (1984). Conversion 
in the West also includes conversion to Islam, of course. Nehemia Levtzion in “Conversion to Islam 
(1979)”, however, differentiates between conversion and adhesion. Conversion usually involves 
individuals in a ‘reorientation of the soul’ and in a commitment to a new way of life and adhesion, 
typically a communal process entailing ‘the acceptance of new worship as useful supplements and 
not as substitutes” to what went before. Thus, according to Levtzion: ‘Islamisation of a social group 
is not a single act of conversion but a long process toward greater conformity and orthodoxy’ (1979: 
21). In my opinion, the discourse of conversion is similar to the spirit of dakwah in Islam, which aims 
to make the beliefs and practices of Muslims better, and includes the dakwah of the Tarbiyah 
movement / the PKS in Indonesia. See, for instance, Poston (1992) and Janson (2003).  
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husband, who had been a Liqo activist long before they were married, as did 
Nuriyah (30s), whose husband is a young local leader in the PKS and a senior 
mentor of the Liqo. Two other female interviewees (Tania and Nisya; 30s) also told 
me that their husbands had been involved in their conversion to the Liqo perspective. 
 
These stories suggested to me that these women’s ‘conversions’ to Liqo beliefs and 
practices were not merely driven by their own free choices, but also by the 
‘encouragement’ and ‘advice’ of their husbands. Both encouragement and advice 
can be difficult for Indonesian wives to refuse, particularly those who come from 
rural backgrounds, where husbands have stronger voices and wives are expected to 
follow their instructions, especially on religious matters. Close observations and 
informal conversations with these female Liqo activists revealed that there is a 
growing trend of family ‘conversion’, in which husbands that have already adopted 
the Liqo perspective transmit it to their wives.  
 
Liqo activists expose their families and friends to the religious lessons taught in the 
Liqo through their everyday interactions with them. The interviewees said that the 
process that their friends and family used to approach them was straightforward, 
involving informal discussions about Islam. In many cases, various religious issues 
were discussed, and the Liqo activists took the opportunity to explain their Liqo 
perspectives on Islam. They made Islam a common topic of their daily 
conversations, discussing it in public places, whilst having lunch at the office, or 
during social visits. The conversations about religious issues were reported as being 
more intense by trainees that were converted by family living in the same house. 
This is partly because a sister or a brother who has either younger or older siblings 
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has many chances to discuss Islam with them – whilst cooking and eating dinner, 
watching television, talking before bed-time, etc.  
 
6.4 Women’s perception of Ghazwul Fikri (ideological conquest) 
My interviews with the majority of the leaders revealed that the idea of ghazwul fikri 
(ideological conquest) is seen as having an important role for members of the Liqo, 
from the beginner levels (anggota pemula) through to the more advanced levels. 
During my observation at the women’s Liqo group, the issue of ghazwul fikri was 
often raised by the mentor, and used to analyse any topic she was teaching. In 
interviews with mentors from different and more advanced Liqo groups, I found that 
this is something that is done with senior members as well as beginners. This was 
indicated by the fact that interviewees often responded to my questions by making 
connections to ghazwul fikri, even though I did not ask them about its connection 
with the topics they were talking about. This suggests that the concept of ghazwul 
fikri has been very successfully reproduced and is a significant influence on the 
community of the Tarbiyah movement as a whole. 
 
The female mentor (murabbiyah) of my Liqo group contended that Muslims’ 
enemies find it easier to contaminate the Muslim faith through importing Western 
culture (Siti, 30s, mentor, female, Jakarta), adding that “when Muslims adopt 
Western culture, it indicates that Muslims have been implicitly defeated by the 
West”. Siti’s opinions emerged when she provided examples of ‘Western’ 
phenomena in contemporary Indonesian culture, such as in women’s fashion and 
behaviours and attitudes in public places that she regarded as ‘un-Islamic or less-
Islamic’, for example, the relationships of young male and female Muslims and their 
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impolite attitudes to older people. Such perceptions are commonly found amongst 
revivalists and/or Islamists, who believe that Muslims should avoid imitating non-
Muslim culture and worry that the cultural domination of the West will make them 
lose their ‘authenticity’ and identity as ‘true’ Muslims (see Chapter 1). From my 
own observations during fieldwork, as well as my informal conversations with the 
mentor and all six trainees from my Liqo group, I found that on the ground the West 
is in practice as well as in theory considered to be a potential enemy of Islam. In 
several Liqo sessions that I attended, the mentor used ghazwul fikri to construct and 
define Western culture and politics as a threat. The murabbiyah perceived ghazwul 
fikri to be an unconventional type of war – a ‘soft war’ – that the enemies of 
Muslims adopted because they could not defeat them in a physical war.  
 
For this reason, even though the content of ghazwul fikri is related to 
Westernisation, the mentor often connected the issue with Zionism instead (see 
Chapter 4). However, my mentor, like other senior Liqo members, failed to clearly 
explain how or why Zionism has had such a significant influence in constructing 
Western civilisation and ideology, and it seemed to me that they could not clearly 
understand why and how Zionism is put into a single package with the West.   
 
The mentor of my group believed that Zionism was the agent behind ghazwul fikri, 
and that its purpose is not only to take Palestine from Muslims, but also to defeat 
Muslims anywhere and everywhere by infiltrating and contaminating their faith, 
ideology, and culture. The murabbiyah put it as follows when I interviewed her: 
  
Zionism is the source of ghazwul fikri. Zionism influences [the] global world 
(European and American states), not only [seeking] to control Palestine, but 
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also all Islamic countries. Zionism wants to defeat Muslims by infiltrating 
our Islamic ideology. 
 
Thus, for the mentor, dakwah is seen as necessary for counteracting Western 
propaganda:  
 
Young Muslims have been exposed to the globalised cultures that are 
completely far from the teachings of Islam. The changing directions of 
Muslims can be seen, for instance, in terms of dress, behaviour, and other 
lifestyles (Siti, 30s, mentor, female, Jakarta).208  
 
This view is typical of the ideas held by Islamists. Similarly, the murabbiyah also 
highlighted the conflict between Palestine and Israel, the American invasion of Iraq, 
and the conflict in Afghanistan as examples of Western conspiracies to undermine 
Muslim power (see Chapter 4). Through my interviews with mentors and trainees 
from different Liqo groups I concluded that this perception is strong among the Liqo 
community.  
 
The mentor’s claims above implicitly suggest that Christians as well as Jews are 
proponents of Zionism. However, the female mentor of a Liqo group who I 
interviewed argued that she does not consider all Jews and Christians to be the 
enemies of Muslims:  
 
The global picture of ghazwul fikri – that Muslims should be aware of 
Zionism – does not mean that all non-Muslims (Jews and Christians) are the 
enemy of Islam or part of the Zionist [movement].  
 
This information was further confirmed by mentors from different groups. 
Darmanto, a staff to a PKS legislator, for instance, said: 
 
                                                 
208 Interviewed on 28/10/2012. 
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The trainees of the Liqo (mutarabbi), later, will also be taught other Qur’anic 
verses clarifying this issue in the next levels of their Liqo sessions in order to 
make them not … generalise that all of Jews and Christians are the enemy of 
Islam.  
 
I did not hear this claim being made in the Liqo of the beginner level that I 
participated in. As a new member, I was not allowed to participate in the 
intermediate or advanced Liqo level classes. However, through my interviews and 
interactions with trainees studying at the more advanced levels, I found that they did 
express a more flexible understanding of the discourse of ghazwul fikri. Their 
flexibility, however, can be seen as part of the more ‘progressive’ dakwah strategy 
promoted for public consumption at the political and the state level (Chapter 4). 
Pragmatic rhetoric presented a moderate face of the movement to the outside, while 
a stricter version of the ideology of ghazwul fikri was maintained within the 
movement. 
 
One likely impact of ghazwul fikri is that it encourages the Liqo trainees to believe 
that they have enemies that are attempting to separate them from Islamic teachings. 
This hypothesis was confirmed by the experience of one of the trainees from Jakarta, 
who shared her experiences of beginning her Liqo participation:   
When I was invited to attend a dawrah [a larger religious class conducted by 
the Tarbiyah movement] at a villa in Gunung Salak-West Java, I got many 
interesting subjects. The event has opened my mind that Islam is an 
incredible and honourable religion so that, having [been] born as Muslims, 
we have to be happy. From this training, I just realised that Muslims 
nowadays are in [a] dangerous situation. Through the topic of ghazwul fikri, I 
realised that we (Muslims) have a huge enemy who are attacking us softly in 
many aspects. Let’s see the reality. There are many evidences supporting this 
suspicion. As [an] example, let us take a look at teenagers … here. Most of 
them no longer have respect for the Prophet Muhammad. They also do not 
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know their life’s aim [based on Islamic teachings] (Tika, 40s, trainee, 
female, Jakarta).209 
 
This testimony fits with the dakwah manual’s explanation that the purpose of 
teaching ghazwul fikri is to make members aware that there are numerous 
movements seeking to defeat and harm Muslims (see Chapter 4). This lesson of 
ghazwul fikri is frequently linked by the mentor to the wider context of wars in 
Muslim lands, Western double-standards and global inequalities --as also written in 
the Manhaj Tarbiyah (2005: 302).  
 
Thus, the concept of ghazwul fikri was perceived by the mentor and the trainees in 
this Liqo group as cleaving people into two groups: ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’. The 
mentor appealed to such characterisations in order to strengthen the Islamic 
identities of the Liqo trainees in an attempt to ‘de-westernise’ them, both culturally 
and ideologically. This bifurcation of people and cultures into friends and enemies 
appears to be driven by the worry that living in a globalised modern society in which 
Western culture and its values dominate could reduce the commitment that Muslims 
have to their religion. 
 
6.5 The Liqo women’s reception of Akidah (Faith) 
Akidah is one of the topics taught in the Liqo. The akidah is related to the basis of 
faith in which Muslims conceptualise their perception of God. For instance, akidah 
explains the tenet of the oneness of God as Tawhid (the unity of God). Tawhid is the 
belief that distinguishes Muslims from non-Muslims, such as Christians, Jews, and 
                                                 
209 Interviewed on 17/10/2012. 
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Hindus. The importance of this topic is confirmed in statements by Liqo activists 
from all levels of seniority, including mentors (Murabbi): 
 
The materials at the beginning of the Liqo mostly talk about the very basic 
and important topics such as Tawhid (the concept of the unity of God), 
Shahadatain (the two phrases of the testimony of faith),210 and Qada and 
Qadar211 (God’s decree) (Thifa, 30s, mentor, female, Tangerang).212 
 
The three subjects mentioned by Thifa here are all parts of akidah. The Liqo 
community believes that the ‘true’ akidah should refer to the interpretations made by 
the early generations of Muslims, comprising the first generation – the sahabah (the 
Prophet’s companions); the second generation – the tabi’un (those who lived one 
generation after the Prophet's companions); and the third generation – the tabi’ at-
tabi’in (the generation after the tabi’in). The Liqo community perceives the 
interpretations of the Quran that were made during these periods as being the most 
authoritative, and regards these three generations of Muslims as being the most 
committed to Islam. As Abdullah (40s) – a senior Murabbi who was appointed as 
one of the leaders of the PKS – revealed, a “Muslim’s faith should be based on the 
true akidah. We call it salafiyatul akidah – the belief of the Salaf people, the early 
pious companions”.213 For me, this is the factor that appears to lead many people in 
Indonesia to label the Liqo community as Salafi.214 Although the Liqo community 
                                                 
210Shahadatain or shahada is the testimony of faith that is required to become a Muslim, and consists 
of the two phrases: “I testify that there is no god but God (la ilahailla-llah)” and “Muhammad is the 
messenger of God” (Muhammadun Rasul Allah). These phrases are recited in order to have one’s 
faith to Islam witnessed, or in order to convert to Islam.   
211Qada and Qadar describe God's capability in terms of controlling and managing human life in the 
world (Rippin, 2005). 
212 Interviewed on 05/09/2012. 
213 Salaf is taken from the Arabic root which means ‘to precede’. In the Islamic lexicon, this word 
refers to al-Salaf al-Salih – the virtuous companions of the Prophet Muhammad – i.e. the three 
generations of Muslims that followed the death of the Prophet Muhammad: the companions 
(sahabah), their followers (tabi’un), and their follower’s followers (tabi’ at-tabi’un) (Al-Rasheed, 
2007). 
214 In an interview that I conducted with a senior mentor (murabbi) and local leader, he noted that 
people around him frequently label him and his Liqo group as the Salafi (Muhammad, 38, Bekasi). 
He said that he responded to this label by saying: “In fact, all Islamic activists are involved in the 
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rejects this label, they share one common key characteristic with the Salafi network 
– the idea that akidah and rituals are based on these three generations of Muslims. 
The concept of akidah is also embraced by many Islamic revivalist movements, who 
purify it by purging it of anything that they consider to comprise ‘non-Islamic’ 
belief. Thus, by adopting akidah, the Liqo clearly shows its revivalist character.    
 
The subject of akidah is used to unite the Liqo community during the Liqo sessions 
through the promotion of the concept of ‘a true akidah’. A senior mentor who is 
experienced in leading Liqo activities said that the distinctive feature that unifies all 
Liqo members – from the beginning of its establishment to its current incarnation – 
is their concept of akidah: “the unchangeable aspect (tsawabit) among us [all Liqo 
generations from its inception to the present day] is the true akidah” (Abdullah, 40s, 
male, Jakarta).215 
 
This concept of the ‘true’ akidah was also mentioned by the mentor and the trainees 
in my Liqo group. They held that the Muslim faith has to be saved from any 
deviations, arguing that klenik (Javanese mysticism) is one such deviation 
commonly found among Indonesian Muslims.216A female trainee who migrated 
from a small village in Central Java to Jakarta explained her experience of klenik’s 
influence on her family and neighbours in the village:  
                                                                                                                                         
PKS/Liqo community]. We have NU [activists], we have Muhammadiyah [activists], and we have 
also PERSIS [activists]. This fact is similar to Masyumi party. Masyumi had Kyai Noer Ali from [an] 
NU background and M. Natsir from [a] PERSIS background. So, we [The Liqo/PKS] have all 
organisations [as our] background”. 
215 Interviewed on 09/10/2012. When I asked him further about this point, he replied that “akidah is 
the point when we must keep all the time without any change. It is different with ijtihadat [debatable 
and changeable] aspects”. He argued that: “the ijtihadat points can be seen and can be discussed. The 
PKS has all mechanisms about this ijtihadat. We have the Shari’ah council … [and] every question 
or problem should be referred to them”.    
216 For the Liqo community, klenik refers to cultural ‘deviations’ that influence the Islamic beliefs of 
Muslims. For other people, klenik refers to Javanese mysticism, which is heavily influenced by 
Hinduism and Buddhism. 
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The cultural practices in my village … [in] central Java are very much 
coloured by klenik. For instance, before the harvest, people must bring 
sesajen (foods provided for God) to the rice field. When … a neighbour 
passes away, we should commemorate him or her with the recitation of … 
‘Laailaahailla-llah’ (there is no god but God) called tahlilan, particularly in 
the 3rd, 7th, and 40th days [after] their death. Also, when there is someone 
marrying or delivering a new baby in the family, we need to conduct 
particular traditions.217 All these occasions should be accompanied by 
providing certain foods (sesajen). Another practice is sort of giving alms, 
well known as sedekah punden, that is arranged once a year. In my village, 
there is an ancestral grave (makam leluhur) called Punden. People of this 
village arrange to visit and gather at this grave and bring many main foods 
and side dishes (lauk pauk), pray together (led by a charismatic village 
leader), and then eat together in this place (Miya, 30s, trainees, female, 
Tangerang).218 
 
 
For the Tarbiyah movement and the PKS, visiting graves and praying for saintly 
intercessions are both regarded as being close to idolatry. As the leaders of the 
movement in the Manhaj Tarbiyah (2005) stated, these two ‘beliefs’ are the main 
actions for so-called ‘grievous crime’ (zulmun ‘azimun or zalalun ba’idun).219 In 
addition, the book asserted that these actions “could annul the witness to the faith 
(shahadatain)” (Manhaj Tarbiyah, 2005:62). These ‘klenik’ cultural practices 
represent everything that is considered to be un-Islamic by the Liqo community. The 
conception of faith (akidah) developed by the Liqo is very critical of the traditional 
culture (klenik-based) faiths practiced by particular societies in Indonesia. Moreover, 
these critiques of klenik practices are not only made by the Liqo community in 
Indonesia, but by the Muhammadiyah community as well. Since its establishment 
(and particularly between the 1930s and the 1970s) the Muhammadiyah has fought 
against klenik practices, and is well known for actively campaigning against any 
forms of ‘superstition’ or cultural ‘innovation’, referred to as takhayul 
                                                 
217 Tahlilan is the recitation of the creed ‘laailaahailla-llah’ (‘There is no god but God’) at 
ceremonies to commemorate the dead. 
218 Interviewed on 15/10/2012. 
219 Both are Qur’anic (Q. 31:13 and Q. 4:60; 116) words that imply the same meaning: “a grievous 
crime”.  
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(‘superstition’), bid’ah (innovation) and churafat (practices similar to 
‘superstitions’). The abbreviation that the Muhammadiyah community uses to refer 
to these three practices is ‘TBC’.220 The Liqo community shares common concerns 
with other revivalist organisations such as the Muhammadiyah about akidah being 
free from klenik, and this fits with the core revivalist belief that “the rejuvenation of 
Islam was to be achieved through a return to the universal core teachings [of Islam], 
free from distorting influences of socio-cultural innovation” (Mandaville, 2007:44). 
  
Some of the official reasons the Liqo mentors give for the positions they adopt do 
not always accord with the perceptions of ordinary members at the grass-roots level 
of the community; Miya's views on klenik rituals being one such example. In 
contrast to the official discourse, Miya states that she disagrees with the klenik 
rituals because of the waste of food they produce:     
 
What I am disappointed [with] was the fact that the food used for rituals is 
really mubadzir (superfluous or waste of foods), because it is too much and 
not provided for eating (Miya, 30s, trainees, female, Tangerang).221  
 
Miya's expression of her views shows that ordinary members have their own 
outlooks about why particular traditional rituals are bad for Muslims.    
 
The concept of ‘true akidah’, as it was taught in my Liqo group, encouraged the 
trainees to think that many Muslims in Indonesia practice distorted versions of 
akidah. Given that the majority of Liqo trainees, particularly those that I interviewed 
in my Liqo group, had only encountered this concept of akidah for the first time at 
                                                 
220 TBC = Takhayul, Bid’ah and Churafat. In my opinion, however, there is a different tone between 
the ‘traditional ulama’ and the ‘modern ulama’ who have graduated from higher education within the 
Muhammadiyah in relation to the way they fight against klenik practices. The former placed a strong 
emphasis on this issue, while the latter express a softer tone on it. 
221 Interviewed on 15/10/2012. 
249 
 
the Liqo sessions, they were shocked that the religious traditions in their society 
were not in line with the Islamic faith:   
 
When I was studying the topic of akidah, it was so tempestuous (bergejolak) 
indeed. I found that there were so many ‘Islamic traditions’ that are not fitted 
with Islamic teachings. Why could our society practice this tradition that 
completely contradicts Islamic teachings? (Miya, 30s, trainees, female, 
Tangerang) 
 
Miya, a mother in her early thirties, had no knowledge of the concept of akidah or 
the issues surrounding it when she lived in her small town in Central Java. After 
moving to Jakarta, attending the Liqo sessions and finding a new community, she 
was surprised to discover that many of the customs practised by her relatives and 
villagers are apparently ‘un-Islamic’ (though she was not unsympathetic to their 
‘ignorance’). She continued: 
 
Furthermore, when reflecting [on] the issues of akidah in my closest society, 
I am very sad because it is very far from the tenets of Islam. The sadness 
increases when I notice that my grandma also strongly believes in un-Islamic 
traditions. She strongly believes if we do not do certain ‘rituals’, something 
bad will be happening. For instance, if she sees a neighbour building his 
house without a sesajen (providing certain services i.e. foods), she will speak 
that something bad will be happening to their family.222 I am very sad about 
her. She is already old and she still believes in this un-Islamic practice. In a 
month she is very busy to come to her neighbour and gives ‘special’ prayers 
(based on her traditional/cultural beliefs) for any birth, death or any occasion 
of a family member (Miya, 30s, trainees, female, Tangerang). 
 
The Liqo mentors had a strong influence on the trainees’ acceptance of the concept 
of ‘true’ akidah (faith) through exemplifying good standards of behaviour and 
commitment to their Islamic teaching. The trainees thus saw their murabbi as good 
practitioners of Islam. This commitment to their values is very important for the 
trust that trainees have in their mentors – perhaps more than other qualities or 
                                                 
222 Her grandmother’s belief here is basically seen as a ‘superstition’ – an ‘irrational’ belief in 
supernatural powers relating to receiving good and bad luck. 
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characteristics such as having a good Islamic education, as a statement from a 
female trainee (mutarabbi) at a different Liqo group suggested:   
 
The mentors of the Liqo are very simple. They learn something very basic 
about Islam, so that they know only little religious knowledge. However, 
they practised this knowledge in their daily life, for example on learning and 
practising the five times daily prayers and reading the Qur’an. This is 
sometimes very different with those who have deep knowledge on religious 
matters … [who do] not prioritise implementing their knowledge due to their 
busyness with other activities (Fadila, 30s, trainees, female, Jakarta).223 
 
 
A similar view was expressed by another female trainee – a graduate from an 
Islamic modern boarding school that had joined a number of different Liqos both in 
Indonesia and while she was overseas. She was attracted to the Liqo lessons because 
of their practical or applied aspects, stating:  
 
Actually, I did not find new Islamic knowledge from the Liqo lessons. What 
I got more was the advantages of the spirit or ethos in implementing the 
rituals in our daily life (Nabila, 30s, trainees, female, Jakarta, university 
lecturer).224 
 
Sometimes trainees had difficulty in accepting and practicing akidah, especially at 
the beginning of the courses, as their traditional faiths or cultures clashed with ‘the 
true akidah’ offered by the Liqo. This was more common in trainees who came from 
rural family backgrounds that were strongly influenced by local traditions. Thus, 
different trainees have different levels of acceptance, and experience different 
amounts of resistance to accepting and understanding new information on akidah. 
During my observations, a range of experiences were communicated by the 
murabbiyah and mutarabbiyah about their parents’ rejections of akidah. The parents 
regarded the akidah as too strict and rigid. However, some parents would gradually 
understand and come to accept the Liqo’s concept of ‘true’ akidah. Thus, these 
                                                 
223  Interviewed on 17/09/2012. 
224 Interviewed on 11/09/2012. 
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akidah lessons are also sometimes successful in ‘converting’ trainees’ parents as 
well.  
 
Liqo trainees, when they come to accept that ‘un-Islamic’ traditions have to be 
eliminated, not only reform themselves, but are also eager to change their families’ 
beliefs. Inviting other Muslims – especially one’s family – to reform themselves is a 
practice that is strongly encouraged by the mentors. Based on the observations and 
interviews, I concluded that this is a part of the Liqo’s dakwah strategy – to 
encourage students to go back to their families and advise them to do what the Liqo 
teaches. Moreover, this is also used as a strategy for encouraging new members to 
join the Liqo sessions, and a part of the more general dakwah strategy designed by 
the Tarbiyah to create preachers (da’i) who are able to conduct dakwah for everyone 
and everywhere. 
 
In addition to building Islamic personality or religiosity through right belief and 
practice, the main purpose of the Liqo and other Tarbiyah activities is to train 
individuals to provide dakwah – i.e. to tell other people about the Liqo’s 
interpretation of Islam. A female trainee (mutarabbiyah) who used to be a member 
of a Liqo group in the Kemanggisan area of Jakarta but moved to my Liqo group in 
Pondok Aren-Tangerang shared her dakwah experience as follows:  
 
I have been trying to remind them about this wrong tradition, because many 
of the village people are still my big family. Usually, after that, I leave them 
to think. I do not really care about their response. The most important thing 
for me is to do what I have to do, which is to give them true Islamic 
understandings [on such practices] (Retno, 30s, trainees, female, Jakarta).225 
 
                                                 
225 Interviewed on 13/10/2012. 
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6.6 Liqo women’s perceptions of Ibadah (Worship) 
Following akidah, the topic of ibadah (worship) was one of the next issues to be 
prioritised in the Liqo sessions.226 My research revealed that a strong emphasis is 
placed on embodied ritual activities within the Liqo community, with almost all the 
respondents (both female and male) that I worked with during my fieldwork citing 
ibadah as an important topic. A female mentor (mutarabbiyah) voiced her concerns 
as follows:  
 
The subject of ibadah in the Liqo is very crucial in order to remind Muslims 
about their obligations towards God, especially in [the] modern era. 
Sometimes we find a situation where we are very busy or [too] lazy to perform 
our daily ibadah, such as five-time obligatory prayers, reading the Qur’an, and 
the Tahajud prayer (Athya, 40s, mentor, female, Tangerang).227 
 
The variety of pious ritual activities or acts of worship in a Liqo group depends on 
the agreements made between the mentor and the trainees of each Liqo group. One 
Liqo group could pursue different types of ibadah acts or have different targets 
concerning the quantity of acts to perform in relation to another group. A Liqo 
trainee who works at Indonesia’s Ministry of Finance and has been a member of the 
Liqo for about seven years shared her experiences:    
 
In the beginning of each Liqo meeting, usually both mentors and trainees will 
discuss and decide together on how many and what kind of rituals … should 
be monitored through the evaluation sheet (sofhah mutaba'ah). For my current 
mentor and group, we have three key rituals to put in our sofhah mutaba'ah. 
The first is to pray voluntary, Dhuha; the second is to perform obligatory 
prayers (shalat wajib) in the mosque collectively (secara berjamaah); and the 
last is to read the Qur’an on an everyday basis so that one juz of the Qur’an 
can be finished in one month.228 Since all rituals are our own decision with the 
                                                 
226 Ibadah means ‘ritual’, and refers to the codified procedures that express human beings’ 
relationship with God. In Islam, Ibadah involves the profession of faith, prayer (shalat), fasting 
(shaum), the giving of alms (zakah), and pilgrimage (hajj) (Rippin, 2005). 
227 Interviewed on 22/10/2012. 
228 Juz (Arabic, plural: ajza) literally means ‘part’. The Qur’an is divided into thirty parts.  
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mentor, we do not need to have difficulty or burden in doing all of these 
activities (Miya, 30s, trainee, female, Tangerang).229 
 
Although the trainees have a chance to ‘negotiate’ concerning the rituals they 
perform, the Liqo does set certain requirements. For example, a young female 
mentor of a Liqo who taught a mixed group of junior and senior high school students 
explained: 
 
The standard of ibadah recommended and monitored by the Liqo is Monday 
and Thursday’s voluntary fasting (shaum sunnah), which is twice in a week, or 
it is also allowed [to be] the three days voluntary fasting in a month for those 
who have difficulty in performing two days fasting in a week.230 Another 
activity is reading one page of the Qur’an per day and doing the Dhuha prayer 
and the voluntary prayers before or after the five-time obligatory prayers 
(Thifa, 30s, mentor, female, Tangerang).231 
 
These ibadah activities – as interviewees stated and my observations attested – are 
fully planned and monitored through a regular review and evaluation sheet called 
sofhah mutaba’ah. This evaluation sheet is a way for mentors to keep track of their 
trainees’ performance, and the same evaluation sheet is provided for both male and 
female Liqo groups. It is designed to ensure that the objectives of the Liqo are 
achieved. For many of the trainees that I interacted with, both during and outside the 
Liqo sessions, the Liqo was seen as the place for training in a variety of ibadah. The 
greatest advantage they received was to improve the quality and routine of their 
ibadah. A neighbour of mine who had been a member of the Liqo for more than 
fifteen years acknowledged that she found herself “sometimes lazy for doing the 
daily rituals such as Tahajud prayer and reading al-Qur’an” (Athya, 40s, mentor, 
                                                 
229 Interviewed on 15/10/2012. 
230Shaum (Ar), puasa (Ind) is fasting or the abstention from all food, drink and sexual intercourse 
during daylight hours. There is an obligatory form of shaum, which includes fasting during Ramadan, 
and a non-obligatory form of shaum, which involves choices such as fasting on Mondays and 
Thursdays.   
231 Interviewed on 05/09/2012.  Shalat (Arabic and Indonesian) means ‘prayer’. The ritual required in 
Islam is that of five specific periods of prayer a day. 
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female, Tangerang).232 She thus saw it as a benefit to have her rituals checked by the 
mentors through the sofhah mutaba'ah.  
 
The sofhah mutaba'ah review system shows the extent to which the Liqo pays 
attention to the lesson of ibadah and its practice. This was evident in the advice that 
I witnessed the mentor of our group giving trainees concerning becoming 
accustomed to ritual practices, such as conducting prayers five times a day 
collectively at the mosques (as-sholat al-jama’ah fi al-masajid), performing 
voluntary prayers (as-sholat as-sunnah), reading the Qur’an (tilawah), and 
performing voluntary fasting (As-shaum as-sunnah). Under the mentors’ monitoring 
and the sofhah mutaba'ah system, a trainee who does not perform one of these 
rituals will likely feel shame in the presence of other more disciplined trainees.  
 
However, this monitoring system is perceived as a burden by some of the trainees. I 
met a former female trainee of the Liqo who was disappointed with this strict rule of 
ibadah, and quit the Liqo sessions, saying: “the ibadah that I must perform in a day 
is too many for me, because I need also to consider other work that I should fulfil to 
raise money for the family” (Fathya, 40s, Ex-trainees, female, Jakarta).233 
 
According to leaders of the Liqo-Tarbiyah, the objective of this lesson is to build an 
in-depth consciousness for practising ritual activities consistently and regularly. The 
movement wants to train all Liqo members to perform these rituals habitually and, in 
my experience, this was something most members embraced. According to one of 
the most influential leaders among the Tarbiyah community, the ‘notification’ 
                                                 
232Tahajud prayer is a voluntary nightly prayer that Muslims perform in addition to their five 
obligatory prayers.  
233 Interviewed twice on 28/10/2012 and 16/12/2012. 
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(taklimat) is given to all levels of the Liqo community – from its leaders, to its 
mentors, to its trainees – in order to make the rituals or acts of worship a habit. He 
provided the example below to make this clearer: 
 
[A] few days prior to the month of Dzulhijjah, the taklimat will be spread 
among the Liqo community asking them to struggle in ten days to finish 
reading all parts of the Al-Qur’an, to conduct the five daily prayers at the 
Mosques, and to perform the sacrifice (Qurban) [of] at least one buffalo 
(kerbau) for one family.234 This taklimat aims to [make] routines [of] these 
rituals among the community. For other Muslims, it is only mubah which is 
flexible – to be done or to be left.235 However, we want to practice these 
rituals because this is a good opportunity for us. Apart from Dzulhijjah’s 
rituals, we also recommend all of the members to fast in Yaum al-Arafah (the 
final day of hajj in Mecca) and to spread this habit to their surroundings 
(Ahmad, 60s, leader, male, Jakarta).236 
 
My interviews and observations revealed that Ibadah activities on a daily basis are 
regarded by the Liqo community as the symbol or indication of true Muslims. 
Ibadah activities are the genuine expression of their piety and obedience to God’s 
commands as individual Muslims. Moreover, these rituals represent the complete 
manifestation of the character of Islam for them, which needs to be adhered to and 
implemented by its followers. In other words, these rituals or acts of worship are 
regarded by the Tarbiyah movement as the key characteristics of pious Muslims. 
Thus, this analysis reveals that as well as matters of belief the Liqo aims to 
strengthen the Islamic identity of its trainees through improving individuals’ 
performance of religious rituals. Living in urban and modern society can cause 
Muslims to become less concerned with their daily ibadah, but tackling this is 
                                                 
234 Dzulhijjah is the last month in the Islamic calendar. The name of the month refers to the annual 
worship of Muslims ‘Hajj’ (pilgrimage).  
235 Mubah is an Arabic term that refers to an action that is neither recommended nor forbidden. It is, 
therefore, religiously neutral. 
236 Interviewed twice on 27/08/2012 and 17/10/2012. Al-Yaom al-Arafah (the day of Arafah) is the 
day of 9th Dzulhijjah, on which it is recommended that Muslims fast. 
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central for the Liqo, regardless of its trainees’ other commitments. This focus thus 
shows that the Liqo’s attempts to Islamise its trainees are largely successful. 
 
6.7 Liqo women’s reception of Adab (Islamic ethics) and Fiqh 
(Islamic jurisprudence) 
Issues regarding women’s dress and their role in public life are symbolically very 
important for Islamist movements (Mahmood, 2005; Rinaldo, 2013; Roald, 2001), 
with their primary concern being to ‘maintain’ the Islamic identity of women and 
their roles in the family and in society. This section examines these issues as they 
are taught in the weekly Liqo sessions.  
 
6.7.1 Muslim women’s dress 
The Liqo of the Tarbiyah movement/PKS is concerned with maintaining a 
traditional Islamic women’s dress code. Wearing the veil or headscarf together with 
proper clothes is seen as central for an Islamic dress code, and the topic is frequently 
talked about in the Liqo sessions. A mentor from a different Liqo group shared her 
first experience of wearing the veil and joining her Liqo group where she was 
trained in how to do this ‘properly’:  
 
My first experience … [of wearing] the veil and Muslimah [Muslim woman] 
clothes was when I entered the Nurul Fikri learning consultation centre. It 
was at my final year at the senior high school (Sekolah Menengah Atas-
SMA). All female students at the Nurul Fikri at that time were required to 
wear the veil. I never wore the veil before, so … I attended the Nurul Fikri’s 
session without the veil. When looking at me, my teacher said: “wearing the 
veil is not difficult and why you do not want to wear it?” Then, my classmate 
[at the Nurul Fikri] asked me to join the regular Liqo sessions. My first 
madah [lesson] I received from my first Liqo session was on Islamic 
obligations for Muslim women [kewajiban Muslimah], one of them is 
wearing the ‘long’ veil that extends over the breast and proper Muslimah 
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clothes. I felt afterwards that this is my first experience learning and 
knowing the true Islamic teachings (Rifa, 30s, mentor, female, Jakarta).237  
 
Rinaldo (2013) found that the majority of female activists who were influenced by 
Islamist ideas began wearing the jilbab or kerudung (headscarf) in high school or 
college when they joined Muslim student organisations. Female Liqo activists 
considered modest clothing for women (al-ziyy al-Islamy) to comprise wearing a 
‘complete’ dress that obscures the shape of their bodies from top to the bottom, and 
a veil to cover the hair and the breast. A female mentor who has been involved in the 
Liqo for more than thirteen years expressed her understanding of the full 
requirements of wearing Islamic modest dress as follows: 
 
Apart from the proper Muslimah clothes, we also wear socks. The socks are 
important for us because we tend to use the school of thought (madzhab) 
which says that we need to cover all required parts of the body (‘aurat) 
except the face and the edge of hand (telapak tangan).238 So we believe in 
this idea and hold firmly the concept of ‘aurat, which says that the foot is 
part of the [women’s] ‘aurat. We therefore wear socks to cover our feet. For 
us, the usage of socks is as important as the veil, so … we need to wear it in 
both formal and informal events. We also commonly wear ladies’ blouses 
(rok) but not trousers. Trousers are rarely worn by female Liqo activists. We 
believe that the trousers can shape some parts of our body. However, I see 
that these trousers can be worn as long as they are made from thick 
materials, [are] not transparent, and [do] not show off the shape of the foot 
(Rahima, 30s, mentor, female, Jakarta).239    
 
Her statement reflected the reality of my observations of the female Liqo group I 
attended, where all the Liqo trainees were instructed to cover their hair with the long 
veil and all their bodies with long clothes and heavy socks during the first Liqo 
session. 
 
                                                 
237 Interviewed on 05/09/2012. 
238‘Aurat (Ind; Awra-Arabic) implies that all parts of the woman’s body should be covered, with the 
exception of the face and the edge of the hand (telapak tangan). The madzhab that Rahima (30, 
trainee, Jakarta) refers to is Madzhab Hanbali.   
239 Interviewed on 04/09/2012. 
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In addition to covering the body and hair, the community also recommends that all 
women’s clothing should be symbolically different to that worn by men. A female 
trainee told me the following story during an interview again underlining how the 
women have to learn how to dress Islamically: 
 
One day, when I attended the first few Liqo sessions, I wore what I 
considered as Muslimah clothes – wearing the veil, a long modest top, and 
long jean trousers. When the Liqo mentor looked at me, she said harshly that 
women should never wear clothes that are similar to men’s [trousers] (Tania, 
30s, trainees, female, Depok).240 
 
Hence, it is unusual to see female Liqo activists wearing trousers, and one of the 
female interviewees commented, “we are mostly wearing Gamis (long clothes) in 
dark or soft colour” (Fadila, 30s, trainees, female, Jakarta).241 
 
The Liqo women’s adoption of this model of Islamic dress and veiling is promoted 
in both direct and indirect guidance from their mentors, as well as by senior Liqo 
members. The evidence for this direct guidance has been mentioned above, and I 
will now provide the evidence for the indirect guidance and precedents set by senior 
Liqo members. A former Liqo trainee recounted her experience about her mentor 
guiding her to a particular dress code as follows, something she was entirely open 
to: 
 
Based on my own experience, the clothing and the veil styles were naturally 
and gradually formed when I joined the Liqo. There was no direct instruction 
from my mentor to follow particular requirements. I think that the need to 
adapt [to] the new environment is the key thing that led me and my other 
Liqo friends at that time [to] following the clothing style of the previous 
activists and the mentor. We felt inconvenient to dress differently, so it was 
for me part of my adaptation (Rina, 40s, ex-trainee, female, Jakarta).242  
 
                                                 
240 Interviewed on 05/09/2012. 
241 Interviewed on 17/09/2012.  
242 Interviewed on 28/10/2012. 
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Rina’s experience was similar to experiences I had during the Liqo sessions I 
participated in. At the beginning of the Liqo, I tried to dress like other female Liqo 
activists that I knew. But the dress of the other members of my group was not 
exactly the same as what I chose. The veil that I wore was one that I am used to 
wearing (which was not as long as their veils), and my clothes were also a bit more 
colourful and modern in style compared to theirs. Although my mentor and my Liqo 
friends never commented on or complained about my dress, or my performance as a 
whole, I began to get the feeling that it was inappropriate for me to dress 'differently' 
than other members after the first few sessions (see Chapter 3). This feeling led me 
to adopt the same clothing styles as the other members of the group. This was my 
own decision, and represented part of my adaptation so that I could enjoy the Liqo 
sessions. However, evidence was provided in the form of trainees’ experiences in 
other Liqo groups that their mentors had given them particular guidance and 
recommendations regarding the proper clothing style to adopt so that they 
conformed willingly with the Liqo women’s community as a whole.   
 
Moreover, the dakwah manual discussed in Chapter 5 (the Manhaj Tarbiyah) also 
contained information about Liqo lessons, including the appropriate dress code for 
Muslim women, and its relation to ‘aurat: 
 
Islam obliges Muslim women to cover their ‘aurat. There is no distinction 
between covering the ‘aurat during prayers and during the interaction with 
people (Manhaj Tarbiyah, 2005:98).243 
 
These clothing styles are the most obvious visible characteristic of female Liqo 
activists in the Indonesian public sphere, and through my long interactions with 
                                                 
243 This lesson in the book explains the ‘aurat, clothing styles and colours based on shari’ah, and the 
impact that ignoring Islam’s teaching about covering their ‘aurat will have for women (Manhaj 
Tarbiyah, 2005:98). 
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them, as well as my observations of several events managed by these women, I 
noticed that this clothing style is used as one sign for identifying them as Liqo 
activists.244 
 
By dressing differently from Muslim women in general, female Liqo members often 
received negative responses from both close family such as parents, sisters, and 
brothers, as well as from their wider community, such as friends and neighbours. 
One senior female mentor (Athya, 40s) related her experience when her parents first 
saw her wearing her new clothing style as a Liqo trainee:  
 
My parents said to me that there is no need to wear such dress and a very 
long veil because we do not live in an Arab country. [They said] “Just wear 
the veil that is commonly worn by the mainstream Muslim women [in this 
country], it had already covered the hair”.  
 
Moreover, she reported receiving such a response from her neighbour as well. Both 
her parents and her neighbour reacted with an explicit dislike to her choice of dress. 
Athya (40s) commented on this reaction: “I thought that it was because I had 
changed my attitudes and clothes drastically”. A female trainee, Tika – who was in 
the same Liqo group as me and works in Jakarta – told me that she had been asked 
about her clothing several times by people she met in public places. They asked her: 
“What religious group did you join that required you to change your clothing 
style?”. She said that she was fully aware that such questions emerged because of 
her different dress code. Even though I have recently seen many Tarbiyah activists 
wearing such clothing, this style of dress is different from what other Muslim 
                                                 
244 This particular style of female Liqo activist is recognisable and obvious in the Indonesian public 
sphere. Overseas researchers that study Islamist movement are also familiar with this Liqo Islamic 
clothing. For example, Rachel Rinaldo (2008b) wrote an article about Muslim women activists in 
Indonesia, and described the female PKS (Liqo) activists as the women wearing a “uniform [of] long 
white jilbabs” and noted that these women are the most visible protesters [against the pornography 
bill in Indonesia] (Rinaldo, 2008a:8).  
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women wear in mainstream Islamic organisations such as the NU and 
Muhammadiyah. The stories from Athya and Tika are two of many instances of 
‘conversion’, as was explored in Chapter 5. They willingly changed their clothes 
along with their understanding and interpretation of Islam through the Liqo of the 
Jamaah Tarbiyah.    
 
Despite people responding suspiciously towards their dress choices, many activists 
maintain these dress codes, believing that they are obliged by Islam to do so. 
However, a number of female activists have recently stopped adhering to these strict 
dress styles. There has been a slight shift in terms of the colour and style of clothes, 
as a female Liqo activist who works at the state Islamic University notes: “nowadays 
we can easily find Tarbiyah activists wearing bright colourful dress and various 
clothes styles” (Fadila, 30s, trainees, female, Jakarta). According to one of my 
respondents, “Their change of style was affected by their understanding of the 
dakwah strategies (Fiqh ad-dakwah)” (Arif, 40s, mentor, male, Jakarta), that is, 
seeing value in appearing more ‘normal’ and ‘mainstream’ as opposed to ‘set 
apart’.245  
 
The Liqo community has linked the issue of the dress choices of Muslim women to 
the idea of how Islam respects women. A Liqo mentor voiced her experience of this 
as follows: 
 
[After attending the Liqo], I [was] amazed how Islam teaches and honours its 
female followers by asking them to wear the proper and modest Islamic 
dress. I understand that many women are being harassed due to their careless 
and laziness to wear such Islamic clothes. This obligation is given to Muslim 
women in order to be respected (Athya, 40s, mentor, female, Tangerang).246  
                                                 
245 Interviewed on 18/10/2012. 
246 Interviewed on 22/10/2012. 
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This point of view, which has spread among female Liqo activists, has led them to 
criticise the women’s liberation movement – both in Indonesia and in other parts of 
the Muslim world – for being part of the project of ghazwul fikri. That is, they see it 
as a Western strategy for undermining Muslims (see Chapter 4).247  
 
6.7.2. Women’s roles in the private and public spheres 
In addition to the discourse on women’s dress that is outlined above, the Liqo 
community is also very concerned with the issue of women’s private and public 
roles. I observed that there is a greater emphasis on women’s roles in domestic areas 
rather than in the public sphere. The community believes that Islam emphasises the 
importance of women performing a domestic role, and the Liqo sessions thus trains 
these women to have a good Islamic personality, practice and knowledge with which 
to educate their families and bring up their children.  
 
During my informal conversations with the female Liqo activists, I frequently heard 
them use the sayings ‘al-ummu huwa al-madrasat al-ula’ (the mother is the first 
school [for their children]) and ‘al-marah hiya al-madrasah al-ula’ (the woman is 
the first school [for their children]). Both statements were frequently used when they 
were talking about their families and their children, and the challenges they faced in 
raising them. They explained that every Muslim woman has a responsibility to raise 
their children and family in accordance with Islamic teachings, arguing that the 
future of Muslim children is in the hands of their mothers. According to Tania, a 
female trainee from a different Liqo group, her mentor always reminds all the 
                                                 
247 See Haddad (1991), who explains that this liberation issue is one of the identifiable elements of 
the discourse on women among revivalist or Islamist movements throughout the world. 
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trainees in the group that this domestic task involves the struggle for Allah’s 
blessing and rewards, which are greater than the rewards they will receive from 
having a position involving a public role. 
 
The Tarbiyah movement is, however, aware of the necessity for Muslim women to 
have public roles because of their dakwah strategies in the public sphere (see 
Chapter 1). Various dakwah activities of the Tarbiyah movement have led female 
activists to participate in Islamising the Indonesian society and the state. Their view 
is in line with the theological bases for the participation of Muslim women in public 
roles through dakwah (Mahmood, 2005), and they believe that the religious task for 
‘commanding right (amar ma’ruf) and forbidding wrong (nahi munkar)’ is given to 
both men and women. My observations, however, suggest that their dakwah roles 
are mostly conducted with other women within their own groups and other women’s 
groups in the wider society.  
 
The Liqo movement urges its female activists to take part in other public roles, as I 
found in my interviews with the female Liqo activists and my observations of the 
Liqo sessions. One of the trainees, a young mother from Depok, reported: 
 
My mentor really motivated us [the Liqo trainees] to get involved in our 
society. The activities are not only restricted to dakwah but also to the 
party’s programmes. For instance, we are requested to help our neighbour 
and to perform our dakwah duty to the closest society (Tania, 30s, trainee, 
female, Depok). 248 
 
As a result of such motivation and encouragement, a number of female Liqo activists 
are active in the political arena, and have been appointed as legislative members, 
policy makers, and to other public roles. Their participation in the public arena is in 
                                                 
248 Interviewed on 05/09/2012. 
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line with Rinaldo’s (2008) view of Islamic revivalism as a phenomenon that can 
contribute to new forms of women’s agency in the Indonesian public sphere.   
 
However, the public role for women promoted by the Liqo community is 
nonetheless subsidiary to male control, particularly women’s subordination to their 
husbands. As one of my female interviewees noted, there are several limits and 
requirements that need to be kept in mind when a woman wants to enter the public 
sphere: 
 
If we go out from home, for either dakwah or other activities, we must get our 
husband’s permission. This is related to [the] husband’s responsibility if … 
something happens to us. The mentor always reminds us that [the] husband is 
a family leader who has the right to say what he allows or forbids to his wife 
(Saida, 30s, trainee, female, Jakarta).249  
 
This indicates that the Liqo community's view concerning women is relatively 
conservative in that they still adopt a traditional Islamic interpretation under which 
men are leaders of women, and women’s power is subordinate to men's. Permata 
supports this interpretation, arguing that ‘the Liqo-Jamaah Tarbiyah holds a 
misogynistic gender conception in which men are superior to women’ (2013: 262). 
Azyumardi Azra,250 one of the scholars I interviewed in his office (the Postgraduate 
School of the Jakarta State Islamic University), highlighted the fact that although the 
Liqo is progressive in terms of the motivation and encouragement it gives to women 
in relation to taking part in public roles, it also teaches its members to practice a 
                                                 
249 Interviewed on 03/10/2012. 
250Azyumardi Azra is a professor in History and was the rector of IAIN (the Jakarta State Islamic 
Institute), with Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta-Indonesia (1998-2006), taking over again as director of 
the Postgraduate School in 2006. He is one of the most productive writers on Indonesian Islam, and is 
an active intellectual in both national and international forums. The interview was held on 19 
November 2012 in his office in Jakarta.  
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very rigid religious life, particularly in terms of the relationships between men and 
women:  
 
I call them Islamic Neo-conservatives. The neo-conservatism maybe did not 
fit into the overall aspects of PKS [Liqo community] because we can see that 
[the] women of [the] PKS are actively involved in the political arena, such as 
in the parliament as legislative members. But, they are practicing very strict 
and rigid family life. For instance, if a man comes to one of the PKS family 
[homes], he will be welcomed and served a cup of tea only by the husband. 
The wife will stay behind and there is no need to welcome the guest. This 
practice is, of course, [a great] contrast compared to the Muhammadiyah and 
NU [conception of the] family (Azra, male, public scholar, Jakarta).251  
 
Azra’s point of view is in line with what I saw in the day-to-day life of the 
community. This was also confirmed by information provided by a female 
interviewee from a different Liqo group in Pondok Aren-Tangerang, who explained 
to me what she heard from her mentor regarding the requirement for women’s 
participation in public activities: 
 
There is a regulation for being an active Muslim woman in [the] public 
sphere. For instance, we are not allowed to shake hands with men. We are 
also taught not to speak with them without any purpose (sekedar menyapa) 
and not to look into their eyes based on the concept of Ghaddul bashar.252 
From the Liqo, I understand that there is a restriction in the interaction 
between men and women (Athya, 40s, mentor, female, Tangerang).253      
 
Thus, although the Tarbiyah movement / PKS has numerous female activists with 
high levels of education, the concept of women's ‘aurat and their roles tend to 
prevent them from being (fully) involved in public roles. This confirms Permata’s 
(2013) findings – although the Tarbiyah / PKS movement provides opportunities for 
women to participate in the party and public positions, the movement or the party in 
                                                 
251 Interviewed on 19/11/2012. 
252 See chapter 5.2 on ghaddul bashar. 
253 Interviewed on 22/10/2012. 
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fact limits female members’ roles in the public sphere, especially within political 
arenas.254 
 
6.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the extent to which female members at the lower level of 
the Liqo experience and receive dakwah subjects designed and disseminated by 
Tarbiyah leaders. Particular attention has been given to the Liqo group that I 
participated in for four months. I focused on mentors and trainees’ stories about their 
lived religious experiences of joining the Liqo and receiving its lessons.  
 
I found that while the lived experiences of female Liqo members are of course 
heterogeneous and complex, and not always entirely in accordance with the official 
discourse of the Tarbiyah leaders’, overall, through their pious lived religion and 
everyday cultivation of right belief and practice, they reproduced the movement’s 
ideology to a greater or lesser extent (cf. Mahmood 2005). Their motivations for 
joining the Liqo are principally to improve their religiosity as the leaders hope and 
expect. But this is a process they have to actively negotiate in the course of their 
developing engagement with the movement. Also, other significant reasons for 
members joining these groups include expanding their social networks (finding new 
friends), strengthening existing friendships, though they may also be obeying their 
husbands. In Islamist and other social movements, informal networks are a resource 
for extending discipline into private and personal lives.  The organization’s 
explanations about the ‘deviation’ of klenik rituals like sesajen (foods provided for 
                                                 
254 Permata (2013) reveals that although women in the PKS hold positions within the organisational 
structure, and there is a separate division for women to deal specifically with issues regarding 
women’s rights, status and empowerment, they only received three seats in parliament out of the 
fifty-seven held by the party during 2009–2014.  
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God) from the true akidah are generally accepted. However, there is also some 
empathy for family members associated with this ‘cultural ignorance’. 
 
The members of the group that I participated in were generally young, professional, 
educated Muslim women living in modern urban society. They still had family in 
rural areas, were upwardly mobile, and wanted to do the right thing in religious 
terms as well as to be respectable. However, as suggested in Chapter 5, they and 
others like them were not primarily drawn to the Liqo by concerns for public 
dakwah, as the formal movement’s leaders increasingly expect them to be. 
Receiving support from the helpful and reliable people in their networks was rather  
more important. The range of motivations and interpretations that the Liqo women 
have in joining and experiencing the Liqo reflects their ‘lived religion’. Their ‘lived’ 
religion is centrally defined in terms of their own agency and choices to have more 
organized and ordered Islamic beliefs and practice within the setting of the Liqo of 
the Tarbiyah movement. In this context, the lived religion of women in the Liqo is 
very different from the ‘pick and mix’ lived religion of women studied by McGuire 
(2008). Lived Islam and official Islam are quite intimately interconnected in the 
same way that Mahmood (2005) talks about tradition being reproduced 
performatively. 
 
Even though the lived religion and experiences of these members indicate the 
complexity of their engagement with the Liqo, the lessons given in the weekly 
sessions are relatively effective in transmitting and reproducing the official 
discourse of its leaders. These lessons not only improve their knowledge of Islam, 
but do also forge a common Islamic cultural and political identity among the 
members. The lessons emphasising particular perspectives and practices regarding 
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ghazwul fikri (ideological conquest), akidah (faith), ibadah (acts of worship), and 
issues regarding women’s rights, roles, statuses etc are designed to create piety, 
obedience, and commitment in the Liqo members. Their repeated bodily practices in 
terms of dress, prayer and so on ultimately create the disposition to receive the pious 
ideology of the original Tarbiyah movement. Similar to the women studied by 
Mahmood (2005), it is the pious everyday and embodied performance of the lessons 
learned in the Liqo that is crucial to the reproduction of the movement. At the same 
time as reproducing common symbolic expressions unifying the Liqo community 
and differentiating it from other religious communities within the Indonesian public 
sphere, the women of the Liqo also take an active role in making, re-making and 
giving expression to their own distinctive Islamic self-identities. 
 
Through the weekly training lessons, the Liqo aims to introduce a common set of 
shared Islamic norms, which include all aspects of life (such as beliefs, worship, 
family lifestyles, women’s dress codes, and social interactions). In theory, these 
represent a distinctive form of Islamic ‘totalism’ that is widely adopted by modern 
Islamists. Indeed, the Liqo provides its trainees with a regular and monitored form of 
training that creates the framework for them but they themselves actively negotiate 
and apply all these aspects of Islam in their everyday lives. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis is the first ethnographic study of a contemporary Islamist group in 
Indonesia to focus on the Liqo of the Tarbiyah movement. It has investigated the 
private and public dakwah of the movement within the changing religious, social, 
economic, and political context of Indonesia since its emergence in 1983. Particular 
attention has been given to analysing the movement’s official discourse and the 
lived experiences of its members. These two related elements are analysed with the 
help of aspects of social movement theory (SMT) (Wiktorowicz 2004; Fox 2012) 
and the concept of lived religion (McGuire 2008; cf. Mahmood 2005). SMT is 
concerned with how movements like the Tarbiyah movement/PKS identify social 
problems, articulate their response in terms of goals for societal change, and 
mobilize their constituencies based on formal/informal networks, as well as how 
they take advantage of changing political opportunities. Lived religion is a concept 
which has enabled me to give more attention than SMT typically allows to the 
everyday lived experiences of members of Islamist movements (cf. Tuğal, 2009).  
 
The use of ideas associated with SMT and lived religion in framing the Indonesian 
Tarbiyah movement is novel because these theories have not been used together 
before in previous studies. In the key chapters of this thesis, I focus on three main 
arguments: i) that the gradual transition of the Tarbiyah movement from a politically 
repressed network of religious purists in the 1970-80s into a fully-fledged dakwah 
political party (the Prosperous Justice Party/Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS) was 
the outcome of new ‘political opportunities’ which emerged during a period of 
democratisation 1990-97 (Chapter 4); ii) that the movement’s weekly Liqo 
illuminates both the synergies and tensions between official, top-down framing by 
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increasingly formal, outward-looking and pragmatic PKS leaders and the more 
informal and more conservative networks, the latter remaining a key resource for 
mobilisation (Chapter 5); and, finally, that the lived experiences of female trainees 
in the Liqo suggest that this is a space where Tarbiyah movement/PKS norms 
norms, lifestyles and dispositions are more or less successfully taught, learned and 
reproduced principally through the disciplined and repeated performances of 
embodied piety (Chapter 6). 
 
My study has demonstrated, in the first instance, the continuing importance that 
conducting public dakwah has for the PKS, whose focus is on a more active 
(sometimes aggressive) and powerful form of dakwah.  They are inspired by dakwah 
in the early period of Islamic history, but they developed it in responding to new 
social, political, economic and cultural contexts. As I explained in Chapter 1, 
although Islamists in the modern age use the history of dakwah of the Prophet and 
the early generations of Muslims as a key reference point, they have developed a 
new significance for the concept (cf. Hirschkind 2006). They began to pay more 
attention to its public ideological form as a way of combating the influence of 
Western modernity, which restructured Muslim societies and led to the absence of 
Islam from the public sphere (Salvatore, 1997). In a clearly delineated programme of 
stages, they have tried to Islamise society and the state beginning with the individual 
and building up cadres through ‘family’ cells, flexibly exploiting conducive political 
conditions as and when opportunities arise.  
 
The relation of Islam or shari’ah and the state as one of the key issues of modernity 
in Muslim countries became the impetus crystalizing Islamist ideology within 
Islamic movements, especially among the Islamic reformists. As I showed in 
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Chapter 2, the relationship between Islam and the state has continued to be one of 
the most important issues for ‘Islamists’ in Indonesia. From the time of the Old 
Order (Orde Lama, 1950-1965) to the New Order (Orde Baru, 1966-1998) 
government they remain committed to applying shari’ah in the public sphere. Thus, 
the application of shari’ah – the formalisation of shari’ah (formalisasi syariat) – in 
Indonesia, has indeed become the main dakwah message of the ‘Islamists’. 
Oppression under Dutch colonial government encouraged Islamic leaders at the 
beginning of the 20th century to establish organisations such as the first ‘Islamist’ 
political party – Sarekat Islam (1911–1929) to campaign for national independence 
and Masyumi in 1945 to respond to the modernisation programmes of the secular-
nationalist government. However, influenced by the wider global Islamist movement 
including the MB, contemporary Islamism in Indonesia emerged only at the 
beginning of the 1980s. Islamists in this period limited their focus to private dakwah 
due to the repressive nature of the New Order government. They were forbidden 
from conducting their dakwah publicly as the government regarded Islamism as a 
threat to the Indonesian nation-state. However, by the end of the 1980s, Islamist 
organisations started to have more access to ‘public’ spaces because the government 
sought their political support and legitimation to ‘protect’ itself from ideological and 
military threats. Since 1998 and the period of democratic transition, a variety of 
Islamic organisations – especially Islamist dakwah movements – have had the 
opportunity to conduct public dakwah, participate in mainstream politics and so to 
‘Islamise’ culture, society and to some extent the nation-state.  
 
In Chapter 3 I reflected on the methodological issues emerging from the process of 
researching the Tarbiyah movement in Jakarta during 2012–13. This chapter set out 
the methodological tools that would be used for collecting the data for my 
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ethnographic accounts in Chapters 4–6 and reflected upon the challenges I faced and 
lessons I learned.  I discussed: 1) research process and methods, 2) data collection 
techniques, 3) ethical issues, 4) researcher subjectivity and positionality, and 5) data 
analysis and interpretation. I explained that Jakarta is the capital city of Indonesia 
and was chosen as my fieldwork site as the birth-place of both the Tarbiyah 
movement and the PKS. The members of the Tarbiyah movement, the majority of 
whom are neo-urban, well-educated, young professionals, were easy to meet in 
Jakarta. I interviewed 45 respondents from the top, middle and lower levels of the 
Tarbiyah movement and conducted observations of their dakwah activities through 
their Liqo and dawrah sessions. 
 
In Chapter 4 I advanced a detailed analysis of the changing political opportunities 
for the Tarbiyah movement in Indonesia. Due to the ‘New Order’ government’s 
repressive approach to Islamic movements with political interests, the Tarbiyah 
activists limited the scope of their activities away from wider audiences for most of 
the 1980s, focusing on campaigning informally for individual piety in terms of their 
dakwah. However, the shift of the (‘New Order’) government’s political attitude in 
the 1990s, which was welcomed by Islamic movements, encouraged the Tarbiyah 
movement to expand their dakwah scope and audience, although it was still mainly 
orientated towards individual piety. The shift of the regime from the ‘New Order’ to 
the ‘Reform’ government in 1998 brought with it a new, more democratising 
political system, which was seen by the Tarbiyah movement as a good opportunity 
to establish a formal political party named the Justice Party (PK) or Prosperous 
Justice Party (PKS). They argued publicly that there should be no separation 
between dakwah and politics but sought to expand their dakwah, Islamisation and 
the party’s influence by placing their cadres in public and state institutions. Today, 
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the private and public dakwah agendas of the movement and party co-exist in a 
complex relationship, with tensions having existed between leaders and members 
further down the hierarchy since 1998. 
 
As I argued in Chapter 5, the official structure and recruitment system associated 
with the Liqo became more formalised and political with the emergence of the PKS. 
The Tarbiyah movement was transformed to focus in a new way on the creation of 
public piety. The drive to promote dakwah messages to Indonesian society as a 
whole built ‘a mutual relationship’ between the Liqo-Tarbiyah community and the 
PKS. From the point of view of the leaders of the party (or the movement), the 
informal networks of the Liqo significantly contribute to the growth in PKS cadres 
and is a major resource for mobilisation of the dakwah party. The senior members 
also believe that the more formal political networks of the PKS enables the Liqo to 
expand its more informal dakwah network through various activities. For the cadres 
at the middle and lower levels of the movement, however – especially those at the 
grassroots level – the party has compromised their ‘pure’ dakwah ideologies and 
orientations (private dakwah) through its increasingly pragmatic focus on political 
interests and strategies (public dakwah). This recalls Wiktorowicz’s (2006) 
distinction (and tensions) between (Salafi) ‘politicos’ and ‘purists’. For instance, in 
the Liqo, I saw how the trainees expressed their ‘disappointment’ at being required 
to participate in the ‘grassroots’ election campaigning process. This turned them into 
‘human resources’ who devoted their time to simple practical tasks for the party 
(such as handing out pamphlets), rather than the lessons of the Liqo. At the other end 
of the spectrum, I saw how genuinely excited the leaders were in contesting 
elections.  
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Although (like the literature) the official discourses of the Tarbiyah movement have 
often been dominated by the public dakwah agenda of the PKS, the lived religious 
experiences of female members of the Liqo, as shown in Chapter 6, still tend to 
emphasise personal piety and religiosity. While this may in part reflect a patriarchal 
division of labour in the movement, I argue that the Liqo is a space where movement 
norms, lifestyles and dispositions are successfully taught learned and reproduced 
through women’s agency, most especially in terms of the disciplined, embodied and 
repeated ‘performances’ of individual piety (cf. Mahmood 2005). Thus, my overall 
argument is that official and lived religion are structurally and analytically 
distinguishable but remain intimately connected. 
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List of abbreviations 
BMKI: Bina Masjid Kampus Indonesia or Indonesia Campus Mosques Supervision 
BPUPKI: Badan Penyelidik Usaha-usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia or the 
Investigating Body for the Preparation for Indonesian Independence   
BPK (PKS): Badan Pembinaan Kader or the Council of Cadres Training 
BPU (PKS): Badan Pembinaan Umat or the Council of Umat Training  
DDII: Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia or Indonesian Islamic Dakwah 
Assembly 
DI: Darul Islam or the House of Islam.  
DPP (PKS): Dewan Pengurus Pusat or Central Board or the National Headquarters 
DPR: Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or People Representative Council 
DSP (PKS): Dewan Syariah Pusat or Shari’ah Council 
FIS: The Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria 
FKAWJ: Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jama’ah or The Communication 
Forum of Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jama’ah 
FPI: Front Pembela Islam or Islamic Defender Front 
GOLKAR: Golongan Karya or The Party of the Functional Groups 
HMI: Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam or Indonesian Students Muslim Association 
HTI: Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia 
ICMI: Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia or Indonesian Intellectual Muslim 
Association 
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IPB: Institut Pertanian Bogor or Bogor Institute of Agriculture 
ITB: Institut Teknologi Bandung or Bandung Institute of Technology 
ITS: Institut Teknologi Sepuluh November or the Sepuluh November Institute of 
Technology 
JI: Jama’at Islami 
JI: Jamaah Islamiyah 
JIL: Jaringan Islam Liberal or Islamic Liberal Network 
KAMMI: Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia or Indonesian Muslim 
Student Action Union  
KISDI: Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam or the Indonesian 
Committee for Solidarity of the Islamic World 
KKN: Korupsi, Kolusi, dan Nepotisme or Corruption, Nepotism and Collusion 
KPK: Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi or the Corruption Eradication Commission 
LDII: Lembaga Dakwah Islam Indonesia or the Institution of Islamic Da’wa of 
Indonesia 
LDK: Lembaga Dakwah Kampus or Campus Dakwah Union 
LDS: Lembaga Dakwah Sekolah or School Dakwah Union  
LMD: Latihan Mujahid Dakwah or Dakwah Trainings for Dakwah Fighters 
LIPIA: Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam or Arab or Institute for Islamic 
Knowledge and Arabic 
Masyumi: Majlis Syura Muslimin Indonesia or the Consultative Council of 
Indonesian Muslims 
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MB: Muslim Brotherhood  
MMI: Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia or the Indonesian Council of Jihad/Fighters 
Movement  
MPP (PKS): Majlis Pertimbangan Partai or Party’s Consultative Council 
NII: Negara Islam Indonesia or Indonesia Islamic State 
NKK: Normalisasi Kehidupan Campus/ Normalisation of Campus Life 
NU: Nahdlatul Ulama or Renaissance of Islamic Scholars 
OTB/OBT: Organisasi Tanpa Bentuk/Organisasi Bawah Tanah or Organization 
without Form/Underground Organization  
PAN: Partai Amanat Nasional or Party of National Mandate  
PBB: Partai Bulan Bintang or Party of Moon and Crescent  
PDIP: Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan or the Indonesian Democratic Party-
Struggle 
PDS: Partai Damai Sejahtera or Party of Prosperity and Peace.  
PERSIS: Persatuan Islam or Islamic Union 
PII: Pelajar Islam Indonesia or Indonesian Muslim Pupils  
PK: Partai Keadilan or Justice Party  
PKI: Partai Komunis Indonesia or the Indonesian Communist Party 
PNI: Partai Nasional Indonesia or the Indonesian National Party 
PKB: Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa or Party of National Renaissance  
PKS: Partai Keadilan Sejahtera or the Prosperous and Justice Party 
PMI: Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Parmusi) or Indonesia Muslims’ Party  
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PMII: Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia or Indonesia Islamic Students 
PPP: Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or Unity and Development Party 
SDI: Sarekat Dagang Islam or the Islamic Trading Association 
SDIT (PKS): Sekolah Dasar Islam Terpadu or the Integrated Islamic Primary 
School 
SI: Sarekat Islam  
SMA: Sekolah Menengah Atas or Senior High School 
SMS: Short Messages Services 
UGM: Universitas Gadjah Madah or Gadjah Madah University  
UHAMKA: Universitas Muhammadiyah Prof. Dr. HAMKA or the University of 
Muhammadiyah of Prof. Dr. HAMKA 
UI: Universitas Indonesia or University of Indonesia  
UNAIR: Universitas Airlangga or Airlangga University 
UOIF: The Union des Organisations Islamiques de France  
UUD: Undang Undang Dasar or Indonesia Constitution 
WAMY: The World Assembly of Muslim Youth 
WMY: The Muslim World League 
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Notes on Transliterations 
For the transliteration of terms, words and phrases in Arabic, I have adapted the 
style used in a variety of international journals on Islamic Studies or Religious 
Studies and the book A Popular Dictionary of Islam (1992), written by Ian Richard 
Netton. I have used them as simply as possible to prevent any confusion. The only 
attempt to Arabicise the transliteration in the text itself, however, is the presence of 
the left facing apostrophe (’) referring to the letter ‘ayn (ع - e.g. bid’ah, mu’assasi 
and shari’ah). Other letters such as ث – th (hadith), ذ – dh (dhikr); and ش – sh 
(shaykh) have been used as counterparts in English in this way.  
 
For Indonesian versions of religious terms originally coming from Arabic, such as 
dakwah, liqo, halaqah, tawhid, akidah and ibadah, etc., I prefer to use them as they 
are used in Indonesia in everyday speech, unless when they are used in direct 
quotations from the literature. Regarding the pluralising of these terms, I use Arabic 
plural forms such as ulama and fatawa.  
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Glossary 
Below is a glossary of the words in Arabic (Ar) and Indonesian (Ind) that appear in 
my thesis.  
Abangan (Ind): A ‘nominal’ Muslim in dominant discourse. Syncretic Javanese 
culture; its beliefs and practices combine Hindu-Buddhist, Animistic-
Javanese, and Muslim elements. 
Adab (Ar): A word with a wide variety of meanings, such as ‘culture’ and ‘good-
manners’. The Basic Arabic root indicates the possession or refinement of 
good habits bequeathed down the ages. 
Adat (Ind): Customary law. 
Ahl al-bayt (Ar): The family of the Prophet. 
Akhawat (Ind, from Ar): Sisters. 
Akhlaq (Ar, sing. Khulq or khuluq): Morals, ethics, virtues.  
Akidah (Ind, from Ar. ‘Aqida. Pl. ‘aqaid): Doctrine, dogma, faith, belief, creed. 
 Al-‘am al-intikhabi (Ar): The election period. 
Al-Khulafa al-Rashidun (Ar): The Rightly Guided Caliphs. 
Al-Qur’an (Ar): Often spelled in English as Koran. Literally this word means: 
‘Recitation’. The Qur’an is Islam’s holiest book, being the uncreated word of 
God revealed through Jibril (Angel Gabriel) to the Prophet Muhammad. 
Al-Wafd (Ar): Delegation Party in Egypt. 
Al-ziyy al-Islami (Ar): Islamic modest clothing for women. 
Amanah (Ind): Trust. 
Amar Ma’ruf Nahi Munkar (Ind, from Ar. Amr bi al-Ma’ruf wa Nahy ‘an al-
Munkar): Enjoining good and preventing evil. 
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Al-Sabiqun al-Awwalun (Ar): Used by the Tarbiyah leaders to refer to the first 
generation of the Liqo activists. 
Aurat (Ind, from Ar. Awra): Implies all parts of the women’s body that should be 
covered with the exception of the face and the edge of hand (telapak 
tangan). 
Bahasa (Ind): The Indonesian language. 
Baraka (Ar): Blessing. It is a quality possessed especially by holy people in Islam, 
who can impart it to others. Baraka may also be attached to places and 
objects. 
Bayanat (Ar): Explanation.   
Benih-benih kehanifan’ (Ind): The seeds of the straight path to Islam. 
Bid’ah (Ind. From Ar Bid’a): Literally, ‘innovation’. Its proper opposite is sunna. 
However, in popular speech, bid’a has come to indicate ‘heresy’.  
Churafat or Khurafat (Ind. from Ar. al-Khurafah): Similar practices to 
‘superstition’. 
Da’i (Ar. plural du’at): ‘Caller’ (i.e. to Islam), propagandist, one who preaches a 
(sometimes esoteric) missionary movement’s summons or calls. 
Da’iya (Ind, from Ar. plural da’iyat): Used to refer to a female preacher or religious 
teacher. 
Dakwah (Ind. from Ar, da’wa plural da’awat): Call, invitation, preaching, mission, 
dialogue.  
Dawrah (Ar): Name for a religious circle conducted by the Tarbiyah movement. 
Dewan Shura (Ind, used interchangeably [Ar] Majlis Shura): Consultative 
Assembly.  
Din wa daulah (Ar): Religion and State. 
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Dhikr (Ar) or Zikr (in Egyptian Colloquial Arabic): Literally, remembrance, 
recollection, mention.  
Dhu’l-Hijja (Ar): The month of Hajj (pilgrimage), which is the last month of the 
Islamic calendar.  
Duhr (Ar): Morning voluntary prayer. 
Fardhiyah (Ar. al-Farziyyah): Personal, individual. 
Fatwa (Ar. Pl. al-Fatawa): A technical term used in Islamic law to indicate a formal 
legal judgement or view. 
Fiqh (Ind and Ar): In its technical sense, the word means ‘Islamic Jurisprudence’. 
Originally the word meant ‘understanding’ or ‘knowledge’. 
Fiqh al-dakwah (Ar): Used by the Tarbiyah movement to refer to the strategy of the 
dakwah. 
Gamis (Ind, from Ar. Qamis): Long clothes origanating from Arab usually worn by 
female Muslims and also known as tunic.  
Ghazwul fikri (Ar): ideological conquest; cultural imperialism.  
Hadith (Ar, plural ahadith): This Arabic word has a large number of meanings, 
including ‘speech’, ‘report’ and ‘narrative’. It also has the very important 
specialist sense of tradition, i.e. a record of the sayings and doings of the 
prophet Muhammad and his companions, and as such is regarded by 
Muslims as a source of Islamic law, dogma and ritual, second only in 
importance to the Qur’an itself.  
Haditsul Khamis (Ar): ‘Thursday talk’, a learning activity among the Tarbiyah/PKS 
activists held every Thursday afternoon. 
Hajj (Ar): Pilgrimage. This is the one of the five Arkan or pillars of Islam. All 
Muslims, provided that a number of conditions, including good health and 
financial ability are present, have a duty to make a pilgrimage to Mecca at 
least once in their lifetimes. 
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Hakimiyyah (Ar): Sovereignty.  
Halal (Ar): Allowable. 
Halaqah (Ind, from Ar. Halqa, pl. halaqat): Study circle.  
Haq (Ind, from Ar. al-Haqq): The truth/Divine Truth. This is a word of immense 
significance in the intellectual and linguistic development of Islam. Haqq can 
be both a noun and an adjective, meaning ‘truth’ and ‘rightness’ and also 
‘true’, ‘right’ and ‘correct’.  
Haram (Ar): Prohibited. 
Hijab (Ar, pl. hujub): Veil. Worn by many Muslim women out of modesty, the veil 
is also a striking symbol of pride in being a Muslim, which many younger 
Muslims, as well as the older generation, are pleased to wear (contrary to 
popular belief). 
Hijrah (Ar, al-hijra): The Migration – specifically in Islamic religious history, the 
migration or emigration of the Prophet Muhammad from Mecca to Medina 
in AD 622, which became Year 1 of the Muslim lunar calendar.  
Hizb (Ar. al-Hizb): The party, group. 
Hizbut Tahrir (Ar. al-Hizb al-Tahrir): A trans-national movement founded by 
Taqiuddin an-Nabhani in Palestine in 1953. 
Ibadah (Ind, from Ar. ibada, pl. ‘ibadat): Worship, devotional action or observance 
required by the Islamic faith, e.g. salat.  
Ijtihad (Ar): In jurisprudence this term means ‘the exercise of independent 
judgement’ unfettered by case law or past precedent.  
Ikhlas (Ind, from Ar): Sincerity.  
Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Ar): Muslim Brotherhood founded by Hasan al-Banna in 
Egypt in 1928.  
Imam (Ind, from Ar): Leader of prayer.  
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Irsyad al-mujtama’ (Ar): Educating the society.  
Itqan (Ar): Well-structured and professional. 
Ittijah fiqh (Ar): Fiqh guidance. 
Jahiliyya (Ar): State of ignorance. The Arabic word is used to designate the pre-
Islamic period.  
Jama’ah Tarbiyah (Ind, from Ar. al-Jama’ah at-Tarbiyyah): The education 
community. 
Jihad: (Ind, from Ar. al-Jihad): Strife, Struggle. 
Jizya (Ar): Poll tax imposed in mediaeval times on non-Muslims who were Ahl al-
Kitab in areas ruled by Muslims.  
Juz (Ar, pl. ajza): Literally meaning ‘part’. The Qur’an is divided into thirty parts 
(30 Juz).  
Ka’ba (Ar): Literally ‘cube’. It is in Mecca, is a cube-shaped building within the 
precincts of the Great Mosque of Mecca. 
Kafah (Ar. al-Kaffah): Total and comprehensive. 
Kerudung or Jilbab (Ind): Headscarves for Muslim women. 
Khalifa (Ar, pl. Khulafa): Caliph, Head of the Islamic Community. 
Khilafah: (Ar. al-Khilafah): Caliphate.  
Khilafiyah (Ar. al-Khilafiyyah): Disputes concerning religious matters. 
Khutbah (Ind, from Ar. khutba, pl. khutab): Sermons, address; in particular the 
sermon delivered during the Friday prayer in the mosque.  
Klenik (Ind): Javanese mysticism. 
Kufr (Ar): Infidelity, unbelief, atheism. 
Lauk pauk (Ind): Side dishes that should be provided with main foods for sesajen. 
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Liqo (Ind, from Ar. Liqo): Small religious training session conducted on a weekly 
basis by the Tarbiyah movement. 
Ma’alim fi al-Tariq (Ar): Means ‘Milestones’, and refers to a book written by 
Sayyid Qutb and published in 1964. 
Mabit (Ind, from Ar): Staying overnight for religious purposes, a training of the 
Tarbiyah movement. 
Madah (Ar): Lessons [refers to lessons delivered in the weekly Liqo of the 
Tarbiyah].  
Madrasah (Ind. From Ar, madrasa pl. madaris): School, college or place of 
education, often linked to, or associated with, a mosque. The madrasa was a 
primary focus for the study of the Islamic sciences. 
Majelis Taklim (Ind): Pengajian (religious lecture). 
Makam leluhur (Ind): An ancestral grave.  
Manhaj Tarbiyah (Ar): The Tarbiyah’s manual book of their dakwah activities. 
Markaz Dakwah (Ind. from Ar. al-Markaz al-Dakwah): Centre of dakwah, refers to 
the building of the Headquarters of the PKS in Jakarta. 
Maslahat Dakwah (Ar. Maslahah al-Dakwah): Benefit of the common good for 
dakwah. 
Mazhab (Ar. al-Madhhab, pl. madhahib): This Arabic word has a range of 
meanings, including ‘ideology’, ‘doctrine’, ‘creed’, and ‘movement’. In Fiqh 
it indicates one of the four major schools of law. 
Melingkar (Ind): Sitting within a religious circle or Liqo. 
Mihwar (Ar. al-Mihwar): Stage. 
Mihwar al-dauli (Ar): a state institutional phase. 
Mihwar mu’assasi (Ar): Political penetration phase. 
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Mihwar tanzimi (Ar): The formation period. 
Minhajul Hayah (Ar. Al-Minhaj al-Hayah): Way of life. 
Mu’amalah (Ind, from Ar): Social interaction (see under ‘ibada). 
Mu’assasi (Ar. al-Mu’assasy): ‘Political period’. 
Mualim (Ar. al-Mu’allim): Teacher. 
Mubadzir (Ar): Superfluous food or waste of food – something forbidden in Islam. 
Mubah (Ar): Refers to an action neither recommended nor forbidden (by Islam). It 
is religiously neutral. 
Muballigh (Ind, from Ar): Preacher.  
Muhammadiyah: A modernist group association influenced by the ideas of 
Muhammad Abduh, founded in Yogyakarta in 1912 by Ahmad Dahlan. 
Mukhayam (Ar. al-mukhayyam): Camp. 
Murabbi (Ar. al-Murabb): Male trainer or mentor of the Liqo of the Tarbiyah 
movement. 
Murabbiyah (Ar. al-Murabbiyat): Female trainer or mentor of the Liqo of the 
Tarbiyah movement. 
Mushalla (Ar. al-Mushalla): A place for prayer. 
Musholla (Ind, from Ar): Small mosque, a place for prayer. 
Muslimah (Ind): Female Muslim. 
Musyarakah (Ar. al-Musharakah): Cooperation, coalition. 
Mutarabbi (Ar. al-Mutarabb): Male trainee of the Liqo of the Tarbiyah movement. 
Mutarabbiyah (Ar. al-Mutarabbiyah): Female trainee of the Liqo of the Tarbiyah 
movement. 
Mu'tazila (Ar): Literally, ‘seceders’.  
306 
 
Nadwah (Ar. al-Nadwah): Seminar. 
Nashr al-dakwah (Ar): Refers to a department for the spreading of Islam in the 
structure of MB in Qutb’s period. 
Nizam al-usra (Ar): The family system.  
Nizham Islami (Ar. al-Nizam al-Islamiy): The Islamic system. 
Pengajian (Ind): Religious learning or lecturing groups such as Majelis Taklim. 
Pesantren (Ind): Islamic boarding schools. 
Piagam Jakarta (Ind): The Jakarta Charter. 
Piagam Madinah (Ind): The Medina Charter – an agreement between Muslims and 
non-Muslims in Medina under the rule of the Prophet Muhammad. 
Pilkada (Ind): A local election. 
Priyayi (Ind): A Javanese aristocrat. 
Qada (Ar): Divine decree, divine judgment, divine will, or the function of God as 
judge. 
Qadar (Ar): Often translated as ‘destiny’, ‘fate’, ‘divine predestination’, ‘divine 
determination’ – qadar specifically is the divine application of qa’da in time, 
according to the most widespread interpretations.  
Qiyadah (Ar): Refers to the Tarbiyah or PKS leaders.  
Qurban (Ar): To perform the sacrifice required by Islam.  
Rabthul ‘am (Ar, al- Rabth al ‘am): Public ties – part of dakwah strategy conducted 
by the Tarbiyah/PKS. 
Rihlah (Ar): Recreation – part of a dakwah activity conducted by the Tarbiyah 
movement. 
Sadaqah (Ind, from Ar. sadaqa, pl. sadaqat): Voluntary almsgiving.  
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Sahaba (Ar, sing. sahib): Companions, i.e. the Prophet Muhammad. The word is 
used variously to denote both the Prophet’s close friends and associates, and, 
more loosely, anyone who saw the Prophet while the latter was alive. 
Salafi (Ar. al-Salaf): Old, ancient. A movement that claims to follow the teachings 
of salafus salih. 
Salafiyatul akidah (Ar): The belief of the Salaf people, the early pious companions. 
Salafus Salih (Ar. al-Salaf al-Salih): The virtuous companions of the Prophet 
Muhammad. It refers to three generations of Muslim after the death of the 
Prophet Muhammad, companions (Sahabah), their followers (Tabi’un), and 
the follower’s followers (Tabi’ at-Tabi’un) 
Santri (Ind): A devout Muslim. 
Sesajen (Ind): Foods provided for God. A local tradition in which people should 
bring foods to accompany their ‘rituals’ or traditions.  
Shahadat (Ind, from Ar. Shahada): Profession of faith.  
Shahadatain (Ar): The two phrases of the testimony of faith in Islam. 
Shalat (Ind, from Ar. al-Salah): Ritual prayers. Five specific periods of prayer a day 
is the ritual required in Islam. 
Shalat Sunnah (Ind, from Ar. as-shalat as-sunnah): Voluntary prayers.  
Shalat wajib (Ind, from Ar. as-shalat al-wajib): Obligatory prayers.  
Shari’ah (Ar): The Islamic law. 
Shaum (Ar): Fasting or the abstention from all food and drink as well as sexual 
intercourse during daylight hours. 
Shaum Sunnah (Ind, from Ar As-shaum as-sunnah): Voluntary fasting or non-
obligatory fasting, such as fasting on Monday and Thursday.   
Shaum wajib (Ind, from Ar As-shaum as-wajib): Obligatory fasting such as 
Ramadan fasting. 
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Shaykh (Ar, pl. shuyukh): Old man, chief – title of respect for Islamic religious 
leader, tribal head, master of sufi order. 
Shaykh-murid (Ar): Refers to teacher-pupil in Sufi networks. 
Shi'a (Ar): Party, i.e. of ‘Ali b. Abi Thalib – those who follow and accept the claims 
of ‘Ali b. Abi Thalib. 
Shura (Ar): Consultation, consultative body, council. 
Sirah (Ind, Ar. Sira): Biography, particularly that of the Prophet Muhammad.  
Sofhah mutaba'ah (Ar): The evaluation sheet used to ‘monitor’ or to check list 
ritual performances of the Liqo trainees of the Tarbiyah movement. 
Sya’bi (Ar. al-Sha’biy): Society, community or socialisation. 
Tabi’ at-tabi’in (Ar): The Muslims generation after the Tabi’in. 
Tabi’un (Ar, sing. tabi’): Followers – the next generation after the sahaba or 
companions (who actually knew the Prophet Muhammad).  
Tadzkirah (Ar): Reminder. 
Tafsir (Ar, pl. Tafasir): Exegesis, interpretation, commentary, especially relating to 
the Qur’an. 
Tahajud (Ar): A voluntary night prayer done by Muslims apart from their five 
obligatory prayers. 
Tahlilan (Ind): Recitation of the creed, La ilaha Illa Allah (There is no god but 
God), at ceremonies to commemorate the dead. 
Takhayul (Ind): Superstition. 
Taklimat (Ar): Notification. 
Tamayuz (Ar): The distinctiveness of Tarbiyah’s characteristics.  
Tandzim nukhbawi (Ar): Cadre organisation. 
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Tanzim (Ar. al-Tanzim): Organisation. 
Tarbiyah (Ind, from Ar al-Tarbiyyah): Education or training model of Jamaah 
Tarbiyah.  
Tariqa (Ar, Plural Turuq): The word is very frequently used to designate a sufi 
order. 
Tasawwuf (Ar. al-Tasawwuf): Islamic mysticism. 
Taushiyah (Ar): Religious advices.  
Tawhid (Ar): Declaration of the oneness. Belief in that Oneness or Unity, 
monotheism. This is one of the most fundamental Islamic doctrines.  
Tilawah (Ar): Reading the Qur’an. 
Tsawabit (Ar): The unchangeable aspect [of akidah]. 
Ukhuwah (Ar. al-Ukhuwwah): Brotherhood. 
Ulama (Ar) (sing. ‘alim): Religious scholars, jurists (loosely), learned men, imams, 
judges and similar people. 
Umma (Ar): Community, people, nation.  
Ushul Fiqh (Ar. al-‘Usul al-Fiqh): Jurisprudential basis. 
Usrah (Ar. al-Usrah): Family. 
Ustadz (Ar): Teacher. 
Wahabi: A movement influenced by Muhammad Abd al-Wahab in Saudi Arabia. 
Wirid (Ind, from Ar. al-Aurad): Set of prayer formula recited regularly. It is also 
called wadzifah. 
Yaum al-Arafah (Ar, means the day of Arafa): The final day of hajj in Mecca or the 
day of 9th Dzulhijjah, where Muslims were recommended to fast. 
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Zakat (Ar): Often transliterated Zakah (plural. Zakawat) – obligatory alms tax which 
constitutes one of the five pillars of Islam.  
Zulmun’adimun or zalalun ba’idun (Ar): ‘Huge or grievous crime’ performed by 
believers of Islam. 
 
311 
 
 
Appendix A: Participant Information Sheet 
Participant Information Sheet 
(22 May 2012) 
Title of the Research Project:  
Islamic Preaching (dakwah) in Contemporary Indonesia; A Study of the Dakwah 
Movement of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). 
 
1. Invitation 
You are being invited to take part in a research project about the dakwah 
(Islamic preaching) movement of the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai 
Keadilan Sejahtera/ PKS). My name is Ai Fatimah Nur Fuad, currently a 
Ph.D student in Religion and Public Life at the University of Leeds. My 
Ph.D is funded by the ministry of education of Indonesia (DIKTI 
scholarship). I am a lecturer at the University of Muhammadiyah of 
HAMKA (UHAMKA) in Jakarta. I have also graduated from Al-Azhar 
University in Cairo-Egypt (Lc.), University of Indonesia (M.Si) in Jakarta 
and University of Leeds (MA) in England. My academic background and my 
research interests are Islamic studies specifically concerned with Islamic 
movements.   
 
Before you decide whether to participate it is important to understand why 
the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take the time to 
read the following carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Ask me if 
there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. 
Take the time to decide whether or not you wish to take part.  
Thank you for reading this sheet.     
 
2. What is the project’s purpose? 
The aim of this project is to analyse a case study of the dakwah as performed 
and developed by the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan 
Sejahtera/PKS) in Indonesia. Several aspects to explore are: the meanings of 
dakwah and its significance for the PKS, the nature and objectives of the 
PKS dakwah, and the development of the concepts and practices of the PKS 
dakwah. 
          
I want to research this topic because I have been focusing my study on 
various Islamic organizations for about ten years. My focus, however, relied 
mostly on literature. Therefore, my current concern is to understand the PKS 
dakwah in terms of both its literature and its practices. Apart from that, I 
have been involved in delivering dakwah materials in my campus, in some 
Islamic organizations and in my neighbourhood for many years. In the 
future, I will continue to pay attention to dakwah in these places and wider 
Indonesian society. These factors all led me to study various dakwah 
movements, including the PKS dakwah. 
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3. Why have I been chosen? 
You have been chosen as the dakwah mentors and trainees/students who are 
actively involved in the dakwah movements of the party. You have been 
approached also as the leaders of the party, intellectuals and officials who are 
concerned with the Indonesian Islamic dakwah movements in general and 
the dakwah of the PKS in particular.  
You are also being invited to participate because you live in the selected 
regions in Indonesia; Jakarta, Bekasi and Depok. It is your own experiences 
in your own words that the project is most concerned to document. 
 
4. Do I have to take part? 
It is entirely up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you decide to 
take part you will be given this information sheet to keep. You will also be 
asked to sign a general consent form.  
 
N.B. You can withdraw from the research at any time and you do not have to 
give a reason. 
  
5. What do I have to do? 
You will be asked to give one continuous interview at an agreed time and 
date to me as the project researcher in a relaxed, quiet place, and free from 
background noise. The place you decide to conduct the interview will be 
mutually agreed. The interview will last about 1 to 1,5 hours. The researcher 
would ideally like to record your answers to various questions on a MP3 or a 
voice recorder. It is also possible for me just to listen or to take some key 
notes from your answers.  
 
Some questions require only short factual responses concerning your 
background, while others are intended to allow you to give more in-depth 
accounts of personal experiences when involved in dakwah activities of the 
PKS. The personal experiences may be explored on several levels such as on 
the religious topics discussed in the dakwah meetings, the reference books of 
dakwah, the websites/bulletins which are used to support the dissemination 
of dakwah messages, the advantages of being involved in dakwah activities 
and so on.  
 
6. What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
Whilst there are no immediate benefits for those people participating in the 
project, it is expected that this work will improve the knowledge of 
Indonesian Muslims on the developments and the shifts of Islamic preaching 
movements in the global Muslim society, especially in Indonesia.   
 
7. Will my taking part in this project be kept confidential?  
My research will carefully protect the anonymity and confidentiality of all 
participants and their data. The access to the information collected from you 
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will be restricted to me and my supervisor. I will store, protect and destroy 
the data I have gathered appropriately.  
 
8. Will I be recorded, and how will the recorded media be used? 
Your permission will be requested to make a MP3/voice recording of your 
interview. The anonymised recordings will be used only for analysis and for 
illustration in conferences or presentations. No other use will be made of 
them without your written permission, and no one outside the project will be 
allowed to access the original recordings. 
  
9. What will happen to the result of the research project? 
The final outputs of the research will be my Ph.D thesis and probably a book 
or a journal article.  
 
10. Who is organising and funding the research? 
This is my Ph. D research funded by the Ministry of Education of Indonesia 
(DIKTI scholarships).  
 
11. Contact for further information 
Ai Fatimah Nur Fuad 
Ph.D Student in Religion and Public Life  
Theology and Religious Studies, School of Humanities, The University of 
Leeds,  
The United Kingdom, LS2 9JT. 
Email address: tr08afnf@leeds.ac.uk 
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Appendix B: Participant Consent Form 
Title of Research Project: Islamic Preaching (dakwah) in Contemporary Indonesia; 
a Study of the dakwah Movement of the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan 
Sejahtera/PKS) 
Name of Researcher: Ai Fatimah Nur Fuad 
Initial the box if you agree with the statement to the left 
1 I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet 
dated [22 Mei 2012] explaining the above research project and I 
have had the opportunity to ask questions about the project. 
 
2 I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time without giving any reason and without there 
being any negative consequences. In addition, should I not wish to 
answer any particular question or questions, I am free to decline (If 
you want to withdraw, please contact the researcher through email; 
tr08afnf@leeds.ac.uk). 
 
3 I understand that my responses will be kept confidential. I 
understand that my name will not be linked with the research 
materials, and I will not be identified or identifiable in the report or 
reports that result from the research.  
 
4 I agree for the data collected from me to be used in future research. 
I agree to give my permission to the researcher to record audio 
voices during the interview and use accordingly as mentioned in 
the information sheet.  
 
5 I agree to take part in the above research project and will inform 
the principal investigator should my contact details change. 
 
 
 
______________________ ________________         ____________________ 
Name of participant             Date                              Signature 
(or legal representative) 
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_______________________ ________________         ____________________ 
 Lead researcher             Date                              Signature 
To be signed and dated in presence of the participant 
 
Copies: 
Once this has been signed by all parties the participant should receive a copy of the 
signed and dated participant consent form, the letter/pre-written script/information 
sheet and any other written information provided to the participants. A copy of the 
signed and dated consent form should be kept with the project’s main documents 
which must be kept in a secure location.  
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Appendix C: Interviewees Information 
Anonymised signifiers for interviewees and date(s) interviewed: 
A. Leaders (top rank of the movement) 
1. Ahmad: 60s, leader, male, Jakarta. 27/08/2012 and 17/10/2012. 
2. Noura: 50s, leader, female, Jakarta. 18/10/2012. 
3. Fatih, 50s, leader, male, Jakarta. 21/11/2012. 
4. Salim: 50s, leader, male, Jakarta. 09/10/2012. 
5. Nadia: 40s, leader, female, Jakarta. 19/10/2012 
6. Abdullah: 40s, leader, male, Jakarta. 09/10/2012. 
7. Arif: 40s, leader and mentor, male, Jakarta. 18/10/2012. 
8. Iffah: 40s, leader, female, Bogor. 20/12/2012. 
9. Hafidz: 60s, male, Jakarta.15/08/2012. 
10. Muhammad: 30s, young leader, male, Bekasi. 08/09/2012. 
 
B. Mentors or trainers (middle rank of the movement) 
1. Darmanto: 30s, senior mentor, male, Jakarta. 04/09/2012. 
2. Rahima: 30s, mentor, female, Jakarta. 04/09/2012.  
3. Aliyah: 40s, mentor, female, Jakarta. 23/09/2012. 
4. Ranti: 40s, mentor, female, Tangerang.14/10/2012. 
5. Athya: 40s, mentor, female, Tangerang. 22/10/2012. 
6. Ridho: 40s, senior mentor, male, Bekasi. 17/10/2012.   
7. Siti: 30s, mentor, female, Jakarta. 28/10/2012. 
8. Rania: 30s, mentor, female, Jakarta.  07/09/2012 and 23/09/2012. 
9. Rifa: 30s, mentor, female, Jakarta. 05/09/2012. 
10. Thifa: 30s, mentor, female, Tangerang. 05/09/2012. 
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11. Arifin: 40s, mentor, male, Jakarta. 14/10/2012.  
12. Emma: 40s, mentor, female, Jakarta. 19/11/2012. 
 
C. Trainees and ex-trainees (lower level of the movement) 
1. Miya: 30s, trainee, female, Tangerang. 15/10/2012.  
2. Tika: 40s, trainee, female, Jakarta, 07/10/2012.  
3. Fadila: 30s, trainee, female, Jakarta. 17/09/2012.  
4. Nabila: 30s, trainee, female, Jakarta. 11/09/2012.  
5. Nabil: 40s, trainee, male, Jakarta.  23/09/2012.  
6. Nisya: 30s, trainee, female, Jakarta. 03/08/2012.  
7. Nuriyah: 30s, trainee, female, Bekasi. 08/09/2012. 
8. Retno, 30s, trainee, female, Jakarta. 13/10/2012.  
9. Tania: 30s, trainee, female, Depok. 05/09/2012.  
10. Mona: 30s, trainee, female, Tangerang.16/12/2012.  
11. Rina: 40s, trainee, female, Jakarta. 28/10/2012.  
12. Saida, 30s, trainee, female, Jakarta. 03/10/2012.  
 
D. Ex-trainees 
1. Fathya: 40s, Ex-trainee, female, Jakarta. 28/10/2012 and 16/12/2012.  
2. Laila: 30s, Ex-trainee, female, Jakarta. 14/12/2012.  
 
E. Tarbiyah/PKS and non-Tarbiyah/PKS scholars/activists 
1. Prof. Dr. Azyumardi Azra, 50s, male, Jakarta. 19/11/2012. 
2. Dr. Yon Machmudi, 40s, male, Depok. 03/08/2012 and 01/09/2012. 
3. Rahim, 60s, male, Jakarta. 06/11/2012. 
4. Zubaidah, 40s, female, Jakarta. 24/09/2012.  
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5. Fachrudin, 40s, male, Jakarta. 08/11/2012.  
6. Masdar, 40s, male, Jakarta. 12/11/2012.  
7. Muiz, 50s, male, Jakarta. 12/11/2012.  
8. Najih, 30s, male, Jakarta. 18/12/2012.  
9. Mulyo, 40s, male, Jakarta. 18/10/2012.  
 
Note: Two public figures are not anonymised because they are public scholars and 
also because their books are used as references in this thesis.  
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Appendix D: Permission Letter submitted to DPP-PKS 
Jakarta, 10 Agustus 2012 
Perihal : Pengantar penelitian mengenai Dakwah gerakan Tarbiyah/PKS di 
Indonesia  
Lampiran:  
- Lembar keterangan mengenai penelitian,  
- Surat persetujuan dari University of Leeds 
- Surat pengantar dari pembimbing Disertasi S3. 
Kepada Yang Terhormat, 
Pengurus DPP Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS)   
di 
Tempat  
Assalamu ‘alaikum warahmatullahi wabarakatuh, 
Semoga surat ini menjumpai bapak dan ibu seluruh pengurus PKS dalam keadaan 
sehat wal’afiyat dan selalu dalam lindungan-Nya. 
Bersama surat ini, saya bermaksud memberitahukan penelitian saya mengenai 
“Gerakan Dakwah di Indonesia; Kajian mengenai Dakwah PKS”. Penelitian saya 
lebih memperhatikan aspek dakwah dari PKS, baik yang terkait dengan dakwah 
internal yaitu Liqo/kaderisasi ataupun dakwah eksternal dalam bentuk tarbiyatul 
ummat. Metode penelitian yang saya ambil selain meneliti dokumen/buku/arsip 
terkait dakwah adalah melalui wawancara dan observasi langsung pengajian/dakwah 
PKS, terutama di wilayah Jakarta dan Tanggerang.  
Penelitian ini dilakukan dalam rangka menyelesaikan disertasi S3 saya di University 
of Leeds, Inggris. Saya akan sangat bergembira dan berterimakasih bila mendapat 
dukungan dari pengurus yang membidangi bagian dakwah di PKS dalam membantu 
saya, baik untuk mengakses dokumen-dokumen atau arsip-arsip partai yang terkait 
kebijakan dakwah, dalam menghadiri kegiatan2 dakwah, dan dalam melaksanakan 
wawancara.  
Berikut adalah data lengkap saya: 
Nama    : Hj. Ai Fatimah Nur Fuad, Lc., MA. 
Tempat, Tanggal Lahir : Ciamis, 5 Agustus 1976  
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Program/Universitas   : Ph.D/ University of Leeds, Inggris 
Alamat rumah di Jakarta : Jl. H. Syatiri no.21 Ulujami Kebayoran Baru 
Jakarta Selatan, 12250 
 Demikian pengantar dan permohonan dukungan terkait penelitian saya 
mengenai Dakwah PKS.   
Terimakasih atas perhatian bapak/Ibu dan seluruh pengurus DPP PKS. 
Wassalamu’alaikum warahmatullahi wabarakatuh, 
Jakarta, 10 September 2012 
 
 
Hj. Ai Fatimah Nur Fuad, Lc., MA. 
 
 
